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THE DUPLICITY OF DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY

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There is one point in the philosophy of democracy that I venture to believe has not had the recognition which it merits and I would therefore make it the subject of this paper.

Of course basal to all democracy has been the idea of equality. Since the contract philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not to go farther back in history and not to mention other contributors even of that time or of later times to the philosophy of democracy, equality has been, to all intents and purposes, a dogma of democracy. Also, as is natural in all dogmatism, there has been a strong disposition to forget that terms, as they actually come into use, must be relative to certain conditions, applying only to a certain context and above all not applying or at least not necessarily applying universally and exhaustively to all the facts and conditions, to the things actual and the things possible, in human life. To take any term in positive use as exhaustive and absolute, thus abstracting it from its context, is to be blind to some important implication of its use and so to some important element of its actual and living meaning at the time and place of its rise.

Even equality, then, must be a relative term. To take it generally or abstrusely, as so often it has been taken, is to betray its

origin in vital human experience and accordingly in just so far to render it impracticable and so to cause the democratic movement inspired by it, as well as the special end or purpose which that movement must be supposed to imply, to be seriously misunderstood and retarded. Indeed, from such abstruseness, whatever violence and instability may ensue, there can come only a virtual conservatism of life. Conservatism and its delays, of course, are often of advantage, but the immediate point is that, while startling changes may ensue, substantial progress cannot come until the inspiring ideas are mindful of their origin and loyal to it. That the democratic movement, when it rises, must imply some purpose, must itself be a means to some end and not just an end in itself, goes almost if not quite without saying, I think; unless, forsooth, democracy be quite unique among the really good things of the earth, being not good for something but good only for itself, good absolutely and intrinsically. The necessary relativity, the only contextual meaning, of democratic equality and this purposive or mediative and instrumental value of democracy go together.

Let me illustrate, although now on very broad lines. There can be little doubt, I think, that those contract philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in their democratic intent were specifically anti-militaristic. Their call for equality, too, met the military monarchy of the time, which virtually when not openly claimed divine sanction, most squarely; meeting it, in other words, in kind by insisting that God himself had created all men free and equal. The equality called for, however, was no abstractly general one, but was grounded in just those rights, natural rights so called, which militarism most obviously had been interfering with, namely, life and liberty of person and the safe possession of property. In the minds of both the philosophers of the time and their readers the military monarchies with traditions rooted even in the Roman Empire gave definite meaning and point and in particular gave polemical animus to the terms, however seemingly abstract, which were employed; nor, the issue being then so much a matter of course, should one expect much attention at the time to definition or limitation of the terms. Contexts, that is, the specific historical settings that define terms in use, commonly are not seen so clearly

at the time of the terms' rise as afterward. The outcry of revolution in France, "Liberty, Fraternity, Equality," affords a notable example of this.

But, those philosophies of democracy being thus anti-militaristic in their call for equal rights, what was the specific purpose which such democracy was intended to serve? Historically the answer is quite easy. Anti-militarism or rather the peculiar democracy which, if I may use an algebraic term, would "satisfy" anti-militarism, was to be established in order that there might be opportunity for the new life, the new kind of life, then setting in and already demanding fair recognition. I mean, of course, the life of commerce and industry. Leveling men democratically with respect to all military aggressiveness, undoing the traditional military aristocracy, was the way or the instrument, the means, by which industrialism was to come to its own. One aristocracy, depending, as I would suggest, on might and a mighty God, was to be leveled, all men being recognized as henceforth equally mighty kings by divine right, and with such leveling and the consequent check put upon the militarism was to be replaced by another and higher aristocracy, dependent on reason and a rational, a lawful and mechanical nature, to the high estate and large opportunity of which even God—witness the changes in theological doctrine—as well as man was to be raised. So was democracy to be, just what in the recent centuries I believe it to have been, the mediator, or say the agent of the transition, between a passing and a rising, a lower and a higher, aristocracy.

Nor must the passing of the earlier aristocracy be supposed for a moment to be only negative—in the sense of the new wholly replacing the old. Probably no one would so misunderstand what I have said, but all possibility of misunderstanding must be avoided here. Moreover, the positive way in which the old persists in the new is interesting in itself. Thus the change is an evolutionary, not a revolutionary, one. Industrialism is not and has not been the mere supplanting of militarism, but (*a*) its control, its being made a matter of life to self, as we say of a child learning to read to self and as we can directly see in so-called armed neutrality, and then also (*b*) its positive mediation, its employment of force and mechanical

contrivance turning from exploitation of human beings, their bodies and their personal interests, to exploitation of natural or physical forces and resources. Thus, as to this mediation, when nowadays one views the turning of some great labor-saving or, more generally, human-nature-saving machine, contrasting it with the movement of that other machine, an army, to which human flesh and human feeling have been so often sacrificed, one must exclaim, as one appreciates the great control and the mediation which history has been bringing about: "Force and system henceforth for man; no longer man for force and system! Behold! The soldier, not has given way before, but himself has grown to, the mechanic, becoming himself the humanly free, skilful user of force and system." Again, industrialism is not militarism supplanted, but militarism, its might and its system or organization, made only mediate to human life, or say also—if I may hope to be understood—militarism vicarious in the natural environment, militarism dehumanized and objectified.¹ Such a change, man coming freely to use the very force and system that once bound and used him at an almost incalculable cost of efficiency, is, then, the positive side of the passing of militarism and it results, as was suggested, from the acquired self-control, from man's learning to be military to himself. Only as one recognizes this positive side, I must insist, can one really appreciate how an anti-militaristic democracy is mediator between a military and an industrial aristocracy, and in a later paragraph there will be occasion for further reference to this meaning of self-control as in general bringing free use or mediation rather than suppression; but sufficient now is the specific instance that our own historic anti-militaristic democracy has been serving to dehumanize militarism and its mechanicalism and so to bring them to a free and an efficient service of human life. The increase in efficiency, I suggest, is proportional to the dehumanization and objectification.

¹And I would suggest, in a note, that as militarism passes into industrialism, becoming mediate, being dehumanized and objectified, even so at the same time in the intellectual sphere legalism, the natural rational life of militarism, becomes objectively rationalistic, being freed from the prejudice of human interest and institution, and so gives way to, or grows into, mathematics and mathematicalism, the natural rational life of industrialism.

Now history affords a second illustration of the rôle of democracy as a mediator. Thus, to go back to earlier times in the Christian era, even the Roman and mediaeval military aristocracy had and needed its own peculiar democratic foundation. Both church and state had their parts in that militarism, and in maintenance of it both relied on a certain and specific democracy. Both had to proceed on an assumption of equality among men and, what is more, consciously to recognize this equality. True, their equality was spiritual; it was not in terms of rights involving positive worldly relations, like those of life, liberty, and property; but their spiritual equality was just the sort that made a military aristocracy, an aristocracy of might and a mighty God, possible. Physical or military equality, equality with a certain natural and earthly content, leveling men in actual earthly conditions and relations, was indeed to come later and was, as pointed out here, to make modern industrial aristocracy, an aristocracy of reason and machinery, possible; but in those earlier days of Christendom's history, democracy, waiting as it had to on achievement, on the acquisition of earthly content for its equality, could be little more than a spiritual principle. All that such a principle of equality required of men as earthly beings in the beginning, when its great office was to mediate between the passing pagan civilizations and the rising Christian civilization, was what, among other things, the pagan philosophies, namely, the Stoic's apathy, the Skeptic's forgetfulness of reality, even the Epicurean's *carpe diem* superiority to death or to fate in any form, had been training them to. By those philosophies and the general atmosphere which they both expressed and helped to strengthen the Mediterranean peoples were taught to give up their cherished pasts, in a splendid self-control resigning themselves to whatever the course of history might bring, and in the democratic leveling, to which through such earthly self-denial they were brought, Roman militarism had its peculiar opportunity. Both the Roman law, moreover, and the Roman religion recognized the spiritual equality of men and only with the progress of life, the years and the centuries passing, did such equality, at first so empty of earthly conditions and relations, acquire—even through the very achievements of militarism itself—concrete embodiment, the earthly rights of life

and liberty and property being finally *won* as "natural rights." When the aristocracy of might, made possible by spiritual equality, had thus achieved these rights, it gave way to the higher aristocracy of reason.

And by way of a third illustration, there are those, I cannot refrain from adding, who are disposed to think—of course in their more optimistic moods—that our present industrial aristocracy of reason must some day give way to something still higher. After its competitive life of cold rationalistic calculation and physically mechanical skill, which in spite of its being still hampered by military methods and ideas has accomplished so much especially in the last century and has also spread the benefits and opportunities of its accomplishments so widely among men, a new democracy, even an anti-industrial democracy, ought to be possible. On the equality of such a democracy, furthermore, a new aristocracy, for which I am at loss for a name, unless we may call it, in witness to its super-rational character, an aristocracy of the will, the inventive and the creative will, could then be established. So some men nowadays do, or at least in justification of what they seem to believe, might reason, and *sotto voce*, among other possible signs of the change they see or imagine, I suspect feminism ought not to be overlooked by any would-be prophet. Also the prophet should not overlook pragmatism, Bergsonism, and any other of the many irrationalisms or superrationalisms of the day on this side or the other of Christendom's ocean. Even a certain orientalism may be a significant factor.

As to what "natural rights" would properly be claimed by an anti-industrialistic democracy we may not say, at least not very glibly. Life, liberty, and property are at the tip of nearly everybody's tongue, but what would be the new rights? In spite of the difficulty I suggest: Instead of mere life, useful occupation or work; instead of mere liberty of person, the freedom of an educated skill; and instead of safety in the possession of property or in the special pursuit of happiness which such safety enables, the unhampered opportunity of using and enjoying the present highly developed machinery of social life. Say, concisely, work, and education, and commerce. Of course such rights, however "natural," would still

carry responsibilities, large responsibilities, but I only call attention to this fact. I do so, however, with emphasis, lest someone be tempted to pervert and misapply my suggestion that work and education and commercial facility are natural rights. Contrary to what many have at least seemed to believe, the more *natural* rights are, the more certain and the more vital are the pertaining responsibilities. Although not discussing the responsibilities pertaining to these new rights, I cannot help wondering and asking my readers to wonder at the possible results, should a democracy based upon them ever be well established. Suppose men were equal with respect to them instead of just with respect to life, liberty, and the safe enjoyment of property. Suppose, men being thus equal, the activities possible under the condition of industrial inequality were put under efficient control, being henceforth of the nature of activities to self, and so in the changed life of men a condition analogous to that of a military armed neutrality and of the positive mediation growing out of the neutrality were brought about. Then this question: Would the new life, made possible by such new self-control, be as great an advance in quality and in efficiency over industrialism as industrialism itself has been over militarism? The question has somehow asked itself and it is certainly an interesting speculation, but I offer no answer here. Some may still hold that industrialism and its reign of routine, of reason, and machinery are the last word of civilization.

Do I seem to have digressed somewhat? Possibly I have; but, be it hoped, not seriously. Still, possibilities of present and future aside, with such illustration as has now been given from actual history it seems fair to conclude at least that any movement for leveling mankind, the equality required being necessarily only contextual, must mean the developed or developing interest in some new type of action, evolutionary in character rather than revolutionary, and the disposition accordingly to live under some new system of values. At risk of mere repetition, the democratic cry for equality at any time must refer to fairly well-established conditions, to a traditional type of life, the opportunity of which has been widely and generally realized by mankind, and furthermore it must imply that its demanded equality is for the sake of the freer development

of some new action and valuation. Possibly the hackneyed phrase "equality of opportunity" tells the whole story, but I am not aware that this phrase has usually been definitely understood to mean what I would now take it to mean and what the illustrations from history would seem to make it mean—democracy on one level, the level of the traditional conduct of life, the possibilities of achievement in which have been largely if not wholly exhausted; in the service of opportunity without the restraints of democracy on some higher level, the level of life under some new vision, *the possibilities of which have still to be worked out*. Always with respect to the lower level men can afford to cry; indeed, if there is to be any real advance, they can hardly afford not to cry: "Long live democracy!" But for the higher level, until once more possibilities which are still latent have been fully exploited and their realization widely distributed among men, this must be the cry: "Let the best win and to the winners the appropriate rewards." So may or rather, in spite of all the efforts of the absolutists, so do and so must democracy and aristocracy live together, working shoulder to shoulder for the progress of humanity; a democracy of only spiritual equality with a military aristocracy of worldly might; of worldly might, with an industrial aristocracy of reason; and, if I may refer again to the suggested possibility for the future, of reason, with an aristocracy—but here the right name was hard to find—of a superrational, creative will. Each new aristocracy, too, as must be kept in mind, the changes being evolutionary, can be no mere supplanting of its predecessor; rather must it depend upon, or consist in, the life of its predecessor being made freely mediate, vicarious, objective.

Apart from various incidental discussions, I have touched so far, as may now be extracted, on three things: first, the only relative or contextual meaning of equality; second, the purposive or only mediative value of equality or of the democracy based on it; and third, what may be styled the natural and necessary duplicity of democracy; the last of these being only a conclusion from, or interpretation of, the other two.

The duplicity of democracy! The phrase can refer only to the fact, which appears to me very like a law, that in any time of democracy of any sort or degree there must be two different and more

or less distinct levels of life and interest. These two levels moreover, as shown by the examples from history, are always in conflict with each other, even as past and future, tradition and vision are always in conflict; also they must constantly suffer from confusion with each other, although at the same time getting more and more distinct, this confusion being only a phase of their conflict; and yet, however much liable to confusion, they must in reality be different qualitatively, different in kind. Their difference in kind, then, is most pointedly the source of democracy's duplicity or at least of a duality involved in all democracy. As for duplicity, I am using this term because democracy seems to me to have been quite in the habit of concealing or, if not deliberately concealing, then not always fully and openly facing and appreciating its own real design, its interest in something besides equality, its service of aristocracy of a new sort, on the higher level.

The question is really one of progress, of what makes progress. Progress, if there be such a thing, certainly must imply the rise from one type or level of action to another, from one system to another system of values. This we have virtually seen already and it seems to me axiomatic. Equally axiomatic is the following: Democratic leveling under the earlier type, natural only when the possibilities have been practically exhausted, *must be a condition of rise to the later*. In other words, as all that has been said here so far has constantly implied, democracy must mark at once the closing stage of an aristocracy of some lower order, *this being an object of its legitimate attack*, and the inception of an aristocracy of some higher order, *this being the proper object of its ideal endeavor*. Objects, however, of such opposite interests, one of attack, the other of endeavor, in their relation to the life of their time, in their value, must really differ in kind. Moreover, in further explanation of this qualitative difference, the purpose of the attack on the life of the lower order, the purpose of democratizing it, is to destroy its traditionally institutional character and to make it only generally instrumental or, in the word already so much used here, mediative, that is, to make it the common privilege and property of all men. Only by such democratization can it be made freely a medium or instrument of life, ceasing to be for any part of society an end in

itself, and only as the life of the lower order is made mere medium or instrument can any substantial success attend the efforts of men to realize the life of the higher order. Doubtless I am getting tediously repetitious, but, again, the institutional becoming instrumental or mediative by democratization is an indispensable condition of progress from one level of life to a higher level. Indeed I know no better definition of higher than what is thus suggested: the immediate become mediate, the institutional become instrumental. But, where two objects or factors of life and interest, like the passing and the rising aristocracy, differ as means and end, there must be difference in kind; quite analogous, I would even suggest, to that between the material and the spiritual, and, like that, only to be understood as a moving or functional duality, not a metaphysically fixed one, or fixed only in principle, not in content or application. Even in that phrase, "equality of opportunity," there is involved the distinction between means and end and so the duality of difference in kind. The democratic motive, I must say with Catonic persistence, is the leveling of men under a traditional order to the end that, the old institutes becoming common and standard instruments, equal opportunity and facility may be provided for the free and productive rivalry of men under the new order.

As to the method of the leveling, this would seem to lie in all proper measures of socialistic tendency. Socialism, in so far as concerned with making the *already developed* means and instruments of life common to all the members of society, has its legitimate place and work. It should not interfere with further development and improvement or with pioneer enterprises, always so dependent on individual initiative and competition, but it may very properly insist on communalization of so much as has been largely if not wholly exploited. The single-tax measure, for example, looks to me very like a measure of legitimate socialism, because it would impose a check on individual exploitation of real property, as militarism has valued property, for the sake of its exploitation in ways consistently and progressively industrial. Again, democratization of banking facilities, as in the recent establishment of regional federal banks, seems calculated to do the same thing or at least to

contribute toward doing the same thing for personal property. Such measures, then, as these two and, to give another example, as the state regulation of rates at least in their apparent purpose, whatever might be or may be their outcome, will sufficiently indicate my meaning. Of course judgment as to time and seasons, as to whether or not a given resource or instrument of life is sufficiently developed to be a proper object of communalization, must always be difficult and there will hardly ever be anything over which socialists and individualists may not have some controversy, but some socialism society must always have, and a socialism, too, that is constantly acquiring new objects or fields for its application, if there is to be any real progress in individualism and its opportunities. So, I repeat, socialistic measures afford the method by which, men being leveled, democracy mediates between a passing and a rising aristocracy. Unfortunately many people are socialists without any thought of the mediation just as many are democratic without any thought of equality being only a relative term.

Democracy is growing, as we proceed, into a term of very large meaning. Conclusively from the relativity of equality or the mediative character or the duplicity of democracy or, more exactly, from what we have seen these to imply, democracy not only cannot stand alone or be at any time unmixed but also never can be a matter just of some one period or another. Its significance is far more fundamental than that. Since every democracy by providing a certain equality of opportunity mediates some new aristocracy or since every aristocracy presupposes some democracy, then democracy must be more than just a name for some particular form of government or some particular era; it becomes a name for something that, so to speak, by night when not by day, is present and active in all governments and all eras. Democracy is one of the two ever-present motives of all history; aristocracy being the other.

Is it not generally better to talk and think of motives or principles instead of eras? Or at least always to supplement the one view with the other? To understand any principle, however, one should see it in at least two different settings or from two different angles. So, changing the viewpoint somewhat, the change being

after all not very great, the principle of democracy is a principle which asserts itself in all conflict and which develops in respect to its applications and manifestations with the development of conflict through all its various types. Also it appears under various guises which are more or less positive and direct in their recognition or presentation of it. Balance of power, fair play, armed neutrality, rules of the game, agreement as to weapons, and the like are some of the guises that may be mentioned. In an article recently published in this journal,¹ "Five Great Battles of Civilization," I undertook to show, among several other things, that all conflict tends toward balance or equality; in other words, that every battle tends in course of time to become a drawn battle. I mean or meant, of course, every type of battle, not necessarily any particular encounter. Thus methods and processes of fighting, whatever they be, from being more or less one-sided tend to become common property, this being the democratization; with the outcome that finally the contestants meet as so much action and so much equivalent reaction, and that action from either side directly in the form of just those methods and processes comes to an end, being neutralized. Whence the standstill, the drawn battle. Whence, also, a sort of common status, or equality, as determined by the common methods and processes. But, to go on, again restating what was said in the earlier article, a drawn battle must always induce a new type of battle. To quote briefly:

Nothing is more suggestive or illuminating than this change that apparently is always incident to the battle of well-equipped but especially of equally matched men. . . . Of course victory must always be to the best man and, unless my vision greatly deceive me, the best man, the opponents being evenly matched, must always win by devising, not just a new kind of fighting, but, as was said, a new kind involving more self-control, that is, involving—for what else does self-control mean?—free and conscious [or mediate, not immediate] use of the existing conditions and relations. . . . In short, in such a meeting there is always induced a battle of kinds in addition to the battle of magnitudes [or say of equated masses or forces] . . . and the best kind [the kind involving more self-control, more mediation, more finesse] always wins and winning raises the plane of future struggles.²

The higher struggle is not independent of the forces employed in the lower, but in it these forces are used with less confusion of

¹ September, 1913.

² P. 174.

means and end. Industrialism and militarism, for an example that will take us back to familiar ground, both use physical force for human ends, but the latter with appalling inefficiency, since human nature is itself so much exploited physically. Industrialism, although often suffering from militaristic entanglements, serves human nature far more efficiently by exploiting physical force in its non-human forms. Most of which is already an old story here.

So in development of the drawn battle and the consequent equality of the contestants we see the principle of democracy. The developed equality marks at once the passing of one type of battle, the ways of it becoming general or common and so secondary and only mediative, and the inception of another type of battle, just as before we saw democratic equality mediating between one aristocracy and another aristocracy. It is well to remember that battle and aristocracy, although quite different in their ordinary associations, are after all about as nearly related as two things can be. Democracy, too, is no synonym for peace, but means only preparation for more skill, more efficiency, in conflict. In the fact that a drawn battle, the meeting of equal magnitudes, induces a battle of kinds may be seen those two levels or types of action or of valuation which were pointed out above, the drawn battle only preparing the way for the higher type. And also, as hardly needs to be said, in the new self-control and deeper finesse of the better and higher battle, we only see again the mediation, of which so much has been said. In any sort of battle there are always at work just those forces which make what is immediate mediate, what is institutional instrumental.

But I must bring this article to a close. That all I have said is in elaboration of the idea with which the article opened, namely, that equality as a term in actual use must be relative and contextual, is clear to me and, as I now hope, clear also to others. Even in the drawn battle and the conflicting types of battle he who runs can read the relativity of equality. But now there are just two things more to which I would call attention. The first has to do with "natural rights," so close to equality; and the second, with the notion frequently expressed, I think as a result of what I will call a sort of democratic or socialistic dreaming, that the bitter

HUMAN PROGRESS: THE IDEA AND THE REALITY

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I

Whatever else the great world-war has done, it is certain that in thousands of sad and thoughtful homes, the globe over, some such questions as these have been asked and pondered: Is human progress a mere illusion? If such things can be, what and where is our vaunted culture, our civilization? If the terrible and apparently needless and futile struggle is compatible with civilization, and does not reduce so-called progress to a mockery and sham, what *is* the true definition of progress? Finally, does a "progress" which renders such horrors possible, or which fails to prevent or exclude them, signify or contain anything worth while?

It is doubtless safe to say that the sad and quiet homes alluded to have not satisfactorily answered these grave questions. They are anxiously waiting for light, and expecting the philosophers and moralists to give them such light and comfort, to renew their faith or allay their painful doubts and misgivings. Some of the American and European philosophers have attempted to grapple with the questions indicated; others have apparently been too stunned and bewildered to venture on the attempt. The City Club of Chicago, conscious of this situation, conceived the admirable idea of arranging a scientific symposium on "Human Progress" for the benefit of its own members as well as the wider public. This notable event took place in June last, and was participated in by Dr. John Dewey, the eminent American educator and philosopher, Dr. Jacob P. Hollander, political economist, and Professor James Harvey Robinson, of Columbia University, historian.

II

In this paper the views and conclusions of these thinkers, and of some others, will be summarized and considered. To facilitate

a better understanding of them, however, there is a preliminary question of importance and historical interest that invites attention—the question as to the evolution and genesis of the very idea or conception of human progress.

To many educated but “general” readers it will be a distinct surprise to hear that there *is* any preliminary question concerning the idea of progress. Our own age is so familiar with this idea, and the term is so cherished a household possession, that few stop to ask anything regarding its past, its origin, and development. Yet, as Auguste Comte and other sociologists have pointed out, the idea of progress *as now understood* is not only modern, but astonishingly recent. According to Comte, it dates from Fontenelle and Condorcet. Antiquity knew nothing of the idea. The seers, innovators, emancipators, reformers of antiquity, Comte contends, merely rebelled against tradition, authority, and blind obedience. In offering the world new truths and new principles, however, these leaders and guides did not explicitly affirm any general idea of progress, and hardly so much as suspected that such an idea was implicit in their views and attitudes. To come to destroy the old and proclaim a new gospel—a revolutionary one—is not to lay down a “law of progress.” To advocate change or even improvement is not to imply that there is such a thing as progress, in the strictly modern sense of the term. To paint or sigh for a Utopia, to dream of a new heaven and earth, to believe that human nature can be suddenly modified and a social order revolutionized, is not necessarily to accept the conception of progress.

What is that conception? In the words of M. Emile Faguet, the French academician, critic, and author, to believe in progress is to admit or assert that humanity steadily, if slowly, marches toward the Better, or the Best—tends toward the Best, undergoes constant improvement.

To be sure, there are those who admit or recognize reactions or retrogressions; who believe that nations, communities, even the whole civilized world, may cease to advance and even temporarily lapse into lower, outgrown states, perhaps even into barbarism. Herbert Spencer and others were of the opinion, in the late years of the last century, that modern society was seriously

threatened with "rebarbarization." Governments, parties, labor organizations, schools of thought, single philosophers, have been accused from time to time of preaching and practicing reactionary doctrines, of seeking to undo the great work of decades or even of centuries. But there is invariably in these complaints or indictments the tacit assumption, if not the expressed conviction, that the reaction is but temporary, and that the march of humanity toward its goal will and must be resumed sooner or later.

Thus the essence of the modern conception of progress is continuity—relative, perhaps, rather than absolute, but continuity—steadiness, persistence, and certainty. The conception implies that progress is in a sense *the law of humanity*; that human beings as such tend to perfect themselves, to grow and improve in certain directions; that they are better now than they were in the past, and will be better tomorrow than they are today.

It is plain that the shock administered to us by the great and cruel war—responsibility for which every nation is so eager to disclaim—is directly attributable to this modern conception of progress. Even those of us who are prepared for lapses, for reaction and retrogression, somehow assume that any reaction must be "a little one" in this day and generation. A bad act of parliament; the repeal or emasculation of a good act; a blunder or crime on the part of a cabinet or diplomatic clique; a "sort of war" in some remote part of the world; even a war between two great but not quite civilized powers—such things we can account for and understand. They do not militate against the very idea of human progress. But this Pan-European or world-war, this tragedy of blunders, aggressions, failures, and jealousies, of suspicions and fears and alarms, we cannot, at least at this time, bring ourselves to regard as nothing more than a lapse, an exception to the rule of human life. We sorrowfully say to ourselves that if this be an "exception," the alleged rule itself would seem to be valueless and a piece of bitter irony. Some thinkers are so buried in gloom and pessimism that they are led to dispute the modern idea of progress and to hark back to the ancients. Others feel that the time for rational and sober conclusions has not come and therefore deliberately lay the whole question aside, to be taken up a decade hence, perhaps.

III

Without speculating on the probable results of future controversies, however, deep interest is felt in many circles in the views expressed today by earnest, informed, and cultivated persons concerning the nature and meaning of progress.

M. Faguet, the eminent Frenchman already quoted, in an article or critical review of a work entitled *L'Histoire de l'idée de progrès*, by Jules Delvaille, a compatriot of his, treated the subject in a fresh, candid, and thought-provoking manner. The article was contributed to the Paris magazine, *La Revue*, in April, 1913, and we may feel sure that the author, in view of the things that have happened to France—wistful, pathetic France—since that time, has not revised his somewhat depressing conclusions. M. Faguet's method of treatment is so clear and intelligent that the final pages of his paper amply deserve, and will repay, reproduction in a rather free translation. Such a translation follows:

What do I think of the theory of progress taken by itself and as it stands—the theory of continuous, or almost continuous, improvement? I think it is absurd by its very definition. To know whether anyone is advancing toward a goal, it is necessary to know whither he is going. If you see a man walking along a route toward a point *A*, and getting farther and farther away from a point *B*, you do not know whether he is progressing or retrogressing until you find out whether his objective is *A* or *B*. If you do not know that, all you can state is one thing—that he is changing his place. Hence, to know whether humanity is progressing or retrogressing, it would be necessary to know what its goal is, its true and real goal—and also whether it is or is not deceiving itself regarding that veritable goal. But we do not know which is the real goal of humanity, and consequently we do not know whether it is advancing or retrogressing; we know only that it is moving.

Only a man placed at the extreme end of humanity and in possession of full knowledge as to the ways traversed by it would be able to tell, comparing its point of departure with its point of arrival, that it has marched from improvement to improvement; or that it has advanced with numerous digressions and retrogressions; or that it has deceived itself all along. But a man living in an indeterminate epoch of history, in the sense that one does not know whether the epoch is nearer the end or the beginning of history—such a man has no illumination on this question of universal history, and lacks sense even if he puts such a question.

However, not to take things too abstractly, suppose we ask ourselves simply whether humanity is in a better state than formerly; have we not sufficient historical knowledge to answer—and to answer "Yes"? This depends on the

point of view. Is humanity greater than formerly by reason of its superior art? The adherents of the theory of progress are bent on proving this to be the case, but they are actually at their weakest in this line of demonstration. Is humanity happier? We do not know; for if there be one incontestable thing, it is that man advances in happiness, or in capacity for happiness and therefore in happiness, to the extent to which he advances in morality. But, are you quite sure of moral progress? There it is that we see waves, crises followed by formidable retrogressions. Nothing, in fact, is less certain than moral progress through the ages.

Does humanity know more? Well, humanity knows more, but man knows less. Humanity has amassed an enormous sum of knowledge, but the most learned knows but a small part of that knowledge, and every man is relatively more ignorant than he was in ancient times, when there was less to know. Man is grand, but men are small; every man is small and ignorant; this is tantamount to saying that Man knows nothing.

If we regard knowledge as an instrument or means of forming general ideas, and as a source of inexhaustible pleasure to him who knows, we still find that the most ancient of ancients had a host of general ideas that satisfied them and that we cannot see were so miserably inferior to our general ideas. As for the pleasure, the joy, of knowledge, the most ancient of ancients had enough knowledge to give each of them pleasure during the course of a long life.

But the question of happiness persists in returning. Does not science contribute to morality; and if there is more science, there must be more morality and therefore more happiness?

Does science contribute to morality? If we have in mind the science or knowledge possessed by the individual, it may be admitted that very often the educated man is more moral than the ignorant; but the truth is, the educated man is more educated just because he is more moral, and not more moral because he is more educated. There are but two classes of instructed men: those who acquire education because they wish to "arrive," because it is a means of material success, and those who educate themselves out of pure love of knowledge. The former are merely ambitious and worldly, and knowledge does not give them superior or higher morality than the morality with which they start. The others, who educate themselves, not because of their desire to prosper and succeed, not from vanity or greed, not from love of power, but out of pure, disinterested love of knowledge, these are evidently moral at the outset; they were born moral, so to speak. It is their morality that impelled them to acquire knowledge. If they had not been able to acquire knowledge they would have been peasants or workmen of that strict integrity, that high morality, that profound virtue, which sometimes astonish and humiliate us—peasants or workmen that belong to the élite of humanity; since it hardly needs saying that the élite is not restricted to any class, and that there are princes of humanity even among the illiterate and the ignorant. As for the general spread of knowledge and literacy among the masses, in France the number of crimes committed has doubled since the introduction of universal

and compulsory instruction. The connection between knowledge and morality has not been demonstrated at all and is more than doubtful.

What, then, becomes of the hypothesis of progress? Artistic progress is non-existent; scientific progress is a fact, but it is a progress that neutralizes itself in the process; moral progress, the only thing that matters, if we consider human happiness to be our true end, would exist if scientific progress had any perceptible influence on morals—but that is a proposition that has not been demonstrated.

M. Faguet concludes that the theory of continuous and uninterrupted human progress is a sheer delusion, a prejudice, not only useless, but dangerous. It is a dangerous prejudice or notion because, M. Faguet argues, it begets indifference, inaction, fatalism. It is just as bad and paralyzing as the belief that things are going from bad to worse and that no human effort is of any avail, or as the belief that, by a sort of law of compensation, things always remain the same, and that no change that takes place affects anything vital or fundamental in human nature and conduct. For if progress is assured, if it be a law of humanity, if it is automatic or spontaneous, why toil and suffer and make sacrifices?

What, then, we should believe in, and what we have evidence to support, is the modest, unsensational doctrine that in certain directions improvements and ameliorations are possible. We should, in other words, believe in certain *kinds* of progress, but not in *progress*. We have a passion for effort, a mania for invention, and this is largely the cause of our zest for life, our joy in life. "Inventionism" is not necessarily good for us; it does not necessarily make for happiness, but it seems to be a law of our being. Some of the things we regard as progressive are not progressive at all, but humanity is like a sick man who seeks relief in turning from side to side, or from side to back. The relief is temporary, but it is real relief for the time being. At any rate, if not all change is progress, some change is, and to believe in amelioration and improvement is to have a motive for effort and action.

IV

M. Faguet's views are not very cheerful, as we see. Even the admission he finally makes is made grudgingly and with reserve. Some advance, some improvement, in certain directions he declares

to be possible. This may be sufficient basis for various reform movements and liberal or radical schools or parties. But it cannot excite enthusiasm or zeal. Such a conception of progress in society and humanity may give us patient, useful workers, but it will not give us inspired and inspiring leaders, martyrs, generous and noble pioneers. Of course, if the conception in question is the best that science and experience will warrant, it is idle to complain. But *is* it the best thing we can hope for? Is M. Faguet as scientific as he is sobering and dispiriting?

Dr. John Dewey, in his contribution to the City Club symposium above mentioned, had more to offer us. He shares some of the negative views of Faguet, it seems. He believes that we have been far too shallow and complacent in our notions of progress, assuming that it is all but irrepressible and inevitable; that we have attributed human progress to Providence, or Evolution, or the Nature of Things, and have mistaken change, and especially rapidity of change, for wonderful progress. He holds that the technical, scientific, and material advances of the last one hundred and fifty years have merely provided *opportunity* for progress in the true sense of the term, instead of representing or being progress itself.

Progress, according to Dr. Dewey, is a human task and a "retail job" at that. It is by no means a foregone conclusion. It is possible, but it is only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are not all material and technical. They include "hard wishing," constant planning and contriving, the exercise of foresight, the devising and adopting of means, laws, methods, and social arrangements. Humanity has now the technique, the method, the resources and facilities that are demanded by what we call progress, but it cannot have progress unless it deliberately goes to work to insure it. Humanity has the intelligence as well as the sentiments and emotions that are requisite to progress. While we have predatory and malevolent feelings and instincts, and while the sum total of these anti-social and selfish sentiments is great enough to keep any person, any group, any nation, any alliance of nations, in perpetual trouble, at war with others, it is equally true that we have sufficient benevolence, kindness, justice, and tenderness to give us peace and neighborliness and brotherhood, just and equitable

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arrangements, if we but make proper use of this part of our endowment, our assets.

Progress, according to Dr. Dewey, is not a matter of intelligence generally, and still less is it a matter of emotion, of so-called altruism and good-will. We may have plenty of intelligence and of right feeling without being progressive or doing anything for progress. We may use our intelligence destructively or in entire indifference to progress. We may stifle or neglect our right feeling and cultivate the wrong sentiments and emotions; those that breed discord and enmity. What progress depends on, what it presupposes, is the systematic thinking and planning of progress. If we want justice, for example, we must carefully think out and enact laws designed to give us just decisions; and we must establish courts and other agencies that could be trusted rightly to interpret and enforce the laws passed in the interest of justice. If we want conciliation and arbitration, industrial or other, we must establish the proper agencies and arrangements for that end and object. If we want a certain amount of internationalism, we must establish certain useful, vital, and vigorous international agencies that will not only exemplify and further internationalism, but that will make internationalism serviceable and interesting to powerful groups of persons.

Dr. Dewey did not provide any exact definition of progress in his brilliant paper at the City Club. But, of course, it implied a clear definition throughout. By progress Dr. Dewey meant national and international peace, concord, justice, as well as social justice and equality of opportunity in every direction. His views, therefore, may be summed up thus: If we want equality of opportunity, freedom, justice, reasonable comfort for all, and intellectual and spiritual joys for all, we must do exactly what men of physical science do when they have certain problems to solve: We must think earnestly and long; we must experiment, plan, observe, compare, rearrange, restudy, experiment again, until we obtain the result desired. Progress may not be ours for the asking, but it is ours for the working. Vigorous and constant contriving and planning of progress is what will give us progress. Notoriously, the modern world has not done any such planning and contriving.

Hence the lamentable and melancholy spectacle in Europe. Hence other lamentable and discreditable spectacles—undeserved misery, widespread want in the midst of abundance, involuntary idleness of armies of men eager and able to earn a living, degradation and delinquency due to lack of vocational training and fair opportunity, and the like. If the great war has shocked us, it has also brought home to us the truth that progress must be planned and worked for, not taken for granted. Even the war is not too great a price to pay for this awakening, this discovery. Even the war, on the other hand, discouraging as it is, does not disprove the possibility, or even the certainty, of progress, provided men want it and are willing to contrive and work for it.

The difference between Dr. Dewey's view and that of Faguet is this, then—the latter expects little progress at the best, while the former leaves both the quality and the quantity of progress in our own hands, so to speak. He assigns no limits and thinks none assignable from any reasonable point of view. Dr. Dewey's message is one of hope and cheer, but also one of action and work.

It may be added here that Professors Hollander and Robinson, each from his special angle, confirmed and indorsed this message. Professor Hollander, as an economist, expressed his conviction that poverty and socially created want can be abolished, and that the means and agencies of reform are at hand. Professor Robinson, as a student of history, declared his conviction that culture and civilization are so unique and so purely human that we need draw no disheartening "biological" parallels; that we have it in our power to improve social and economic and political relations "at will," and that our failures and lapses are due to intellectual indolence, to superstition and blind reverence for tradition and authority, to erroneous notions of "human nature" and human destiny.

V

Now, while such conclusions as these are cheering and revivifying, they leave one very important question unconsidered and unanswered. We can easily imagine thinkers like Faguet putting this question as a veritable "poser" to Dr. Dewey and his adherents. It is this: If progress is "a retail job" to be successfully performed

by patient and infinite toil, by hard thinking and contriving, why should the selfish, the comfortable, the powerful, the secure, the happy, wish it hard and work for it even harder? If progress is *not* a law of humanity—if we must, as it were, bargain and contract for it—to what elements or properties of human mind and nature are we to address our demand or prayer for co-operation in the cause of progress? What inducements have we to offer them? The contractor works for profit; if we wish to contract for progress, what profit can we promise to those who are well off here and now? Shall we appeal to their sense of expediency? Shall we tell them that they would be happier and safer than they are under a régime of progress? M. Faguet would smile at a suggestion of this sort; there are hundreds of thousands who would not respond to any argument from expediency. They live in the present and care little about their grandchildren or more remote posterity; they will tell us that the existing order is certain to outlive them and those that are dear to them, and that there is no earthly reason why they should work hard for social progress, for the welfare of others. Shall we appeal to the sense of justice, of sympathy, of generosity? Shall we argue that there is great joy and satisfaction in well-doing, in service, in disinterested labor, and that the promotion and realization of progress will be its own reward? Shall we, in short, appeal to the altruistic sentiments and emotions? If so, and if we expect our appeal to be successful, what is the necessary implication? Clearly, the implication is that the altruistic sentiments are stronger than the egoistic ones, and that even the selfish, the callous, the indifferent, the beneficiaries of unjust privileges or accidental good fortune, may be aroused and stirred to action by tales or pictures of suffering, of want, of inhumanity, of avoidable degradation and degeneration. And if we admit that this is the implication of the appeal, do we not admit, in reality, that man is distinguished by his altruism, by his sentiments of justice and beneficence? And, finally, if we admit this, do we not admit that progress is the law of human nature? If we can have progress by appealing to altruism because altruism is stronger than egoism, then progress is a law of our being, since it is inconceivable that the appeals in behalf of progress and of altruism—and to altruism—should ever be suspended for any considerable period.

To say that the appeal is not to altruism, to the sentiment of justice and generosity, is to say that there is nothing to appeal to, for there is no third set of qualities in human nature. If enlightened self-interest or expediency is insufficient, and if altruism is also insufficient, then M. Faguet is right, and we need expect no very great advance in any direction save that of material prosperity and mechanical invention. A little social or moral improvement may, indeed, be expected as a mere by-product of such progress, but in such a by-product there is little to glorify.

The Spencerian evolutionist, it may here be pointed out, regards the question just discussed as unanswerable from the viewpoint of strict utilitarians or pure intellectualists. He holds that the only basis for a rational theory of progress is the doctrine that social development and social discipline *have* steadily strengthened and *are* steadily strengthening our sentiments of justice and beneficence; that, although altruism is as primordial as egoism, and is by no means confined to man, it is not a fixed quantity, and that human progress depends on the growth and intensification of our altruistic sentiments. He holds that what we call character and goodness are the highest and finest products of evolution, and that intelligence and knowledge are only tools and instruments used by the emotions and the will of humanity. If the Spencerian evolutionist is right, progress may be said to be a law of our being, albeit education and environmental influences are extremely important.

But if we deny that altruism is and has long been increasing, and if we assert that there is no more evidence of any increase in innate altruism in a hundred thousand years than there is of an increase in the mental power and capacity of man in the last six or seven thousand years, then the burden of proof falls on us and we must demonstrate by reference to history and to contemporary experience that, weak and frail as we are, divided against ourselves as we are, sadly deficient as we are in qualities we deem admirable, the amount of right thinking and right feeling in us is, and long has been, quite sufficient to assure progress if we but take the necessary pains with it and deliberately make it our object and goal. Can we sustain this burden of proof? Is the proposition demonstrable? *Can* it be shown that "we have as much progress as we deserve"; that we have always had as much progress as we "bargained for,"

worked for, sought, in a "retail way," to achieve and nail down, as it were?

Let us see to what lame and impotent conclusion a great naturalist and biologist—Alfred Russel Wallace—was finally brought by his disbelief in the inheritance of acquired traits, his assertion that natural selection and sexual selection are the only actual factors of evolution.

Wallace, as his last books show, believed that "our whole system of society is rotten from top to bottom," and that "the social environment as a whole, in relation to our possibilities and our claims, is the worst that the world has ever known." He ascribed the rottenness of modern society to the competitive régime and to the failure of governments to substitute co-operation for competition. He also recognized the fact that the so-called competitive régime is only competitive in part; that many monopolies and special privileges enjoyed by the few render the field far from free or fair, and that equality of opportunity is the first condition of really legitimate and fair competition. His remedy for our ills may be stated in one word, "co-operation." By co-operation he meant "economic brotherhood," industrial democracy, freedom of access to land and capital by all, under capable direction.

Of course, Wallace could not and did not ignore the question which such views inevitably suggest—how, if society is appallingly rotten and things are going from bad to worse, we can expect to change our immoral environment into a moral one and to initiate an era of sound and healthy progress. That is, to whom and to what are those of us who are dissatisfied and restive to appeal in the name of progress?

Wallace's answer, however, was so strangely and singularly superficial and unscientific that it has puzzled many of his admirers. It amounts to this—that, in the first place, "the more intelligent of the workers" are now prepared to attack the root-causes of our social and economic ills and to demand the appropriate remedies, and that, in the second place, the creation of a new and moral environment *through* co-operation and social justice will release certain purely natural and biological forces, now dormant, that make for human improvement and progress—the forces, namely,

of sexual selection. Today woman is not free to choose; the emancipated and independent woman of the co-operative order will refuse to marry the ugly, the mean, the brutal, and the anti-social man, and her rejection of the unfit will gradually lead to the selection and further improvement of the morally fit.

It is not in the least necessary to discuss the claims and hopes based by Wallace on sexual selection, for he tells us himself that this factor is inoperative at present and will come into play only *after* the creation of a new and moral environment. Woman, when free, will do this or that; but only a co-operative and just régime will free woman, and our problem is how to abolish the present régime and usher in the new one. Here sexual selection will not help us, and we are left with nothing save the fact that, in the words of Wallace, "the more intelligent of the workers" realize the evils of monopoly and wage-slavery, and are ready, or almost ready, to fight resolutely for equality of opportunity and co-operation.

Verily, the mountain has labored and has brought forth a mouse! That *some* intelligent workers favor co-operation is true and of good augury; but if all our hope of reform and progress rests on that fact, and that fact alone, the social and economic outlook is dismal indeed. How long will it take to convert the millions of the "less intelligent workers"? And are we sure that the conversion of even a decided majority of the workers would suffice? Are we reduced to the class struggle and the class consciousness again, and after all? And what would Wallace have said about the collapse of the class struggle and of international socialism in Europe as a feature of the great war?

The truth is that those who deny that the altruistic sentiments are developing and growing stronger as the result of social discipline and adaptation to the social state, those who base their hopes of progress on intelligence alone, are left with broken reeds to lean on after an analysis of the whole situation and the various factors involved.

Fortunately, not all thinkers reject the theory of the transmission of acquired psychological traits, of the inheritance of the effects of education, culture, and social discipline; not all thinkers reject the doctrine of the continued adaptability of mankind and the

growth of the altruistic sentiments. The belief in human progress rests on something more than class interest, on something more than the ideas of "the more intelligent workers," on something more than the existence of scientific method and technique, on something more than the possibility of more systematic planning and contriving of certain desiderata in social, economic, and political arrangements. All these are factors, no doubt, but the greatest factor is the growing sentiment of justice. Progress is a resultant of several forces.

Illustrations of this truth abound. Slavery was not abolished in the United States by any single set of influences. Self-interest, reason, emotion, military necessity—all these conspired to bring about the step—certainly a progressive step. Industrial co-operation is progress, but it is clear that it will not displace the wage-system and capitalism solely because of the "intelligence of some of the workmen." Prison reform, the abolition of the capital penalty, and like improvements are slowly being realized largely by reason of successful appeals to and stimulation of the altruistic sentiments. On the other hand, for some proposed reforms we say that "the time is not ripe," or the average human being "is not ready." We imply that at some future time the average human being will be prepared to accept the now "utopian" proposal. We expect that events, experience, and propaganda will educate him—educate him not intellectually alone, but emotionally as well. If, however, we can purify and refine human emotion, do we not thereby facilitate progress, render it less difficult for the future?

Progress is not automatic, to be sure. Changes are effected in time, not by time, as Morley said long ago. If humanity went to sleep for a century there would be no progress. Progress, as Dr. Dewey holds, is a retail job, to be bargained for and carefully planned. But if we are to enlist the hosts of the indifferent and the prosperous, the doubting and the hostile; if we are to treat progress as a human and not as a class problem and task, our appeal must be increasingly to the best qualities of our evolving and improving human nature.

The war has been a bitter dose to swallow. We must revise a good many particular opinions, but we shall find ere long that even

the terrible war has not seriously shaken the profound belief in progress. For are not thoughtful men and women already saying that the war itself may become a potent instrument of progress? Are we not already planning better peace and arbitration machinery, greater publicity for and democratic control of diplomacy, and other safeguards and preventives of war? Out of evil good may come—nay *must* come. Human nature, derided and condemned by many, will attend to that operation.

PROFESSIONALISM: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL DEFORMATION¹

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The continued performance of a certain profession or trade creates in the individual a deformation of the reasoning processes and of the sane valuation of the importance of his activity in the social labor of the community to which he belongs.

First of all, such deformation is largely a matter of adaptation to environment. Certain surroundings may for the generality of the social group and under normal economic conditions be absolutely repugnant to the individual, yet, if endured long enough, they become dear through long association, like vice in the old familiar verse:

Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As to be hated needs but to be seen;
But seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

There are to be found in actual life a great many instances of such a reconciliation of the individual with decidedly bad conditions under the influence of the power of habit and the inertia generated by repetition. Certain kinds of labor are performed under such conditions that even the most pressing status of economic necessity is unable to induce the vast majority of the potential laborers to give them a trial, and yet in these works it is generally possible to meet "old-timers," men who have grown gray and old in the performance of these almost universally shunned duties. In the great majority of such cases there may be a certain amount of conceit, but very seldom will one meet with a well-characterized deformation

¹ Space is given to this paper because for several reasons it represents a type of opinion to which sociologists must give a hearing. The main theorem is an important datum of social psychology. Alleged facts and interpretations in the writer's elaboration of the datum are largely partisan opinions. The editors are in no way responsible for them beyond consenting to allow the author a medium of publication.

of the normal mind. Most generally we find a kind of dull resignation, which leads the individual to accept unthinkingly conditions to which the vast majority object.

Professionalism, in the more limited sense of the word, results in the production of certain definite idiosyncrasies, illogical in fact, which are, however, the outcome of a slow process of deformation of which the individual is not conscious. To the outside observer alone is the ultimate result of such a process painfully obvious.

Through the continued performance of a certain function and the repetitions of the various actions required by such a performance, the individual adopts an estimation of that function which is both absolutely and relatively unwarranted. The inertia of the human mind is brought into play. An exaggerated importance is attached to the systematic performance of an established sequence, and every infringement upon such an established order is not considered on the basis of its intrinsic bearing upon the result sought, but condemned as a violation of an established custom raised beyond the boundaries of admissible criticism.

Professional deformation is largely influenced by surroundings and by the initial mentality of the human element in which it is noticed. It will be especially noticeable in all the lines of activity where the labor of the individual is not separated from his life as a consumer of food, clothing, shelter, etc. In every instance where an individual can be considered always on duty, if not always at work, wherever his life is closely interwoven with his productive or unproductive activity, we find the greatest amount of professional deformation. Thus is established the "institutional type," of which the soldier, the sailor, the monk, the prisoner, the jail-keeper, and several others are the best-known examples.

For two kinds of labor performed under identical conditions the less productive socially will always entail the greatest amount of professional deformation.

The various social types react against professional deformation to the extent that they are normal. Pathological types are first and deepest affected. A class-conscious proletarian is almost impervious, while the slum-proletariat is specially remarkable for the ease and the speed with which it falls a prey to professional deformation.

The study of the most obvious and best-known cases of professional deformation will provide us with a great many of instances susceptible of leading to a general synthetical view of the subject and also to an understanding of the utility of such deformation as a factor of social dynamics.

The military establishment is perhaps the most conspicuous instance of social deformation. The continued observance of military discipline creates a reaction which leads the individual to exact from his inferiors the same unquestioning obedience which he mechanically yields to his superior officers. Such a retaliation leads in practice to cruelty and abuse. The cruelties practiced in all armies during the period of instruction of the recruits confirm this conclusion.

When such treatment is challenged in the press or in parliament by the champions of civil authority, the answer most frequently given is unintelligible to the general public, because it starts from a condition of professional bias limited to the military. Officers are in the habit of exacting from their inferiors a certain amount of callousness as an initiation to promotion. The professional deformation of the latest arrivals proves itself to be complete when students of Annapolis or West Point brought before a committee of Congress are affected by a sudden lapse of memory concerning their compulsory participation in hazing practices. Such a mental bias is the destruction of every manifestation of individuality and must perforce lead to a condition of subserviency which is only too much in evidence in all military affairs. War department reports are generally made to comply with the views of the officers to whom they are addressed, if these can be ascertained beforehand. In the Dreyfus case a general reported very favorably concerning the artillery officer when he believed that he had powerful friends at court; but when the same general was asked for a report a few months later he completely reversed himself to comply with what he now knew to be the wish of the general staff in its attempt to railroad an innocent man to jail and disgrace because he was a Jew in religion and a republican in politics.

The professional deformation in the individual leads to *esprit de corps* or clannishness in the group. Military and naval officers

consider themselves a superior class or caste in society, inaugurate their own ethics and traditions, and aim to exercise upon the destinies of nations an influence which is out of alignment with the original purpose of national defense which justifies their existence.

To witness the *esprit de corps* of the military, one has only to be present at army maneuvers in European countries. Deep-seated comradeships between potential adversaries on the battle-fields of tomorrow spring up which in military history have had real influence upon the outcome of military operations. The headquarters of the foreign attachés are regular market-places where new military devices are exhibited and peddled to the highest bidder and there is laid the technical foundation of that international war trust, with its galaxy of gold-braided officers as stockholders, whose participation and material interest in war President David Starr Jordan has so convincingly exposed.

In the navies of the world the fellowship of professional navy officers has been consecrated by a code of rules enforced in every seaport on the face of the earth, and nobody has ever witnessed this exchange of visits, with their character of familiarity and comradeship, without gaining the impression that they impaired the value of the navy as an agent of national defense.

Similar scenes are enacted on land, though less frequently, when troops are drilling near the boundary lines of their respective countries and officers meet and toast each other. In the course of such gatherings there is abroad a general if tacit approval of the theory that armies or navies are first of all an end in themselves and as such have interests different from, and superior to, those of the nations which have created them. In its accentuated form, such a notion leads to the contempt of civil government.

In the midst of the dramatic non-essentials of the Dreyfus affair the public lost sight of the fundamental principles involved. After her defeat in 1870-71, France felt the necessity of a strong army. So pressing was the necessity that even the republic's civilian war-ministers were willing to overlook the political opinions of her officers and the danger to the nation of the deranged mentality of her professional military. As a consequence, the general

staff of the army became an asylum for the partisans of the fallen monarchy and the overthrown empire, a point of vantage from which they could with alarming efficiency threaten republican institutions. Besides, the professionalism of the military became a danger for the country as a civil democracy. France found herself in the position of a farmer who has paid big money for a blooded watchdog only to wake up to the fact that the fierceness of the animal is a danger to his family.

Germany is in practically the same condition. German officers talk to and of civilians with unconcealed contempt. Strangers who had, through mere ignorance of local customs, taken seats habitually occupied in a café by army officers have frequently been insulted. Assumed military superiority asserts itself in the streets of German cities by army men claiming the use of the inside of a walk, which is by common courtesy granted to ladies. The vote of no confidence of the Reichstag, as a result of the Zabern incidents, proves that all democratic elements of the population are aware of the dangers of such a situation, while all reactionary parties uphold it, not on account of the intimate nature of the incidents, but on account of the usefulness of such a mentality in the general framework of an autocratic form of government.

Military professionalism was unconsciously upheld in the Reichstag by the imperial chancellor and the minister of war when they declared during the debate that, at all costs, the dignity of the military uniform must be upheld. We must here take into consideration the military code of professional ethics, which has become mixed with the survival of the privileges of the mediaeval nobility. These traditions required that, if the aggressor be an individual of low degree, disqualified by his birth or station in life from crossing swords or exchanging pistol-shots with a gentleman, nobleman, or professional officer, the latter had no alternative but to cut or shoot him down on the spot, regardless of the question whether he was armed or defenseless, strong or weak, large or small, able-bodied or crippled.

Military professionalism is not limited to commissioned officers. It permeates, although in a minor degree, even to the privates in the ranks. In national armies recruited through conscription this

deformation is diluted by the return of the soldier to the civil life of the nation after his period of active service has expired. Nevertheless, many German writers on social psychology agree that military professionalism leaves indelible marks and creates a predisposition in the individual to become influenced by the professional deformations resulting from the continuous practice of other forms of activity. In England, criminologists and magistrates have repeatedly pointed out the utter worthlessness of ex-soldiers for the productive activities of life. The British army is a volunteer army and its rank and file are not renewed with the periodical regularity of continental armies, and, besides, the authorities are anxious to see the men re-enlist and they foster their professional spirit accordingly.

In all armies, professional deformation is developed in the non-commissioned staff and even in the rank and file, because with the latter categories we do not find the resistance generated by intellectual discipline and training which may be expected from commissioned officers on account of the academic training required to pass the entrance examination to a special school.

This phenomenon is illustrated in the American army. The two main sources from which the army of the United States is recruited are: (a) the farmers' sons and agricultural laborers of the southeastern part of the United States, where agricultural wages are inferior to the army pay; (b) the unemployed. The first class belongs to the social category generally known as "crackers" or "poor whites." They are to the middle class of competitive individual farmers, local merchants, and small manufacturers what the slum-proletariat is to the wage-workers, a kind of social residuum. As a rule they are submissive, with a mentality naturally adapted to the acceptance of metaphysical quantities reduced to their simplest expression. Generally, they indulge in a lot of in-petto grumbling, but lack the necessary self-reliance to pool their grievances and to express them constructively. Their resistance to professional deformation is very low. As far as the unemployed are concerned, we may divide them in two very distinct categories. The slum-proletariat with its low resistance considers professional deformation as one of the attractions of the service. The opposite is true for

the normal wage-worker. To him the practical manifestations of professional deformation are irksome and repugnant. As soon as the lure of improved economic conditions and better opportunities for employment in civil life is added to this repugnance he begins to fret under the yoke of military discipline and, following the individualistic mode of protest of the American wage-earner, he finally deserts.

The least resisting elements to professional deformation are thus left to constitute the bulk of the rank and file and among such a class of men professionalism finds a favorable soil. Hundreds of instances could be quoted; a typical one will do.

No standing army in the world receives from its government the enjoyment of a higher grade of accommodations and quarters than the American army. As a matter of fact, these are not actually used, the men do not derive any benefits from them. The weekly inspections prevent their use. By the privates they are not considered as being primarily erected for use, but to be regularly inspected; and so great is the fear of these inspections that as soon as they are over all accommodations are locked up till the eve of the following inspection day, when they are cleaned and polished for the ceremony of the following morning. Inspections are the nightmare of the American soldier. The inspecting officer is described as a man "going around looking for trouble," and when reviews and inspections are over men behave as if they felt relieved from a great impending danger. On inspection days all other activities are suspended and hasty lunches are substituted for regular meals.

Munson, an army surgeon, has mentioned in his standard work on military hygiene the fallacy of a perfunctory cleanliness during a few ceremonial minutes on inspection day as a substitute for a reasonable degree of cleanliness during the remainder of the week, but without understanding the origin of the effect noticed.

Professionalism among the commissioned officers of this country's military establishment has been both increased and decreased by the original features which the American army has developed under the influence of special national conditions. It has been increased by the mode of living created under the system of army

posts, an inheritance from the days when the army was mainly used as a police force against the Indians. Under the post system the officer, even when at home in his private quarters, may be considered as being, to a certain extent, on duty. He never mingles with the civil life of the nation like the European officer, who, after his day's work, lives away from his barracks and becomes an everyday citizen. The social life of the American officer is based upon the use and frequently the abuse of government buildings, bands, supplies, conveyances, etc.

On the contrary, professional deformation is decreased by the wise disposition which makes appointments to Annapolis and West Point dependent upon the choice of the civil authorities. There can be no doubt that such a system has prevented the growth of military and naval families in which professional deformation is transmitted by heredity and whose existence is a menace to civil society.

Let us now consider the effect of professional deformation upon the liberal professions. The medical profession in the United States has recently adopted a code of medical ethics which has met in many quarters with a good deal of criticism on account of what certain people called an ultra-altruistic character. This character and its criticism can only remotely, if at all, be connected with the deforming influence of professional practice. The attitude of the medical profession in England after the vote of the Lloyd-George insurance bills, the many conflicts in all countries between the friendly societies and their medical staff, the differences of opinion between the New Zealand government and its medical practitioners, have all one common trait: a more or less openly expressed antipathy for preventive medicine, a feeling that there should be a modicum of disease in order that doctors may live. Some three years ago Mr. Bernard Shaw assailed the medical profession in his most vigorous manner. He stated that medical ethics and etiquette were only the cloaks for a huge conspiracy of silence against the public, professional etiquette in particular having for its object, not the health of the patient or of the community, but the concealment of the doctor's blunders and the protection of his livelihood.

The legal profession, both bench and bar, is not free from the inroads of professionalism. It was a favorite saying of Tolstoi that every man could always find good reasons to justify the way in which he made his living. When a man is conscious of being an unproductive laborer, he has a tendency to become reconciled to the defective institutions upon whose defects he thrives. The lawyer fighting the private battles of competing business-men becomes from a social point of view an agent of economic waste, just as the soldier who fights the public battles of competing nations. A long practice of his profession will cause him to overlook the social point of view and to consider the conflicts from which he derives his living as at least necessary and often unavoidable evils.

As for the judge, a long term spent on the bench will endow him, perhaps in a degree a little less forcibly expressed, with the mental condition of the jailer who asked: "If there were no more criminals, what would become of the jail-keepers?" Many old judges share the substance of such an opinion. The appointive prosecutors of European countries frequently see in every accused person a guilty person and they are not always very scrupulous in their efforts to convict or in the choice of the means which they use to influence the collective mentality of the jury.

There is a great deal of analogy between the psychology of the jailer and that of the professional charity-worker. In one of her books Miss Jane Addams, with the insight derived from long years of practical acquaintance with settlement work, insists upon the fact that the average charity-worker or paid agent of a relief institution is most always the scion of a family of the middle class or of a father who belongs to the liberal professions or is a social servant. The college training of these workers does not change the mentality which they have derived from the atmosphere in which they have been raised. Their reasoning runs in the meta-physical channels so dear to the contemporaries of the era of individual competition. Such a mentality makes a person unable to understand the mind processes of the working classes, whose existence is spent in connection with the closely regulated activities of machine-production.

From the point of view of the class-conscious worker, the acceptance of any form of charity brands one a slum-proletarian. The slum-proletariat is essentially predatory; and trickery, misrepresentation, and simulation are the means it uses to realize its parasitic tendencies. As a result of long years of dealing with this stratum of society, the charity-worker builds up for his personal use a scheme of social interrelations wherein all applicants are considered as frauds or approximations of frauds. The intricacy of statistical details and the minuteness of bureaucratic routine, quite frequently devoid of the slightest intrinsic value, cause the average charity agent to loose every bond of human affinity with the applicants.

Thus is produced that atmosphere of chilled sympathy and rough questioning in current use in every office of a charity organization. To a considerable part of the working class our actual organized charity seems inferior to the chaotic charity of old, when every bit of a gift was wrapped up in the personal kindness born out of a strong religious sentiment. The self-supporting worker can see no justification for the huge overhead expenses of organized charity, especially because the professional deformation of the employees of organized charity is to him exceedingly obvious.

Neither is this the worst count in his indictment. The co-existence of charity work with our social system develops in the professional a tendency to uphold such a system as a permanent one on account of the necessity of the corrective, which provides him with his means of livelihood. Hence the same professional has no sympathy for preventive charity or for any form of society which would automatically dispense with the necessity of an eleemosynary corrective.

In the case of ministers of the gospel, the professional deformation corresponding to the lengthy performance of the duties of the ministry is ritualism. It causes the minister to lose sight of the higher nature of religion and sometimes to overlook it entirely, while placing a correspondingly higher stress upon the use of religion as a means of social restraint and the mechanical observance of church practices.

In common with ministers of religion, teachers suffer from the fact that they give *ex cathedra* instructions which are as a rule uncontradicted. The average listener in any audience can readily detect men or women teachers on the lecture platform by the finality of their statements and the self-satisfaction displayed in their argumentation, caused by the atmosphere of the classroom. This is probably the cause which prevented our educators from taking a larger share in the parliamentary work of the nation and from bringing to representative government a little of that capacity and prestige of which it is so sorely in need.

When the British royal commission on secondary education was at the beginning of its work, I remember Mr. Bryce saying how struck he was at the growth of professional feeling among all classes of teachers in England. On every side he found societies which had been formed partly for professional protection, partly under the stimulus of a real interest in their calling. This tendency, upon which the practiced eye of Mr. Bryce fell at once, has been growing during the last ten years. It has now culminated in the success of the attempt to frame a teachers' register. The teachers' registration council ought to be a real center for the experience of teachers of all kinds throughout the country. It ought to give the profession that sense of unity which necessary sectional and administrative subdivision tends to blur. But it ought not to become a super-trade-union. Still less ought it to have any ambition to control the educational system of the country. For just as education is itself many-sided, so is the responsibility for it divided among several co-workers in a great enterprise. The nation as a whole is concerned in the training of the nation's youth. The teachers are concerned about it, because—if anybody—they ought to know most about it.

The connection between professionalism and the material status of the teacher is duplicated in the nursing profession. The great majority of the American states have now boards of examination for nurses, composed not of doctors but of members of the nursing profession themselves, appointed by political office-holders. The reasons offered to justify the restricted exercise of the nursing

profession resulting from the existence of such a registry are generally summed up in a statement concerning the necessity of protecting the public. Several state courts have held, in the case of the barbers', plumbers', and undertakers' registry laws, that taken at its face value such a purpose had no reason for existence in fact; that even the exercise of such a profession by incompetents would not work a sufficiently well-defined injury upon the community to justify the limitation of the number of those belonging to it and the relative monopoly which is the result of such a regulation.

Professional deformation has combined with sex-consciousness to exclude men from the nursing profession. Eminent practitioners have defended the theory that nursing was a woman's calling by citing sentimental reasons unworthy of the scientific standing of their advocates. As a matter of fact, nursing is not a woman's calling. Hospital efficiency today is greatly hampered by the lack of competent orderlies. Nobody can blame men for refusing to enter a calling which is no calling, but just a blind alley. Still, decent ward management is as much dependent upon a capable orderly as upon a capable nurse. From the point of view of women themselves and in order that they may derive from their economic independence all the benefits it holds in store for them, it becomes more than necessary that they should discourage every attempt to commercialize womanliness. Nursing is a useful and honorable profession. For its own sake it ought to be freed from any morbid character with which professionalism and other considerations may try to burden it.

There is another social condition remotely connected with such callings as teaching, social service, and nursing which has been seriously attacked by professional deformation, viz., the labor leaders. We may consider as fairly accurate the statement that the reasons which influence the members of a union in the selection of their officers are zeal and capacity. That a man who owes his elevation to office to such considerations should become a victim of professional deformation seems at first sight almost improbable. Still, it can no longer be denied, since professionalism of the labor leaders has been one of the most potent if

not the principal cause leading to the creation in the United States of a dual organization of labor in the economic field. Institutions which have remained in existence for a long time acquire thus an element of strength which is independent of their intrinsic value and helps them to monopolize a certain sphere of human activity. The American Federation of Labor is now in such a position. In the birth of a rival group, the I.W.W., professional deformation of the actual personnel of the Federation has played a most important part. Many workers, inside as well as outside the Federation, state that professionalism rules the Federation today. This is true to such an extent that the element in control of the Federation did not hesitate, to save its existence, to refuse to elect the Federation's officials through a referendum of the membership, while the political program of the Federation strongly advocates direct government in the state and nation.

After several years in office the primary reason for his existence is no longer obvious to the trade-union official. He considers himself as the owner of a business and the membership as a kind of compulsory customers. Professional deformation brings about a consciousness of his private interests sometimes directly opposed to the sane and logical conception of the interests of the membership. Like the charity-worker, he is very prone to consider our actual social system as permanent, because it requires the corrective of unions in the process of collective bargaining and of officials to lead the unions.

If a transformation in the mode of production requires that the framework of economic organization be discarded to make room for a new and more efficient form of organization, the professional labor leader will oppose the change, because in the ensuing reorganization he is liable to suffer the loss of his position.

Labor leaders frequently become parliamentarians. Labor parliamentarians and legislators in general suffer from their own kinds of professional deformation. Zola, who could not be called a sociologist, but who was an observer of an uncommon acuity of vision for psychological details, has drawn a vivid picture of the work of professional deformation in shaping the mentality of the peoples' representatives. In *Germinal* he introduces Lantier, a

labor leader, and proves how his vision is slowly altered from that of a fighting strike-leader to that of a middle-class intellectual, snugly reclining in an arm-chair, with a tableful of books and magazines at his elbow, while a bright and warm fire flames up gaily before his outstretched feet. How long will it be before this middle-class complacency will influence his ideas and his principles without his knowledge?

The development of anarchistic syndicalism in France was largely due to the dissatisfaction caused within the ranks of the working class by the professional deformation of several labor politicians, whom the brilliancy of the personality of Jaurès had attracted in a movement which they did not understand. Such a deformation is not limited to the immature intellectual who strays into the collectivist camp. John Burns of Battersea is another instance, whose purely proletarian origin cannot be disputed.

No matter how close an office-holder may have been to the sod when he broke into public life, it requires but a short time to warp his view when he gets to Washington. There the politics of the nation crystallize. Small groups of men, because of their herding in one place, their intimate interchange of ideas, and their power to legislate, get to think their view is the prevalent view—not because it really is, but because their vision has become restricted to the narrow circle of their official actions. Professionalism is a sort of introspective egoism. Insiders remain inside, looking out, instead of going occasionally outside to look in.

From the point of view of a progressive party, professionalism decreases the efficiency of the representative, while in the case of a conservative or a reactionist, professionalism helps to increase his efficiency.

Social phenomena should never be separated from their social usefulness. They are not static, but essentially dynamic. From this angle we may extend to all the forms of professional deformation what we have said about the adaptability of the nature of parliamentary professionalism to the purposes of democracy. Professional deformation always acts as an auxiliary force to human inertia. Hence a progressive society must react against it, destroy it. The

value of a trade-union convention to the workers, for instance, will depend largely on the success with which they eliminate from their deliberations the influence of their professionals.

If such a defense may rightfully be considered as preliminary to the very existence of a democracy, it must also be remarked that every step in democracy will decrease the amount of professionalism with which society has to contend in the course of its development.

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION

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WHAT DO WE MEAN BY RELIGION?

It is often said that no people entirely destitute of religion has ever been discovered. And it is true that no people whose thoughts and practices we have learned to understand adequately has been without social activities to which the name religion could be applied, provided that name be given a sufficiently wide definition.

The word religion has received many definitions. Historically the most characteristic substance of religion has been beliefs concerning relations with unseen powers or beings, whether here or hereafter, and the emotions and practices elicited by those beliefs. Religion, however, might be defined as those ideas contemplation of which is found, in the experience of any people, to raise life to the highest level, together with the emotions and practices prompted by the contemplation of those ideas. The latter definition, however, would express rather an ideal of the meaning which the word religion may sometime convey than a description of all the religions that have existed or that still exist, for religions have contained much that debased life, and omitted many of the most ennobling elements in the life of the peoples by whom they were believed.

According to our second and idealistic, or normative, definition of religion, conversion is a readjustment of attention, bringing into the middle of the stage, in our mental drama, the ennobling ideas—whatever they may be—and sending away from the spotlight of attention the ideas that drag life down. Every adult has a multitude of ideas stored in memory but makes habitual daily use of only a few, and these give to life its character. Instinctive propulsions, and the suggestions of the general social environment, are sure to thrust themselves forward, but the ideas that have been more recently developed, which differentiate man from his less

evolved progenitors and which tend to raise him above the commonplace, must be diligently brought to mind.

The religious man, in our normative sense of the word religious, is one who discriminates between the ideas that give life dignity and worth and those which drag life down or anchor it to mediocrity, who takes the necessary pains to keep the ennobling ideas in the forefront of his attention, and who, by so doing, responds strongly to those conceptions by aid of which he most completely realizes his possibilities.

According to our normative definition of religion any man may be religious; for to every man some ideas are more ennobling than others. With the same man religion may pass through various stages, the ideas that once most warmed and fed him may lose their hold upon his mind and their power to set in motion the mechanism of his being, yet he may be no less religious if he takes no less pains to recognize and to keep in the place of dominance those conceptions that in his new stage of growth prove themselves most uplifting.

For purposes of evolutionary study we must turn back from our normative conception of religion to its historical description. Religion, far from being a matter of indifference to the "savage," in reality "absorbs nearly the whole of life." "His daily actions are governed by ceremonial laws of the severest, often of the most irksome and painful character."¹ The Dyaks of Borneo, "when they lay out their fields, gather the harvest, go hunting or fishing, contract a marriage, start on a warlike expedition, propose a commercial journey, or anything of importance, always consult the gods, offer sacrifices, celebrate feasts, study the omens, obtain talismans, and so on, often thus losing the best opportunity for the business itself." "It was a severe shock to the Pueblo Indians to see the white settlers plant corn without any religious ceremony, and a much greater one to see that the corn grew, flourished, and bore abundant crops!" Captain Clark, an officer of our army with the widest experience of Indian life, is thus quoted: "It seems a startling assertion, but it is I think true that there are no people who pray more than the Indians. Both superstition and custom keep

¹ Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, pp. 17 ff.

always in their minds the necessity for placating the anger of the invisible and omnipotent power, and for supplicating the active exercise of his faculties in their behalf." And Brinton says of primitive people that the injunction to "pray always" is nowhere else so nearly carried out.

The beliefs and practices commonly spoken of as religion grow from four roots each of which requires our attention.

I. MAGIC

Magic may or may not contain any idea of relationship with unseen persons.

a) Magic which does not depend upon ideas of relationship with unseen beings probably is not to be regarded as a part of religion, but it is too important and too closely related to religious notions to be omitted from our discussion. This magic which depends upon no ideas of unseen persons is the predecessor of applied natural science. Primitive man, not knowing what really causes the effects that interest him, that harm or benefit him, guesses what might have caused the evil or the good he has experienced, and what may cause the good or evil that he anticipates with hope or dread, and like the man of science he acts upon his hypothesis. In the development of magic there are certain steps which must be enumerated at the outset, since they are to be seen in the development both of impersonal and of personal, or religious, magic.

1. Desire suggests ideas. The desires are at first predominantly practical. Man wants to *do* something that will secure good or avert harm. His child is sick and he wants to do something to cause recovery; he is going fishing and he wants to insure a catch. Because ignorant of what *does* affect the result, he is free to imagine that anything *may* affect it. He feels that he must do something and so he thinks of something to do. The brighter, more imaginative he is the more he thinks of that may bring either good or harm.

2. Whatever arrests his *attention* in connection with the result, so far as he knows, may cause it. Especially do suggestive *analogies* rivet attention and hint at causal relation. Thus the father during the *couvade* must not eat what would disagree with the new-born

babe; the pregnant woman must not eat any animal that was killed by a wound in the entrails; to eat the heart of a lion will make one brave; and to cause sand to patter on the hut is part of the ceremony of making rain.

3. In order to be believed an idea has only to be clear, of practical interest, and free from inconsistency with previous knowledge or belief. The less one knows the less there is to contradict whatever ideas may occur to him, so that to one who lacks established ideas by which to test new notions every fancy may be true.

4. Once the idea occurs to the mind that a given act or thing is favorable or unfavorable to a keenly desired result, no chances are taken, the lucky thing or act is not omitted, and the unlucky one is avoided. This tendency we still witness in the reluctance of many to sit among thirteen at the table.

5. To act upon an idea strengthens it in the mind of the actor, and also suggests it to others. When the idea that this or that will bring either good or evil is suggested to B by the action of A, the faith may be stronger in the mind of B than if it had first arisen in his own mind—it comes with *authority*—and after such an idea has become prevalent in a group of savages no one would dare take chances with it.

6. One instance in which the belief works, that is to say, one coincidence between the belief and the event, arrests attention, is told, exaggerated, and retold, and does more to confirm the belief than many instances of failure. Instances of the failure of an established belief to work are explained away on the ground that the rules of the magic were not exactly followed, or that the expected result was otherwise prevented. By the process above outlined nature men develop elaborate systems of pseudo-science for the control of the results which they desire or fear.

The tendency to invent magic is still strong among children and the ignorant, and would go to great lengths if not corrected by knowledge of natural causation supplied to children by their elders and to the ignorant by the better educated. Physicians who attend the ignorant have opportunities to witness the spontaneous invention of new magic to meet emergencies, to insure strength and brightness to new-born infants, or recovery to the suddenly

afflicted. Farmers who insist on doing certain work at "the right time of the moon" illustrate the persistence of the tendency to rely on magic. And the whole system of astrology, which commanded belief among the intelligent during certain stages of our own civilization, shows how hard it is to deny causal efficiency to whatever powerfully arrests the attention, even though as remote as the very stars, provided the nature of real causal connection is dimly apprehended.

b) Magic that is based on supposed relation with invisible persons implies the development of belief in such persons which grows from the second root of religion, next to be discussed. Man seeks to influence unseen beings in three ways:

1. He may believe that by magic he obtains control over them, that if he knows how he can command them and they must obey. The desire to control them suggests a method, as the desire for other results suggests methods, by the mental process above described.

2. He bargains with the unseen beings and seeks their favor by gifts, sacrifices, and services.

3. He seeks to influence them by his words; by flattery and praises he conciliates, and by imploring he seeks to persuade them.

II. ZOÖMORPHISM

The word anthropomorphism denotes the practice of conceiving of unseen beings as having the form and attributes of men. Zoö-morphism denotes the practice of conceiving them to have the form and attributes either of men or other animals, or of fantastic combinations of human and beastly shape and character.

Zoö-morphism is based upon the idea that every effect implies an actor. In the early stages of mental life the idea of causation which is most familiar and intelligible is derived from the issuance of results from our own activity, and from that of other persons and animals whose activity resembles our own. Thus the child and the savage ask, "Who made the moon?"—not "what caused" but "who made" is the natural form of inquiry. Of causation by reflection, refraction, chemical combination, evolutionary processes, etc., there are at first no ideas. And so they ask who makes the

sun rise, traverse the heavens, and set, who makes the rivers flow, the tides surge, the thunder roll, the ice form, the trees put forth their leaves in spring. Wherever there is a deed there must be a doer—there must be great and mighty beings to produce the grand effects in nature, and there must also be a multitude of little beings to produce the countless small effects, too trivial to occupy the dignitaries of the unseen world, to sour the milk, to cause a wart to come or disappear, to cause all the noises, incidents, strokes of luck, and bafflings that fill the hours. To the imaginative mind at this stage of education it appears that the unseen population of the world may well be far more numerous than the seen, and that there must be among them diverse beings, some friendly and some unfriendly to man, great gods and great devils and little sprites, nixies, fairies, gnomes, goblins, elves, brownies, nymphs, dryads, and fauns. A priest, it is said, went on Walpurgis night to count the devils, and being observed by one of them was asked what he was doing. When he confessed his intention he was told that if the Alps were broken into grains of sand and for each grain there were a devil, and he should count so many, he would only have begun to number the devils.

Primitive man feels himself surrounded by unseen beings who can mysteriously benefit or harm him much as the civilized man feels himself surrounded by the omnipresent microbes. And accordingly the one seeks for disinfectants and the other for spirit-scarers.

Here again the desire to do something about it suggests something to do; and the wish that something might have protective power suggests that almost anything that sufficiently arrests attention in connection with the wish may be the right thing.

Among^{*} the objects that are thought to be effective as protections against spirits one of the most universal is fire. Fire is highly arrestive to the attention, it is mysterious and has powers to harm or to bless, it comforts us with warmth, it cooks our food, it melts the hard iron, it dispels the terrifying darkness, it spreads a circle of safety from beasts—why not from spirits also? Peoples in all quarters of the globe have regarded a fire, a lamp, a candle, a sacred

^{*} Professor W. I. Thomas enumerates to his classes a longer list of spirit-scarers. From him many of the facts here used have been derived.

flame, that must on no account be allowed to go out, as the source of safety from unseen terrors. English farmers used to gather in the wheat fields and build one large fire and twelve smaller ones, representing Christ and the apostles, by this means, together with a great shouting, to drive away the spirits that might cause blight and mildew.

Next to fire as a spirit-scarer is water, a mysterious element that drives out the spirit of thirst and washes away many evil things. The sprinkling of infants to keep away bad influences, holy water, and baptism in many forms represent ancient practices common to many peoples.

Hardly anything is easier than to give an old ceremony a new meaning. Even among us baptism means the descent of the holy spirit, or the washing-away of sin, or the death of an old life and the beginning of a new one. Ancient ceremonies survive with new interpretations. Of this baptism, the sprinkling of holy water, and the burning of candles in churches appear to be illustrations.

Metal that requires the magic of the smith to melt and fashion it, that makes weapons which let out the life, is thought to have mystic powers. So also is food that drives out not only the spirit of hunger but also other evil spirits as well, and brings us strength and cheer in place of despondency, moroseness, and weakness; and hence to scatter rice or other grain is protective and of good omen.

There are not only protective objects, but also protective acts and protective words and speeches formulated by the mind in answer to the desire for safety from the unseen powers. Yelling and racket, bells and tom-toms are thought to drive away evil spirits and assist in the cure of the sick, in the safe passage of the dying, and in the guarding of infants. Threatening gestures, blows, and whipping serve the same purpose. It was thus that the soldiers of Xerxes scourged the Hellespont to drive away or subdue the spirits that disturbed the waters. Liquor is full of "spirits" as we still say, both good spirits that cheer and evil spirits that make men violent and wicked. Therefore before broaching a cask whip it well with switches, and if you want to sell it hang the bundle of switches, or bush, over your door to show that you have plenty of new and well-chastened wine—but "good wine needs no bush" to

advertise it. A whip becomes in itself a protective object, and finally any piece of leather.

Thirteen centuries before Christ, to draw a cross was already a way to make a spirit trap that would catch and hold the invisible beings of evil intent, and far and wide the drawing of a circle or curve is regarded as a way to make a trap to keep them in, or to erect a fortification to keep them out. Perhaps both the curve and the metal of the horseshoe made it seem to our forefathers protective.

In order adequately to understand the tendency to zoömorphism it must be borne in mind that the savage does not look down upon the animals as we do. He cannot build an abode equal to that of the oven-bird or the beaver, he would gladly possess eyes like the hawk, strength like the bear or the ox, courage like the lion, cunning like the fox, the deadly power of the serpent, vigilance not to be surpassed, or skill in stalking game like that of the leopard. In most things to which he aspires the animals surpass him.

Moreover, the sense of mystery demands strange symbols, sets the imagination roaming, and often the fittest embodiment of the powers man fears or worships seems not to be a form like any that he sees but one in which there are combined the shapes of men and beasts, as in griffins, sphynxes, and other imaginary monsters. And when a people has once formed conceptions of the forms of the gods, these conceptions are likely to survive, filled with an enriching symbolism, as ancient ceremonies survive with changed interpretations, and still to be retained when the people become as civilized as the Hindus or Egyptians.

Primitive people not only fear the unseen zoömorphic beings, but also seek their aid. This leads to fetishism. The savage, with the vague notions of causal relationship which alone are possible to men who have made little progress in explanation, thinks that to possess anything that has been in close relation with a person is to establish a mystic relation with that person. He does not carelessly throw aside the skin of the banana he has eaten, for if his enemy should pick it up, would he not have power over the man in whose vitals the pulp of the banana was! The hair cut from his head or any cast-off article that he has made or long worn he care-

fully secretes or destroys. Now if this same savage finds a strangely gnarled stick, or a bit of fossil or meteorite, which evidently has been shaped by some mysterious power, he hopes that by possessing it he may establish relations with the power that shaped it and perhaps still haunts it. And if while he keeps it he has good luck and his prayers are answered, he prizes it and will not willingly part with it, unless for a valuable consideration. If, however, it seems to bring him no good luck, he will throw it away. The value which the savage attaches to the fetish which he carries about with him seems to be of precisely the same sort as that which devout Catholics have attached to relics of the saints, objects that have had close relation with a supernal being and which aid the possessor in maintaining special relations with that being. Grottoes, strange boulders, trees of unusual shape or size men everywhere seem prone to call devil's den, or witches' seat, or the like. Such manifestations and abodes of strange powers also become fetishes. But it is not the great rock or tree that is worshiped. Probably men never anywhere have literally worshiped stocks or stones. As one savage in answer to inquiry declared, "Tree not fetish. Fetish spirit, not seen, live in tree."^{*}

III. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP

Belief that man is surrounded by spirits arises not only from zoöomorphic interpretation of natural processes and natural events, but also from belief in the survival of human spirits after the death of the body. Thus Codrington in his *Milanesians* says that this people has two words for spirit, one denoting zoöomorphic nature spirits, and the other denoting the spirits of ancestors. Savages do not regard the death of the body as the termination of life; doubt of life after death arises later in men's minds. Belief that the spirit survives dissolution arises in perfectly natural, even inevitable, ways. When a man awakens in the morning and declares that he has been in the forest, seen a foe, or encountered a lion and barely escaped with his life, or that he has been on a journey or had a successful hunt, and those that are with him in the hut know that his body has lain there all night, they conclude and he concludes that he can

^{*} Brinton's *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 132.

have experiences in which his body does not participate. It is hard to persuade the child who wakes up terrified that the cause of his fear "was only a dream." Savages have no one to correct their belief in the reality of dreams. Often, to gather at dawn to recount the experiences of the past night is a regular and important part of the day's interest. Some tribes decamp and flee if one of their number dreams of seeing an enemy approaching. Some think that in their shadow and in their reflection they catch glimpses of their own "double." If one is struck on the head his spirit leaves the injured body, after a while he "comes to," or if the injury is too severe the separation is permanent and the body is not reanimated. Then where is the spirit that has withdrawn from the visible form? It must be near! You cannot see it. You can never know when it is seeing you and listening to your words. Therefore "speak no evil of the dead," for who can tell in what mysterious ways the invisible can affect us, or how much of our sickness and ill luck are due to their ill will? Nothing sets bounds to the fancy in its dreadful conjectures about the hovering ghosts. Moreover, ghosts have reason to be vengeful and ill-humored for have they not been driven out of the body and deprived of visible life? Death by blows gives ground for taking vengeance and death by sickness no less, for sickness is practically always attributed by savages to magic, exercised by an enemy. And savages are not prevented from taking vengeance by the fact that they do not know what individual caused the injury.

For such reasons as these savages sometimes try to prevent the escape of the ghosts of those about to die by strangling them and leaving a ligature about the neck, or by driving a stake through the breast. Some peoples who have no permanent abodes decamp and flee the haunted place whenever a death has occurred, exercising precautions that the ghost shall not follow them, for instance, carrying their weapons pointed backward and stacking them in that position when they stop to sleep. The precautions to be taken are suggested by desire and analogy, and faith in them developed by the process already repeatedly referred to. Most frequently people try to conciliate the ghost. They gather in the presence of the dying and praise him inordinately and exhibit signs of mourning at

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his departure. They are careful after his death to continue the forms of praise and mourning, even at times hiring men to keep up the demonstration of grief. No one dares to use anything that had belonged to the dead, for fear of exciting jealous vengeance. His standing crops are burned and his personal belongings are burned, or cast into the sea, or buried with the corpse. Thus there is no saving from generation to generation to promote economic progress, but each generation destroys the accumulations of its predecessors.

The burning of property with the body of the dead results not only from fear of using the belongings of a ghost but also sometimes from an intention to provide the departed with the spiritual essence—the double—of that which he has used here and will require hereafter; for if the man has a double, why should not a bow or a knife or a tree or a mountain have a double as well as a shadow and a reflection? Belief that inanimate things as well as living beings have an unseeable counterpart or essence, a soul or “*anima*,” is widespread. For example, in Japan the housewife attributes a soul to her kitchen utensils, and the soldier to his sword. This belief is called animism.

The propitiation of the spirits of the dead by praises, prayers, and sacrifices is carried on at the places of burial. Thus, said Spencer, graves become the first altars and tombs the first temples.

It is felt to be especially necessary to propitiate the spirit of a great and powerful chief, whose mysterious powers the timorous imagination is free to exaggerate unchecked and uncomfited by any saving ray of knowledge. All peoples, as they progress, tend to gather glorifying traditions about some great characters in their history. Thus while each family or clan worships and propitiates the spirits of its own particular dead forbears, the families enter also into the worship of the heroes of the whole tribe or people. This implies a considerable degree of advancement, and is especially characteristic of the patriarchal phase of social evolution. Any patriarch under whom the tribe particularly prospers contributes real incidents, and patriotic and religious imagination add more, all of which tend to gather about the name of a few or of one of

those from whom the group believes itself descended, and the spirits of these dead heroes become the tribal gods.

In the earlier stages of its development religion is chiefly a matter of fear and not of hope or love; but in the stage just described it is natural to think that the household or tribal divinities will exercise their powers in the interest of their own "chosen people." This is accompanied by the belief that other peoples have their gods who are favorable to them, so that in case of warfare the contest is thought to be between both the unseen and the visible representatives of each people.

A conquering people believes that its gods are conquering gods, lords of lords, and kings over all gods. To regard their own god as superior in power and other attributes is not the same as to become philosophical monotheists. Their belief is not monotheism but monarchy among divinities. Monotheism comes very late, and when we speak of the "gods" of other peoples than ourselves it is customary to refer by that name to all the invisible beings with superhuman powers in which they believe, and perhaps to forget that it has been usual for Christian peoples to believe in many invisible beings with superhuman powers. If we had discovered Milton's *Paradise Lost* written in a strange tongue and calling its supernatural beings by other names than ours, we should not have hesitated to pronounce it the expression of a highly polytheistic religion.

In the roots of its development religion has no essential connection with morality or righteousness. The gods were thought of as exhibiting the motives and passions which man would exercise if he feared no superior, and religious conduct was simply the etiquette or ceremony of the court of the unseen potentate. And as man was always in the presence of the unseen he was always living at court and must regulate his every action by the required ceremonial. It was natural and inevitable to think that the requirements of the unseen would resemble those enforced by visible rulers, and there was a general correspondence between the obeisances, adulation, and tribute rendered to both. Conversely, visible rulers have been quick to avail themselves of the obvious addition to their own power which resulted whenever peoples could be made to feel that the

gods required that which the visible rulers commanded. The fact that the difference between gods and kings was not very wide, in the minds of ancestor-worshipping peoples who as yet were far from the concept of monotheism, is shown by the practice of according divine honors to living potentates. Omitting, for the present, many qualifications, we may say that ethical requirements result from the lessons of experience concerning that which promotes or diminishes the common welfare. Rulers early recognize the teaching of experience as to what promotes the tribal strength and solidarity for purposes of war, and in the patriarchal phase they are not blind to that which promotes economic prosperity. As soon as rulers or leading men (prophets) become deeply interested in the tribal welfare they feel certain that what they are convinced the common good requires is in accordance with the will of the unseen spirit patriarchs and divinities of the tribe, and so they declare to the people that to secure divine favor and avert divine wrath, to secure prosperity in basket and store and victory over their adversaries, they must fulfil not only ceremonial but also ethical requirements. When, to proffered rewards and threatened punishments in this life, is added the thought that the same unseen potentates will rule and continue their favor or disfavor in a life to come, religion becomes a yet more stupendous agency of social control.

Two distinct tendencies in the development of religions are recognized by scholars. The first may be called the priestly tendency and the second the prophetic; the first is based chiefly on fear, the second more on hope and love; the first inculcates ritual requirements, the ceremonies and observances by which to court the favor of the invisible potentate and all distinctively religious demands, while it looks down upon "mere" morality, insisting far less loudly upon righteousness than upon religious conformity, but the second inculcates chiefly ethical requirements, it may even say, "Incense is an abomination unto me" (Isa. 1:13-17); "Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousand rivers of oil? . . . What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (Mic. 6:7, 8). The first approaches deity with supplication, praises and flattery, conciliation and atonement, in order to secure favor and

favours, the second trusts an ever-waiting love and does not seek special favours but finds the sufficient reward of communion in the sense of personal relation with the divine; the first is predominantly selfish, a means by which the worshiper may secure to himself the divine favor, avoid calamity, secure prosperity, and save his own soul; the second is benevolent and patriotic, prescribes the method by which to secure the common prosperity and triumph of the group, and at its highest aspires toward a universal kingdom of righteousness, the establishment of which is the supreme co-operative enterprise in which all good men combine with God, and what is "done to one of the least" of the great brotherhood is done unto the God of all; the first is conservative and reactionary, ever calling upon men to maintain "the religion of their fathers," and unwilling that any belief or practice regarded as religious should be abandoned or modified; the second is progressive, always adapting its requirements to existing exigencies and likely to say, "Ye have heard that it was said unto you by them of old time . . . but verily I say unto you"—that requirements once thought essential are unimportant and that only vision that distinguishes the ethically fundamental from matter of observance and opinion and applies universal principles to the present demands of society can fulfil the will of God.

IV. INSPIRATION AND MIRACLE

The fourth root from which religious beliefs and practices have grown is found in inspiration and miracle. These are unusual psychic states and unusual events which are ascribed to supernatural agency.

By the words inspiration and miracle I here refer to realities. In a prescientific age with a people among whom religious beliefs are already established miracle tales spread and grow with great facility, but it is real events and experiences that play a part in the origination of such beliefs.

Between inspiration and miracle no absolute line need be drawn, but we will first give attention chiefly to inspiration. It is said that "by far the majority of the impressions on our senses leave no trace in conscious recollection, although they are stored in the records

of the brain." According to this view the subconscious stores are our capital, our states of consciousness are the interest we collect, and all our past experience is on deposit. It is sufficiently impressive to think that even a major part of the sights and sounds and thoughts that were ever present to our vivid consciousness are stored as records in the recesses of memory and that from this vast half-hidden accumulation we draw the interpretations that give meaning to the perceptions and thoughts of each passing moment. We have not only this vast hidden store, we have also hidden processes of combination and recombination, of fermentation and growth, among these hidden elements. It is even said that such subconscious action "is not only common but practically if not absolutely constant," and even if we are staggered at the thought of its continuity we may all admit that "the results of this unperceived labor of our minds are often far more valuable than those of our intelligent efforts." Now and then, under stimulating or otherwise favorable conditions, one may experience an uprush out of the stores of his mentality, so far beyond his ordinary powers and containing conceptions and conclusions that have been reached by a process of which he has been so unconscious, that he says, "This is not mine, it has been given me!" Thus the poets and the novelists often speak. Most of the great art work of the world has been of this character; it is everywhere spoken of as the product of inspiration. In this respect as in some others religious revelation resembles art.

A state of concentration and eager expectancy is favorable to such experience, so that the earnest prayer of faith is likely to be answered by consolations and decisions. An experience that is eagerly desired and at the same time sought and expected is naturally produced by auto-suggestion, so that the "seeker" is likely soon to cry out, "I've got it, I've got it." The presence of an expectant surrounding group and similar experiences on the part of others effectively heighten the power of auto-suggestion.

Dreams also are upswellings out of the unconscious. They are likely to be closely related to recent or intense waking states. Thus, for example, those whose death has been recently witnessed are

likely to be seen in dreams and this powerfully confirms belief in life after death—not necessarily in immortal life, for at least some savages have not formed that concept, but believe that those who are no longer seen in dreams or remembered by the living are spiritually and totally deceased. Because of the close relation between waking thoughts and dreams the latter frequently suggest answers to problems of the waking life, and even when this relation to any reality is least, still the thoughts that come with waking are likely to interpret the dream into some connection with themselves. Moreover, the elements contained in dreams, however fantastically they may be recombined, are all afforded by previous mental states and so they are likely to corroborate and powerfully confirm the beliefs already held.

The last is also true of visions seen in trance, and other abnormal states. Especially death-bed visions are likely to confirm, as with ocular demonstration, faiths concerning the life to come. Visions and hallucinations are common in disease, and often occur in the final disturbance of the brain that precedes dissolution, and at that time the mind is full of thoughts and hopes or fears concerning the hereafter, and established beliefs are not unlikely to visualize themselves.

One of the widespread practices of early religions is to induce the physical states that are accompanied by hallucinations. Inhaling of gases, long abstinence from food, dances carried to the point of exhaustion are among the familiar means of obtaining trances and visions.¹

Quite commonly boys, at the time of initiation into manhood, are expected to secure by aid of fasts and vigils some vision, revelation, or ecstatic state. The breaking-down of normal nervous co-ordination is a cultivated art so that among certain peoples, as the African Zulus, it is said that "any adult can cast himself or herself into the hypnotic state." Those with especially unstable nervous systems are generally regarded as religiously gifted and likely to become medicine men, priests, or priestesses. The supernatural origin of the mental states thus obtained is confidently assumed and unintelligible babblings are regarded as mystic utter-

¹Davenport, *Primitive Trails in Religious Experience*; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

ances in unknown tongues. Even in America and in present times a person who becomes cataleptic under great religious excitement is sometimes spoken of as "possessed by the Holy Ghost."

And now as to miracles, any strange and unexplained event is practically certain to be taken, by people who are in a prescientific stage of development, as a miracle. The miracles which especially deserve our attention are the miracles of healing. The power of the mind over the body is now an established fact. The action of the mind not only constantly controls our voluntary muscles, but also, in common experience, it causes the vital organs to alter their operations, so that the cheek flushes or blanches, the heart palpitates, the functions of the alimentary canal and of the liver, salivary and other glands are stopped or quickened or perturbed. The great majority of diseases (it is said four-fifths) are caused by irregularities in the functioning of the organs rather than injuries to the organs themselves. This being so, how vast a power over health and disease has the mind! As the mind through the nerves can absolutely control the voluntary muscles, so it seems that scarcely less absolutely can it control all the functions of the body. If one were to be as certain that his heart would double, or abate by half, its beating at a given hour as he can be that he will leave his office for his home at that hour, the effect upon his heart would apparently be little, if at all, less certain than that upon his muscles of locomotion. The facts in substantiation of such a view are exceedingly numerous.¹

¹ A Frenchman of rank was condemned to death for a crime, and his friends, willing to avoid the scandal of a public execution, allowed him to be made the subject of an experiment. He was told that he must be bled to death. His eyes were bandaged, and his arm having been lightly pricked a stream of warm water was made to trickle down it and fall into a basin, while the assistants kept up a running commentary upon his supposed condition. "He is getting faint, the heart's action is becoming feebler; his pulse is almost gone," and other remarks of the sort. In a short time the miserable man died with the actual symptoms of cardiac syncope from hemorrhage, without having lost a drop of blood (*Treatment by Hypnotism and Suggestion or Psycho-Therapeutics*, 5th ed., p. 30).

Among savage tribes, in undoubted and repeated instances, the curse kills as certainly as the knife. Among Western Indians of our country, when a medicine man gathers his medicine, that is, rises to the full height of inspired volition, and utters a withering curse upon his antagonist commanding him to die, the latter knows all hope is lost. Sometimes he drops dead on the spot, or at best lingers through a few days of misery (Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, pp. 90-100).

The power of the mind over the body is not only for cursing and death, but also for blessing, health, and recovery. "A mind to live" and "the expectation of recovery" as well as "the welcoming of death" have their direct effect. Scientific books are now written concerning the part of suggestion in therapeutics.¹ "In all ages wonderful cures, real amid a multitude of shams, have been wrought at holy places dedicated to various saints of various cults." Of the throngs who for centuries have sought and still seek healing at Mecca, at the sacred rivers and shrines of Hinduism and Buddhism, in the Grotto of our Lady of Lourdes, before the holy coat of Treves, and at a hundred other holy places of the Catholic church by no means all have been disappointed. "Touching for the king's evil did no doubt effect many cures." Great numbers of healers in all lands and ages, from the savage medicine man to Alexander Dowie, and of all degrees of sham and of sanctity from charlatans who inspired faith in doctrines that to them were pure pretense, to Martin Luther, Dorothea Trudel, and many other believers in divine intervention in behalf of the sick, have taken practical advantage of the mind's power over the bodily functions. They have inspired confident expectation of recovery by appeal to the most various beliefs, and the confident expectation has caused effects that have confirmed the belief, whether it was belief in the power of Gunga or of Allah, and whether the prophet were Brigham Young or the reverent and saintly Charles Cullis.

Out of the "four roots" which we have now described there have grown masses of the most various belief and practice, characteristic of peoples of every stage of ethical advancement. But quite as impressive as the variety of these beliefs are the resemblances between many of them. Similar beliefs about the zoöomorphic cosmogony are widely diffused, and were participated in by the early Semites whose traditions we inherit. Beliefs concerning the hereafter exhibit many interesting similarities. Various peoples possess a cycle of myths based upon the conflict of nature, of day and light with night and darkness, of summer and warmth with winter, cold, and storm, of youth with age, health with disease, life

¹ See a selected bibliography in *Hypnotism and Its Applications to Practical Medicine*, by Otto Georg Wetterstrand, M.D., translated by Henrik G. Peterson, M.D.

with death, good with evil, and hold that victory will not always rest with the powers of darkness, for as they believe in great heroes, conquerors, teachers of useful arts and virtues who have lived in the past so also they have for the future a messianic hope.

The foregoing discussion has not raised the question whether the religious beliefs of the tribes of mankind correspond with any reality, but has only traced the method of the origins of these beliefs, considered as prevalent social phenomena. Human intelligence, developed in connection with fitting a tiny round of activities to certain superficial aspects of a very limited environment, is at first no more adequate to comprehend in detail the whole and ultimate truth about the universe than man's voice and hearing are adequate to maintain converse with the inhabitants of the planets that revolve about some fixed star. Science has somewhat widened the narrow circumference of man's knowledge and replaced his earliest guesses, but has not illuminated the telescopic spaces of his ignorance. The more man's knowledge grows, the vaster his estimate of that which lies beyond the compass of his senses. At first he imagined nature spirits in the form of men or beasts, long he conceived the methods of creation on the analogy of human artifice. Later he has begun to get some hints of a method of creation far more divine than man's imagination could have invented, to see that the power at work in nature does not operate by the contraction of muscles, that a universal intelligence cannot depend upon the neuroses of a brain, that power and intelligence independent of organic mechanism may well be freed from boundaries of space, or limitations of attention, that the words omnipotent and omnipresent may have real meaning, and that the power and the intelligence that are adequate to the continuous causation of all the phenomena of such a universe as this cannot be portrayed in human terms and under a bodily semblance.

All savages and all children are idolators—in the sense that they tend to imagine visible embodiments of divinity. The God of childhood is likely to be “a benevolent old gentleman with a long white beard.” We first shrink from chiseling or painting him, not because we doubt that he has a limited and sensible shape, but because we think that we know his form and features imperfectly,

as we do that of a relative whom we have never met, and because we think our art inadequate. In the Middle Ages, artists confident of their pictorial powers did not hesitate to paint portraits of Jehovah. There is no fundamental difference between the worship of a god whose features are portrayed in stone or upon a canvas and worshipping one whose idolon is conceived in human form within the mind. As we have seen, probably no men were ever idolaters in the crude sense of worshipping images as more than the representation of an unseen being, and probably no people that has risen high has been free from the tendency to make of its God an idolon in spacial form. When the beliefs of any people seem to us utterly absurd we may be almost if not quite certain that it is because we do not understand them or get at their point of view. Perhaps, for some purposes it does no harm for men to think of God in terms of human personality, but they should remember that he is more than can be comprehended in those terms. As one cannot drink the Amazon, but afloat upon its mighty bosom may dip up from those waters in a cup as much as he can drink, so we who live and move and have our being in the infinite, although we cannot conceive the infinite, may slake our soul's thirst with thoughts of God in terms of human personality, judging that our thought is not then more than the truth but immeasurably less.

VALUE AND SOCIAL INTERPRETATION

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The basic fact of value consists in a certain restlessness on the part of the will, and the allaying or satisfaction of this restlessness. To understand the nature of this restlessness, as well as the type of realization which is possible, we must first glance at the canalization and organization¹ of the will in its biological, psychological, and social aspects.

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF VALUE

Biological presuppositions.—To understand the basis of value, we must first take account of the congenital organization of the will as indicated by instinctive capacity and temperament. The will as we find it is already canalized in the form of certain typical tendencies, which are of vital importance in the orientation of life to its environment. Instincts furnish the fundamental springs of action and interest. While much modified in the course of experience and organized into various patterns of sentiment and disposition, the instinctive impulse still furnishes the primal pressure of life. We cannot understand social association without taking into account such impulses as the tender emotion and gregariousness. They lie at the basis respectively of the two most fundamental institutions in human development, the family and the clan. In order to understand the zest of competition and rivalry in human affairs, we must hearken back to the instinctive tendencies which furnish a constant motive and pressure for such activities. To understand the zest in the search for truth, we must take account of the primal instinct of curiosity. To appreciate the meaning of

¹ The term canalization as here used has reference to the forming of special tendencies for adaptation to special types of stimuli, while organization has reference to the correlation of tendencies and beliefs.

aesthetic activity, we must recognize a certain fundamental organization which makes us take delight in certain combinations of sound, color, and movement. The past and the future of man are thus written in his instinctive constitution—the primitive appetites which he shares with the brute, and the love of truth and beauty which furnish the program of his destiny. These instinctive capacities furnish both the limits within which realization is possible and the type of realization for each particular individual. Defectiveness in the scale of instinctive endowment must mean a corresponding defect in realization. Special endowment in some particular direction furnishes the opportunity of distinguished realization in that direction, whether it be artistic or practical.

This does not mean that we can compound in an arithmetical way the later sentiments and dispositions out of the primary tendencies. To understand the later complex organization, we must respect its own uniqueness. The organization itself is not a mere reshuffling of certain elementary constituents, but is productive of new dispositions with new possibilities of value. The elemental impulses are transformed and reconstituted in the chemistry of life. But still we can recognize the reminiscences of the tiger and the monkey in human nature. These traits bear evidence of their descent at least. We must also take account of certain tendencies which are prophetic of a higher order of life; which are indicative of man's peculiar destiny.

The interrelation of emotional dispositions into sentiments, as well as their individual organization, is in part foreshadowed in the congenital structure of human nature, however much it is complicated by later intellectual organization. The rudimentary sentiment of love, for example, must be regarded as innately present. Even in its most primitive form the parental disposition shows its interrelation with such other dispositions as anger when the object is threatened, fear for its safety, as well as numerous organized tendencies for the care and succor of the offspring. The same could be shown for hate, curiosity, and other fundamental sentiments. What the later intellectual organization does is to complicate vastly the number of tendencies interrelated, as well as to make the sentiment more definite and conscious in terms of its typical object.

The more general fact of temperament, too, has a good deal to do with the nature of our activities, the strength and persistence of their realization, and particularly with the manifestations of feeling in connection with our activities. Some temperaments are slow, others quick in their response; some forceful, others weak; some warm, others cold; some flare up quickly with violent fluctuations of feeling, others have a steady tone with a cheery or melancholy level. Temperament thus enters as a fundamental factor into our capacity for enjoyment. It determines to a large extent the difference in the threshold of satisfaction as between different individuals and as between different races.

These primitive presuppositions of instinctive endowment and temperament enter into the fundamental texture of life throughout. They are elicited and recognized in the more conscious processes of life, but they remain the comparative constants in the complex movement of our experience. Without understanding these presuppositions, the complexer organization is left in the air.

Psychological presuppositions.—We must furthermore take account of the intellectual canalization of the restlessness of the will. The primitive impulsive values are transformed and re-created into new patterns with the development of the higher intellectual activities. Memory enables us to conserve past values and to live them over again indefinitely. The values of the past come to figure thus in two contexts. We must recognize the context of the past, with the values of realization and failure which this implies; but the past context, besides its own value, borrows a living present value from its relation to our present purposes. This means sometimes the enhancement of the values of the past by recognizing further implications of development which could not be realized at the time. The movement of the past is taken up and adds its energy to ever-larger organizations of human experience, and so the joys and sorrows of the past may become intensified by the consciousness of the further success and failure to which they contribute. It is also a well-known fact that the values of the past may sometimes be reversed from the point of view of the later movement of the self. What seemed success at the time becomes failure in the further reorganization, with corresponding disappointment; what seemed

hardship and misfortune at the time may from the point of view of the later moment be seen to contribute to a larger realization. Thus the values of the past are ever transmuted, ever re-created into new patterns, ever shifting in color, with their function in the larger development of life.

What memory does for the past, imagination does for the future. By means of imaginative selection and reconstruction, we are able, in part at any rate, to anticipate the future, to know its values in prospect. Such values are again subject to transformation in the actual carrying out of the process. They may shift their tone from positive to negative, from harmony to discord, and from discord to harmony in accordance with the actual movement of the will in mastering its situation.

Not only are we able to prepare for and to enjoy the future by means of constructive imagination, but we are able to create new worlds for the free play of our activities, the world of pure mathematics, of fairyland, of artistic activity, and thus to enhance indefinitely the values of life. Thus we add to the meager situations of actual life an indefinite number of opportunities for stimulating the emotions. This applies equally to the negative values of unpleasant foreboding and to the positive anticipations of unimpeded play. Infernos and Paradisos are alike the product of creative imagination and eke out indefinitely the meager values of everyday attainment.

The more somber creative activities of abstraction and generalization, of induction and deduction, have their tone and value as well; and in lives organized in those directions these may be fully as intense and absorbing as those of the freer play of creative intelligence. Each type of intellectual activity has thus its own kind of value, which can be understood only by taking account of the particular organization of the will. In each type there is the ever-shifting play of values, as past tendencies are successfully or unsuccessfully reorganized into the more complex patterns of life. In each case the elemental impulses do indeed furnish the basis of energy and zest, but they are vastly transmuted in the new organizations; and the organization itself, with its redirection and transmutation of the past, is ever a source of new values. The world of value is thus fundamentally a creative world. The reflection upon

values, in following out the implications, in taking up the past into new creative situations, is itself a source of values. To understand the world of values, therefore, we must understand the laws of intellectual recompounding of the primary experiences.

Sociological presuppositions.—In order to understand the world of values, we must also take into account social organization—the social matrix into which our consciousness is born and in which it must find its meaning and definite fulfilment. Psychology in the past has been too prone to treat mind as a subcranial affair. Whatever justification such treatment may have for the abstract purpose of psychological description, it is an artificial method at best. Mind is organized and receives its content from the already developed world of social tendencies, of which the individual forms a part. Values as we find them in adult experience are largely the result of social emphasis, suggestion, and organization. This social world of accumulated experience we assimilate largely at second hand. Society is ever at our elbow admonishing and compelling conformity to its standardized estimates of value. It bribes us with rewards, it threatens us with punishments, it exercises its constant pressure to make us into its likeness. Our instinctive and intellectual activities are thus canalized and organized in the directions approved by the social mind. For the most part, we find it easiest to follow the beaten track, to be carried on the wave of social energy. What we choose and value is largely the result of our desire to live as part of society and win approval within it. Our own tendencies and needs are transformed into the socially organized life of our day. In desiring a dress, a woman does not want it merely as clothes, but as it is socially approved by the fashion of the day, however poorly it may serve the purpose of clothes. She does not desire to be immodest, if the fashions are such, but to conform and excel within social standards. And we cut our other activities, our thoughts and ambitions, to conform to the styles of the time. Even though we would be original, we must still react to the background of organized experience, and if we succeed in our originality, it is by divining the deeper trend of this experience. Novelty and conformity are alike to be understood with reference to the social matrix and its pressure.

THE VALUE SITUATION

The nature of value.—We have seen that value somehow has to do with the restlessness of the will and the canalization and organization of this restlessness into definite activities with their typical objects. Value may be defined as the congruity of an object of activity with the organized tendencies of the will which seeks realization in terms of the special situation. This must mean congruity¹ with the instinctive and temperamental tendencies as intellectually organized into the social network of definite relations. Values are first of all standardized for us by the systematic purposes of society. It is this standardization into which we are educated, and which for the most part we unquestioningly accept. If value is defined as a realization of a more or less organized tendency in terms of the object to which it points, or as the congruence of an object with the direction of organized activity, we find that there are two factors of which we must take account to understand the meaning of value. These two factors are organized tendency and feeling. Of these factors, I regard organized tendency as the primary and feeling as the secondary factor. The two are relatively independent variables. The strength of the desire depends upon the strength of the original impulse and its organization into the network of intellectualized and socialized tendencies. The strength of the particular impulse itself may be relatively weak, as in the case of the later ideal tendencies, but its organization with other tendencies such as pugnacity may give it preponderating strength in the determining of the choice of values. The strength of the feeling in a particular individual depends upon the struggle or resistance in the attainment of the end and upon the postponement of this attainment. Organized tendency means steady pressure through all kinds of weather. It is a constant through indefinite stretches of time in accordance with the complexity of its realization. Feeling flares up into emotion and goes down again with the resolution of the conflict and the more fluent movement of realization. Feeling is likely to be strongest with natures least organized, as in such

¹ The aspect of congruence has been emphasized in Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, pp. 281-84, a book replete with suggestions for a theory of value. A similar concept, that of harmony or fitness, is beautifully expressed in Palmer, *Nature of Goodness*.

cases the ups and downs are more numerous. The relatively unorganized life of childhood and early youth furnishes us the most conspicuous examples of joys and sorrows, of the ups and downs of emotional life. It varies too with temperament, some temperaments being peculiarly of the hair-trigger type, ready to burst forth into explosive energy and emotion, while other temperaments manifest a steady tenor of activity with a correspondingly permanent level of feeling.

The steady pressure of organized conation may have but little feeling or emotion accompanying it. We might contrast the French attitude at the beginning of the present war with its unbounded enthusiasm, and the British attitude with its quiet, undemonstrative, but "grim determination." It meant to stay in to the finish whatever the cost, yet the emotional loyalty was largely suppressed. Some of us come to do almost everything with a grim determination—even playing and eating. The realization of an organized aim through years of ill-health, as in the case of Herbert Spencer, or in doing much of our work past the threshold of fatigue, may even have a negative tone of feeling. Feeling depends upon the visceral and sex systems of an organism, their health and buoyancy; desire depends upon the organization of the conative tendencies, and so is comparatively constant, however much feeling fluctuates. In the organized life of the will, feeling tends to become largely neutral—the striving of the business man for success through years of toil, the long plodding of the scientist in the mastery of his tools and in the accumulation of his facts. Large stretches of a life of achievement may be dreary and desolate, so far as feeling is concerned; and at best the attainments in a life with a large ideal fall far short of the ambition, with a corresponding sense of failure. Scientific instruments in such cases of organized activity will probably indicate but slight fluctuations in the conditions upon which feeling depends. There are sometimes of course the more marked variations—the conspicuous success or failure in the turn of business, the lucky hit of the scientist, and these have indeed their strong affective tone—but they are a comparatively small part of life's activity and in many lives may scarcely exist.

The strength of the feeling may often show itself in what are comparatively trivial aspects of life, while the more fundamental values of life remain largely neutral. A man's attitude toward his home, his relation to his happy family of beautiful wife and children, his loyalty to his country, or to his religion, may indicate but little affective fluctuations and, if undisturbed and unimpeded, may have largely a neutral tone, while his consciousness of becoming bald may be a matter of considerable fretfulness. And yet it is not to be supposed that the man values his hair more than his family or his country. We cannot, therefore, regard feeling as the measure of value. Organized desire must be regarded as the more essential and as the constant condition.

If feeling cannot be regarded as the primary condition of value, the existence or at least the possibility of feeling must be regarded as a *sine qua non* of value realization.¹ A machine may grind out products in a thoroughly satisfactory manner, but to the machine itself there can be no such fact as value. Somehow, therefore, realization must be *felt*, or at any rate be capable of being felt, in order that we may speak of value at all. While the irksome activities may prove to be more valuable than the pleasant diversions, and while an organized aim makes us comparatively independent of the ups and downs of fortune, still in the further realization of life the agreeable feeling or in any case the sense of being at ease in one's situation is an index of successful activity.

The threshold of feeling varies with temperament and with the organization of tendencies. As the former is a constant in a particular life, we can leave it out of consideration.² With little organization as in childhood and in some natures throughout life, the threshold is particularly low. It takes but little to stimulate the child to joy. The simplest toy may be an occasion of great merriment. The smallest disappointment for the time being is unalle-

¹ We cannot eliminate feeling from satisfaction altogether, as seems to be done by Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, 1909, chap. v.

² There are other variables which affect the threshold from time to time, such as surplus energy and fatigue. Their influence, however, decreases with organization of tendencies. There are also pathological conditions which affect the organic bases of feeling. But from these we must abstract here.

viated in its bitterness by any perspective of the future. In the organized life, the affective threshold is correspondingly high. Feeling varies in inverse ratio to organization, so that with habit feeling falls to zero; yet, if there were no threshold of feeling, we should become mere machines and value would be impossible.

We are now in a position to understand certain ambiguities in the use of the terms "value" and "interest." We sometimes use the term "value" or "interest" in the singular, having reference particularly to the affective state at the time. We sometimes use these terms in the plural, having reference to the objects which satisfy an organized system of tendencies. Both terms have their genetic significance in the development of our consciousness of value. In the primitive value situation, the tendencies are relatively unorganized and the object correspondingly accidental. In this case values become the momentary likes or dislikes that are stimulated by the particular occasion. As our conative life becomes organized in terms of intellectual machinery and social institutions, value comes to mean, not merely the momentary feeling, but that which *can* satisfy the organized tendencies. Having eaten our Christmas dinner, we do not desire food, yet still we recognize that food is desirable because the appetite for food is a recurrent impulse, and so we prepare for further emergencies. While our mind is bent upon a particular type of realization, a social engagement for example, a business interruption may be emotionally unwelcome; and yet we recognize the value of attending to our business. Value no longer becomes the fulfilment of a mere momentary set of the will, but has reference to other tendencies as well in the complexly organized life. Moreover, while certain types of realization may have no direct bearing upon our own individual needs, we may recognize their bearing upon the needs of others, and the realization of such activities becomes valuable as part of a socially organized life. Hence, the plural of values or of interests, as having reference to a complex intellectual and social organization, comes to take the place in our consciousness of the feeling of value as a momentary affair. This again goes to illustrate the primary importance of organized tendency as contrasted with the more secondary though essential function of feeling.

If we look now at the value process as such—the whole series of activities involved in the realization of an organized tendency in terms of its object—we must recognize certain implications. Realization implies, for one thing, persistence or identity within the process of realization. This applies equally to the aspect of organized tendency and to the object toward which it aims. To be conscious of realization, the tendencies which strive to be realized must be relatively persistent and the object striven for must be relatively constant. To be sure, both tendency and object receive new significance in the process; but if every moment were entirely a new fact with no reminiscence of the past, we could be conscious neither of tendencies realized nor of an object attained. In either case the striving would become meaningless—a mere restlessness without aim or fulfilment.

There must further, in order to have a sense of realization, be a consciousness of movement or development. On the conative side this means the satisfactory organization of tendencies, with the intellectual machinery which this implies. In its objective aspect, it means the successful mastery of the situation and the transforming it into terms of the particular need. The will must not be wholly balked or stare at mere vacancy. There must be the consciousness of control, of redirection, of transformation, in order to have a sense of realization.

There must, thirdly, be a consciousness of achievement, of agreement of the consequences of the operation with the direction of the process, of organized desire as satisfied in terms of its object. If nothing comes of the movement; if the plot does not take form in its material; if the development stops in the middle, the process is not truly valuable. This is easily seen in the simpler processes of realization with their periodic restlessness and striving for fulfilment. In the more complexly organized activities it is true that no climax may be reached, each moment of the process leading on to other moments. Within an indefinitely complex scheme, such as the search for truth, the end can never be completely realized. Yet here too there must be, in some measure, the consciousness of achievement. While a stage in the process cannot be regarded as a thing in itself, yet it must be felt to contribute in some measure

to the total movement of a life's plan, even though this partial success may be subject to further revision and rearrangement in the process as a whole. The consciousness of something done, some degree of success, is an indispensable part of the sense of realization, though in the fully organized life this does not permit of any final climax. This is why the Greeks were averse to praising a man till he was dead.

The value judgment.—Value as we have treated it so far is a part or an aspect of a complex life-organization. We have taken it in its concrete matrix as implying as its background, not only impulsive tendencies, but the intellectual and social organization of experience and the executive aspect of conduct. For purposes of science it is necessary to abstract from this concrete situation and to single out the value aspect itself for our consideration. This singling out of an aspect of experience and making it explicit in relation to a context is an act of judgment; in terms of value, it is an act of evaluation.

In the case of values, as in the case of sense qualities, it is possible to distinguish logically between the content of the judgment and the act of judgment itself. In the case of sense qualities, this separation is facilitated by the fact that qualities must be recognized as part of other contexts besides the context of judgment. Our perception of a quality may be a judgment, but a quality need not be perceived in order to exist. It may be a fact to another consciousness or it may exist in a context which, so far as we can see, is independent of any consciousness. Vast geological eras, with their changes, passed before our consciousness on this earth existed. In the case of values the problem is somewhat more subtle because values are fundamentally dependent upon mind. They cannot exist except as realizations or possible realizations of an organized will. Here, therefore, it would seem to be more difficult to distinguish between the act of judgment and its value content. But here, too, we are aided by the social organization of activity. Values are not dependent, at any rate, upon our momentary judgment. They may be part of a socially organized system of realization quite independent of any individual consciousness of them. There are values in the past, too, of which we must take account,

but which do not depend for their existence upon the present individual consciousness of realization. While values, therefore, are somehow bound up with the organization of the mind and its consciousness of realization, we have ample opportunity in the complexity of value to distinguish between the individual judgment of value and value as a content.

The value judgment, moreover, must not be confused with the theoretical judgment, making due allowance for the abstraction in each case. Value judgments do of course imply intellectual judgments and intellectual judgments do have their value; but it does not follow that the value judgment is a mere intellectual judgment. Our reference in the case of the value judgment is to a value context, organized in the case of the individual into sentiment and in the case of society into definite objective systems of value. Take for example our aesthetic judgments of value. What we are here concerned with is not the cognitive significance of our judgments, but their relation to a scale of preference, individual and social. The individual preferences have already been organized with reference to the prevailing social scale of values, though sometimes they may become critical of this scale. Our placing of the particular objects in a series or system has to do with the degree of satisfaction which they furnish us compared with other objects of the type. Value, in other words, has its own type of organization and its own method of judgment. Verbal abstraction, while important for purposes of communication, is not of the essence of the value judgment. Our preferences become clear and distinct in relation to the various objects upon which they are exercised. Our emphasis here has to do with an appreciation scale, not with description. Abstract symbols become of importance only if we wish to record or communicate our judgments.

It is unnecessary to point out how thoroughly social is this whole process of value judgment. In value judgment as in theoretical judgment, it is social pressure in the way of social problems and perplexities which raises consciousness above mere submergence in the evanescent likes and dislikes of the situation. We can no more understand our first-hand value judgments than the second-hand judgments, excepting in terms of the social matrix of which they are

a part. Our first-hand value judgments are indeed made in terms of personal experience. They indicate the merits which the object has for us in terms of our tendencies. But in the first place, our tendencies have already been organized in terms of social systems of evaluation. That, in the beginning at any rate, satisfies us which has the stamp of the valuation of our group. And even in the more conscious and critical processes of valuation, we are still largely subject to our age. The desire for conformity or for novelty is itself in a large measure of the temper of the age. In an age which emphasizes conformity to tradition, such conformity becomes valued accordingly. In an age which yearns for new things, novelty is equally striven for. Few have the courage to stand out; and they do so as a result of another kind of social loyalty than the one prevailing. The organized souls, as well as the social drifts, receive their inspiration from some other soul, past or present, but best of all from a living master.

How subtle is this social interplay in everyday life! How little we live by our own testing; and much of that testing is itself modified by organized or by chance suggestion and our finding is prejudged. We are prone to regard that as beautiful which conforms to the organized standards of the times and to be suspicious of new movements in art. This holds even more as regards the introducing of new gods into our practical life. How our values rise and sink, again, with chance suggestion. You think well of someone; and some friend, or even acquaintance, suggests a fault and spoils the harmony. You are indifferent, and someone else's enthusiasm warms your admiration. Who has not felt it—marrying a wife or not marrying, selecting a suit of clothes, a college, a church, a friend? In the world of values, who can say I am myself and myself alone? The scale of values with its subtle balance is indeed a social scale, and in weighing values we are weighing to a large extent social influences rather than the direct relation of things to us, if indeed, there are any such relations. However individual our strivings, however remote from the market place, however seemingly isolated, we desire to live with our fellows, to win social commendation, to be well thought of at least in the future, to be counted and approved of in the clearing-house of history, and to have our values

standardized—to have them stamped even as gold is stamped. We may select our judges very differently—the crowd or the select few, the present or the future; but through it all we move within the gravitational bonds of society.

If this is true of our first-hand value judgments, how much more of our second-hand judgments. And most of our values we accept necessarily as standardized for us by society. It is the organized social matrix which judges in us for the most part rather than we ourselves. And they come to seem our own values, because we have already, more or less unconsciously perhaps, assimilated the social standards. In this assimilation mere psychological contact necessarily counts. We accept the values of those about us, repeated as they are from day to day in our experience. Some, however, have greater weight than others in influencing our attitude. They may have the prestige which comes from superior personal qualities and strength of affirmation, or it may be the prestige which comes from superior position, the dazzle of circumstance, but in any case they serve to inspire admiration for their own type of value in proportion to our own lack of critical organization in that particular direction of activity. Mere numbers too—what everybody feels about it—tend to overawe us. We come to feel that there must be something wrong with one whom everybody criticizes, or something particularly meritorious about what everybody admires. It is hard for us to break away from the tyranny of majorities.

We cannot, however, reduce values altogether to social relations. We must take into account the surd of our own instinctive and temperamental endowment. It is this which furnishes the possibility, the raw material, of social organization. And it is this which in the last analysis, when raised to consciousness through social pressure, must give us the variations which make new values and interpretations of value possible. Only so can we have progress in evaluation.

If we now stop to consider in more detail the content of the value judgment, we find that our preferences imply certain qualitative distinctions and certain differences in the intensity of values as related to one another. There has been considerable controversy as regards the value qualities. Some have regarded values

as having only the qualities of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Pleasures differ not in kind, but in quantity, they hold. This controversy, however, has been due in large part to identifying value either with affections or with feelings. We are not interested here in the abstract qualities of affection which some profess to have verified in introspection.¹ When they tell us that there is only one quality of pleasantness and one of unpleasantness and that these vary only in intensity and duration, their finding is indeed obscure. It seems that introspection has here played the trick, which it has so often played, of substituting words, class names, for elementary perceptions. The facts which introspection reveals are feelings. And feelings at any rate seem to vary in a number of directions. Doubtless they have a sensory basis in the visceral and sex systems of sensations; and these systems present an indefinite number of variations. Sometimes the kinaesthetic and respiratory sensations seem to play a prominent part. Particularly is this true in the more exciting situations of stress and its cessation. We have seen, however, that the feelings themselves must be regarded as secondary in making up the value qualifications of reality. They may even sink to a comparatively neutral point in the organized life of realization. The primary aspect of value we have found to be congruence with conative organization. This furnishes a practically infinite number of variables, involving, as it does, not merely the tone of feeling, but the various grades of complexities of the tendencies to be realized.

Are values to be regarded as real qualities of our world? Two extreme positions have been maintained in regard to this point. One holds that values are independent qualities of things,² quite irrespective of any relation to human nature. The logic underlying this position is doubtless the same as that which has led some to regard sense qualities as existing abstractly in things. Once we can abstract from any particular context, it becomes easy to regard

¹ For the theory that affections possess only two qualities, pleasantness and unpleasantness, see E. B. Titchener, *A Text-Book of Psychology*, 1913, pp. 226 ff. Royce in his *Outline of Psychology* adds another dimension, excitement and calm; and Wundt in his classic work, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, gives three dimensions, including, besides the foregoing, strain and relaxation. See Vol. II, p. 263.

² See G. E. Moore, *Ethics*, pp. 167 ff.; also *Principia Ethica*.

qualities as independent of all contexts. We have seen that values can be distinguished from the individual moment of judging. They exist in social contexts as well as in individual experience. They come to attach to organized situations which are regarded as desirable, quite independently of whether they are momentarily desired. Hence it is easy to fall into the error of regarding them as independent of all relation to experience, i.e., as abstract qualities of things.

The other position holds that values are mere gifts to the universe by human nature and in no sense qualities of the real world.¹ This position emphasizes the importance of the emotional-volitional aspect of the quality-situation and ignores the importance of the object.

Now the truth seems to be that values are real qualities of our world and in the same sense that sense qualities can be regarded as such. Values are the qualifications of objects in the organized contexts of human nature. They give us a real insight into the character of the world. They cannot be said to exist independently of situations, but no more can other qualities. It is only as qualifications within emotional-volitional situations that value qualities can be regarded as real. Such qualities can be arranged in series according to degree of preference. The preference may be due to rankings among the qualities as in the ranking of pure colors or tones. Or it may be based upon the difference in intensity of the qualities. Or it may be based upon the organization of qualities. At any rate our preferences, like sense qualities, are capable of being related with reference to each other within the judging process.

Value qualities have sometimes been called tertiary qualities. This seems to involve a false assumption as regards values. It is based upon the distinction of primary and secondary qualities in estimating sense qualities—the latter qualities being generally regarded as more subjective and unreal. We cannot go into this distinction here, except to say that it is purely pragmatic and that the so-called secondary qualities are no less qualities of things than the so-called primary. To call value qualities tertiary would imply that they are sense qualities of a more subjective order. The

¹ For this view see James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 150, 151.

important objection here is that they are not sense qualities at all, but that they must be regarded just as primary in their own relation to reality as the sense qualities. They differ from sense qualities in two important respects. They may vary entirely independently of the stimulus. What pleases us at one time may be entirely unpleasant at another, though there has been no alteration so far as the sense qualities are concerned. Furthermore, the judgment of value is a creative judgment. Reflection upon sense qualities does not as such vary the qualities, but reflection upon value, the taking it up into new contexts of organization, produces new values and may reverse the original values. It seems best, therefore, to regard value qualities as a unique order of reality and not to confuse them with sense qualities.

While value qualities are relative to human nature as their reagent and vary vastly with organization as between different individuals and different groups of individuals, still there are certain constants which make social prediction and agreement possible. That is particularly true in the same period and stratum of development; but, as regards certain fundamental types of value, it holds for large stretches of time and is well-nigh as broad as human nature. We can still enjoy Homer, though much of his world has become a myth-world to us. Love and hate have not changed as fundamental types of sentiments since Homer's day. That there are limitations in our possibility of agreement in the world of values must of course be self-evident, since full sympathy would mean, not merely a similar organization of sentiments, but a similar world of beliefs to which those sentiments are related. A great deal of the value of the Homeric age must be lost to us who can no longer take the Homeric world as a world of reality, but must deal with it as a world of fiction. The greatness of Greek art still appeals to us in the few remaining fragments, but Greek art as an interpretation of the real life of a great people cannot be reproduced in our appreciation. Agreements in the world of values, therefore, are more limited by social conditions than agreements as regards the world of sense qualities; yet real agreements there must be, or we could have no institutions of value, no laws governing human appreciation and conduct, no standards of value.

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I

THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF VALUES

The systematic organization of values takes two directions. It has to do with the correlation of our interests with other interests, and it also has to do with the organization of our beliefs as regards the objects of value. Desiring the fulfilment of a purpose means the realization of the implications of the purpose whether as regards the relation of the sum-total of interests or as regards the beliefs about the object. In the primitive value situation the presence of an impulse makes it imperative. The presence of an object to consciousness, whether that object be fact or fancy, makes it real. In the organized life of experience, distinctions as between the authority of interest, on the one hand, and as between the degrees of reality of objects, on the other, both become part of the value realization.

Fortunately for us, we are born into a world already pretty thoroughly organized both as regards the interrelation of interests and as regards the beliefs toward the object. We adopt, first of all, the classes of values as socially organized—their rank and standardization. We similarly adopt certain organized belief attitudes toward the objects of value. We distinguish between dream and waking, fact and fancy. It is only upon later reflection, if at all, that we come to regard critically their social systematization and to try to appreciate and perhaps revise the institutional world of values in terms of our own experience.

Classes or types of value.—As a result of the judging process, social and individual, we have come to group values under certain types. Each type has its own organizing relation, found as a rule in some important sentiment which itself has become organized in terms of social objects. Any classification of values, however, must be regarded as purely pragmatic. It has been suggested that we divide values into immediate and derived values. The trouble with this classification is that the really immediate values, values with no background of intellectual organization, are for us purely speculative. No doubt they exist in some of the lower types of animal life and in the early life of the child, but they are inaccessible to us as psychologists. All our values are intellectualized and socialized values.

We may divide values for the sake of convenience into naturalistic values on the one hand and formal values on the other hand. Under naturalistic values we may include the biological values or the realization of such impulses as have not been institutionalized to any large extent in our experience, but as a rule exist in a rather amorphous form. Such satisfactions as come from ordinary physical exercise, from eating, from casual associations of human beings in smaller or larger groups, from the sex impulse, and a large number of other impulses and sentiments which remain in a relatively unorganized state may be classed under this general heading of biological satisfactions. They are, of course, subject to social suggestion and control, and they may, in individual cases, be organized into systems.

Among naturalistic values we may also class utilities, when no reference is made to an ideal of satisfaction, but when we attempt merely to establish certain ratios or laws governing the demand and supply of certain objects furnishing satisfactions. The organizing relation here is the idea of exchange. This implies some common measure of exchange, which with civilized countries takes the form of some metallic equivalent in the way of money. Gold with most civilized nations is used as a standard of exchange. The standard itself is thoroughly conventional and has no justification except its convenience. It must have a certain exchange value of its own, though that value is doubtless affected to a considerable degree by its having been made a standard of exchange.

The psychology of utility values is decidedly unsatisfactory. If utilities were determined in the way some have defined economic value, i.e., as based on marginal utility and a marginal consumer, the problem would be comparatively easy; but economic value in this artificial sense can hold only under very artificial conditions of free competition and an equally artificial human nature.¹ Utilities as we know them are determined by a number of factors, some of which are economic in the way of cost of production and

¹ For an excellent criticism of the Austrian school and of some other theories of economic value see Anderson, *Social Value*, 1911, especially chaps. iii, iv. It also contains a bibliography of some of the recent discussions of value. See especially pp. 94, 95.

capital; others are legal, having to do with certain privileges in the way of control granted by the state; others are social in the sense of fluctuations of social emphasis as in fashions; others are ethical in the way of condemnation of certain types of utilities by strong public sentiment; others are aesthetic, making craftsmanship and beauty count; others are purely psychological in the way of successful advertising, etc. The science of economics, therefore, has difficulty in finding any definite organizing relation for its facts. At any rate, values regarded as utilities have that in common that they are bought and sold; that they are statable in terms of some medium of exchange.

In formal values certain implications are raised which are not present in the naturalistic type. In the organization of formal values, we have reference, not merely to values as they actually occur, but to values as they ought to be combined under the specific organizing type. We imply that there shall be *agreement* within values—that is, that all the values pertaining to a type shall bear some definite relation to a common ideal or purpose, whether within a static or a temporal unity. We demand, further, that the values shall support each other or constitute a *harmonious* whole. We demand, in the third place, that the value shall be *clear and distinct*—that the object shall be unified in the simplest way that will satisfy the interest; and we demand finally that the formal object of value shall be *universal*—that is, that it shall appeal to all who are competent to appreciate it.

Now this formal organization of values may relate to various types of activity. We may be concerned with the value of logical activity—the search for truth. The value of truth may lie in the successful striving of the organized tendency itself—the agreement of the consequences with the implications which govern its intention. We may want to verify an hypothesis. We may want to organize a new fact into old established laws. The value, in any case, lies in the success of our curiosity in realizing its end under its own formal rules.

Truth may be satisfactory for reasons quite irrelevant to what makes it true. We may adopt the belief because it fits in with other organized tendencies—because it is satisfactory to our religious,

patriotic, or social sentiments. It is hard indeed for us to divest ourselves of the bias of our social and temperamental setting, hard for a German to believe good of an Englishman, or for an Englishman to find good in a German, while engaged in a bitter war. At any rate, we may welcome beliefs for what they bring in the way of emotional or aesthetic or other satisfactions, rather than for any intrinsic interest in the truth activity itself.

We may be concerned with the organizing relation of beauty. Here the organized object is isolated from ulterior uses for the time being, so far as this particular interest is concerned. At any rate, to be appreciated as beautiful it must be recognized as complete and satisfying in itself without reference to utilitarian or biological satisfactions. It must furnish an equilibrium of tendencies while the mood lasts, embodied now in tonal harmonies, now in color and perspective, now in sculptured marble, now in towering temples, now in flowing verse, now in the grace of the dance, but everywhere suggesting the unity, proportion, harmony, and simplicity of a whole, static or moving, of an object valued on its own account.

We may be concerned with the organizing relation of ethics. Ethics, as having to do with the proper control of conduct, implies two types of attitude.¹ It implies a definite social order—organized expectancy of cause and effect in conduct—an order enforced by definite social authority in the form of organized government or by the sanctions of custom. Life must be secure from petty interference. Each man must be able to sit under his own fig tree and to enjoy the fruits of his own labor. He must have the opportunity to realize his capacities in terms of the organized division of labor in society.

Ethics implies morality as well as law. It implies not only loyalty to the laws of the land, to organized institutions as they are, but it also implies criticism and improvement. Only by evaluating the actual organization of society in terms of formal ideals of fairness and proportion, on the one hand, and by striving to make those

¹ This conception of ethics agrees in the main, I believe, with that of Plato and Aristotle in ancient times and with that of Hegel in modern times. The tendency of late has been to identify ethics with morality. Royce's *Philosophy of Loyalty* and Dewey and Tuft's *Ethics* return in a measure to the earlier tradition in emphasizing the social side.

ideals prevail in a concrete social life, on the other hand, can the ethical sentiment be fully satisfied. It must be loyalty not merely to things established, to an order that is, but loyalty to improvement, to an ideal order.

The type of value to be organized may have reference to our concrete life of association, to love and friendship. Here, too, the significant values must be emphasized; there must be fulfilment of an ideal tendency in terms of its object. The actual bond must become clear and distinct in its significance and harmonious in its reciprocity of feeling and co-operation.

The type of value to be organized may be religious value, where the organizing relation is our attitude toward the mysterious power, toward the supernatural. This involves indeed a unification of many elemental sentiments; but we cannot regard religious reverence as we find it in the highly developed attitude of the civilized man as a mere compound of certain primitive emotions of fear and wonder and the tender emotion and other primitive dispositions. No doubt there are those and other reminiscences of simple impulses, but the ideal tendencies, which enter in, and their more abstract organization must be taken into account as well as the more primitive impulses. The significance of the religious situation from the simplest to the most complex stages of development is the sense of dependence upon a higher power and the belief that this power, if proper relations are established, can and will co-operate in the realization of our needs—at any rate of our momentous needs—however differently those needs may be conceived. The prayers of man range all the way from the primitive petitions to fill one's belly to Socrates' prayer for "the beauty of the inward man."

It can be seen now that our separation of values into distinct classes is an artificial affair and that in real life these types of value interpenetrate in all sorts of ways. We found that economic values could be understood only in connection with legal, social, ethical, and other values. Truth has its value of beauty as well as its aspect of truth. The moral and the beautiful have always been recognized as having a close kinship to each other. Religion brings into its unification ethical, aesthetic, and other values which have helped to give content to its object.

The hierarchy of values.—Values, besides being co-ordinated into classes of value, can be subordinated to each other within a scale of ranking, where some count as higher than others. There probably is no absolute scale in human experience. Giddings has arranged values with power at the top of the scale and with utility, integrity, and self-realization as the successive gradations under power. But this must be taken as a purely relative and personal arrangement. Power sometimes is estimated higher than all other values. That has been true of individuals and of nations; but if Sparta and Rome emphasized power, Athens made beauty the highest crown of values and subordinated all other values, including power, to it. With some, utilitarian values and their estimate in terms of exchange are the dominant motive of life. With others, integrity, the sense of right, occupies the uppermost place. With Kant, for example, the moral law overarches all other values like the starry heavens above.

It is impossible, therefore, to establish any absolute hierarchy for all individuals and for all ages of development. History might be written in terms of the dominant values which furnish the motives of nations and races. Sometimes the love of conflict, the emulation in the art of war, has been the dominant motive; sometimes the cupidity for territory and commercial gain; sometimes curiosity with its fascination for exploration and the mastery of the unknown; sometimes self-assertion with the pleasure in skill and excellence; sometimes the sentiment of justice with the demand for fairer relations between man and man; sometimes the religious sentiment with a zeal for the dominance of its own type of faith—these in turn, and more often in varying combinations, have dominated the current of history. But in group life, as in individual life, some values are ranked at the top, others become subordinated as means to an end—external relations to be translated into terms of the movement of the ruling passion.

Is there, then, no ultimate hierarchy or standard of values? In our practical choices we may, and in the larger number of our evaluations we generally do, go with the majority. Democracy is based upon the principle that the majority is right, or at any rate more likely to be right than the individual, and so must be obeyed

in matters of importance to the group. To be sure, not all individuals in this majority count alike. A few leaders generally formulate the inchoate feelings and beliefs of the many. We may feel dissatisfied with the verdict of the majority and turn to the élite, to the experts who are supposed to know. But they, too, are part of a social stratum of evaluation. They may be hidebound by tradition and as unwilling to welcome revolutionary, though superior, perspectives of value, as the scribes and Pharisees. Sometimes the individual is wiser than the élite. Galileo was wiser than all the authorities and would-be experts who tormented him. The new gifts of insight come to the individual; and sometimes it is the very superficiality and formalism of his age which rouses the individual genius to activity. He must combat established schools and institutions with their inherent will to live. In this struggle the new evaluations very often become recognized only after the individual is sacrificed. Organized society is likely to be retrospective—wise, looking backward. In this lies the tragedy of progress. In such a conflict, the individual may appeal to an ideal order as against existing standards. This appeal is not necessarily an appeal to the future. Indeed, it used to be an appeal to the past, to a golden age when men were reasonable, to the great prophets and sages who came before society got incrustured and who foreshadowed and made possible the greater progress. But whether the ideal order is put in the past or in the future, so far as human history is concerned, in order to be effective it must inspire a sense of living companionship, support, and ratification. It must be the faith in a present reality, which is in sympathy with our highest strivings, and which can make the higher values prevail, somehow, in the end. However strong our faith may be in such an ideal order and however absolute its validity may be, it is well to remember that *our* valuations are pragmatic—relative to our experience. They must be tested in the ongoing of the life of the race. We must not be too dogmatic, therefore, in speaking for the absolute. New adventure implies a risk—a risk which we must take courageously and in faith, hoping to approximate a little nearer to the ideal order of the universe.

The social ranking and emphasis of values have a great deal to do with what values are stimulated in individual striving and what values survive. If the social judgment, the spirit of the *Weltgeist* of which we are a part, emphasizes certain values as supremely worth while, individual genius and achievement are pretty sure to take that direction. If society puts a premium on showy preferment, on ostentatious power or the display of wealth, as it usually does, the best talents of society are sure to be drained in that direction. The more ideal values of truth and right and beauty are accordingly discouraged. They either fail to be elicited at all; or, if by dint of higher inspiration they are elicited, they fail to become effective and to survive. Plato with right complains that society is the great sophist, the real corrupter of youth.²

The emphasis of one set of values is sure to lead to the neglect and suppression of others. The emphasis of the values of beauty, as with the Athenian, may lead to the neglect of the more rugged values of righteousness. The emphasis of the values of power and efficiency, as with the Romans, is likely to lead to the neglect of higher ideal creativeness. Thus perished a large number of the most precious products of Greek genius—the majority of the dramas of the great tragedians—while barren and largely worthless libraries of rhetorical treatises, supposedly more practical in the service of the state, survived. The one-sided emphases on religious values in the Middle Ages led to the neglect and suppression of ancient culture, of the spirit of scientific discovery, and of pagan art, though it gave us in turn a new sense of religious unity and created Gothic cathedrals. The spirit of the scientific Renaissance, again, could see nothing significant in the massive architectonic of the Schoolmen; and the very name “Scholastic” became an opprobrium, though we might learn much from the Scholastics in careful habits of thought. Great nations today are bending their entire energies and genius on military power and commercial supremacy, with little respect for the creative life of other peoples and with corresponding warping of values at home. Thus we have the greatest tragedy of history, not only in the destruction of noble manhood

² See in this connection Joseph Jastrow's interesting essay, *The Qualities of Men*.

and in filling the cup of life with bitterness for millions of human beings, but in the deflection of the energies of the spirit from all that characterizes the highest in civilization.

Conversely, creativeness in any one direction is sure to be in direct proportion to social pressure and appreciation. The Golden Age of Pericles, with its supreme encouragement of ideal creativeness, set a high-water mark for achievement in art. Rome unified the world through its laws and institutions in a way that provided a permanent heritage when political Rome had perished. The mediaeval church, with splendid missionary zeal, extended the idea, if not the reality, of the fatherhood of God to all the boundaries of Europe. The Elizabethan age showed the possibilities of modern Europe in literary achievement. The Germany of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel perfected for the world an idealistic philosophy. Little Norway, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, rose to a first-class power in literature. And what can be accomplished in the destructive art of war when a great nation bends its energy in that direction is shown by the Germany of today. The same effects of emphasis can be seen in our political and social relations. That the so-called lower classes have been socially lower is not due to inherent incapacity, but to social hypnotism. Witness in modern times the progress from slavery to political equality of the masses, the growing emancipation of the industrial classes, the liberation of the woman and child. Thus the ruling sentiment of an individual and a people ranks, encourages, and suppresses the values of humanity in accordance with its organizing principle.

The unification of values.—It is the aim of social interpretation and systematization to constitute a whole of values—a happy life. This involves the correlation of the various types of values, naturalistic and formal, so that they may constitute a unity through the various stages of a life's development. It is an axiom of long standing that all human beings desire happiness. But happiness cannot be a series of discrete pulses of pleasure, a mere sum of discrete satisfactions. It must, somehow, have some organizing principle which makes the present activity refer to the past and to the future, and which is adequate to the complexity of claims within the social network in which we live and move and have our being.

While we may all desire happiness, we discern from experience that it can come only through a realized life. And so, considering the complexity of the inner life and the intricate and often clumsy organization of external conditions, there is plenty of chance to miss happiness. Yes, one might say, small chance of finding it.

The content of life varies indeed, from moment to moment, from period to period, from individual to individual, and from race to race. The relative strength of tendencies varies. In some individuals some tendency is particularly strong, in others weak or lacking. Endowment and temperament vary in individuals and peoples and affect the complexion or mosaic of the whole. In the same individual and the same people, we find that sometimes one tendency, sometimes another, predominates—now love, now hate; now self-assertion, now self-abasement; now anger, now pity; sometimes the striving for property, sometimes the striving for truth; sometimes the feeling for beauty, sometimes the zeal for righteousness; sometimes the somber mood, sometimes the cheery. In an organized life, however, some one sentiment, whether conscious or unconscious, can be seen to run through the various moments of life and give connectedness to its various parts; some theme recurs in the symphony and makes life a whole. It may be any sentiment—the love of a human being or even a dog, the striving for wealth, the passion for fame, for truth, the loyalty to some cause toward which the multitudinous details are made to converge.

If we look at the formal categories of unification, we find that these are indeed implied wherever a whole of life is being constituted. There must be *agreement*. One part of life must be seen to be consistent with the rest. There must be a common direction. This, we have seen, is furnished by any ruling sentiment. Further, there must be *harmony*. Each part, both longitudinally and in cross-section, must be seen to support the main idea and to support it in due proportion. The sort of harmony is, of course, dictated by the principal theme and the relevancy which it implies. It would be different for love, for acquisition of wealth, for truth, for beauty, for religious devotion. Then there must be *simplicity*. The leading idea must be seen clearly and distinctly in the details. The whole, too, must possess *universality*. It must be such that it

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can be socially approved—at any rate, approved by those who are competent to appreciate, whether it be a present or future gallery of spectators.

Beside these formal categories, there are other categories which pertain more particularly to the content of the moving whole. We demand the *conservation* of values. We demand that the largest number of values consistent with a whole of life shall be conserved. And conversely, we regard that as a more perfect whole which conserves the greater number of values and destroys the fewest. It is the “wrecklessness” of values which makes the history of humanity seem so irrational an affair to our limited viewpoint. Whole civilizations have perished with scarcely a trace—the civilization of the Hittites with its meager inscriptions but recently discovered, of ancient Carthage with but “a few lines in Pliny.” It is this chance element in history which makes us suspicious of such philosophers as Hegel who would interpret history as a logically cumulative system. With the growing unification of humanity we may hope for more continuity of values. But there still remains war with its irrational devastation.

We must also have regard to the *quality* of the whole.¹ While any dominant sentiment produces some type of unity, we demand that the unity shall be of the highest possible quality. It has been maintained that preference for a supposed higher type of values is in reality a preference for a greater amount of value, that quality is always reducible to quantity.² This implies a false theory of values. It assumes that values are entities which can be measured and weighed apart from the constitution of the self. But even granting this, who shall prove that a primitive unity based upon some strong instinct, where the ideal tendencies are weak or lacking or not elicited, does not furnish so great a quantity of satisfaction as the more ideal type of unity with its infinite demands and its inevitable sense of failure? Who can measure the quantity of

¹ The noblest statement of the qualitative view is to be found in J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism*.

² The theory that values can be stated entirely in terms of quantity has found classic expression in Plato's *Protagoras* and in Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation*. It has recently been maintained by R. P. Perry, *Jour. Phil., Psych., and Sci. Meth.*, XI, 161.

satisfaction as between the man and the pig, the fool and Socrates? We must regard the unity of life, which is produced by the dominance of some ideal tendency such as love of truth or right or beauty or friendship, as of intrinsically higher quality than that produced by a more primitive sentiment, though the latter, too, has its claim which must be recognized. Perfect happiness would be the realization of a human nature, complete in its endowment, in terms of all the types of stimuli of a perfect social environment. But we are at best one-sided, and our realization is limited by our endowment, on the one hand, and our opportunity, on the other. Some of us are specialized in one direction, some in another, with corresponding limitations. We are but fractional men.. And out of the variety and supplementation of values we hope to constitute a social whole, which shall make up for our individual limitations, and perhaps be greater because of them.

Since true happiness is the realization of humanity, and humanity at its highest possible level, we must will that humanity everywhere, whether in ourselves or others shall be realized and realized at its best. The realization of the whole *extent* of happiness implies not only the individual but also the social realization of humanity; its participation in a common good, in so far as this is consistent with the highest quality of the good. This means the union and participation of humanity at its highest level—not the unity of prejudice and passion. When human happiness in ourselves or others fails to conform to such an ideal it must be corrected and subordinated so as to support, if possible, the quality of the whole, or at any rate not to mar it. For we must remember that the prime condition of value is not a quantity of feeling, but the realizing of the highest tendencies of human nature.

Finally, the realization of a human whole of value must mean the *enrichment* of values. The will must seek new adventure, new fulfilment, in order that sustained happiness may be possible. Life must be creative to maintain its significance, else it retrogrades to the mechanical level. The sentiment for truth must ever find its satisfaction in new discovery, the love of beauty in new creations of beauty. Some formal themes must indeed continue, in order that the process may have unity, and in order that the past may be

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conserved in the ongoing process. But the past can be significant only in new variations, in new creative unities. To rest satisfied in the moment is to miss the significance of the process, to sell out to the devil.

It must be clear now that the organizing of happiness involves a corresponding organization of the conditions of happiness. Social institutions must be so made over as to furnish human nature the opportunity for this maximum realization. For a large number of human beings, happiness has been largely impossible, at any rate happiness of a type worthy of human nature. While the Athenian gentleman realized his dream of beauty, what about the slave? And what about the vast majority of mankind today, who are doing the drudgery of society? We have, indeed, made rapid strides during the last fifty years toward making the cumulating ideal values more accessible to the many. Public education, public libraries, public art museums show what can be accomplished by an enlightened public will in these matters. And a great deal of thought has been directed of late, and more must be directed in the future, toward making the economic conditions of the mass of human beings more conformable to ideal realization and more proportionate to their claims for happiness. This does not mean, except incidentally, the dispensing of charity, the handing things over to the neglected part of humanity by the more favored few. It must mean greater incentive to participate in a common good; greater opportunity to realize their humanity through education, through adequate wages and leisure, in such human fellowship and co-operation as their capacities may make them capable of doing. It means the removal of such conditions as destroy the security and health and peace of human beings by making them the instruments of the selfishness and vanity of the few, whether captains of industry or war-lords. With improved means of communication, with increased imagination, and with greater moral sensitiveness, the presence of conditions of misery in a large part of humanity must act to decrease the happiness of the remainder and spur to efforts for improvement. Any thoroughgoing organization of happiness must mean the joy in the common task of realizing a common humanity and the control of the means for so doing.

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THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF BELIEFS IN REGARD TO THE OBJECT

Let us turn now to the implications as regards the object of value. The organization of our beliefs in regard to the object proceeds *pari passu* with the organization of our interests. We have seen that in the primitive value situation, the presence of an object to consciousness is equivalent to a belief in its reality. There is no distinction here between grades of existence—between ideal and perceptual objects. The controversies as to whether an object must exist¹ in order to be valuable have, for the most part, missed the point at issue. In the organized value situation, the object, in order to be satisfactory, must have such existence as is implied in our expectancies with reference to it. This may mean perceptual existence, as in satisfying hunger. We do not want to eat imaginary food or to be hypnotized into thinking we have eaten when we have not. Not all value situations, however, imply the perceptual existence of the object. A mathematical proposition is said to “satisfy” the existence postulate when it harmonizes with its presuppositions and with other propositions in a logical system. It is mathematically satisfactory when it fulfils this function. It may relate to a fourth dimension. In any case, perceptual existence is irrelevant. *Alice in Wonderland* is a thoroughly satisfactory system of relations in so far as it is consistent within its imaginary world. We do not expect to verify Alice’s adventures in the world of perception. We should feel that we had gone crazy if we thought we did; and that is not very satisfactory. While the Homeric world has become for us a world of myth, we none the less enjoy the appeal which its organized values make to our imagination. When we watch a moving-picture film we should be shocked to have the characters step off the film into the audience; and it would make our flesh creep to have a madman step off the canvas, or to have marble statues take life in the manner of Pygmalion’s Galatea. To say that the value object must have existence does not, then, define the situation. To be satisfactory the object must have *such existence*—

¹ Meinong emphasizes the “existence judgment” in regard to the object of value in his important work, *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wertheorie*, 1894, Part I, chap. i. Tarde seems to take a similar point of view. See “La Psychologie en économie politique,” *Revue philosophique*, XII, 337, 338.

whether perceptual or ideal, verifiable or mythical—as harmonizes with our system of beliefs within the type of realization selected. Our expectancies in regard to the object may, indeed, be wrong. In that case the situation becomes finally satisfactory only when our beliefs have been revised so as to agree with the object which we have set ourselves. In any case the object becomes satisfactory when it exists as conceived. And this may be the filmy structure of imagination rather than “this too solid frame of things.”

What needs to be emphasized in this connection is that the belief attitude enters, as a fundamental ingredient, into the value situation. It is not merely external to it, as is sometimes implied in theories of value. That the former is the case is, of course, apparent enough in all our practical values. In business we may sometimes take a gambling chance at winning out. In some enterprises, such as mining promotion, so many unknown variables are involved that we realize that the odds are against us. But still we have a right to demand that the conditions shall be such as they are represented; that they shall conform to the expectancies which we are led to entertain. In the normally organized business of credit and exchange there are also unforeseen vicissitudes, but in investing our labor or capital, we have a right to demand that the consequences shall be such as to harmonize with our expectancies in so far as those consequences can be foreseen and controlled. We demand, in other words, that business shall be done in good faith; and our sense of realization and satisfaction imply such observance of the rules of business. We condemn selfish manipulation and the advertising of fictitious conditions as real. But belief enters into artistic values as well as practical. It makes a profound difference to our appreciation whether we believe that art interprets a real world or merely furnishes play for our imagination under such formal restrictions as our creative activity may adopt. There is a momentous difference whether we believe that Phidias is interpreting a real Zeus and a living Athene, or is merely delighting us with a myth world. The Athenians convicted Phidias of impiety, while we delight in the formal beauty of the remaining fragments. Our appreciation of the Sistine Madonna is very much affected by our being part of a certain Christian belief world. It cannot have

the same value, though it may still be art, to one who has no sympathy with that world. Art not merely fulfils certain formal requirements; but genuine art is the interpretation of a content, of the life of its age, its peculiar stratum of civilization. It makes this content clear and distinct; it selects, condenses, and frames; but it must be true to the meaning of the content to be appreciated as a realization of our will. Hence the different appeal that is made to us by such art works as the *Venus de Milo*, the *Sistine Madonna*, or the *Angelus*. The first needs a faith in the Greek gods, the second in mediaeval Christianity, the third in modern democracy, for its full appreciation. The reason that even so great a critic as Browning has found Greek art impersonal and formal, while modern art seems to him personal and passionate, is that we lack the reality feeling for the content of Greek life which made art so vital to them. We always find another civilization formal when judged by our standards—the Moslems burned the library of Alexandria, the Christians the library of Cordova; we destroy other peoples' cathedrals and art works. We don't burn our own libraries or art works for they are vital—to us.

What we have said about the existence of the object holds equally as regards its properties and its quantity. We find the object satisfactory as regards its properties when it has such properties as are implied in our expectancies. If we expect the object to be sweet and find it sour; if we desire bread and receive a stone; if we pay for woollen goods and get cotton, we are dissatisfied so far as the particular purpose is concerned. Our expectancies may, indeed, be upset in a favorable direction, when our beliefs are understatements of what we want the facts to be. We had expected to see none but strangers and we find an old friend in the crowd; we had expected but small return from our investment and discover that it is profitable; we had conceived a man as having indifferent moral qualities and find him heroic. Here there is congruity, however, with our fundamental, organized desires and the feeling is only enhanced by the unexpected realization.

As regards quantity we find the object satisfactory when it is attained in such quantity as is implied in the organized tendency. We may pray the gods to save us from embarrassing riches as well

as from grueling poverty, for wealth which interferes with our deeper purposes of achievement is no longer satisfactory. We do not want to be forced to be bankers when we have set ourselves to be scientists. Some tendencies in human nature seem to be insatiable as regards quantity. If the sentiment for ownership or for power is the controlling motive, there seems to be no limit to the quantity. Such sentiments grow with what they feed upon. Every attainment raises the threshold of satisfaction, perhaps in geometrical progression, and so makes impossible anything like permanent satisfaction or happiness. What is more, such one-sided emphasis on what should be instrumental contradicts the deeper end of life, as regards both individual and social realization. It is treating one's self, as well as others, as mere means to an end.

Even such insatiable sentiments imply, however, that the object of the satisfaction is limited, if not in its supply, at least by virtue of its artificial control. Objects which can be had without limitation, such as fresh air and sunshine in the open country, fail to impress the will as valuable even though they supply fundamental needs. We sometimes speak of them as "absolute" values; but it is the relative and limited values, the utilities which can be controlled and withheld, for which men strive. And what wealth and power strive for is unlimited control of their objects.

Some sentiments imply a definite limitation of quantity. Love in practically all birds and in some human beings limits its object to one. The higher the realization, the more circumscribed is the notion of mere quantity. Artistic creativeness and appreciation, as well as love, demand uniqueness. We do not want more than one artistic creation of a kind. We demand that the artist shall express himself again with a new soul in a new work. We do not attach a high value to mere copying. The same is true in ethical relations and in friendship. We want virtue with individuality, not mere conventional virtue. We may have more than one friend, but we don't want duplicate friends. We want uniqueness, the ministration to different purposes. We may have to find ruggedness and sweetness in different personalities, and we want both types. Even as utilities, we value objects more highly in terms of gold when they possess individuality, when they are craft-made

and not merely machine-made, even though the abstract utilitarian need might be served as well by the latter as by the former.

Finally, we demand that the object, in order to be satisfactory, shall possess such organization as agrees with the implications of the specific value attitude. This organization may have reference to external associations. If we value a painting because it is a work of Rembrandt, we are not satisfied unless it is the work of Rembrandt. We don't want even a perfect copy or a work by another artist, though it may be intrinsically just as good. But the organization implied may be intrinsic, may have to do with the relation of the object to our formal postulates. We may find the painting, even though by a master, to be unsatisfactory because it does not harmonize with our standards of art. We are disappointed by the conduct of a man when it falls short of what we have conceived him to be. In such cases the organization of the object is truly objective. If it were merely subjective we should have no one to blame or praise but ourselves. We recognize the object's own organization and approve or criticize accordingly.

In the organization of our beliefs as regards the object, as in the organization of our interests with reference to each other, we must recognize our dependence upon the social matrix of which we are a part. It is the social organization of our world of beliefs which gives us our grades of existence; which prescribes largely what properties are satisfactory, what quantity is necessary, and what organization we shall approve. We may, indeed, criticize and attempt to improve the objects of our choice; but it is with the advantage of the social background and with the expectancy of at least eventual social approval that we do so.

Of the world of values, at any rate, it can be truly said that it is an idealistic world. Not, indeed, a world of subjective idealism. Value is not merely what the individual approves or enjoys at the time. It does not rest merely on his immediate perception. It is a world of social idealism—a socially organized world in which the individual appreciates and judges. His own idiosyncracies do, indeed, count for him. There may be private and evanescent values. But over and beyond his private likes and dislikes, there is the social world of values, which furnishes organized objects of

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realization, which tests and standardizes our individual evaluations, and which gives the private evanescent values such significance as they have for the individual. Within this world, whether in loyalty to organized values as they are, or in loyalty to social improvement, we must find our realization and happiness, so far as it can be found. The world of values has, at any rate, minds for its poles of relation. It rests on human nature as a conscious organized community of interpretation. Should mind disappear, should Endymion sleep without waking again, the world of values, too, would disappear. There would remain, indeed, physical changes, but they would not be even junk. Things are but instruments in the world of values, raw material to receive the stamp of creative spirit. The real ends are selves. And the respecting of such selves—the encouraging of their realization in a reciprocal social community—is the fundamental condition of the organization of values.

VALUE AND THE UNITY OF HUMAN NATURE

If value is the congruity of an object with the specific realization of human nature, it seems clear that we must take into account the whole organization of the self in order to understand value.¹ For in order to have realization there must be an end to be realized; and this implies intellectual organization. We must also take into account the executive aspect, for successful realization implies control and action.

We are still prone to divide human nature into water-tight compartments. The latest manifestation of "faculty" psychology is the tendency at present to explain values by referring them to sentiments. We are prone to explain moral values by referring them to a moral sentiment, religious values by a religious sentiment; etc. Having coined a name for a certain aspect of the process of realization, we proceed to treat the abstraction as an entity. Now, it was important to call attention to the fact that the organization of the intellectual and executive aspects of the self involves a corresponding organization of the appreciative aspect.² Psychologists have

¹ Urban has done valuable service in showing the importance of the presuppositions of the total psychosis in understanding value. See *Valuation*, 1909, pp. 14-16.

² Important contributions to the psychology of sentiment are Shand's paper in Stout's *Groundwork of Psychology*, chap. xvi, and McDougall's *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, chaps. v, vi.

been prone to take the intellectualist view of Hegel that feeling remains indefinite and amorphous, while it is the cognitive aspect which is organized and therefore has superior claim to our attention and regard. But there is no organization of one aspect which does not involve, in so far as it is genuine and real, the organization of human nature as a whole. To indicate this parallel organization of the self, at its upper level, we have invented the term reason for the intellectual aspect of systematization, character for the volitional, and sentiment for the emotional. But these are not separate organizations. They are complementary aspects of the conscious realization of human nature. Each has to do with the whole self. Intellect is for the sake of conduct; and conscious conduct implies the realization of ends. Value has to do with the whole self in the aspect of conscious realization. There is only one organization of normal human nature.

This unity of human nature is foreshadowed in the simplest value situation, that of instinctive realization. Here we have the cognitive aspect represented by a certain specific way of perceiving the situation, the executive by the organization of a series of adaptive movements, and the appreciative by the unique satisfaction of the specific realization. The latter, we have seen, implies a specific direction, on the one hand, and a specific complex of affective factors, on the other. The case does not differ essentially in purposive realization. The complexity of the situation is here greater and the process is conscious of its own direction, forward and backward, but much depends still upon unconscious tendencies. The postponement of the satisfaction may indeed become indefinite, with its corresponding effect on feeling; but on the animal level, too, there is postponement. The wolf must sometimes hunt for days for food, and he has other instincts with a constant pressure which can be satisfied only at rare intervals. The difference is, therefore, a matter of degree.

We have seen that the organization of values involves, on the one hand, the classifying and ranking of values with reference to each other, and, on the other hand, the organization of our expectancies with reference to the object or activity. In either case the organization of value implies intellectual organization. It must be equally clear that our value attitudes and judgments imply the

cumulative organization of reactions into character. Value owes its reality and vividness to reaction. Its strength in an organized self depends, not merely upon the primitive impulse, but even more upon the organization of impulses, forged by habit into character. The worth of a value, as J. S. Mill indicated, must be measured by the hierarchy of dispositions as organized into character. It is this, too, which makes possible that sustained sense of realization which we call happiness. What we must emphasize is the wholeness of human nature in its realization. The aspects interpenetrate; they are complementary to each other in one life-process, the successful realization of which is recognized as value. There is only one organization, whatever aspects and moments we may emphasize.

Doubtless some will insist on cases where one aspect has developed comparatively independently of the others. Sentimentalists, normal and otherwise, will be dragged forth as horrid examples of the dissociation of sentiment from character or from intellect or from both, as the coupling of "meanest and wisest" has been intended to show the dissociation between reason and conduct. But as we might quote Aristotle to show that real insight, as contrasted with mere vague or drunken repetition of words, involves motor control, so we could show that the sentimentalist is chaotic in his sense of values just in proportion to the vagueness of his conceptions and the indifference of his reactions. The stogy illustrations, usually brought forth, either prove this to be true or are libels on the personalities in question, when these are estimated in their own social setting. What is at the bottom of the confusion in our judgments—on ourselves or others—in such cases is that we confuse second-hand evaluations, or the sentiments of the group, which we have imitated externally without assimilating them into our own experience, with bona fide sentiments, or our real habits of evaluation. It is easy enough to find people who indulge in pious cant and who are Pharisees at heart, but such people just serve to illustrate the principle which we have already stated. Their real sense of values is quite proportionate to their conduct; or their conduct would be different. We value things—family, country, friends—in proportion to our willingness to sacrifice for them.

The unity of human nature of which we have spoken implies, not merely the unity of abstract individual nature, but the social unity of human nature. Realization must mean realization within social groups. It may be family realization, or club realization, or national realization, or the realization of friendship or of truth; but it is always the realization of a social community. We may indeed aim at an ideal community, but even so, it is the living community which we wish to improve by such correction and inspiration as we are able to bring. The organized realization of value implies the solidarity of humanity. In its ideal creativeness and self-criticism there is implied further the unity of humanity, somehow, with an ideal order which draws us onward in our groping endeavor to realize ourselves as parts of an unseen future, and which makes us "more than we are and wiser than we know."

REVIEWS

Studies in the Marketing of Farm Products. By L. D. H. WELD and students in agricultural economics. (Bulletin of the University of Minnesota, No. 4 of the "Studies in the Social Sciences.") Minneapolis, February, 1915. Royal 8vo, pp. iv+113.

The studies which are comprised in this valuable bulletin are devoted to the very important task of collecting facts in several fields of farm marketing and of analyzing the situation in those fields so that the defects of the present system may be detected. Of the eight papers represented, Dr. Weld contributes the first, "Market Distribution," the seventh, "Co-operative Marketing of Grain in Canada," and the eighth, "The Food Supply of the Iron Range." The other papers deal with "The Marketing of Live-Stock Products in Minnesota" (by K. F. Warner), "Co-operative Potato Marketing in Minnesota" (by O. B. Jesness), "The Marketing of Minnesota Poultry" (by S. H. Thompson), "Milk Distribution in Minneapolis and St. Paul" (by W. L. Covert), and "Minneapolis Central City Market" (by R. M. Peterson), and consist of studies made under the direction of Dr. Weld by his students.

The central point of interest in these studies is the determination of what portion of the price which the consumer pays for agricultural products the farmer secures. Dr. Weld rightly calls attention to the fact that many of the published statements pertaining to this issue are either mere assumptions or of doubtful validity, and that, as a consequence, patient studies and careful analyses of the system of marketing must be made before an absolutely just opinion can be formed. He believes that, when the results are all in, it will be found that the farmer receives a larger share of the consumer's price than is usually stated. His own analysis of the facts pertaining to the marketing of Minnesota agricultural products allots to the farmer a simple average of 53.09 per cent and a weighted average of 63.5 per cent of the retail price (p. 7). The average price per pound paid by consumers living in New York City for Minnesota butter is 36 cents. Of this price Minnesota farmers receive 25 cents. Minnesota chickens marketed in Minneapolis at an

average price of 20 cents per pound bring the farmer an average price of 9.1 cents a pound.

These studies confirm the conclusion, which previous studies had reached, that the larger portion of the share of the spread which goes to the various groups of middlemen standing between the farmer and the ultimate consumer in the marketing system is absorbed by the retail dealers. And while all features of the marketing system require careful study, the retail distributive system stands in special need of it.

It is believed that studies have gone far enough now to indicate some of the remedies of the present marketing system, and these remedies are stated as co-operative marketing on the part of farmers, voluntary association among dealers, government regulation, and the education of the public by special courses on marketing in agricultural colleges and schools of commerce and by information given to farmers and business men.

These papers show that co-operative marketing is gaining a stronghold in Minnesota and Western Canada. Minnesota has over 1,000 marketing organizations and did a business in 1913 of over \$50,000,000 in handling farm products. The Grain Growers' Grain Company of Winnipeg handled about 30,000,000 bushels of grain during the year 1914 besides doing a large distributive business for farmers. Professor Weld believes that the co-operative movement has assumed such proportions in Minnesota, at least, that it is in need of direction rather than encouragement.

JOHN M. GILLETTE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

The Modern City and Its Problems. By FREDERIC C. HOWE. New York: Scribner, 1915. Pp. 390. \$1.50.

The merit of this book is not originality of material but clearness of arrangement and profundity. Dr. Howe has wide and profound knowledge of the modern city in Europe and America, as all of his books show. Here he has arranged clearly a good part of this knowledge, some of which has appeared before. With so many things for which to criticize the American city we welcome the hopefulness (e.g., pp. 55, 64) of this book and we are shown the intellectual basis for this hope. The thesis may be quoted from the book: "It is not the voter, not the people, who are primarily at fault, but institutions, traditions, and public opinion which have failed to keep pace with the problems we have been

called upon to face. But our point of view is rapidly changing, as is our social psychology" (p. 369). It is refreshing to get away from the importance usually ascribed to the mere forms of government by the political scientist and see social psychology and sociology given such prominence. The particular merit of Dr. Howe's latest book is this "point of view" of the social psychologist and especially the sociologist. This is seen in the attention given schools, recreation, play, charities and corrections, homes, residential districts, housing, water and food supply, planning, health, markets, slaughter-houses, lodging-houses, unemployment, pawnshops, and children. Dr. Howe's book is a reflection of our best thought about the city, that "municipal sociology" is deserving of as much attention as municipal political science. Notice such sentences as the following: "We are building our democracy on men and are developing our cities on a human rather than a property basis" (p. 58). City building "involves a new vision of the city in which all property will be subject to the community" (p. 374). "Solicitude for people will take the place of solicitude for property; the ideal of human welfare will be substituted for the ideal of economy" (p. 375). Would that all persons dealing with the social sciences had the knowledge of Dr. Howe and could act on his convictions in these respects. This is not Dr. Howe's most original, but it is his most profound, book about the city.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Essays in Social Justice. By THOMAS NIXON CARVER, PH.D., LL.D., David A. Wells, Professor of Political Economy in Harvard University. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915. Pp. vii+429. \$2.00.

The present volume presents a new interpretation of the subject. Mr. Carver believes that too much emphasis has been placed upon a "sentimental morality" combined with an "ingrowing conscience," and that there is something without the individual rather than within that should be the guide. His viewpoint differs from that of Mr. Willoughby in his *Social Justice*, for instance, in that he emphasizes the idea of a strong state as of chief importance, whereas Mr. Willoughby holds that the individual should bring his every act to the bar of reason, and determine for himself whether the ethical motive which prompts each act is a proper one or not.

In developing his idea of a strong state, Mr. Carver devotes his first chapter to a consideration of what is justice. He regards the problem as one which "has to do with the internal economy of the nation rather than with its external relations. As to the individual, it has to do with his external relations with his fellow-citizens rather than with his internal adjustments" (p. 9). The second chapter, "The Ultimate Basis of Social Conflict," emphasizes economic scarcity as the root of all social conflict. Three phases of the social conflict are mentioned—the industrial, the moral, and the individual; the relief suggested is, repression of desires, increased multiplication of goods, checking of reckless parenthood, and growth of altruism. But these methods do not furnish absolute relief, and continue to leave antagonistic interests. Therefore the state must go on administering justice.

Enough has been said to indicate the unifying plan of the book and illustrate the method of approach. The first three chapters lay the foundation for Mr. Carver's answers to his own questions: "What ought the state to do with respect to these conflicts, and how ought it to do it?" (p. 10). The remaining chapters are given over to a consideration of economic and social problems, as evidenced by such topics as economic competition, interest, the single tax, inheritance, monopoly, the cure for poverty, responsibility of the rich for the condition of the poor, and social service. Of these, the distribution of wealth based on a man's worth, and a discussion of "the estimate of a man's worth"—an estimate summed up in a stimulating fashion in four opening statements—are perhaps the most important.

No bibliography, no index, very few references, and an occasional tendency to needless elaboration, illustrated by an array of formulae on pp. 188-97, constitute some of the possible objections. The practice of summarizing the gist of the subject in a few pointed sentences at the head of each chapter adds much to the value of the book.

The keynote, "Virtue and strength are identical" (p. 34), is perilously akin to materialism, despite the author's denial of any leaning toward it. Yet this very emphasis upon what we may term the economic side of social justice is not only stimulating and timely, but is handled in a vigorous and practical fashion. The book is unquestionably a genuine contribution to the subject of sociology.

LORIN STUCKEY

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

America in Ferment. By PAUL LELAND HAWORTH. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1915. Pp. viii+478.

This volume is a comprehensive survey of some social, economic, and political phases of American life. Beginning with a hasty sketch of American political ideals, the author devotes the second chapter to "The Home of the Nation." According to him the future will see but four nations of the first rank—Great Britain, China, Russia, and the United States. "The material power of the United States is assured by a combination of many conditions, among which are geographical position, natural resources, and the character of the population" (p. 15). Here follows a most vital discussion of the resources of the nation and its capacity to support the tremendously increasing population of the future. This is logically followed by discussion of conservation in all its phases, which finds in the author an able advocate.

In the chapters on the "Blood of the Nation" and the "Color Line" is found a particularly informing discussion of the race problem, complicated as it is by increasing immigration. Throughout the entire work one is impressed with the writer's firm conviction that unrestricted immigration is an actual and increasing menace to the best interests of the nation.

The general question of social justice receives illuminating treatment in a series of chapters. These are free from cant and dogma, are sympathetic in their understanding of both capital and labor, and are characterized by a sanity and a perspective that are most gratifying. These are perhaps the strongest chapters in the volume. The industrial revolution, with its attendant results of good and evil, is graphically set forth. Proposed forms of remedial legislation are described and analyzed. Inheritance taxes are indorsed as the most effective attack upon plutocracy, and the prohibition of immigration is declared essential to maintaining a living wage. In dealing with the standard of living, an interesting attack is made upon tobacco and alcohol, which are alleged to be among the leading causes of poverty. The average annual drink and smoke bill is said to be \$129.00 per family, which frequently covers the difference between the mere subsistence and the comfortable living of the wage-earner. General waste and extravagance, the cost of the middleman, and inefficient distribution come in for their share of condemnation.

Political and institutional matters are mainly dealt with in the remaining chapters. Modern political parties, their issues and their

composition, are discussed and analyzed. The author believes in woman's suffrage, favors the short ballot, criticizes the courts and judicial procedure, and concludes with an effective chapter upon "Our Defective Citizenship," which in the last analysis is the real cause of our political graft and inefficiency. "Better systems are needed, but, above all, a higher sense of righteousness and responsibility among the voters." To meet this need, public education must be more virile and effective, churches more militant, and our patriotism must be the patriotism of the new age, the patriotism of peace.

On the whole the volume is fair and accurate, though doubtless many will find reasonable grounds to disagree with the analysis of political parties and the forces behind them. In dealing with the court and legal questions, the writer's criticisms have occasionally evidenced a superficiality not found in other portions of the volume. However, few if any books of like nature will be found which are as readable and popular in their appeal and which at the same time are as reliable and instructive, well-grounded in fact, and wholesome in spirit. It is not so constructive as thought-provoking. It is not a ready-made solution for the ills of democracy, but is an excellent approach to the intelligent study and appreciation of our national problems.

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Old World in the New. The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American People. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York: Century Co., 1914. Pp. 318. \$2.40.

The contents of this volume are for the most part already familiar to readers of the *Century*, in which its chapters have been appearing in serial form during the past year. Not a few of these readers will welcome these articles in book form, despite the flood of immigration literature in recent years. Indeed *The Old World in the New* may well prove the most influential study of the immigration problem published since the findings of the Federal Immigration Commission became available for exploitation. The reputation of its author, its freshness of illustration, its spicy style, its scope and method, all combine to give it a wide appeal; and the vigor and hard-headedness with which the larger meanings of American immigration are presented are calculated to bring conviction.

The viewpoint of the author is set forth succinctly in the preface:

I am not of those who consider humanity and forget the nation, who pity the living but not the unborn. To me, those who are to come after us stretch forth beseeching hands as well as the masses on the other side of the globe. Nor do I regard America as something to be spent quickly and cheerfully for the benefit of pent-up millions in the backward lands. What if we become crowded without their ceasing to be so? I regard it as a nation whose future may be of unspeakable value to the rest of mankind, provided that the easier conditions of life here be made permanent by high standards of living, institutions, and ideals, which finally may be appropriated by all men. We could have helped the Chinese a little by letting their surplus millions swarm in upon us a generation ago; but we have helped them infinitely more by protecting our standards and having something worth their copying when the time came.

In plan and method the volume is also distinctive. After the introductory chapter on "The Original Make-Up of the American People," it divides itself into two unlabeled parts. The first is longer, and consists of seven chapters each devoted to the characterization and evaluation of one of the following immigrant elements: "The Celtic Irish"; "The Germans"; "The Scandinavians"; "The Italians"; "The Slavs"; "The East European Hebrews"; and "The Lesser Immigrant Groups." With rare skill in each case are data—historical, statistical, anecdotal—marshaled with a view at once to compelling interest of style, to essential accuracy of generalization, and to the significance for our Americanism of the coming of the peoples discussed.

The second part comprises four chapters on the economic, social, political, and ethnic effects of modern American immigration as a whole, and in each there is an emphatic restrictionist note. For the streaming in of millions from backward regions "is sensibly converting this country from a low-pressure area to a high-pressure area" (p. 225) and is raising "the pressure-gauge at once for laborers but only gradually for other classes" (p. 226). Moreover, "until education, democratic ideas, and the elevation of women restrict their increase or modern machine industry widens their opportunities, these regions will continue to produce a surplus of people, which the enterprising avarice of steamship companies will make ever more mobile and more threatening to the wage-earners of an advanced country." The continuance of this depressive immigration will mean nothing catastrophic, but "a mysterious slackening in social progress. The mass will give signs of sluggishness, and the social procession will be strung out" (p. 255). Politically the admission to citizenship of "myriads of strangers who have not yet passed the

civic kindergarten" will mean the reopening of questions supposed to be settled, the threshing over again of old straw, and the leaving untouched "ripe sheaves ready to yield the wheat of wisdom under the flails of discussion." "Pressing questions—public hygiene, conservation, the control of monopoly, the protection of labor go to the foot of the docket, and public interests suffer" (p. 279). Withal, beauty, stature, vitality, morality will probably decline, and "the older immigrant stocks are becoming sterile even as the old Americans became sterile" (p. 303). Never have the foreign-born and their children formed so large a proportion of the American people as at the present time, and "the blood now being injected into the veins of our people is sub-common" (p. 285).

However fully we may share with Professor Ross this dark view of the situation, we cannot but regret that here and there he uses picturesque but opprobrious and offensive terms in characterizing these newcomers and heightens effects at the cost of exaggeration and sweeping generalization. We should also welcome, even in work of this popular nature, an occasional reference to sources.

It is worthy of note that the ethnic and intellectual aspects of immigration receive especial attention; an interesting feature of the volume is the mental rating of the various racial groups. The emphasis of the book is that of the sociologist and social psychologist rather than that of the economist, who has contributed so largely to our immigration literature.

PAUL S. PEIRCE

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Jewish Immigration to the United States. By SAMUEL JOSEPH. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. LIX, No. 4, 1914.

Dr. Joseph's account of Jewish immigration is a useful analysis of the causes and characteristics of one of the most important elements in our immigration of the past thirty years. It is divided into two parts: (1) a discussion of the economic, social, and political conditions in Russia, Roumania, and Austria-Hungary which have caused the emigration of the Jews, and (2) the numbers and characteristics of those who have come to the United States.

The immigration of the Russian Jews is the most important, for out of over 1,500,000 Jews who came to the United States from 1881

to 1910, 71.6 per cent came from Russia alone. The treatment of the Jews by Russia and Roumania is in many respects similar. In both these countries the limitation of the economic and cultural activities of the Jews as well as the Russian pogroms had for their object, according to Dr. Joseph, the expulsion and extermination of the Jews from those countries. In Galicia, where the Jews are guaranteed their civil and political rights under the constitution of 1867, the causes of the increased immigration in recent years is shown to be the organization by the Poles of economic boycotts against the Jew. This movement made life unendurable in a country in which poverty is general. The numbers coming from other parts of Austria and Hungary are insignificant.

The characteristics which distinguish Jewish immigration from the immigration of other peoples the author shows grow out of the fact that it is induced mainly by persecution. Instead of the great preponderance of young men that is found among the Italians, Greeks, and Poles, it is a family immigration; instead of being mainly farmers and farm laborers, the most important occupational group among the Jews is that of the garment workers, which explains their occupational-distribution in the United States. Migrating as do the Jews to escape religious and political persecution their coming is not experimental as is the coming of those who desire to better their economic conditions. Because of the restriction of educational opportunities in the countries from which they come, illiteracy among the Jews is high (26.7 per cent of those entering the United States from 1899 to 1910) in spite of the fact that they are city residents, but not as high as among the peasants who are not prohibited from attending school but who, unlike the Jews, live in the rural districts where schools often do not exist.

The book contains an appendix of useful statistical tables. It is altogether the sort of contribution to the history of immigration which is much needed.

GRACE ABBOTT

CHICAGO, ILL.

La Sociedad Argentina. Análisis-crítica. Por CESAR REYES.
Cordoba: Imprenta La Minerva, de Alfonso Aveta, 1913.
Pp. xxi+643.

In this Doctor's dissertation, presented at the University of Cordova, the author has attempted to glorify his native country. The general setting of the treatise is historical, the intent being apparently to account for the existing political, economic, religious, educational, and other

social institutions and associated groupings. These are described in a rather popular manner, often suggesting a journalistic purpose and outlook. But the volume as a whole contains much valuable information regarding conditions in Argentina. The author is considerably of a radical in many respects. For example, he approves in the strongest terms of the separation of state and church for Argentina, he urges that women of suitable age be given the suffrage, he argues for free trade, and he contends that the proper source of the study of law is in society rather than in the laws themselves. As a philosopher he rejects both the spiritualistic and the materialistic dogmas and takes refuge in a monistic energism of the nature of realism.

Among social thinkers he seems to have been influenced mainly by Lester F. Ward and Nietzsche, a combination which perhaps is not altogether illogical, since he is decidedly biological in his viewpoint. In a theoretical summary he sketches evolution as he sees it. He holds that life on the planet has passed through three stages of development, considered from the standpoint of adaptation to environment—mechanical, instinctive, and conscious. At the top of human social development he places the Anglo-Saxons, especially *los norteamericanos*, who excel in their combination of the scientific and the humanitarian; though he does take some exceptions to certain implications of our commercialism as manifested in the Monroe Doctrine. It is such an ideal as this that he sets for his future Argentina.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Applied History. Vol. II. Edited by BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH.
Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1914. Pp. xx+
689. \$3.00.

This second volume of the "Iowa Applied History Series" contains ten studies in addition to an introduction by the editor. The monographs are "Reorganization of State Government in Iowa," by Frank E. Horack; "Home Rule in Iowa," by O. K. Patton; "Direct Legislation in Iowa," by Jacob Van der Zee; "Equal Suffrage in Iowa," by Frank E. Horack; "Selection of Public Officials in Iowa," by Henry J. Peterson; "Removal of Public Officials in Iowa," by O. K. Patton; "The Merit System: Its Application to State Government in Iowa," by Jacob Van der Zee; "Social Legislation in Iowa," by John E. Briggs; "Child Labor Legislation in Iowa," by Fred E. Haynes; and "Poor

Relief Legislation in Iowa," by John L. Gillin. Of these studies it is necessary to consider only the last three.

Mr. Briggs presents a very good brief summary of social legislation in Iowa from 1838 to 1913, with special emphasis upon the last sixteen years, which began with the code of 1897. In this monograph there is no attempt to discuss the general conditions which stimulated the legislation which he records; his study is chronological rather than interpretative.

Of the 61 pages of Mr. Haynes's study of child-labor legislation in Iowa only 31 pages deal with conditions and legislation in Iowa. This study is drawn largely from secondary sources, a fact which applies even to a considerable extent to the part concerned with Iowa. But the facts are apparently well selected and clearly presented.

Professor Gillin's study of poor-relief legislation shows much more originality, though it is based on a more extensive work on the same subject by the same writer. Besides containing a good, brief account of legislation so far enacted, it presents an excellent argument for district almshouses to supplant the present county-almshouse system.

All three of these monographs are to be commended for the large proportion of space given to very concrete suggestions for improvements in the types of legislation which they discuss. This fact gives them a marked local value. In common with the other studies in this volume they may be useful as convenient sources of information regarding data which are not sufficiently available. Teachers and other workers in these fields would profit materially if other states would adopt the Iowa idea of "applied history."

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Industrial Conditions among Negroes in St. Louis. By WILLIAM AUGUST CROSSLAND. (Studies in Social Economics. Edited by the Faculty of the School of Social Economy of Washington University, Vol. I, No. 1.) St. Louis, Mo., 1914. Pp. ix+123. \$0.75 net.

This study, largely statistical, follows the general lines adopted in several monographs on the negro in northern cities which have appeared in recent years, although it deals only with industrial facts and contains only a moderate amount of interpretative discussion. Despite its southern aspect, St. Louis shows much the same conditions as those

found by Dr. Dubois in Philadelphia, by Dr. Haynes in New York, and by Mr. Daniels in Boston. There is the same superabundance of low-grade labor, and there are the same obstacles to advancement in skilled trades, including open or tacit opposition from the trade unions. Negroes are losing ground as barbers and waiters where they were once strong. The Pullman car service where the negro has little competition offers no hope of advancement and is attracting a diminishing number of the race. As chauffeurs negroes have found a new and apparently promising field, but it is doubtful whether they will hold it. On the face of the figures a fairly good showing is made for the negro business man, but a closer examination of Mr. Crossland's figures reveals the fact that it is restaurants, saloons, poolrooms, and groceries, lines of business in which the patronage is largely or exclusively colored, which are the largest items on the list. Mr. Crossland agrees with most recent investigators in holding that race discrimination is not diminishing. The colored professional man, for instance, has little chance for practice outside the members of his own race. Therefore in St. Louis as elsewhere the race is forced back upon its own resources. There can be little dissent from Mr. Crossland's conclusions that the negro must learn to depend upon himself, must develop wise and efficient leadership, and must acquire the spirit of active co-operation.

ULYSSES G. WEATHERLY

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Art in Education and Life. By HENRY DAVIES, PH.D. Columbus, Ohio: Adams & Co., 1914. 12mo, pp. xii+334.

Forbidding as the Puritan made religion, still more uninviting has the author made art. "A plea for the more systematic culture of the sense of beauty" is a combination of Rooseveltian platitudes and Ruskinian didacticisms without the force or pith of T.R. or the rhetoric or clarity of Ruskin. The English would do credit to Hashimura Togo, the typography to a parental school press, but the pedagogy is pure Yalensian, even to Professor Ladd's introduction.

In these materialistic days, who would not take kindly to art when he learns: "Illusion is still the largest part of art: human creation is, in one sense, always petrification"? It logically follows that "it is the fine arts that reveal more clearly than anything else the *meaning of life*. In the absence of these arts, life is sordid and mean. With them, none need go through life a slave to ignorance or selfishness, or blind to its meaning." Witness our Fifth Avenue private galleries!

The author says that it is not the chief business of the school to impart information, but "to inspire the pupil with the joy of creation." This worthy end is to be attained, how? "First, the best general means of cultivating all classes of minds in their artistic *milieu* is, of course, the study of *art history*." Shades of Ruskin, these are the author's own italics!

Perhaps the author's method will best explain the ponderous inconclusiveness of this inartistic book. At the head of an undigested bibliography he says:

Each student has, or may have, his own individual way of following up the scent of a subject. In my own case, this is to read everything I can lay my hands upon from all quarters, not noting down at first what I read, but gradually clarifying my mind by reflection in the light of my own slowly evolved convictions. Hence, the list of books that follows is partial, not complete.

Why use valuable space in reviewing such a book? To recommend to Professor Ladd, Dr. Davies, and all Ph.D.'s the extension of the methods of Froebel and Montessori in the schools. Goethe said, "Fortunate is he who at an *early* age knows what art is."

CHARLES ZUEBLIN

BOSTON, MASS.

Peace and War in Europe. By GILBERT SLATER, D.Sc., Principal of Ruskin College. Oxford, London: Constable & Co., 1915. Pp. vi+122.

This is among the sanest of the books produced on the present European war. Its author, Dr. Slater, principal of Ruskin College, Oxford, is one of the rising thinkers of the newer British sociological school, which is headed by such men as Professor Geddes and Professor Hobhouse. It discusses with frankness and impartiality the causes of the war, the possible terms of peace, and the problem of the future maintenance of peace. The discussion rises above the ordinary type because of its frequent reference to general sociological principles.

While the point of view of the book is confessedly British, yet there is a frankness in the statement of fact which we do not always find in similar works. A single passage will serve to illustrate this. Dr. Slater says:

We have to confess that in ordinary times the average Briton, Frenchman, or Russian is a slacker compared with the average German. . . . Germany should make us ashamed of the extent to which we allow private interest to

override those of the Commonwealth, and the quarrels of factions to imperil the general safety.

Perhaps the best chapter is the last, in which Dr. Slater discusses the problem of the future maintenance of peace. He points out here the necessity above all of creating an international morality much higher than past history has known in Western civilization. He says:

Our own record for the past sixty years includes the Crimean War, Chinese opium wars, Afghan and Zulu wars, bombardment of Alexandria, the Soudan War, the South African War. There are, of course, varying opinions about each of these; there is one, but only one, of them which I personally should be prepared to defend before an international audience. Nor has our inaction been much more honorable than our action.

But the nations will learn, Dr. Slater concludes, as a result of the terrible experiences of the present war. British "navalism"—the right of capture of private goods at sea—as well as German militarism will have to be given up; and society as a whole will win the right to control its belligerent organs.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

British Rural Life and Labor. By FRANCIS GEORGE HEATH.

London: P. S. King & Son, 1911. Pp. xi+318. 10s. 6d.

This volume deals exclusively with that class of rural inhabitants of Great Britain who work for an employer. The author suggests that the terms "servant" and "peasant" are fit designations of the class of paid assistants. The work is largely a detailed statement of the conditions of employment as seen in classes of workers, terms of employment, various modes of payment, wages, housing, clothing, and food, for the various counties and districts of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Part V gives a comparative glimpse of the situation in the four parts of the Kingdom, and Part VI, which is an appendix, describes the conditions which obtained in 1873, and is intended to afford a basis of comparison with the present situation. Twenty tables, most of which deal with wages, make it possible to compare the various counties and parts of the Kingdom in the matter of the items covered.

Since it is impossible to review the details of the work in a brief space, attention will be directed to some of the more important results established.

Relative to wages, it is apparent that there has been a general advance between 1873 and 1901, the latter date being the latest date

for which data were available. While at the former date payments were made in cash, kind, cider, housing, and in other ways, the average wage seems to have been about 10s. per week. And while at the present time great variations occur in the amount of earnings, running from 8s. 9d. in Mayo County, Ireland, to 22s. 2d. in some counties of England and Scotland, the average earnings for England, Scotland, and Wales for all classes of laborers for the countries in the order named are 18s. 3d., 19s. 3d., and 17s. 3d. For Ireland they are only 10s. 11d. (pp. 153-56).

Although some attention has been paid in Great Britain to the improvement of the status of the farm employees, it would seem that the advance of wages and any improvement in housing and conditions of living which have occurred have resulted more largely from the working of unconscious social forces than from voluntary efforts. One of the greatest factors has been rural depopulation, which has resulted chiefly from migration to the cities. Between 1871 and 1901 the total number of rural laborers in England and Wales declined nearly 20 per cent; between 1891 and 1901, about 8.8 per cent. The number of farm laborers in Scotland in 1881 was 102,075; in 1901, 83,441. In Ireland at the former date it was 300,001, and at the latter, 217,652 (pp. 158-60). This migration out of the rural districts consists of both males and females, women, like men, preferring to work in cities. Thus in England and Wales the number of female laborers declined from 143,475, in 1851 to 11,963 in 1901. A part of this decline of female laborers is due to a changed view as to the function of women.

While there is a certain amount of casual labor in the Kingdom, this is limited by the fact that on large farms and estates labor is specialized and the employees are hired for a long period, mostly during a half-year or a year. Seasonal labor is partly supplied by men from adjoining towns, by small farmers who have extra time, and to some extent by men from Ireland, who also are generally small farmers (pp. 9, 96, 147). Because of the fact that, generally speaking, the supply of farm labor is less than the demand, there is little unemployment among this class of laborers (p. 38).

The decline of agriculture and the backward condition of the labor population long ago attracted the attention of the British public. The author of the volume under review began to write about those conditions over thirty years ago and to bring them before responsible statesmen. During the course of time the Holdings acts were passed to relieve the situation in Ireland, but at the time this volume was written no legislation for other parts of the Kingdom had been passed. But Mr. Heath

and, judging from quotations, many other enlightened students of the rural situation believe that rural life can be improved and the flow to the cities from the country be stopped by the creation of a system whereby the laborer is enabled to obtain a freehold and freehold cottages. The author believes, and I think rightly, that not only the farm population but the nation's life and welfare are to be most benefited by the working out of a system of small farms and farmers (pp. 161-80).

JOHN M. GILLETTE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

The Education of the Negro Prior to 1861: The History of the Education of the Colored People of the United States from the Beginning of Slavery to the Civil War. By CARTER GOODWIN WOODSON, PH.D. (Harvard). New York: Putnam, 1915. Pp. 453+Appendix, Bibliography, and Index.

This book is a chapter in a history that has yet to be written, the history of the American negro. The anti-slavery controversy, abolition, and reconstruction have concentrated the attention of historians to such an extent upon the legal and constitutional aspects of slavery and upon the political consequences of its abolition, that the more intimate and human side of that institution, the relations between the races during and under slavery, has been neglected. One effect of this neglect has been to reduce the negro to the mere embodiment of a political abstraction, in regard to which our chief interest has been to determine to what extent he was to be regarded as an adult human being, entitled to the rights and privileges which a democratic state guarantees equally to all its citizens.

Human institutions, however, are something more than the abstract formulas in which we seek to describe and define them. They get their specific characters very largely from the concrete relations existing between the individuals and groups of individuals who compose them. Neither slavery nor the slave, as they actually were, conformed to the conceptions in which they were defined in the local statutes which are our principal sources of information in regard to them. The slave himself was not always as degraded and abject a being as he would have been if he had conformed to the legal conception of slavery. The cruelties of his situation were ordinarily mitigated by many humane compromises.

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Already, in slavery times, we discover the first feeble strivings of the negro to improve his condition. We see the dawning of a race-consciousness which the present-day struggle for existence, in an environment that is sometimes friendly but often frankly hostile, has extended and intensified.

The value of this book consists in the fact that it contains the first systematic and intimate survey of the facts which give us an account of the negro himself as he was in the period before emancipation. The first interest of the negro as a race was religion; the second was education. The fortunes of the negro in slavery can be measured by the interest which the negro people showed for these two civilizing influences, and by the progress which they made in making them a racial possession.

The efforts of the slaves and the free negroes north and south to gain an education were both stimulated and limited by the fluctuating sentiment of the surrounding white population in regard to the then existing and prospective status of the black man in the white man's social order. At the close of the Revolutionary War, under the influence of the enthusiasm for liberty and freedom to which the struggle for independence had given birth, there was a disposition to regard slavery as a passing institution and the negro as a possible citizen. With the invention of the cotton gin and the extension of the plantation system a marked change in this sentiment ensued. The effect of this change was that the negro, now thoroughly domesticated to American life, with a racial stock largely adulterated with white blood, seemed considerably less human to a large portion of the people in 1860 and a little less entitled to consideration as a person than was true, in the seventeenth century, of the raw heathen, freshly imported from Africa.

Aside from the light which this book throws upon the rather obscure subject, there is something at once touching and romantic in the story which its records of fact reveal: the groping efforts of a primitive and enslaved race to find its way in an alien world; the gradual rise, as a result of its struggle to get on its feet, of a racial consciousness, and the disposition to substitute distant, racial, and ideal ends for immediate, instinctive desires and individual interests. It is this that lends a special interest to the history of Negro education.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Problems of Community Life. An Outline of Applied Sociology.

By SEBA ELDRIDGE. New York: Thomas T. Crowell Co.,
1914. Pp. 190. \$1.00.

This book is a rough analysis and classification of the problems of modern city life, such as will perhaps be valuable for club discussions and an aid to the investigations of amateur sociologists. It has no merits as a work of science.

The following reproduction of p. 122, minus the heading, is representative of the contents of the volume as a whole:

Biological and social causes of insanity and feeble-mindedness.

Necessity of custodial care of those suffering from these ills; liability of feeble-minded adults to reproduce their kind; unfitness of the insane for association with normal persons.

Institutional care of these classes in New York:

Capacities of institutions as compared with the demand for accommodations;

Medical treatment and its efficacy in realizing curative possibilities;

Physical care, treatment by caretakers and occupational activities as viewed from the humanitarian standpoint;

Employment of those capable of productive labor.

The cost of providing additional facilities required and of elevating standards of care in accordance with humanitarian demands.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The Church and the Social Order.—The social problem that confronts us today is as old as humanity, but it assumes a new form in every age. The common man has come into his own, and has boldly protested against the denial of his rights from his autocratic masters. In all the revolutions since the Reformation, the constant factor is the common man asserting his human rights against tyrannical authority. Socialism serves as religion to masses of men today. Here is a great movement that pits its philosophy of life against ours, and whose followers claim that the church is indifferent to the social welfare of mankind and impotent to redress grievances. We ought to assure them that their longing for a fuller, juster, and freer life finds sympathetic interpretation and active co-operation within the church. Not only has the church never been hostile to the social amelioration of mankind, but, from the primitive era to the present time, she has furnished many valiant champions and immeasurable power to the cause of social betterment. In addition to social creed, we need social deed. On the other hand, there is the danger of aiming at social amelioration instead of social regeneration. Socialism is a philosophy, but Christianity is a religion.—Theo. F. Herman, *Reformed Church Review*, January, 1915. J. W. H.

Catholic Womanhood and the Socialistic State.—We are now told that woman's whole future depends upon her economic and political independence. We are no less interested than the Socialist in a decent means of livelihood for the worker, her living wage, or her educational opportunities. Yet it is in this very oneness of our material needs and aspirations that the Catholic woman finds herself cautioned against this apparently practical program. Socialism, by presupposing that we are all alike, or that we all want the same things, builds its arguments upon economics. A purely economic justice can neither give nor guard our moral rights. In the Socialistic state neither woman's political nor her economic independence would safeguard her sexual independence. The Socialistic state would determine the position of its citizens according to its economic needs. Collective economics would brook no revolt against scientific eugenic selection. The regulation of the birth-rate would be as stern a solicitude as a sound physical inheritance. But state control by collective will assumes far sterner proportions for the Catholic woman than for any other American woman. This would be particularly true of our contemplative orders. It is not easy to forecast any outlook for the nun in the Socialistic state. It is necessary, then, that our Catholic women come to see the economic argument in its true proportions.—Helen Haines, *Catholic World*, January 15, 1915. J. W. H.

The English Laboring Class and the anti-Jacobin War.—In 1870 the Constitutional Society was founded in London. At the outbreak of the French Revolution, Richard Price made a speech in praise of the Revolution, and on his motion, the society expressed its approval of the acts of the French National Assembly. Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* became very popular among the laboring classes, and the dramatic deeds of the Parisians stirred their political interest. The London Corresponding Society, the majority of whose members were laborers, was founded in 1792. The news of the fall of the French monarchy electrified the society whose activity served as an example to the awakening revolutionary spirit in English democratic circles. When England declared war on France, the propaganda of the society was checked on the one hand, but on the other hand it was given new impetus. But in May, 1794, the leaders were imprisoned and the society was soon after broken up. Thus was overthrown the first political movement of the English laboring classes, but the idea of a revolutionary movement on both sides of the Channel has remained in the memory of the London working-man, and in the alliance between England and France a strong

tendency may be seen to contemplate an international labor movement.—N. Riasanov, "Die englische Arbeiterklasse und der Antijakobinerkrieg," *Neue Zeit*, January 1, 1915.
J. W. H.

The Russian Problem.—Social progress starts from countries with a well-differentiated seaboard and gradually extends to the more massive continental blocks. Eventually these blocks of hinterland may prove more fertile and rich in culture than the tracts which have assumed the initiative. The course of Russian political evolution follows on parallel lines that of Russia's western neighbors from personal rule toward constitutionalism. The first and greatest asset of Russia is its peasant democracy, but on the other hand there is a lamentable gap to be filled up as regards provision for the poor. More important than economic and technical improvements is the requirement of popular education. A definite scheme has been worked out by which a network of schools will be organized and started in the course of a few years. The future of Russia depends on the essentially peaceful process of democratic enlightenment and economic improvement. The rule of law and freedom must be substituted for the reign of arbitrary discretion. The people of Russia, and more especially the educated class, will revive in the atmosphere of the great reform movement and may yet astonish the world in peace as in war.—P. Vinogradoff, *Yale Review*, January, 1915.
J. W. H.

The Babies Who are Not.—There has been a remarkable drop since 1900 in the numbers and rate of infant mortality. New York City reduced the rate (deaths per 1,000 births) from 150 to 102 in a decade. The great predisposing causes, however, are hardly touched. Continual breeding of mental defectives and the unfitness of girls in industry for motherhood are responsible for a large proportion of early deaths. These causes must be subjected to more social control.—D. B. Armstrong, *Forum*, January, 1915.
B. W. B.

Dream Neurosis; a Dark Page in Social Reform.—*Traumatische Neurose* was first recognized in 1866 as a form of nervous hysteria due to railroad accidents. It was carefully investigated and finally accepted as a legitimate basis for compensation in the insurance laws. Of the 900,000 pensioners in Germany, only 8,700 cases are directly attributed to this cause, but it figured indirectly in many others. Recently, however, it has been discovered that in those cases financially cared for by a lump-sum payment from the government the patients recovered their health with wonderful rapidity. It was found on investigation that a wholesale system of shamming has existed, furthered by the custom of diagnosing this form of hysteria from objective symptoms. The findings of the investigator, Dr. Nageli, have been indorsed by conventions both of German and of Swiss nerve specialists. Needless to say, lump-sum settlement of insurance for this type of sickness has been discontinued. Dream neurosis as a separate malady has ceased to exist; it was the result of well-meant social relief abused by the laboring class. This is an instance in which the class struggle defeats its own end.—Dr. A. Beck, "Die traumatische Neurose—ein schwarzes Blatt in der Geschichte der Sozialreform," *Monatschrift für christliche Sozialreform*, September-October, 1914.
B. W. B.

Has the Church Collapsed?—The bombardment of Rheims Cathedral has stirred feeling, not because it is the desecration of a sanctuary, but because it is the destruction of a work of art. This is profoundly significant of the collapse of the old idea of the church. The apostolic church was a reaction to the darkness of the Roman world. The essence of Roman power was outward authority, materialism; that of the Christian is inner perception. Four vital steps toward Romanism brought the church to a denial of its own soul: (1) it denied the humanity of Jesus, following Roman customs of deification; (2) beginning with Peter, it adopted Roman organization; (3) through the work of Paul, it set up creeds corresponding to Roman law; (4) reviving pagan art, it adopted magnificence as a means of social control. No wonder the church has lost its power. After 1,800 years it is as easy for men to thrust bayonets into one another as it was in the heathen world.—E. D. Schoonmaker, *Century*, February, 1915.
B. W. B.

Thrift and Its Possibilities.—Thrift implies sacrifice of the present to the future. It has two sides, saving and judicious expenditure. As the poor man pays relatively the highest prices for what he buys, 3,052 co-operative societies have been organized in England to remedy this. The Leeds Society in 1912 had 47,000 members and sold £1,626,362 worth of goods. Trade unions are militant rather than thrift organizations, but building societies and government-secured savings banks are increasingly important in conserving the savings of the poor.—E. Brobrook, *Charity Organization Review*, January, 1915. B. W. B.

Cohabitation and Tuberculosis.—Tuberculosis is undoubtedly of human origin. It is little if at all transmitted to human beings by means of the milk or flesh of tubercular animals. The contagion is from one person to another and is by way of inhalation and not at all by way of the stomach. The tubercular contagion is due exclusively or almost exclusively to dry and powdered spittle. Transmission by liquid particles directly inhaled is, if not non-existent, at most very exceptional. The cough spreads tiny drops of infected liquid. These dry and later the virus is stirred by the movements and the brushing of clothing. The virus itself is very short-lived, but is being continually renewed by invalids who, because of ignorance, do not take proper precautions. Experiments have shown that persons in the same room with the invalid are infected exclusively by inhalation of the dust particle suspended in the air they breathe. The density of the infected matter is of course greatest near the person, and so danger of infection is greatest to the members of the immediate family. Outside of the house the virus is very quickly destroyed. In suppressing the spread of the disease the chief thing is to avoid carrying the virus and to observe proper precautions in regard to cleanliness of person and clothing.—Maurice Letulle, "Cohabitation et tuberculose," *Revue d'hygiène et de police sanitaire*, October, 1914. E. B. R.

The Contagion of Transmissible Maladies.—The minute drops of moisture suspended at all times in the air space carry particles of organic matter and also the microscopic microbes which correspond to the most contagious diseases. In a drop of water chemically pure the life of a disease microbe is very short. The moisture drops in the air are never pure. They contain matter capable of nourishing the germs. Respired air, especially, not only contains the material to nourish the germs in suspension but directly favors their multiplication. The rapidity of the multiplication depends primarily on the temperature, the barometric pressure, and the conditions of the air. These micro-organisms breed in the neighborhood of a sick person and fill the air of a room. There is thus constituted a dangerous zone in the neighborhood of the sick person. The ventilation practiced is generally not sufficient because of the room space that is not affected by the ventilating current. The impure air often forms eddies and side currents in the corners and along the walls and is not removed. It is localized in protected places. The danger zone is not, therefore, in the direction of the ventilating current of air. This explains why persons in a certain part of the room or apartment are more easily affected than those in other parts. Decreasing the temperature greatly diminishes the chances of contagion.—M. A. Trillat, "La Contagion des maladies transmissibles," *Revue d'hygiène et de police sanitaire*, October, 1914. E. B. R.

War and Catholic Doctrine.—In the Catholic doctrine war is considered a plague: all effort is directed toward the establishment and preservation of peace. But under the present conditions of life recourse to arms is sometimes necessary in order to attain the common good. It is a misunderstanding of Scripture to find in the Sermon on the Mount an absolute reprobation of war. But for a war to be a just war there must be presupposed a grave, notorious, and culpable violation of right. It is only when the adversary is guilty of a grave violation of the right against a country or a country's allies and when war is the only way possible of obtaining just reparation, that it becomes a justifiable procedure. To be moral the war ought to make for a durable peace founded on order, justice, and right. Catholic doctrine excludes all conceptions of recourse to force of arms on any such grounds as expressed by the phrase "might makes right." It forbids an appeal to arms to settle a judicial question as where the

political or commercial interests of nations are in conflict. But where there exists a scandal still worse than the horrors of war Catholic doctrine recognizes that to take up arms to redress that wrong is just and necessary. The only offensive wars—in the modern sense of the word offensive—that were encouraged by the church were the Crusades. They were to punish Islam for her injustices to the tomb of Christ and to the Christian populations of the Orient. War excites the most intense energy of a people. It arouses noble sentiments and stimulates to generous actions. It creates religious fervor and so creates an atmosphere where the work of God can be accomplished with exceptional splendor. So it may bring about moral and social regeneration. War is divine when it avenges a wrong, when it carries a salutary chastisement, and where it ennobles and regenerates a nation.—Yves de la Brière, "La Guerre et la doctrine catholique," *Etudes*, October and November, 1914. E. B. R.

The Struggle of Nations.—There are two factors that go to make the strength of nations—the moral force of the individuals who comprise it and the aesthetic life which they are capable of living. From a political point of view great intellectual life weakens a nation because it lessens its power to resist attack. The ideal is for a nation to preserve a balance between the forces of will and of intellect. Their excess of attention to the intellectual life caused the fall of the Greeks. Among the modern nations Germany has well kept the balance between the two forces. Her position is weakened by internal enmity: the partition of Poland and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine were political mistakes. France is strong in the homogeneity of her people and language and in her democratic form of government. She is also the richest country in the world and her colonies are so grouped as to be easy of protection. England's great rôle in international politics has been due to her insular position. The fact that her colonies are in all parts of the world makes their protection a matter of some difficulty. Sooner or later she will find it necessary to adopt a policy of obligatory military service. America from the point of view of physiography is inferior to the Continent of Europe. Socially she is unformed. Each of the European nations has been formed through struggles which have made each a particular society. In the case of America the population is made up of late arrivals from every country of Europe: they are not yet one people. America, too, has the negro element which in the long run will completely transform the character of her people. Also the elevation of Japan to the position of a first-rate naval power adds another factor of uncertainty to the future of the United States.—Arthur Bochart, "Les Luttres des nations," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, December, 1914. E. B. R.

The Teaching of the Gospels and the War.—Universalism is the social principle of the gospel. God is the father of humanity; therefore all men are brothers. The characteristic of evangelical love is the renouncing of individual or group privileges or desires, wherever they menace human society as a whole. The founder of Christianity did not recognize either his family or his nation: he belonged to the world. The early Christians were brothers in the true sense of the word, and they tried to spread universal brotherhood over the world. Their principles did not allow them to carry arms, for war was contrary to the teachings of Jesus, but finally the church, as a measure of self-preservation, was obliged to cease insisting on its principles. When it became the official religion of the empire, many of its original ideals were lost and it absorbed certain of the old pagan ideas. The ancient gods who had fought for the aggrandizement of the Roman Empire changed into a deity called the Father of mankind, who had precisely the same ambitions. The Christian church is a traitor to Jesus: the idea of God as father is retained, but he is the father of each separate nation, and not of the whole world. At the present time many are against war, but the majority believe that in fulfilling their civic duty they are fulfilling their duty as Christians, thus directly opposing the teachings of Jesus. Whoever takes part in war or admits its necessity is not a disciple of the God of the Gospels. The present war shows how far we have been driven away from his teachings. When the world is reorganized, may the spirit of Christianity pervade the new institutions, so that all social action may be inspired by the universalism of the Gospels.—Maurice Neeser, "La Morale évangélique et la guerre," *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, December, 1914. A. B. L.

The French Labor Movement during the War.—Before 1905 there was no unified Socialist party in France, there being a constant struggle between the trade unions and the syndicalists. At the outbreak of the war there had, however, been a reconciliation: the leaders of both factions had together issued a "peace manifesto," and several well-known union leaders had joined the party. The war has, in certain ways, accelerated the union, instead of destroying it. The unions have been crippled by the war, in so far as the members have been called to the colors, very few of them not being affected by the mobilization, and in the discontinuance of most of the Socialist papers. There is no direct agitation. So-called *soups communistes* have been established to help those thrown out of work, and these meals also serve to give the laborers a feeling of unity and common interest that formerly was lacking. Before the war the relations between the unions and the government were rather strained, but when the leaders took the attitude that the defense of the country was a citizen's highest duty, the relations became more friendly and now there is a considerable amount of co-operation which creates the hope that the opposition to the demands of the laboring classes will not be so strenuous after the war is over. A committee of union and party leaders now deals with all questions directly concerning the laboring men which arise as a result of the present crisis. It is probable that the Socialist party in France will not suffer from the effects of the war. The unions ought to gain in strength, for the sentiments between brothers in arms are likely to endure. The necessity of co-operation between the economic and political representation of the laboring classes is plain, and it will hardly end with the war, now that the work has once begun.—Josef Steiner, "Die französische Arbeiterbewegung während des Krieges," *Neue Zeit*, December 18, 1914. A. B. L.

Christianity and the Ancient World.—At the time of Christ Judaism was syncretic, and Christianity, being an outgrowth of Judaism, naturally contained elements borrowed from other oriental religions. This may best be seen in the Revelation, which abounds in pagan notions, but also in many portions of the Gospels which are similar to pagan myths. Oriental syncretism had penetrated the Roman Empire and religion was no longer a civic duty, but a personal obligation. The Greek idea of seeking the highest good and development in this world gave way to the conception of existence as preparation to a happier life in the next. When Christianity came into agreement and conflict with these doctrines and religious conceptions, many of them were taken over, such as the doctrines of baptism and communion, which as they are found in the Epistles, differ greatly from the fundamental principles laid down by Christ. The language of the New Testament is the popular Greek of the day. Christology was founded by Paul, who put into it his personal knowledge and experience, as well as what he had learned of the history and personality of Christ. This will show the influence on Christianity of the ancient world, its bizarre notions and mysterious rites. It shows the marvelous power of adaptation which is a characteristic of the Gospels. In spite of being weighted with various rites, rules, and dogmas, the Gospels have never ceased to solace the minds of those who approach them with reverence, for they are an account of the life of God, manifested in the life of a man, so that all human lives may receive divine life, justice, and love.—Louis Perriraz, "Le Christianisme et le monde ancien," *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, December, 1914. A. B. L.

Catholic Religious Education after School Age.—The religious education of the Catholic church is not ended when the child leaves school. Its primary objects are the development of personality, of individual initiative, and of the social sense. The basis of the spiritual life is the maxim that salvation implies a constant and permanent co-operation between God and man. Too much thought on the subject of sin is discouraged. The teachers try to develop personality through the culture of the idea of responsibility, at the same time emphasizing the importance of humility. Individuality in prayer is encouraged and a devotion to the mystic symbolism is awakened as much as possible. Cultivation of the social feeling begins with the teaching of the catechism and the Lord's Prayer, emphasis being laid on the universality of God. Through prayer, self-mortification, or good works, each member of the earthly church may benefit someone in purgatory. Thus the Catholic mind is made to believe that it

may have the glory of helping God to pardon the unfortunate or of imitating Christ through suffering for another who may never know it. The young people are taught that each of their acts has a social consequence, and are taught to keep informed about these consequences, the aim being an awakening of interest in the rest of humanity, and the development of leaders for Catholic labor organizations. The system rests on the maxim of the co-operation of God and man, and on the dogma of the communion of saints.—Georges Gayau, "L'Education religieuse dans les œuvres post-scolaires Catholiques," *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, December, 1914. A. B. L.

State Maternity Insurance.—The question of maternity has received much attention from hygienists, social reformers, and others who are trying to solve the problem of a falling birth-rate as well as to make the way easier for those women who must fulfil the duties of motherhood and wage-earning at the same time. One nation after another has been compelled to adopt maternity insurance laws. The working classes have felt the importance of the question for a long time. At present there are state maternity insurance laws in fourteen civilized countries, the systems operating through sick funds, particular maternity funds, or state pensions. The laws further differ as to sphere of action, financial basis, and time of payment of the insurance. Some grant insurance to all women citizens, some to those working for wages, others to a more restricted circle. The aid may be obligatory or voluntary. The principal burden of payment in some states falls upon the workers, in others upon employers. The time of payment varies (it is usually six or eight weeks); and the amount is generally from 50 per cent of the wages up—in Russia it may be equal to the total amount. In many respects the laws are wholly inadequate to answer the demands of the laboring class, so that they need to work with energy and indefatigability to secure the expansion and improvement of this form of state aid.—Alexandra Kollontay, "Staatliche Mutterschaftsversicherung," *Neue Zeit*, December 18, 1914.

M. G. B.

The War and the Problem of Population.—We are living in the midst of the greatest war of all history. The German people, destined to play the leading rôle and fighting for their national existence, are confident as to the outcome, although at first the numerical superiority of their opponents seemed threatening. The fact that Germany's enemies can draw from inexhaustible sources while the German supply is practically limited, brings appreciation of the significance of population in national life. During recent years there has been a deplorable decrease in the rate of growth of population in Germany. The war will enhance this evil. Increase of population depends upon two factors—the birth-rate and the death-rate. The death-rate could be lowered by better living conditions, shorter hours of work, and decrease of sickness, epidemics, and infant mortality—especially among those born illegitimately. Increase of births could be affected by improved social and economic conditions. There is among certain classes a developing sense of responsibility for their posterity and an unwillingness to bring children into the world unless physical and cultural advantages are assured them. Financial considerations prevent many from marrying, restrict births with many who are married, and drive others to prostitution. The solution of the problem must be found in state aid for family support, alleviation of conditions whereby women must work for wage while fulfilling the duties of motherhood, and material decrease in the cost of educating children. The elemental impulse toward propagation is strong enough to prevent loss of population that may become a menace to national independence and civilization.—Dr. Edward David, "Der Krieg und das Bevelkerungsproblem," *Neue Generation*, November 14, 1914.

M. G. B.

Agriculture and War.—Much praise is due to Germany for the absence of any neglect of its agriculture during the war. Technical progress has been the aim. All means of increasing the productivity of agricultural labor have been used. At present, prisoners of war are busy with the cultivation of moor and heath lands. The military authorities permitted this against protest, owing to the large number of men and horses taken away by the war. Further to supply the need, drastic measures were adopted to force rural families to paid labor, war protection to be withdrawn upon their refusal to work. Agriculture has been amply supported by the agricultural parliament and by the state. Automobile ploughs have been purchased for use where

sowing is possible in East Prussia, and provision has been made for further improvements there. The ranks of agricultural workers will be decimated by death in the war, and by removal to cities of those seeking more favorable conditions, so that fundamental reforms must be established in living conditions, wage, and labor relations to keep men on the farms. After the war no doubt large-scale production in agriculture will assume new significance. The present need of men and horses urges it, and increased output will demonstrate its potency.—Karl Marchionini, "Landwirtschaft und Krieg," *Neue Zeit*, January 1, 1915. M. G. B.

The Development of Russian Agriculture.—The development of Russian agriculture is of great significance in Europe today, because (1) Russia's economic power depends principally upon the product of its fields, and (2) the condition of the country people is important to the European proletariat. Previous to 1900 there had been great decadence in productivity, and most of the land was under the control of the small farmers. Owing to the low prices received for the crops large-scale production and general improvement schemes were not favored. The oppression of the land proletariat made him wish for the abolition of the large landholder. These conditions, however, have been completely changed by raised prices in the corn market and modification of the agricultural policy of the Russian government. In the last ten years the growth of production has kept pace with the increase of population. Intensive cultivation has replaced the old systems, the purchase of agricultural implements and machines has advanced remarkably, and there has been a constant increase of capitalistic production in farming. The formation of a special agricultural laboring class is probable. Small farms are diminishing, more technical knowledge of improved methods is used, and friction between the different classes of landholders has been lessened by the changes in the policy of the government. Russia, agriculturally as well as industrially, is a modern state; and consequently in this war evidences different characteristics from those shown in the war with Japan.—Juri Larin, "Die Entwicklung der russischen Landwirtschaft," *Neue Zeit*, December 4, 1914. M. G. B.

The Effects of the War upon Non-Christian Peoples.—Almost all non-Christian races have been dragged into the vortex of the European struggle. The Indians, Japanese, and Turks participate directly. China has had the fray carried to her doors. What are these races likely to think of Christianity now? To begin with, the war is due to the un-Christian element working in our civilization—the spirit of materialism contending with the spirit of Christianity. But this same spirit of materialism may be evidenced at work in Tokyo and Pekin as well as in Europe. Hence the East is in a position to interpret the Western situation. It should also be remembered that the non-Christian races are not swayed to any appreciable extent by pacifist ideals. To the Gurkha "all war is good; this war is heaven." Furthermore, the Eastern races are not so unsophisticated that they cannot appreciate the principles involved in the "scrap of paper." The fidelity of non-Christian peoples to contract obligations is well known. "The faithfulness of the Gurkhas has been proved unto death over and over again"; and "any merchant who has lived in the East and has had regular dealings with Chinese traders will testify to their general probity and respect for contracts." Again, it is difficult to estimate the influence which Western civilization has upon the non-Christian races. It cannot be said that China and Japan are accepting Christianity for the sake of Western social and political advantages apart from its religious and moral value.—Right Rev. Bishop Frodsham, *Nineteenth Century*, January, 1915. R. D. McK.

Emigration and State Aid.—The policy of the Motherland in refraining from active co-operation with the dominions oversea in regard to the question of emigration is fundamentally uneconomical and at the same time prejudicial to the best interests of the Empire as a whole. Part of the huge sums which are being ineffectually spent on charitable institutions might be infinitely better employed in furnishing aid to those who desire to emigrate to, and are much needed in, other parts of the Empire. Probably the most efficient method to employ in establishing joint co-operation between the Motherland and the dominions oversea in regard to the question of emigration would be to institute a joint board of control "fully representative and possessing very

large if not plenary powers." This board should sit permanently in London and have the direction of all assisted emigration. Due precaution should be taken that the emigrants assisted are of the sort that the dominions most require. The elementary side of their training might be given in the Homeland, the state providing farms for the purpose. However, that is a matter better left to the Joint Board to decide. Especially might large numbers of children who are at present under the direct care of the state be advantageously sent in their early years to the dominions overseas. Such action would not only be beneficial to the children themselves, but it would also supply a much-felt need in the dominions and at the same time relieve the pressure at home.—Sir Clement Klinloch-Cooke, M.P., *Fortnightly Review*, January, 1915.

R. D. McK.

Unemployment and the War.—The war, although the chief cause, is not the only cause of the increased percentage of unemployment this year. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities trade was duller than usual. The returns given under the National Insurance act indicate a percentage of 4.7 of unemployed in the shipbuilding trades for July, 1914, as compared with 3.4 per cent for the same month the year before. Other trades show a corresponding increase in the percentage of unemployed before the war commenced. But except in the case of trades that were specially benefited by it, the war naturally made things a great deal worse. In trade unions alone, the percentage of unemployed increased from 2.8 at the end of July, to 7.1 at the end of August. The records in connection with unemployment insurance indicate a percentage of 6.2 of unemployed at the end of August, 1914, in contrast with 3.1 per cent for the previous year. The paralysis given to industry by the sudden declaration of war began to wear off in September, October, and November. In the cotton trades, which were most seriously affected by the war, the percentage of unemployed jumped from 3.9 for July to 17.7 for August. But since that it has fallen to 14.5 for September, 9.2 for October, and 6.3 for November. The trade-union returns also show a decrease in the percentage of unemployed for the three months in question of 4.2, 2.9, and 2.0, respectively. This encouraging drop in the percentage of unemployment for the three autumn months is due (1) to the wise action of the war office in demanding that contractors should employ extra hands instead of working their employees overtime, (2) to the fact that a large portion of the surplus labor was drafted into "Kitchener's new army"; and (3) to the ability of our navy to establish beyond a doubt her complete control of the sea.—H. J. Jennings, *Nineteenth Century*, January, 1915.

R. D. McK.

Convict Labor on Country Roads.—The question of finding suitable employment for convicts is a harassing one. The contract convict labor system works injury to the competing honest laborer, and the "useless" labor, which is frequently resorted to, is fundamentally demoralizing to the persons engaged. But there is still a large field of productive labor, the products of which never find their way into the competing market. Millions of dollars are spent annually on the construction of state and national highways. Could not convict labor be advantageously engaged on these highways? The work would be productive and remunerative, both to the state and to the individual employed. Experiments made in Fulton County, Georgia, in employing convicts upon road construction, justify the contention that the system is both practical and reformatory. Moreover, it is in harmony with the principles of organized labor.—George C. Warren, *Municipal Engineering*, January, 1915.

R. D. McK.

The Condition of the Wood Industry during the War.—At the outbreak of the war the wood industry was on the whole in a bad condition, because of the year-long crisis and the resulting stagnation of industries having largely a foreign market. The German Wood Workers' Association's report for the month of December, 1913, shows that of the total membership of 192,000, not less than 27,896 were without work, while for the year 1912, the number was only 13,125. Simultaneously with the outbreak of the war, the different branches of the wood industry restricted their activity. Some were compelled to close down altogether, while others reduced the number of working days, of working men, or of working hours. The activity in the two main branches

of this industry, the piano and furniture factories, whose products are chiefly marketed in Italy, France, and Great Britain, came almost to a standstill. The skilled workmen engaged in these trades are unable to find any work worthy of their skill, and refuse to do unskilled labor. The three branches that have remained active, the wagon factories, the dock-builders, and the basket-makers, owe their activity to the demand of the War Department for their products. The wood industry is further hampered in its activity by its difficulty in importing certain necessary kinds of wood. The Russian government, seeking to encourage the development of this industry, has imposed certain restrictions on the export of these necessary kinds of wood. Hence the unemployment problem in the wood industry cannot be solved by the industry itself.—U. Neumann, "Die Verhältnisse in der Holzindustrie unter den Kriegszustand," *Neue Zeit*, January 15, 1915. H. A. J.

Paupers in Almshouses.—The Bureau of the Census has recently issued a special report on "Paupers in Almshouses," based upon data collected at the census of 1910. In this report, which reproduces and amplifies the material contained in *Bulletin No. 120*, issued some time ago, are given statistics relating to the age, sex, race or color, parentage, place of birth, marital condition, literacy, occupation prior to admission, fecundity of females, capacity for work, presence of mental or physical defects, legitimacy of children, length of stay in institution, etc., for inmates of almshouses, with ratios, percentages, diagrams, and text discussion. Condensed data are given for each individual almshouse in the United States.

Not the least interesting feature of the report is a comparison between the ratios of almshouse pauperism among natives and among immigrants of various nationalities.

Those interested in this publication, which is a quarto volume of 141 pages, can obtain copies by addressing the Director of the Census, Washington, D.C.

State Laws Relating to the Dependent Classes.—The Bureau of the Census has published a summary of the state laws relating to the dependent classes.

This summary epitomizes and classifies for each state the laws governing the administrative and supervisory agencies dealing with the dependent classes; the laws relating to the conditions and methods of poor relief, institutional and outdoor; and the provision made for special classes—children, the sick, the blind, the deaf, the insane, the feeble-minded, the epileptic, the inebriate, and soldiers, sailors, and marines. It is not intended as a complete or authoritative digest, but as an outline of the more important features of the laws in force in the various states in the year 1913.

Anyone desiring a copy of this publication can obtain it by addressing the Director of the Census, Washington, D. C.

Necessity for a Revision of Our Criminal Procedure.—Our criminal procedure needs a radical change. The courts keep on citing authorities and precedents that hampered justice a hundred years ago. A trial is often a contest to see which side has the best lawyer. It is a game of chance and the technicalities are the points. The Supreme Court is the referee to decide which one has won on points. Reformation of the defendant and his proper treatment is forgotten. A number of cases in the supreme courts of states have been reversed because of the omission of a word or even a letter in a word. Let us wipe out these technicalities and get down to justice. We have been studying words and phrases, not treating these unfortunate criminals according to their needs. Our law should be so simple and plain that everyone could understand it. It is not the severity but the certainty of punishment that deters the criminal. We need to study the criminal as a doctor studies his patient. Our criminal law should be directed toward education, reformation, and segregation.—Eugene Lankford, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, March, 1915. B. W. B.

Classification and Definition of Crimes.—Statutory definition of offenses is a fundamental principle of criminal law policy. It may take the form of defining specific offenses such as homicide. This has its weaknesses due to careless thinking, poor models, uncertainty of definition, vagueness, and the practical impossibility of completely defining all types of offenses or of adequately distinguishing motives and phases of any crime. Again, statutory definition may be generic, as in the case of nuisance

and conspiracy. National codes differ greatly in these respects. The most satisfactory solution of the problem would seem to lie in the further expansion of the system of mitigating circumstances and of provisions for altering penalties. This should take the form of a careful elaboration of a complete system of relevant elements of criminality, and a general provision that in adjudging specific offenses, they should in some way be taken into account. This is a problem for the solution of which the legislator must look to the trained criminologist.—Ernst Freund, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, March, 1915.
B. W. B.

Progressive Evolution and the Origin of Species.—The organic theory of evolution is now practically established, but, owing to the experimental methods of investigation now employed, its subsidiary theories are still a field of controversy. The main point to be accounted for is that evolution has actually taken place. This can be demonstrated for man by the fact of an increasing fund of capital which he accumulates and the same explanation holds for lower species. Capacity to profit by experience by habitual and better adjustment to repeated stimuli accounts for this accumulation. Progressive evolution must follow as a necessary result of the law of accumulation of surplus energy in all cases where no counter force acts. This process is independent of natural selection. The existence of low types today may be explained by the retarding action of these counter forces. The line of progress for this theory may be demonstrated in the evolution of air-breathing vertebrates. The cell division of the Protozoon may be due to cell hunger, requiring active search for food, the cell group or colony to an excess of food supply. Somatic and germ cells then differentiate. The former die in the struggle for existence; the latter protected from that struggle, develop and persist. One generation gives to the next an environment practically the same as that of the parent, but a larger supply of energy and facility for adaptation. There results from this a recapitulation of ancestral environments in the development of later generations. For example, air-breathing vertebrates at one stage have gill slits, indicating development from water-breathing ancestors. This opens a field in adapting environments experimentally and offers an explanation of species opposed to the theory of crossing.—A. Dendy, *American Naturalist*, March, 1915.
B. W. B.

The Contagion of Hallucination.—In the study of the contagion of hallucination the fact must be taken into consideration that true cases occur only among those who are insane, or those whose minds are predisposed to insanity, and that there is always a danger of reporting as true cases of contagion those due to analogous predispositions or common causes. These considerations allow us to eliminate the numerous cases which have not been reported in sufficient detail, those in which the hallucination is imposed by the first case on the second, and those in whom the hallucinations represent the violent emotion felt by the second case when living in close intimacy with the first. The study of twenty-six cases brings out the following: (1) cases where hallucinations are produced at intervals in subjects having the same or similar heredity or common environment; (2) cases of transitory delirium wrongly considered as self-suggestion; (3) cases of hallucination or insanity brought on by physical or emotional exhaustion, occasioned by systematic suggestion. Of these, the first and second cannot be classed as contagious, and their causes are to be found either in a psychopathic defect caused by some moral disturbance or in communication of ideas and delirious representations, resulting in apparent similarity of morbid hallucinations. All false cases must be carefully eliminated so as to diminish the field until more careful analysis will show results.—G. Dumas, "La Contagion de la folie," *Revue Philosophique*, January, 1915.
A. B. L.

The Spirit of France.—In spite of the memory of Alsace-Lorraine, in spite of constantly renewed menaces on the part of Germany, France has kept herself profoundly peaceful for a generation. Schools and universities and the most eloquent voices have preached the curse of war and the blessings of peace. Germany, on the other hand, has during this time made every military preparation. When the moment of conflict came the spirit of France awoke and enabled her, to the amazement of those who noted the contrast, to withstand the shock. The spirit of France has moved her

to place the welfare of humanity and the service of men above all things else. This spirit has inspired the councils of her diplomats and her dreams of peace; but not here only, for even in the midst of battles her sentiments of humanity have a place. This spirit, which may have been a weakness in times past, will presently be the greatest strength of France—in a time when all people, small and great, weak and strong, shall stand united in a great human concord.—A. Darlu, "L'Âme de la France," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, January 10, 1915. E. E. E.

Unlawful Motherhood.—In the United States comprehensive statistics on illegitimacy are lacking, but such as we have indicate that it is on the increase. Nor can we take comfort from the fact that its ratio is lower with us than in Europe, for illegitimacy at home is not quite synonymous with illegitimacy abroad. The percentage is observed to be a great deal higher in our cities than in rural communities, but too large a generalization from the figures is not fair to the former, since it is very common for women who find themselves in trouble to seek obscurity during the hour of shame by going to a city where they will not be known. An analysis of illegitimate white births in St. Louis during the years 1911 to 1913, inclusive, yielded the startling fact that one-half the mothers were non-residents. We must not forget, whatever data we may gather with respect to unlawful motherhood, that the condemned estate may be "a badge of comparative virtue" contrasted with the crime of abortion, the extent of which we can only estimate. Statistics which are available for certain portions of the United States indicate that nearly 60 per cent of the women who fall do so before they reach the age of twenty-one, and that the age of greatest frequency is eighteen years: an impressive commentary on the perils that surround budding womanhood. Heretofore the mothers have chiefly borne the burden of the stigma attached to illegal parenthood. A solution of the problem depends on bringing it home to the aggressive sex, and of making it costly and burdensome to the father, who has hitherto escaped the penalty.—George B. Mangold, *The Forum*, March, 1915. E. E. E.

The German Woman-World in War.—The greatness of our times is shown by the way in which the war draws everything and everybody into its jurisdiction. When we speak of the German woman-world, we have in mind all of those German women whom these great times have placed in the right position, who with the fine instincts and sensitive feelings of true women, have found where they are best able to serve their fatherland. The young German woman, not bound by the duties of a home, has found her task in caring for the sick and wounded; the wife and mother has found her highest and real mission in the war in protecting the hearth and home and caring for the children. All have found a place to serve through sacrifice of time, money, jewelry, and material comforts for the soldiers. The German woman has recognized her calling, her inner mission in the war, praying and working, sacrificing and helping to build the destinies of the fatherland.—P. Wendland, "Die deutsche Frauenwelt im Kriege," *Vierteljahrsschrift für innere Mission*, January, 1915. H. A. J.

The Struggle against Intemperance a Cultural Problem.—Our interest here is to determine whether the general drink habit has any effect on the cultural and mechanical powers of the people as a whole, and whether and in what ways any such threatening danger may be successfully combated. The influence of alcohol is of such a nature that the finest and most tender parts of the brain are the first and the most easily destroyed. The greater activity, energy, and cheerfulness under the influence of alcohol is due to the paralyzing effect of the stimulant on the inhibitory centers. The reports of physicians in the German city schools show that 50 per cent of the school children are pale and deficient in red blood, 33 per cent show traces of glandular swelling, 50 per cent of the boys and from 52 per cent to 62 per cent of the girls have a weak constitution and muscular system. Not less than one-half of the young men from the city are unfit for military service. This is to a large extent due, directly or indirectly, to intemperance, resulting in the transmission of a weak constitution to the offspring, and from the waste of money that should provide proper care for the children. The commonness of the drink-habit has its origin in the viewpoints, the customs, and adjustments with which the entire society is interwoven, and must therefore be combated in every circle of society. The heart of our present-

day cultural problem is to recognize the need of a comprehensive, well-organized plan for training the volition.—Konrat Weymann, "Die Bekämpfung des Alkoholmissbrauchs eine Kulturaufgabe," *Vierteljahrsschrift für innere Mission*, January, 1915.
H. A. J.

The Changing Conception of Property.—In a primary sense property is a need. A tool, garment, or house is an extension of personality. A difference of opinion arises at the point where it is enlarged into a right to control irrespective of relation to personality or use. We say that a man has a fundamental right to what he earns. This is true enough in primitive society, but in the present order of things it is not possible to state what anyone has earned. It is identified with what he is enabled by legal means to possess. Property is what a man legally possesses, but a man may possess what he has not earned. The legalizing at best is only a matter of social expediency. It holds only in so far as society has not discovered a means of successfully discriminating between earned and unearned possessions. Actual possession is not sacred: it is a temporary tenure subject to modification when social insight has reached a point where it is able to discriminate. There are three reasons for justifying private property: it is necessary as an instrument to personality, it is justified as far as earned, and it is justified so far as society legally approves of it on grounds of expediency. Whenever property serves as an instrument to suppress or injure personality it loses its fundamental justification and has no right to exist. It does this when it is in excess of needs and when it is below the level of needs. Society has the right to alienate property, even earned property, unless it serves the true ends of personality. Access to property is justified not only on the ground that it is earned, but more fundamentally on the ground that it is needed. A tuberculous man has a fundamental need without adequate earning power. In absence of the earning power the presence of the need itself justifies the access to property right. The right of every fundamental life-need to fulfillment is coming to be recognized as absolute, and the social order is condemned when it permits a single such need to go unrealized.—Harry Allen Overstreet, *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1915.
E. B. R.

German Culture and the War of 1914.—Culture is that which elevates a man above the animals: it refines the morals, makes the sentiments more delicate, fosters the arts, and introduces politeness into the social relations. In so far as we are able to put a precise idea into the expression "German culture" the war of 1914 is not necessary to its defense. It is very difficult to know the precise state of mind in a country not our own, but we may be quite certain that the necessity of the war in order to protect the culture of Germany is a myth invented in lieu of the true cause. This is shown, for example, in the official note of July 3, 1913, on the state of public opinion in Germany. The reality behind the myth of defending German culture in 1914 is the Prussian royalty. The Hohenzollerns not only possess material strength but presume to have moral authority as well. The incredibly crude doctrine which would identify the state with the person of the prince and grant to him the right to use or abuse the riches of his subjects as an inherent natural right is precisely the doctrine that is dominant in the present-day German constitution and gives to the war of 1914 its true character. This doctrine is the negation of all philosophy which invokes reason and justice. It is the materialistic apology of force—of mediaeval feudalism—relieved by an eloquent use of Christian phraseology. The idea of the emperor is closely associated with the idea of God and divine providence. The idea of culture is modeled on the conduct of the soldier. They are the flower of the culture. They swear fidelity to the person of the emperor. Victory is the gift of God and they will be absolved of any crime. In last analysis German culture is the claim of right for a German and the denial of right to other men. This is quite opposed to the French idea of human culture. It is contrary to the French instincts and tradition to make patriotism synonymous with hate.—Léon Brunschvicg, "La Culture allemande et la guerre de 1914," *La Paix par le droit*, January, 1915.
E. B. R.

Social Organization and Peace.—There are two rival theories as to the conditions which must exist if there is to be permanent harmonious organization. The theory held by the economists is that of enlightened self-interest; the theory of the sociologists is that of likeness and sympathy. The historical forms of the utility type have

differed widely in stability and harmony. In very few has the broader aspect of utility been appreciated by the co-operating members. Force or reward has usually been necessary to gain the co-operation of persons outside the limited group of organizers. The largest, and relatively the most harmonious forms of organization have been the great modern nations whose inhabitants are essentially alike. It is probable that nationality will long exist on the basis of sympathy. Organization on the basis of force and of reward will also persist in certain countries. Where these are superimposed on nationality international harmony will be preserved only when it is in the interest of the organizing class of such nations. The fundamental thing that will ultimately lead to permanent international peace is the producing of enough likeness among all peoples that there may be organization based on sympathy. When this is so there will be like response to similar stimuli. It is desirable to create like-mindedness of peoples on a plane above race, religion, language, and customs, and to create an organization responsible to the peoples back of the national governments. This would base action on sympathy resulting from like-mindedness and on "the democratic-control-expert-executive form of the utility type." To this end there should be established a world-consular staff partially to replace the present national consular services, a world-conservation investigation commission, a central bureau of human betterment projects, a permanent world-commission on international migration, a world-publicity service to produce like-mindedness and other similar projects. A beginning should be made toward world-organization at the close of the present war.—A. A. Tenney, *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1915. E. B. R.

Graded Social Service for the Sunday School.—The dominating aim of social service is the socializing process. Every agency that facilitates sympathy gives vividness to social imagination, and fosters co-operative endeavor, performs a socializing function. The purpose of social service in the Sunday school is to socialize the young people. This is done by promoting genuine personal relation with other groups. Several dangers beset social service, namely, (1) its very popularity; (2) the activities incidental to social service can easily become the end in themselves; (3) the pauperization of the poor; (4) it may fail of its highest efficiency; (5) the development of a patronizing spirit in the social worker. Types of social service for Sunday schools are: friendly visits and entertainment, casual rendering of relief, seasonal relief, and organized and graded service. This organized work may take the form of the school working as a unit or of graded assignment to the various groups in the Sunday school. A suggested curriculum includes service for needy children, unfortunate families, aged people, and special occasions. Social service for the Sunday school is worth while because of its objective and reflex influence.—W. N. Hutchins, *Biblical World*, August 1914. E. T. H.

Movements of Negro Population.—When in 1790 the first census was taken, the negroes constituted 19.3 per cent of the entire population, but according to the census of 1910, they constitute only 10.7 per cent of the American people. This shows that in the country as a whole the whites are increasing relatively faster than the blacks. The census of 1910 also shows that the negro population is tending toward dispersion throughout the country, and there has been a considerable movement of negroes during the decade, northward across the Mason and Dixon line and the Ohio River. Nowadays in the South, wherever industrial centers are developing or cities are gaining in population, the whites are in the majority, or soon will be. The really important revelation of the census of 1910 is that negro preponderance is not great enough in itself in the South to prevent an increase of the white population. In the most Southerly group of states the whites are increasing much faster than the blacks. However in the country as a whole, the negroes are increasing in numbers.—I. C. Rose, *American Economic Review*, June, 1914. B. N. D.

Socializing the College Curriculum.—The characteristic of the present age is its lack of respect for mere tradition; and this is very apparent in the field of education. Thirty-five years ago, science was competing for recognition in our college courses on terms of equality with the ancient classics, history, and philosophy. Now the sciences are secure in their position. Soon after this the "elective system" was

introduced into the college curriculum. These revolutionary changes are in the direction of their socialization. And this socialization is to be brought about by a succession of compromises between the conservative and the progressive elements of college faculties. As the ideal at the present age is efficiency, the colleges must have greater efficiency, industrial, intellectual, and moral, which are parts of social efficiency. Efficiency must be the measure of evaluation of culture. The college atmosphere is becoming socialized and likewise the college curriculum. The scholastic is giving way to the practical, the efficient. The college professors are responding to the new demands, and the college is more and more "of the people, for the people, and by the people."—L. G. Weld, *Religious Education*, August, 1914. B. N. D.

The College and the New Social Order.—The meaning of the new social order is not clear. If it means the pulling down of all the institutions of society, an introduction of a dead level of equality of condition, of character, of ambition, the abolition of all human inequality by legislation and the paralysis of human progress that must follow it—then true religion and the exaltation of college education demand a fight against such dangerous doctrines. But if the new social order means a society improved by brotherly love, by helping along in the industrial race, and a stirring in the souls of men of a stronger spirit of service to the state and all the people, then such social order should command the heartfelt approval of every lover of his kind. The new social order must conform to natural economic law and be consistent with the possibilities and the frailties of human nature and their practical betterment. In considering any new social order we must give attention to the improvement of the individual. And in the elevation of the individual religion, character and clear thinking are the highest instrumentalities.—William Howard Taft, *Religious Education*, August, 1914. B. N. D.

The Struggle against Unemployment.—The unemployment problem in America is to make people feel that there is such a problem. The first thing necessary is a record of every man who applies for work in order that the public may know the extent of unemployment. The next thing is to develop efficient local, state, and federal employment agencies. Another thing needful is that contracts be spread over ten-year periods. Then should be provided insurance against sickness, accident, old age, and unemployment. When everyone is paying into an unemployment insurance fund it will not be sufficient for the "captains of industry" to bring together men and raw materials so as merely to make money, but to plan to develop manhood as well.—Charles Richmond Henderson, *American Labor Legislative Review*, May, 1914. E. B. R.

The Literature of Scientific Management.—The literature of scientific management is of six classes dealing with: (1) the theory of scientific management, like Taylor's *Shop Management*, and *Principles of Scientific Management*, H. L. Grant's articles on a "bonus plan," the 1912 hearings before the House Committee on Shop Management, L. R. Brandeis on the Eastern Rate Case; (2) descriptions of practical operation by managers in various industries; (3) scientific management as urged upon railroads by Mr. Emerson and Mr. Brandeis before the Interstate Commerce Commission; (4) detailed methods; (5) scientific management and the human factor, treated by Professor Münsterberg in *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, by the Russell Sage volume on *Fatigue and Industry*, and by W. C. Redfield, in the *Atlantic Monthly*; (6) scientific management and organized labor.—C. Bertrand Thompson, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1914. R. B.

The English Method of Dealing with the Unemployed.—The close of the Boer war forced the government to some sort of action. The first measures were the usual palliative ones, but in 1909 the government passed an act creating a chain of connected, free public-employment bureaus. Government insurance against unemployment was adopted in 1911. The act introduced the Ghent system of government subsidized unemployment insurance through labor organizations, and a national government-administered system of unemployment insurance. Seven great trades were chosen as a first experiment and unemployment insurance was made compulsory. The premium, five pence a week, is paid, one-half by the employer and one-half by the

employee. The government adds an amount equal to one-third of this. The worker is entitled, after the lapse of one week of unemployment, to benefits from the national insurance fund amounting to seven shillings a week. A man of sixty years, after ten years of insurance and the payment of 500 weekly contributions, may claim a refund of all he has paid in, less what he may have taken out during periods of unemployment, with compound interest at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Employers who keep their employees at work continuously for the year get a refund of one-third their contribution. During the time the system has been in operation, since January 15, 1913, it has been highly successful.—Henry R. Seager, *American Labor Legislative Review*, May, 1914. E. B. R.

The Struggle over the Payment of Labor in Australia and America.—Organized labor is weakest in the United States and strongest in Australia. It controlled the Australian government in 1910 and forced wages upon a time basis whereas wages in America are maintained by capitalists on the basis of output. Between these extremes lies the contest between capital and labor. The packing industry in Chicago illustrates the American capitalistic tendency to "speeding up," securing output by exploiting the strongest and best laborers. Sweatshop work is the offshot of this system of paying for labor-output rather than labor-time. The writer discusses, also, the relation to this struggle of "Ca Canny," the socialistic labor policy, the minimum wage, and opposition to the introduction of machinery.—Dr. Junghann, *Zeit. f. d. g. Staatswissenschaft*, Heft. 3, 1914. R. B.

The Influence of the Passing of the Public Lands.—The old free land policy in United States—good in its day—is now superseded by an era of dear lands. This explains in part diminishing returns on land investment, high prices of food, and the necessity of conservation replacing exploitation. It makes monopoly more dangerous, industrial education more essential. Historically the free lands of the West made possible our distinctive American characteristics—an overconfident individualism, wastefulness, disregard for law, panics, corrupt government, and at the same time a high degree of political and social equality. Whether that equality can be retained is the present problem. Increasing specialization tends to social stratification. We are working with political democracy to secure social and industrial democracy, but through improving conditions within one's class rather than rising out of the class as heretofore.—William J. Trimble, *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1914. R. B.

The New Civilization: America at the Forge.—Robust democracy is the spinal column of the new civilization in America. "To amass and to hoard is a modern sin." The enthusiasm among the laborers for leaders like "Mother Jones" shows a new impulse toward the exaltation of service. Woman's influence is felt in America in an evolution of the idea of woman's place, in an improvement in the schools and courts. She is working out the problem of her economic independence of man. The humanization of law is becoming an enlargement of the true spirit of the home. Woman's vote is only a small part in the new civilization. The principal necessity, so far as woman is concerned, is her economic independence of man.—Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *Craftsman*, July, 1914. C. D. B.

Distributing the Damages Caused by War.—In all times a state of war has caused a considerable amount of injury—murders, fires, destruction of all sorts—to non-combatants. Today the damages are greater than ever before, and the end aimed at by the present national committee is the repayment of the whole damage caused by the war. The first step of this sort was that taken by the law of the Legislative Assembly in 1792-93. The idea of the framers of this measure was that while a war is to conserve the liberty and independence of the people and that all citizens may be called upon to sacrifice life and fortune, the state also should protect the citizens. In case of invasion where some lose part or all of their property, the loss should not fall upon them alone but should be more evenly distributed over the whole of society by the state reimbursing the individual loser for a part, at least, of his loss. Napoleon had created a fund to provide for the victims of the invasion in 1814. But his work was swept away by the return of Louis XVIII. In 1807 came the defense of indemnity in the name of national solidarity. The damages are the result of war; the war is a

national affair; so the nation should bear the damage, though a large part of it was not touched by the invasion. But the enormous financial consequence of the state bearing the whole of the damage, and the charge that such an idea was communism kept the Assembly from voting the entire indemnity. The Germans, thanks to the indemnity which the French had to pay them, partially repaid their own victims of the war.—R. Mauduit, "La Répartition des dommages causés par la guerre," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, February, 1915. E. B. R.

The Industrial Unrest from Labor's Standpoint.—The writer defends English organized labor against the "Tyranny of Labor." The immediate issue of the justice of deporting trade-union leaders from South Africa raises the whole question of labor demands in England. Using the railways and the coal trade as illustrations, the writer charges the increase in railroad accidents directly to "speeding up" against which employees are so "tyrannically" protesting, and cites the 170,000 injuries a year in British mines as ample justification for a strike in midwinter if necessary. The Leeds and Norfolk strikes and the standard of living reports of the Somerset society are also put in evidence. The article closes with a review of the growing prosperity of English trade to refute the charge of the ill effects of so-called labor domination.—Frank Smith, *Fortnightly Review*, May, 1914. R. B.

The Religious Revival in the Labor Movement.—Influences have been at work in the labor movement making for a religious revival such as democracy has never known since it became organized. In the past, great democratic leaders turned against Christianity because the church as a body failed to champion the cause of the weak and oppressed and because it stood for individualism in religion. The spirit of Christianity is finding expression among the working classes in new forms. The most significant is the brotherhood movement which today numbers 550,000 members. There are sisterhoods connected with it, and many of the ordinary brotherhoods are open to all. The adult school movement, numbering some 100,000 members, is another great modern religious influence among the working classes. Sunday morning gatherings are held at some 2,000 centers throughout the country. The Salvation Army attracts because it gives a way of life and not a creed. So we find the labor movement sweeping by the churches and ignoring them, working out its own stupendous problems, regardless of their aid, reviving Christianity among the working classes by its great ministries of laymen somewhat in the spirit of the early Christians. The labor movement is making for Christian life while remaining apart from church life. The new evangel of labor has set men free from the dead hand of church tradition and the arrogance of priestly claims. It awoke mankind to new life with the knowledge that redemption came, not by church organization, but by direct fellowship in Christ.—George Haw, *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1915. J. W. H.

Sexual questions in Time of War.—New problems and tasks for sexual science are presented by this war which we hope will help to lay more definite foundations for our science. There is a growing unity of opinion that the fundamental principles of sexual-science investigation must be on the lines of the biological, natural-science method. There are obviously varied changes in all phases of sexual life, since the war began. Marriages are contracted with love rather than policy as the actuating motive. The unions of war times may prove stronger and more harmonious than those of times of peace, judging from the marriages made during the war of 1870-71. Not so pleasant is the prospect of those temporary alliances made out of wedlock. Furthermore, the questions of prostitution and sexual diseases are of particular significance. In addition to the bodily ailments brought on in times of war is the growing prevalence of psychical disturbances and nervous disorders. There is also the problem of homosexuality, not only among those taking part in the war but among others, since the natural tendency of persons so afflicted, to wander, is furthered by the existence of war. Both men and women are found guilty of transvestiture, a nervous abnormality useful in fulfilling the office of spy. Problems of social hygiene are greater than ever. The psychiatrists can, and should, prevent abnormal persons being drawn into service, thereby decreasing the prevalence and spread of certain sexual perversions. The scientists should further discover how to affect the birth of

men to replace those lost in war. We conclude with the hope that this fearful strife may prove a fundamentally refining force, freeing us from all prejudice and leaving us able to work in peace on the problems of sexual science, with German earnestness, honesty, and clarity of perception.—Dr. E. Burchard, "Sexuelle Fragen zur Kriegszeit," *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, January, 1915. M. G. B.

Effects of the Idea of Religious Salvation from the Sociological Point of View.—The most practical and at the same time the most essential religious sentiment to man is the idea of salvation. It has to do both with this life and the life beyond the tomb. Salvation is always one of the culminating points of religion. It is the strongest stimulus to the practice of virtue, in spite of the pretense that morality is sought for its own sake. To work out one's salvation is a common expression with diverse theologies. Of course this is not the only stimulus to doing good. There exist some general motives which are higher. The idea of salvation has two distinct phases: the hope of happiness, and the existence of suffering. The last has been the more active, especially in the Middle Ages. Some religions hold out only moderate suffering of short duration, and promise much happiness, while others threaten with terrible torments, intense and of long duration. Without the idea of salvation, the exercise of virtue is indeed possible, but difficult. There are two sorts of men; those who do not need any such spur, and those who do; and the latter class is more numerous. If all men believed that death ended all, morality would inevitably suffer.—Raoul de la Grasserie, "Des effets de l'idée du salut religieux au point de vue sociologique," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, January, 1915. J. W. H.

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
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THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN^{*}

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THE BURDEN OF PROGRESS

One of the most used words is "problem." There is the problem of city government, of taxation, of immigration, of pure food, of education, of the liquor traffic, of the judiciary, of direct legislation, and many others. Modern civilization presents a snarl of problems.

There must have been plenty of problems of old, but the people did not always define them. Many issues have been hatched by modern conditions, such as changes in industry and transportation and growth of population. Moreover, with greater general enlightenment society has become self-conscious, for intelligence has a revealing power. The discovery is made that social relationships are not all they should be, and reform is undertaken.

Making the world over is new business and new business is difficult. We can scarcely say that people are prepared for it, for a large part of the development of society has heretofore been as free from foresight and conscious direction as has the evolution of the society of bees and beavers. Much of our present order has been brought about by mere force of circumstances, by an

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impromptu unwinding of events which men have barely understood, let alone directed. There has been little anticipation of social outcomes or attempt to substitute planning in place of evolution. Society has arrived at its present organization largely without knowing why or electing aims; it has gone forward in some such way as the individual grows up, his vital processes taking place in the absence of intention or understanding.

But this is changing. Society consciously seeks social ends as truly as the individual seeks personal ends. Conditions have so changed that the individual, in order to get what he wants, must combine his efforts with those of others. A revolution in economic, industrial, and commercial relationships compels the individual to make common cause with others, leads him to look at life from a social viewpoint, and causes social questions to demand the expenditure of more and more mental energy. The social machine is complex. Physical force will not operate it. The man who got along in the twelfth century by using his fists now has to use his head. Thought rules, and it is only by study that social ideals may be realized or that individuals or groups may protect themselves in a noiseless warfare in which the most dangerous enemies and devouring opponents may be as invisible as germs.

To accomplish ends through social machinery is a real intellectual feat. Political and social science as a branch of learning is not easy to grasp. There is perhaps no kind of subject-matter which taxes the mind more severely. A high degree of culture is required to enable one to understand the movements and issues of the times. The intellectual requirements for capable citizenship, for ideal citizenship, are exacting. Now the mind which is available for the conscious direction of society was shaped under a different set of conditions than those prevailing in the modern world. Hence we find individuals who would be highly effective in a physical struggle or in contesting with nature for subsistence but who are at a loss in an environment so new to the race. Everywhere there is evidence of a bewilderment. There is little agreement among specialists in political science. Social engineering tests the capabilities of the human intellect. A singular confession of weakness is that represented by the action of the Senate at

Washington in voting to reject the annual contribution of \$250,000.00 from the Rockefeller General Education Board, which had been used for farm demonstration work and the extermination of the boll weevil. A senator declared that that money was covered with "the blood of women and children shot down in the Colorado strike." This incident brings out in strong relief the futility of legislation, for it should have been possible long ago to curtail centralized wealth to which such abuses are ascribed. Legislators appear strangely limp in dealing with conditions whose evil results are denounced on every hand. Of thirty-two acts of parliament, Herbert Spencer found that twenty-nine produced effects opposite from those intended. The utterly diverse views of public men indicate that social administration is a problem out-topping the average of ability.

In the last analysis the reasoning capacity of the individual is called in question. Ours is not a race of super-men, and mental limitations enhance the difficulty of making headway. Consider the fact that we have to "study" to understand. If a novice could sit down with Euclid and in an evening know geometry! It takes weeks and months of painful concentration to master a branch of learning represented by books which could be read through in a few days, so narrow is the gateway to understanding. Man is a reasoning animal, so it is said, though in discussions regarding the power of animals to reason some scientists hold that not only do animals not reason but that very few human beings reason. Men reason not from choice but from necessity. Reasoning occurs when a situation cannot be successfully dealt with in some other way, as by imitation, habit, or memory, or by getting someone else to do it. But oftentimes the pinch of a situation, instead of evoking reasoning, will call forth a futile deluge of emotion, and the citizen will—swear. We hate to think; we avoid it if possible; we think only under pressure, and not always then.

The reasoning faculty in its fulness develops late in the individual, and on the other hand may disintegrate in the closing years of life; it is first to be disturbed by alcohol, sickness or fatigue. The freshest hours of the day are required for work that involves the nice balance of logic. We hesitate to attack problems, and

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gladly defer consideration to the next day of those matters that call for vigor of thought. Frequently people will exhaust every means of dealing with a difficulty except that of reasoning, and persistently try to flank a situation that might be resolved by direct mental exertion. The tendency is to rely upon the lower mental processes.

Concepts and principles, with which reason deals, are products for which the mind has less affinity than for objects. The vastly greater appeal of the objective is attested by a thousand evidences. The concrete is popular, while the abstract is synonymous with dryness and difficulty. A speculative exposition or a dissertation on principles repels all but a few, while satiating and repetitious concreteness attracts a multitude. But it is the concept and the principle that are of chief significance, for they represent meanings. Thinkers are characterized by grip of abstractions and the ability to pursue a generalization, undisturbed by the swollen floods of concreteness. In reasoning, meanings rather than forms engage consciousness and for it Plato held that but few were fitted by nature.

A good imagination is the basis of reasoning and a trait of infinite significance for social betterment. But what of its prevalence? The mere restoration of a past experience is common enough; vivid recollection of something actually experienced is indeed characteristic of children, and "narrative old age" employs the almost photographic images of earlier years, but a constructive, original, penetrating, and interpreting turn of mind is a different matter. Otherwise it would not take a third of a century to secure even partial realization of the trust issue or of the meaning of watered stock.

Many evidences of the failure to see the significance of facts will occur to one: the young married woman who laughs at the spectacle of a drunken man on the street; the teacher who uses uncomplainingly a textbook containing a picture of a rooster on a cannon; the working-class mother who is pleased when her son joins the national guard; the farmer who does not distinguish between his labor income and the income derived from his money investment, who "buys a job"; or the young English woman who

expects to tour the United States in three days, not thinking it so "frightfully large." And is it not usually the case that one is much more concerned about the loss of a shirt stud than of a hundred dollars abstracted from the family income by invisible but real tentacles? The absence of ideal conditions is little noted if the familiar is found in place. If the man lower down had the gift of vision would there not be new chapters in history? Here and there are those who image the advantages of other status or penetrate mentally into the monstrous mushroomism of privilege or follow with the mind's eye the play of social and economic forces, but can it be assumed that actual realization of harmful conditions is at all usual? Is not invisible evil effectually protected by lack of vision? It is still vastly more heinous, because more objective, to steal a horse than to steal a franchise. The fact that the mind tends to adhere to objects of direct acquaintance, making a little world out of the materials within the sweep of the eye and less frequently rising to a stage from which the larger world may be surveyed, is fateful with reference to the rational ordering of a better civilization. Constituents are proudly triumphant when their representatives force through a bill compelling railroads to bulletin the time of arrival and departure of trains, but are not particularly curious as to the relation of freight rates to the cost of living; women highly, if not well, educated oppose suffrage from inability to represent to themselves the various situations in which a voter's power affects their interest; politicians find that temporizing often wins over statesmanship; omission and inefficiency make far less impression than the unimportant overt act; a scientific management and the avoidance of waste are long delayed. Ever the tangible reality of the moment rather than the greater reality of the ideal moves men.

Indisposition to think and the circumscribed field of imagination are significant, for in social administration the power of generalization and logical sequence is much engaged. The usual sciences are actually more simple than the knowledge with which the voter, ballot in hand, is presumed to be acquainted, the science and philosophy of society. In fact the belated development of sociology and allied subjects may be taken to mean that social phenomena

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are reduced to system only with unusual difficulty. Anthropology, social psychology, civic theory, and economics deal with elusive and thought-taxing materials. Governmental issues cannot be wisely dealt with on the spur of the moment. To know the nature of the task of imposing intelligence upon the social order is to recognize the need of a more intensive study than is common. Serious discussion, one subject by this group, club, or coterie, and another topic by others, is needed, each to arrive at a degree of expertness, each to contribute to a common fund of thought. The absence of insistent inquiry and discussion among the people is a source of political weakness, for men elected to office reflect the common attitude and are circumscribed by prevailing conditions of insight and interest. The average voter needs to be convinced that unless he studies issues he will be unprepared to deal with them; he needs to study his lesson. Government is a matter requiring downright application on the part of citizens. Political questions must be framed for discussion, terms defined, and time devoted to the study of principles. Civic welfare cannot be achieved with a general avoidance of strenuous mental effort, and with a spatter of attention and a lust for amusement to fill every free hour.

The faulty management of public business raises a question in some minds as to the possibility of successful collective enterprise. It is doubted whether the people are capable of sustaining consciously a far higher social organization. When one tyranny is overthrown, it is argued, another will rise in its place. There is implied in many quarters the view that the people collectively are inadequate for perfect self-government and for achieving a genuine community welfare. "Things will not be any better than they were before" is the melancholy comment on programs of reform.

The answer is education, an education that centers on thinking. And as one cannot think unless he has materials with which to think, it is important that there be provided specific thought-materials bearing upon the evolution of the state. There is need of a subject-matter compounded of biological, historical, scientific, and evolutionary data the upshot of which would be a grasp of

underlying social principles. More need an acquaintance with the kind of material found, for example, in the works of Spencer, John Fiske, David Starr Jordan, Metchnikoff, Haeckel, Karl Marx, Darwin, Alfred Russell Wallace, Henry George, Lester F. Ward, and Prince Kropotkin.

The culture required for social ends receives too little attention, due in part to the prevailing enthusiasm for training for salaried employments. As a result there are engineers and chemical experts who are not interested in politics. Technological preparation is often a mechanizing process which in adapting for a necessary function widely deflects consciousness from social issues.

Nor is the student of ancient history and literature, of the time-honored classics, necessarily well equipped for the coming nation. He possesses, indeed, the advantage of contact with the best minds of the past; he has associated, not with groundlings and slaves, but with masters—Caesar, Xenophon, Marcus Aurelius. A certain aristocracy of associations is thus established, and it is not to be wondered at that the early American clergyman, lawyer, and public man approached life from a high plane and carried a dignity derived from the stately and poised spirit of classical letters, essays, and orations. Horace and Cicero were good consumers, and slavishness did not infect the underfed and impecunious student of early Dartmouth or Amherst. Fresh from the upper-caste associations of Virgil or Lysias, the early American college student was keyed high and was notably rich in historical ideals, though perhaps walking the streets of cities in poverty without the collateral of skill.

But the very fascinations of the classics lead to a certain disqualification; the view is backward, and the enthusiasm of youth becomes attached to a gloried past. And the mind nourished on prescientific literature cannot take quick offense against pseudoscience. Not that the Apollo myth or the prowess of Beowulf are really credited, but there exists a haze not conducive to realism. The classical scholar tends to be but partially scientific, from the permeating influence of ancient misconceptions. The need of instruction actually clarifying mental processes—even the need of

educating the educated—may be inferred from the fact that “sucker lists” are compiled from college catalogues.¹

A type of education which would avoid the dubious qualities in classical subject-matter and the isolating and mechanizing effects of occupational instruction is needed. The ideal society cannot be formed of men whose interests are no wider than money-making, nor of men whose instruction has incorporated into their outlook a mythological squint which exposes them to the patent medicine vendor or causes them to look upon nations as big personalities, rather than, as Chancellor Jordan remarks, jurisdictions. What tendencies to exaggerate, to hope unduly, to misread evidence, to exalt intuition, to obtrude emotions, to idealize animals, and to personify property or cities are not bound up with an intellectual nurture based on the age of fable! When the small boy says that the luck has gone out of a trinket which he carries about with him, and when in a single day in Chicago 25,000 people gather about a miraculous shin bone, the need of intellectual reorganization is evident.

Clarifying and disillusioning instruction is needed with regard to social organization. Undue veneration for constitutions implies a misguided study of history; for the men who framed constitutions, so far as not merely responsive to special interests, were attempting no more than the people of today attempt in dealing to the best of ability with the problems of the hour, and that any particular

¹ The following clipping from the *Chicago Record-Herald*, of February 11, 1913, speaks for itself:

“SUCKERS” ALL COLLEGE MEN

Hawthorne Case Witness Tells Where He Got 700,000 Names

NEW YORK, February 10—The so-called “sucker list” of mining companies promoted by Julian Hawthorne, Josiah Quincy, Albert Freeman, and Dr. William J. Morton, who are on trial for alleged fraudulent use of the mails, was compiled from 400 college catalogues and contained 700,000 names.

Freeman so testified today under cross-examination by government counsel. He identified a check for \$20,000.00 as one of his own and said it was drawn to cover the expense of making the list of names of persons to whom literature was sent.

Testifying as to the cost of printing circular letters sent out, Freeman said: “I did not care how much I paid if the letter was perfect. But the trouble was to get the different names put into the letters in such a way as to make those who received them think they were personal letters from Hawthorne and not mere circulars. I sent out fully 700,000 of those letters.”

authority attended the deliberations of early publicists, in excess of that attributable to the latest session of a legislature, is no more credible than that the impressions of today should be imposed on the public of a century hence.

The educational system suffers an underdevelopment, for it is responsive rather than dominating. Institutions of learning tend to conform rather than to form, and the seal of approval is placed on unregenerate ambitions and the ethics of disorderly competition. Young men who should be in a spiritual kindergarten, whose conversations are crude and gossipy, and whose reactions to quality are wondering skeptical, are released at graduation certificated if not refined. The vices of the street—"clamorous insincere advertisement, push, and adulteration"—may possess the graduate as well as the entrant, and the aim of a department may be colored to the purpose of the crafty student who would equip himself to make "a heap of money" by overcapitalizing electric-lighting plants in small towns which in all ethics should be taught how to manage their own public utilities. The educated man should be by that fact a prophet, not paramountly a profit-seeker.

Within the total body of knowledge there exists an enormous quantity of material which is inert or irrelevant. It is a serious dissipation of energy that youth should devote years to a relatively inconsequential learning. The good general repute of knowledge has thrown the mantle of approval over types of learning which, considered from the point of view of a dynamic society, represent a deadening load upon the factors making for progress. Often one hears it said that a given person or a certain class is "well educated," there being no distinction made between highly educated and well educated; whereas there is all the difference in the world between the two conditions. Many great scholars have been very highly, and at the same time very poorly, educated, when regard is had to mental content. Certainly no very extensive improvement in brain capacity has occurred since the middle ages or the days of Diocletian, and whatever of human weal has been achieved for the present as against former periods is to be referred to mental content rather than to increase of brain cells and spread of cortex.

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Too much emphasis can hardly be placed upon the actual character of the information which society permits to circulate or deliberately diffuses through agencies under state control. The substitution of valid materials for those not meeting the most searching tests of value must occupy the foreground of effort for social betterment.

If there is a wide range of values in real knowledge, how significant becomes the toleration of pseudo-science! Error obtains widely, and indeed a certain conventional respectability attaches to quantities of traditional material which any scientist knows could not bear scrutiny. Much of this is so knit up with emotion that scholars plow around it rather than risk the consequences which a too fearless opposition would entail. Hence it is that verified knowledge and pseudo-science may achieve a considerable circulation in the same community, the one to a degree undoing the work of the other, but with no joining of issue and thorough enlightenment. There is an immense circulation of worthless reading matter, ranging from dream-books and drugstore almanacs to pulpy fiction. The church would do well to inspect closely the materials which are placed before millions, often as their almost sole mental food, and should not be unaware of the possibility of benumbing intelligence by forever having over points of doctrine or the minutiae of Jewish history. One may listen attentively yet unprofitably.

The practice of systematically misinforming children cannot be too strongly condemned. Parents allow their children to be taught matter known to be misleading. The presentation of myths and attractive falsifications befogs the child's mind and contributes to the permanence of a public expecting to meet with the fountain of youth in the decoction sold for "a dollar a bottle." The strange case of mythology and actual science in the same mind may be due to the it-is-so and it-isn't-so duplicity of the make-believe literature on which children are nourished far into the age of reasoning.

A great gain will have been made when there is a more general realization of the importance of building up an effective civic mind. The social outcomes of various types of cultural material and of training deserve consideration. Especially is it important that

there should be convictions regarding the scientific character of social questions. A function logically requiring the highest devotion and insight—government—is too often given over to men who are not grounded in appropriate learning, and the citizen himself too often lightly dismisses civic obligations which should set him to burning midnight oil.

SOCIAL INERTIA

Progressive movements are held severely in check by accumulated habits and customs. As one grows older he becomes, unless under unusual conditions, firmly set in feelings and views. Habits tend to grow into the very constitution, and represent a force whose power is experienced whenever a new idea is introduced in the world. Repetition of movements and of thoughts results in fixed arrangements of the brain cells. The grooves of thought become deeply worn, and the mind comes at last to resemble in definiteness of character and permanence of structure the physical body which supports it. It is the exceptional person who keeps green at the top, and who remains in sympathy with dynamic phases of society.

The paths of thought are greatly influenced by one's surroundings. Not without cause do we wish to know where the individual came from, who his parents were, where he went to school, and what his occupation is, and our curiosity extends to his wife and children. The ethical atmosphere which one has known, combining elements from many sources, essentially determines interests, outlook, and opinions. The individual is to a great extent a composite of the ideas which environment has forced upon his attention. Differences in native ability are apparently less determinative than those resulting from the complex of suggestions associated with one's place of residence, acquaintanceship, and social contacts. The to us strangely inverted views and practices of alien peoples, ancient or modern, are none other than we ourselves, transferred to other environment, would have approved. The culture materials of the Kentucky mountains and those of a northern city are respectively instrumental in creating most diverse types. One cannot escape the pressure of environment. Even the greatest minds are a reflex

of their age, sharing in contemporary attitudes and errors; Pascal believed in French miracles and Sir Matthew Hale in witches.

Especially do first impressions last. The importance of a fifty-cent jackknife to a boy sinks deep into the emotional nature, and men of means will flinch at the expense of a new pocketknife in unconscious revival of emotions of childhood. Stamped with the forms of religion, language, or manners as a child, one can never be fully freed from either their good or bad features. The negro who was invited to sit with his white employer at a dinner in the South, but at the table trembled with fear, gave evidence that legal emancipation did not carry with it emancipation from the psychology of slavery. Pronounced radicals exhibit on occasion the awe which undemocratic centuries have bred into the emotional life. One brought up to refrain from gladness on Sunday may convince himself of the acceptability of tennis on that day, but may experience difficulty in bringing his feelings into accord. Not readily do sentiments and prejudices, reverences and submissions disappear. How rare it is for a community to change its feelings to correspond with the development of one of its gifted sons or daughters; hence a prophet is given scant honor at home. For which reason discerning youths go to new parts where there is exemption from the levity of reminiscence.

The persistence of habit and the inertia of custom are everywhere to be discerned. Sudden transformations are rare. Though terms change, realities abide, as witness pagan gods succeeded by saints as numerous, feudalism transferred to industry, and the fetishism of the elk tooth. Writing of the Incas, James Bryce notes that the Spaniards abolished human sacrifices—and burned heretics.

Without special efforts to change habits, or the supplying of conditions which enforce new ways, the probability of considerable changes in social orderings is slight. People will go on in the same old ways, and it is the next generation that is the principal hope of those who strive for change. Laws influence society but slowly; they are rather the reflex of states of mind than actually agencies of social transformation, and it is to educative factors that attention should especially be given in reform. A weakness of the older socialism was its disregard of the persistence of habit, showing in

the ten thousand enmeshing sentiments of the static multitude. Writers still imply the possibility of a sudden redirection suggestive of the "conversion" of the religious revival, which itself is far from being a comprehensive change. Inertia is an outstanding trait of primitive peoples, whose characteristics obtain in no small portion of modern society, and a trait, as well, to be reckoned with in individuals more advanced.

The threat of revolution can never be more than partly executed, for in the greater number of relations the individual will continue to be as he was before. Those who have been servile will continue to be servile. Under the older system of family discipline the youth looked forward to becoming of age, only to find when he arrived at that time that both docility and authority persisted. In fact, the only social revolution which seems possible in view of the tenacity of habit is one which slowly proceeds under the pressure of conditions and is directed by strong leadership. There was never yet a revolution or emancipation which was true to the full vigor of the term. For sharp social advances shock and surprise, and the dislocation of environment is required. If psychology has a message for progress it is that efforts must be focused upon the disorganization of old and in turn the establishment of new habits.

Actual contentment under unfair conditions may exist through the spell of environment. One becomes so used to things as they are that the prospect of change is unpleasant. The farmer's mortgage becomes part of his cosmos. Conditions which would appear most singular from a fresh point of view come under the principle of habituation and scarcely attract attention. Improvement means change and confusion, the rupture of accustomed ways and adjustment to a new order, and it is bewildering to face new conditions, even if theoretically better; hence the inevitable reaction which follows a mood of reform and the slight immediate response made by the mass of mankind to idealistic appeals. Privilege and exploitation, parasitism and humbug, are relatively safe when rooted in the old order. To look at such in a new light would be their extermination, but it is not usual to look at things in a new light.

A popular weakness is susceptibility to undemocratic emotional attitudes. It is a well-known fact that one's reason and emotions may not agree perfectly, and that feelings are likely to be the deciding factor. Our feelings have been gathering force since early childhood, while our arguments may be of recent acquisition. A substantial fund of emotion comes down to us by tradition from far absolutist régimes; we are early infiltrated with archaic sentiments from a thousand points of cultural contact. As a result democratic attitudes are less prevalent than democratic opinions.

"And your petitioners will forever pray" these words appearing at the close of a legal paper are redolent of sociology. While phrases of courtesy have a place not to be lightly surrendered, this form points to a former social order in which power did not flow from the people to officials but on the contrary favors were from the rulers "vouchsafed unto us." The awe which does hedge about "his honor" is perhaps not so much an expression of respect for the law—for laws are abstractions—nor deference to one's self, the voter who elects judges and builds courthouses, but more likely a mood which comes to us by relayed example from the days when civic humility worshiped at the feet of kings. We believe that our officials derive their powers from the consent of the governed—help thou our unbelief! For while we believe we may yet feel otherwise. One dictates to a stenographer a letter to his servant, the congressman, and finds that the dictated formal close, "Yours very truly," has come under the pervasive influence of inherited deference to office and reads instead "Very respectfully," which is indeed better than "Your obedient servant." And the salutation of "Dear Sir" is supplanted in the process of transcription to the self-conscious and formal "Sir." Of course it is the congressman who should address the voter, by whose consent he exists, with the prostration of phrase which creeps into the voter's letter to him. Men of toil come upon the campus of a state university, their institution by right of taxes, hat in hand, instead of in the consciousness of owning the place. Truly, for lack of what meat does the citizen remain so small!

The timidity of the public in pressing claims against corporations seems to be founded on traditions of servility. It seems

almost like interfering with the course of the planets to compel a railroad company to stop a long train at a mere county seat, and when a citizen tells the president of the road a few human facts staid residents get their heads together in a certain consternation. Walt Whitman in a memorable poem justifies man to the bigness of material things, like great machinery and buildings, trampling them under foot of a forced accession of self-respect. But it requires no little temerity to lay the ghost of mere bigness, and the lowly spirit of the peasant uncovered before authority still lives to a degree.

Yet men desire to be as good as other men—or a little better—and if defeated and humbled by others' huge success, resort may be had to the theory of compensation. So-and-so is rich, but his home is childless; he visits Europe, but he has arteriosclerosis; he has a beautiful residence, but he is not happy. Social evolution would move more swiftly if once for all the supposed compensations of misfortune were subjected to actual observation, and the fact frankly recognized that some conditions of life are better, immeasurably better, than others. A fatalistic doctrine of compensation disposes one to bear those ills which under a different philosophy he would flee or fight. When one secures a benefit he does not thereby release the lever of a correlated misfortune.

Possibly the conventional doctrine of compensation is related to limitations of experience. Habituated to salt and potatoes, the individual denies the advantages of mutton chops. The benefits of travel come to be seen obliquely, because travel cannot be afforded. The grin-and-bear-it attitude becomes confirmed into a religious devotion to hardship. Misfortunes thus undergo an apotheosis into blessings, and happiness is expected not to last; there are "terrors of cloudless noon." Moreover, the great mass of mankind have had meager experience as consumers, and therefore the upper ranges of life are seen in false perspective, which fact gives color to compensation. The development of suitable wants throughout populations is accordingly preliminary to democracy. In fact, not until mere maintenance ceases to absorb the major portion of one's efforts may the possibilities of human nature be realized. At the very basis of social inequality is an ancient cringing spirit and a time-honored glorification of suffering.

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A vast kingdom of inherited fears and deferences, of shadowy evasiveness yet substantial reality, prevails, especially in older societies. The error of not "knowing one's place" thus becomes obnoxious, and the particular merit of the great English public schools, regarded from the aristocratic point of view, has been that through "fagging" the boy was taught to know his place, a subtle social system of distinctions thus being fortified by training. The shocking nakedness of communication in the western states implies by contrast the traditional deference which exists in older communities for academic, political, or economic status. Prevailing sentiments of deference are very often inappropriate, and a rational skepticism of conventional attitudes is warranted. Lack of intelligent unrest and challenge lies at the basis of backward conditions. As one measures himself so is it meted out to him. Development toward democracy requires a stimulation of personality and the charging of individuals with ideals of larger attainments. To preserve fairly even conditions in a population requires watchfulness against an invidious conventionality.

Oftentimes conventional attitudes are singularly at war with what facts warrant. Consider the social prejudice against basic productional occupations. The honor accorded arms is something of an anachronism when the world is held back from peace only by false ideals. The most toilsome and necessary labor is not recognized as meriting special approbation, while predaceous wealth is never without distinction. All degrees of respectability prevail in modern employments, to a large extent based upon inappropriate considerations. All necessary forms of work should be held alike worthy, and the performance of disagreeable and dangerous tasks deserve special commendation.

Traditional conceptions as to who deserve credit for wealth production, coupled with a certain obtuseness with reference to the fact that society overtly or tacitly fixes incomes, give rise to astounding overpayment and underpayment, to a most unscientific scale of remuneration. A degree of imagination is required to see things in their true light, in default of which nothing appears surprising. Social conditions are so largely a reflex of prevailing states of consciousness that to change conditions is first to change

minds. The cherishing of economic tradition by those who would most profit by a new outlook, the possession of the "capitalist mind" by the expropriated, is a singular obstruction, only to be accounted for by the static condition of intelligence which prevails when not guarded against the domination of custom and an excess of habit.

A consideration of the force of environment gives a clue to the extreme significance of new surroundings; change of environment provides a multitude of suggestions resulting in new methods and ideals, but is especially important in compelling, through the rupture of habit, the reasoning reaction. Men's minds tend to conform to their immediate surroundings as truly as the color of the fur of a prairie dog to the dun expanse of its semiarid habitat; there is thus an underlying quality in the intellectual processes which relates *homo sapiens* to the birds in the tree and the imitatively colored larvae which coat its leaves. As the inherited powers and instincts of man are in a large way the reflex of the requirements made upon him through unmeasured prehistoric time, so the thought of the individual of today is in direct response to the features of his environment. If environment is easy, little mental effort will be exerted, but if the individual is placed under exacting conditions whose demands cannot be met by memory, habit, or impulse, then activity is forced upon the reasoning powers.

To supply the conditions which compel development new environment is effective. One is rarely acquainted with his own capabilities until he is thrown upon his own resources through some dislocation of his habitual setting. We are full of surprises to ourselves, the tug of effort to effect a new adjustment being the prerequisite of disclosure. One may believe that he is making the most of himself in a given place in the world, but upon being subjected to fresh demands he may feel with the character in Mark Twain's *A Double-barreled Detective Story*: "Duffers like us don't know what real thought is." To suitably precipitate upon one thought-provoking requirements, the importing of new elements into one's daily order, or the bodily transference of the individual to different surroundings, is necessary.

Evidence of the part played by change of surroundings in stimulating intelligence may be gathered from various historical occurrences. The England of Shakspeare was convulsed with the realization of a new world—imagine what would be our reaction if communication were established with a race on another planet! Under the law of shock new intellectual manifestations appeared in the Age of Elizabeth, of which an invigorated drama and an unwonted bouyancy of phrase were a normal expression. Unfortunate the age that has no new worlds to discover or no thrilling vision to provoke the creative spirit!

The shock of the frontier resulted, in the case of the American people, in a remarkable burst of initiative, resourcefulness, and idealism. The patent office at Washington, which bears witness to an inventiveness unique in the history of the race, is evidence of the stimulating effects of a new environment. In New Zealand, likewise, where within memory the cannibal Maori feasted on "long pig," the response to new demands is to be read in laws which are wisely imitated in older countries.

It is ever the emergency-meeting race or individual that generates progress; static conditions tend to reduce mankind to a set of fixed reactions, whose insidious approach may be noted in the unprogressiveness of old communities where the leading citizens have hung their hats on the same hooks for forty years. Likewise in the iron environment of cities, where, especially among clerical and commercial employees, may be found signal provincialism, there is ample illustration of the dangers of routine. To one who has not the means to travel, to occupy the same house or apartment for a long time is unfortunate, and occupations which have a migratory character contribute in no small way to the yeast of civilization. The automatism of fixed conditions and the approach to a moribund zone were unwittingly illustrated in the reply of a denizen of a torpid village when asked if he expected to be buried in the local cemetery; he replied, "Yes, if I live!" The tendrils of sentiment twine more closely indeed about the familiar, and there is a tragic note in the snapping of ties, but the law of human evolution reads that only by the advent of the strange may welfare be won, and the pains of readjustment are less to be feared

than the corruption of habit. Any Utopia which left no channels free for the forces which break habit and thrust upon society the urgent need of solving new problems would, after the first fruits of system were garnered, tend toward stagnation.

With the passing of frontiers and the rapid filling in of the inhabitable empty areas of the earth, with the question of habitability still pending as regards the enormous and fertile *selvas* of Brazil, and parts of Africa, the problem of environment takes the form of other means to insure the individual such thought-taxing situations as will result in progressive mentality. In some phases of modern life there seems to be a letting down of insistent requirements. It should not be necessary to return to the primitive in order to stimulate initiative and circumspection. It should be permissible to turn a tap rather than wade through snow to a pump for water, but unless there be requirements which fairly equate with the pricking rigors of a less conventionalized life we need have no doubt as to the results—degeneracy will appear. Notwithstanding the complexity of life today it is doubtful if it represents, so far as the separate individual is concerned, the complexity of demand of earlier conditions. The total social mass is complex, but the individual may—indeed, typically does—find that his daily requirements, especially in urban employments, entail but slight resort to constructive ideas. “All you have to do” in many positions consists of a narrow range of mechanized tasks apportioned under a business system which makes independence impertinent. The great mass of employees today are following orders, with not enough participation in the problems of the occupation to provoke thought. It is a misfortune to be connected with an enterprise where the individual is not weighted with all the perplexities necessary to tax the association centers of his cerebrum. A single day of camping out will perhaps raise more problems than months of routine occupation.

In individual cases the transforming effects of a change of place or occupation are often to be observed. An elderly east Tennessee farmer moves his family to western Washington and takes up a different type of agriculture, with the result that by a decade later he has “renewed his youth,” gained an evident adaptability,

and multiplied his interests. The arrival of the first baby of middle-aged parents results in a rejuvenation and development directly traceable to dealing with the enigmatical creature. If the Supreme Court were never to hold two sessions in the same room, a more modern atmosphere would no doubt attach to its deliberations. Even a change of clothes has its developmental aspects.

The misfortune of failing of a shift in associations is to be noted in the cosmic quality of views and feelings characteristic of classes that but slightly change environment, being rooted to place, as in the case, historically, of the peasants of the Old World. In the recent revolution in Portugal, from which ancient kingdom the late monarch left "without leaving his address," it was the agricultural classes that opposed change. And indeed in America, among the stationary farming class, there has been at times the political apathy which is likely to appear wherever movement and new surroundings are least experienced.

The equivalent of the stimulating effects of new scenes may largely be duplicated by importing into one's usual environment new elements. The progress of recent years has coincided with the growth of reading habits and the breakup of static local conditions; at first, to considerable degree, by the advent of the bicycle, and later by the trolley, rural free delivery of mail, and the automobile. A steady influence making for adaptability is represented in the social center in both city and country, where an exchange of ideas results in the formation of fresh opinions. Education, reading, conversation, the theater, marriage, and sickness are meaningful variations of environment.

But especially among the agencies to which we must look for establishing adaptability and resourcefulness are those which bring about change of residence. Travel has an important function to this end. The traveled person is tolerant. Race hatred grew up in the days of the pack mule and the ox cart and of the watertight compartments of mountainous regions where every peak meant a different language. The morbid war spirit of Europe could probably not survive a month's vacation spent in a foreign country by every citizen. An American public man, it is said, once begged that he be not introduced to an enemy, for he said he

could not hate anybody with whom he became acquainted. The flood of ideas which is brought against preconceptions through travel represents a thought-compelling situation of the greatest significance. The acceleration of progress which this age witnesses is in no small degree the outcome of the fact that of late, for the first time since history dawned, men have been able freely to visit new scenes and far countries. Individual travel should by all means be made universally possible through the widest opening of the gates of transportation.

THE LIMITS OF ATTENTION

Psychologists have demonstrated the fact, which anyone may verify, that the attention may be focused upon a given point for but a few seconds. Let the mind be directed to a given object, and it is found that the actual attention plays over a multitude of minor aspects or darts away to remote considerations, to return perhaps in a twinkling; but at no time does attention really stick to a given phase of the object for more than a few seconds. When we say that we give perfect attention for an hour, it is not to be inferred that our attention has been unvarying, but it is rather the case that our thoughts have been directed to one large subject with its associated details.

Why we possess a nerve apparatus which functions in this type of attention is evident upon a moment's consideration. In the ceaseless war of the lower world the animal that was not alert to every significant stimulus was likely to lose its life. The eye became trained to flit to every point from which danger might arise, and the mind followed the eye. Attention is a mental trait whose character is derived from the nature of the surroundings which have pressed upon the organism during the clockless depths of time. Every quivering leaf in heated jungles now converted into coal, every prowling beast stirring the reeds, every dancing gnat, every rush of wings tended to break into bits the consciousness of our prehuman forbears, and through inheritance to give the average mind a power of attention somewhere between the inconsequential zigzag of the phrase talker and the philosopher's

stuck-fast consciousness, miscalled absent-mindedness, but on the whole a distinctly unstable type of attention.

Now the fact that the power of human attention, even in its highest development, is selective, partial, variable, and hopelessly and forever short of that simultaneous and comprehensive consciousness of all events present and past which has been imputed only to deity, has a multitude of bearings upon the affairs of civilized society and especially must be reckoned with in laying the foundations for achieving social welfare. How frail a remedy, for example, against the "malefactors of great wealth" would be the proposed remedy of publicity taking the form of social ostracism. Attention flags, and our grievances are short-lived. Even the drama has retired the delayed-retribution motive and no longer asks the audience to follow a character who bides his time for a quarter of a century and brings his enmity rank to the tragedy just before the curtain falls. Attention shifted so rapidly at the close of the Civil War that the wind went out of the sails of revenge.

In the first place we simply cannot give our attention to a wide range of matters, past or present, and any exhortation to the public to give its attention beyond the normal stretch is futile. Governmental complexities soon must pass beyond the unaided attention of the great majority of citizens; if a vast deal more of attention must be given by the citizen to details of government while engrossed in his personal affairs then we have come to about the end of the rope. The limitations of memory and attention must be acknowledged with scientific frankness and efforts to prod our millions into an abnormal attitude of mental strain abandoned, and in their place must be substituted schemes by which the rational ordering of society for general betterment may be brought about in conformity with the laws of the human mind. When aroused by flagrant abuses or shocking imposition the citizen and the reformer feel that such will never occur again; the affair is burning-white in the center of aroused attention, but as it is said, the people soon "go to sleep," which indeed is perfectly natural. And within a month the gas company is again selling air, and the food manufacturer while perhaps removing benzoate of soda puts his goods in smaller containers at a higher price. The public cannot give

its attention in detail to all its public affairs, and plans of social improvement that rest on such assumption simply delay the sort of progress that rests on human factors. We have seen public attention swing ponderously in recent years from one issue to another, and while one evil was under attack others were escaping.

The public, like the individual, frequently thinks it is giving its attention more fully than is really the case. Let one try to recall what he had for dinner yesterday or try to list his expenses for the past week; the events that one does remember give a fallacious sense of the fulness of recollection, but upon close investigation it is found that thousands and thousands of items and incidents have gone down with scarce a bubble on the surface. Indeed the normal feeling is that one who is consistently attentive, as to the single tax or the physical valuation of railroads, is a crank—he is a person of “one idea.”

The popular mind shows the same kind of variability exhibited in the individual who is absorbed in one topic this week and in another the next. Today it is the Dayton flood or a Billy Sunday revival and tomorrow oil wells or the Poughkeepsie regatta, but always a singularly piecemeal consciousness. Even a three-ring circus is too much for any one patron. When one's business expands one is sure to neglect some part of it. The press reflects the fickleness of attention. For a period a piece of big news throws its shadow across many columns, then to be succeeded by another equally engrossing subject. The influential criminal wins delays, and when his case is finally disposed of the echoes of the former outcry have died away. Congress attacks its problems seriatim. Immigration, the parcel post, rate regulation, rural credits, the trust question, all have their day and cease to be; one waits on another, and all wait on the tariff—the tariff has been a colossal sponge licking up the consciousness of the public for a third of a century while hundreds of issues have waited to be heard. There are cases where issues have been raised to divert the public mind on the principle enunciated by Josh Billings: “Tight boots make a man forget all his other troubles.”

In appraising, then, the mental factors which must be employed in social reconstruction, it is well to recognize these limits. In

private affairs the individual is likely to develop a system for jogging his memory; he may tie a string in a buttonhole, or place a pencil in his left shoe the night before; he knows his frailty, and perhaps thinks other people are not so—but they are. There is need of a system of memory jogging for the public with reference to public business. At any rate let note be taken of the limits of attention as a fact to be considered when public welfare is sought to be promoted. This feature of mentality should be recognized in a far more effective system of publicity for governmental affairs and the utilization of special agencies by which the variable consciousness of the public may be brought back again and again to matters of import.

A fitting attention has its chief function in bearing to consciousness information needed to keep one in adjustment to physical surroundings. One must notice a drop in temperature, the smell of escaping gas, and a thousand stimuli which are significant for personal safety. But the inherited and confirmed tendency rapidly to shift the mental eye is a fundamental disqualification for concentrating thought upon abstruse problems, while the completeness with which one idea dispossesses another and one topic forces another out of mind suggests that special measures be employed for marshaling thought for civic ends.

FORMS OF DISTRACTION

A fact which has a bearing upon the improbability of society is that the individual has only a certain amount of energy and that if this is drained for physical purposes there is a shortage for mental processes. Mental and motor activity are, of course, closely joined; without motor expression mentality is not clearly defined; thought is generated and quickened by demands upon the muscles, and physical and mental training have much in common. But nevertheless the balance between typically physical and mental activities is easily disturbed, and the outlook for a higher civilization is in no slight measure concerned with the extent to which motor expression unnecessarily obtrudes and consumes energies otherwise more effectively employed.

That there is a conflict between intellectual and physical employments is evident. The housewife, busy with a wide range of manual activities, not only often does not find time to read, but even when time is found discovers that her mental grasp is disappointing. Days of toil in the field dispose rather to torpor and slumber than to thought. At Brook Farm the author of *The Blithedale Romance* learned that there is an inconsistency between meditation and hoeing corn. So protected must be the easily blown-out flame of attention and thought that, with many mere sense stimulations, as a rattling window, a fly buzzing in the pane, the infrequent beating of a distant door, or street sounds quite interrupt these processes; for which considerations, perhaps, philosophers are associated with the desert and divers authors "take to the woods." The splendor of the intellectual life of England has been ascribed to the existence of a leisure class, The leisure represented by the school is the very foundation of civilization.

The evolution away from big bodies and small brains, of the age of the dinotherium and the mammoth, is presumably paralleled in mankind by an evolution away from mere muscle and toward rational attainments. Accordingly, the shortening of hours of labor, the providing of vacations universally, the substitution of machinery, and the guarding of the years of youth and of leisure in maturity are of the utmost meaning for progress. Under slave and factory conditions the absorption of energy in motor uses is often so complete that mentality can hardly appear, and even in the intelligent farming class interminable hours of work and "chores" so sop up the nervous forces that few in this occupation have been found with the mental activity required for the leadership of country life. We properly distinguish between brain work and other work, and only by holding down physical labor to a moderate maximum may there exist generally throughout society the alert mentality which the social vision requires. The great majority of people do not regularly find time to read and think, and so when an unexpected leisure occurs there is little preparation for making the most of it. As a result the physical laborer is likely to spend his odd hours sharpening his pocket knife or wandering

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aimlessly about in the woods or fields subject only to the minimum stimulations of raw nature.

The time necessarily spent in taking care of the body reaches an immense total. The man who spends twenty minutes a day shaving, between the ages of twenty and seventy, thus consumes more than two years of eight-hour days. People who fast report a remarkable lengthening of the day, for no small percentage of one's waking hours is spent in eating. "The raveled sleeve of care" may indeed be well knit up by sleep, for twenty-three years of man's three score and ten are spent in slumber. Sunday is a day of rest, and there are ten years of Sundays in seventy years of life.

The political sagacity of a people who in the majority spend nearly all their time in physical activities is sure to be disappointing. The slave owner of the South opposed the teaching of slaves to read, realizing its stimulating effects. But "free" labor may be so arduous that the benefits of reading are but slightly realized. Probably the immense majority of adults in the United States do not read a book a year, and many who take papers do not find time to read them. Included in the non-reading public are five and one-half million persons in the United States, over ten years of age, who are illiterate. "In double line of march, at intervals of three feet, these 5,516,163 illiterate persons would extend over a distance of 1,567 miles. Marching at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, it would require more than two months for them to pass a given point."¹ It is indeed a wonder that political progress is making so rapidly when so few have opportunity for intellectual development and the obtaining of appropriate information. The factory hand who reaches home tired late in the day is in no condition to weigh political theories or follow the lines of thought in the more profitable articles of the day. A more just division of time between physical and intellectual exercises must be attained. Democracy implies a reasonable universal leisure.

But leisure does not insure against a disproportionate devotion of energy to the physical. While health, recreation, and valuable social training are promoted by participation in sports and games, athletic activities may become an obsession and displace other

¹ U.S. Bureau of Education, *Bulletin No. 20*, 1913.

important interests. Athletic training finds its warrant in developing a good body as a basis for moral and intellectual possibilities. Knobby muscles and Herculean physique are unwisely exalted when standards are set up which in effect discriminate against mentality in favor of "beef." It is indeed a confession of the impotence of the intellectual appeal of universities when it is argued that without militant football the energies of the student body would turn to vice, for which the pigskin is a prophylactic.

The absorption of energy in motor interests takes a peculiarly degenerate turn in the riotous abandon of enthusiasm displayed on the "bleachers," where neither the benefit of actual exercise nor the stimulus of mental effort is experienced. The significant term, "rooting," represents a phase of American life of more than passing importance. When 30,000 people "go wild" at a ball game which settles no issues and involves no uplift, and when "fannism" is the principal avocation of multitudes of voters whose vocations are in many cases those of office routine or are narrowly mechanical, it is to be doubted whether commercialized sports are an unmixed blessing. Divided thus between vocation and avocation, is it any wonder that it has taken the people of the United States a quarter of a century to secure a pure food law, and that the people's Congress is styled by Mr. H. G. Wells as the "feeblest, least accessible, and most inefficient central government of any civilized nation west of Russia?" Any interest may acquire an abnormal development, and physical expression not rarely passes moderate bounds, and consumes nerve forces which would otherwise be available for grappling with the problems of the age. Attention may be deflected from social issues by athletic propaganda, as witness the recent promotion by the Russian government of sports and games with a view to counteracting radical tendencies among young people. One cannot attend to several things at the same time, and if a youth is "baseball crazy" he is not likely to worry over the evils of absolutism. One has only to listen to conversation to be convinced that the procession of athletic topics throughout the year, chronicled in acres of print, has a tremendous diverting effect upon public intelligence. The reader will be able to call to mind cases of individuals whose

mentality is perpetually dissipated through attention to this ever-recurring sensationalism.

Passing to a different phase of life, the dominance of the sex interest must be recognized. Of all the innate interests sex is the dominant one, radiating through the whole social structure the heat and light of a primal force. The aim of life, biologically, is reproduction. There is a sex element, accordingly, in all activities and relationships. Mating-psychology looms large in human nature and is an element to be reckoned with in appraising forces available for the improvement of society. Robert Burns wrote many songs, but the socially reconstructive "A man's a man for a' that" stands alone; more characteristic,

Oh, my luve's like a red, red rose
That's newly sprung in June.

The mating instinct influences the rate of progress, especially as it may acquire abnormal recognition and represent an undue absorption of attention. While it would not be well to join too heartily in deploring with the poet "The time I've lost in wooing," yet one is impressed with the immense deflection of thought from social issues which artificially stimulated sex interests entail. It is only under ideals of gossiping sensationalism and by means of modern facilities for diffusing ideas that the attention of millions could be almost exclusively fixed upon an unsavory criminal action or centered upon newspaper discussions of a dubious picture. If unsupplied with suitable culture materials and exposed to protean suggestion, the individual may attain a sensuality of outlook probably unparalleled in savagery. Society in its collective wisdom may well concern itself with the character of the channels through which mentality finds expression. What ideas enter the mind is of radical significance, for interests may be caused to grow or to wither. It is accordingly a vital question whether public attention is excessively directed to sex.

While the drama of human life extends vastly beyond early love affairs or the maladjustments of marriage, nevertheless mating is ingeniously exploited and made the central subject of popular literature, as the "best sellers" bear witness. Despite the fact that millions of people have suitably adjusted their connubial relations,

the printing presses are clogged with the literature of mating, and heads of families who venture betimes to the theater are regaled with eroticism. It is demonstrable that the post-adolescent years abound in an exhaustless supply of materials for novel and drama, but that themes from this fruition period of experience are effectually displaced is evident.

Possibly the delayed age of marriage has much to do with the preponderant attractiveness of the mating theme and its consequent financial exploitation. Be this as it may, the problems of the years that follow the heyday of youth should not be unceremoniously put to rout, nor should the forces which might energize social betterment be dissipated in a promoted and protracted absorption in sex themes. If in Russia the edge of revolution may be turned by the inspired circulation of pornographic literature, it is evident that there is loss in the obtrusion of sex sentimentalism into thought-currents. The attention of thousands is consumed at popular entertainments where whole evenings are devoted to "numbers," musical or otherwise, in which the mating theme is worn to shreds, and not the slightest impulse is given to creative thought in any direction. Time thus spent may be absolutely crossed off the records so far as progress is concerned.

The biological impulsions to mating would hardly of themselves excrese into obstructions to progress were efforts not inspired by commercial motives to play upon sex inclination. Advertising seizes upon this interest, even to the distraction of thought from the merits of goods advertised. For example, a men's clothing advertisement on a billboard represented a young woman dressed in a man's suit; eight young men, the number interrogated, testified that they did not notice the brand of clothes advertised, their attention being given solely to the illustration. Society is familiar with the idea of commercialized vice, but there is also, from the viewpoint of energizing progress, a problem arising from the unrestrained commercial exploitation of sex interest through a multitude of appeals in advertisements of travel, personal belongings, beers, and cigarettes. An obsession of sex interest is readily developed, abetted by trade, the sentimental song, the problem play, and sensational journalism.

A feature of mating whose social significance can hardly be exaggerated is dress. The burden placed upon woman, rather than upon man, of attracting the other sex—in the lower animals a burden borne by the male—is deplored by Mrs. Gilman.¹ In any case woman has largely assumed the load of sex ornament, and it is a heavy one. Not only during the mating age proper does the “sex vanity” of dress nearly monopolize attention, but as well quite commonly for a longer period, either because mating is not a closed incident or because of the vitality of a strong interest, transferred to rivalry in jewels, equipage, and pursuit of fashion. The volume of interest and intelligence thus prevented from being directly available, not only for the improvement of the status of woman, but for general social betterment, is enormous. Observe the thought-currents of the chance feminine group or of the tense Easter assemblage, and note how often hardly a rill of intellectuality flows out toward the world’s wider movements. Great amounts of “crystallized labor,” which is capital, are Moloched to fashion, and vast energies are thus lost to constructive social effort.

An acceleration of progressive movements would doubtless follow the adoption of more uniform dress, while such economic readjustments as would permit marriage at an earlier age in certain classes would tend to enlist interests in the larger social issues. Surely commercialized suggestion merits disapproval. To build the ideal future requires the conservation of suitable ideas and a reasonable exaltation of other than sex topics.

Whatever occupies the public mind to the undue exclusion of public affairs may be set down as retarding the solution of the issues which lie at the threshold of rational civilization. Historically, the focusing of attention upon a future world, in which the evils of the present would disappear without human effort, proved an unwitting ally of temporal injustice. The expectation that the world would come to an end in the year 1000 had a paralyzing effect upon the energies of Europe. Wherever injustice has been passively endured because of faith, injustice has become more firmly rooted. Hence the vast importance of the newer viewpoint which assumes that one is his brother’s keeper and that the highest

¹ *The Man-made World.*

ideals of religion are to be exemplified in current human relationships. In the new drift of religious thought there is the promise of unprecedented social betterment, for an immense volume of feeling and will, at one time not so active a reform force, now supplies motive power for progress.

The intellectual capital of the world consists largely of people's interests; and these are subject to modification; they may be enlarged or diminished, and new interests may be developed. It is highly important, this, what people are interested in, because there is no doubt but that people may readily become interested in the best things. While there is a substratum of permanent tendencies, one is nevertheless susceptible to extensive redirection.

The interests which characterize the public today are often criticized as trivial and unworthy. A writer ventures the following as a truthful list of the great "interests" which make up American life: (1) the ticker; (2) female apparel; (3) baseball bulletin; (4) the "movies"; (5) bridge whist; (6) turkey trotting; (7) yellow journal headlines and "funny" pages; (8) the prize fight. And the estimate is made that 100,000 Americans are genuinely interested in the foregoing matters to every 5,000 who are interested in politics and to every 1,000 who are interested in education.¹

This list is not a highly creditable one, and it is not one that speaks hopefully of the ability of the people to inject intelligence into the social process and achieve reforms of government. As long as such interests dominate there can be but an imperfect base for democracy. But it may be that these interests are receiving a hothouse culture or that they represent but frivolous moods. There are solidier elements in human nature, to which appeal may not be made in vain.

THE EFFECT OF MACHINERY UPON THE MIND

The most obvious aspect of the use of machinery is that it frees muscle and shifts a tremendous burden from flesh and bone. An immense amount of heavy, grinding work has been transferred to inanimate forces and nerveless matter. This is a great gain; in the first place because of the increase of production. The average

¹ *The Independent*, April 17, 1913.

man today, through the use of machinery, produces twenty times as much as was produced by the average man 250 years ago. When farmers cradled their wheat, bound it by hand, and threshed with flails, the operations required for one bushel of wheat the labor of one man for an average time of 183 minutes. With labor-saving machinery, the modern farmer can do the same work in 10 minutes. Seventy-five years ago, 66 hours of labor were expended on an acre of oats, whereas the labor time is now but $7\frac{1}{10}$ hours. Modern civilization rests upon an increase of wealth traceable to the industrial revolution and a machine era. Libraries, universities, assemblies, the press, and other agencies of enlightenment rest squarely upon the machine, which enables mankind to realize a higher culture. The educated and leisured classes owe their emancipation to an easier production of wealth.

Time and energy are afforded for intellectual pursuits. Heavy physical labor is incompatible with mental exercise. A long working day leaves small energy for brain activity. When to feed, clothe, and provide shelter for the world required unceasing toil, the masses could not be expected to develop a thought-life. A certain amount of physical activity conduces to mental development, but there is ample evidence that motor employments have an arresting effect. Larger and larger numbers enjoy the possibility of exemption from the deadening effects of severe physical toil, a fact which throws a most favorable light upon a machine age. There is mental bondage where there is muscle bondage. The long-continued existence of a near-slave status on the part of women finds a partial explanation in the fact that household labor has been hand labor and that it has been excessive.

Not only is energy released for mental development, but efforts to provide new devices and improvements are distinctly stimulating, and a remarkable intelligence appears in a limited class. Here is a field which has furnished large incentives for active intelligence; not only in mechanical invention, but in repair and regulation, is a resourceful mind called for. A considerable body of men are employed in thus dealing intelligently with motor vehicles, power machinery, typesetting machines, and the like, and in the installation and regulation of all sorts of manufacturing equipment.

This sort of activity stimulates intelligence, though it must be conceded in all fairness that the mechanical genius or the expert repair man may be unlearned in philosophy, ignorant of political science, unacquainted with history, and destitute of an appreciation of poetry; but for all that, his intelligence is quickened and all he now needs is concrete instruction along other than mechanical lines. He has undergone cerebral stimulation; he has learned how to think and to adapt himself; he can seize upon a problem. A dull person would find himself very much out of place installing dynamos or repairing microscopes. The skilled mechanic may have his limitations in liberal culture and sociological insight, but he has real problems to face and he meets them successfully. The plumber who is called in consultation upon an inadequate heating system is quite as professional for the time as the physician called to deal with sudden illness. The farmer who buys a new windmill, a wild-oats separator, or a milking machine is made to take a learning attitude. A piece of machinery that will not work, may nearly if not quite duplicate the unparalleled educational situation represented by a balky horse. No people can remain entirely uncivilized if visited by salesmen of modern appliances, subjected to the instruction of innumerable advertisements, circulars, and pamphlets, and impelled by the necessity of knowing how to operate the contrivance when once it has been purchased.

Under certain conditions machinery has a stimulating effect upon intelligence. It presents problems to be solved; it necessitates a concentration of attention; it constitutes a new world for mankind and represents a complexity which compels thought. To keep in proper adjustment to this mechanical environment requires a degree of mental alertness. There has been upreared on the earth an artificial environment which taxes attention and thought in a way no less real than in the case of nature. It is not to be inferred, however, that such effect of machinery is to educate for civic or social relations. In estimating the general culture of the individual, it is quite fitting to look principally to his preparation for comprehensive social relationships, and while the skilled workman is often a highly intelligent citizen and voter, or, as in

Germany, perhaps a philosophizing socialist, yet various phases of intellectual life are doubtless but indirectly if at all favorably affected by mechanical training.

But to turn to a very different class of people, a very large class, compared to whom the creative mechanics are but a drop in the bucket—the operatives—we find that machinery has its bad effects. The operative who performs but a mere repetition of movements is subjected to about the worst possible influence from the standpoint of mental development. It is true, of course, that motor activity, as in manual training, has a stimulating effect, but just as soon as movements become habitual, mental development therefrom ceases. It is educative to learn to drive a nail, but when the driving of a nail is performed automatically as the result of practice, it ceases to be thought-provoking. Manual training is an important adjunct of the educational system, viewed simply from the point of view of mental development; but when the exercises are fully learned the individual must pass on to new situations or suffer an arrest of development. Machine production tends toward a minute division of labor and a specialization inconsistent with the mental welfare of the operative. There are over four hundred and fifty operations in the making of the upper of a shoe and each of these is performed by a different man in a well-run shop. Such division of labor results in an intense monotony on the part of the workman. The whole manufacturing world is adjusted to such specialization, the peculiar value of which is that it tends toward increased production. No one has ever argued that the individual was benefited by doing work under the conditions of intense specialization and rigid routine. "When mind becomes mechanical," says President Hibben, of Princeton, "it is departing radically from its essential source as a living organism. It depends wholly upon the manner in which we treat the mind whether it retains its vital character or becomes a mere machine."

Employers and employed unite in the view that routine is undesirable from the individual standpoint. Long subjected to unvarying employment, the individual loses initiative, spirit, and will-power. His work is planned for him by someone else and a limited range^{of} physical movements engrosses attention. Such conditions areⁱⁿevitably stupefying. The operative becomes a

mere adjunct to his machine. All except the most elementary forms of reasoning are dispensed with. Consciousness sinks to a low level and the lower centers govern responses. Especially are the results harmful when there is speeding up and the individual is left with no surplus energy.

Mr. Frederick W. Taylor, author of works on scientific management, made the following statement before a special committee of the House of Representatives:

I think this tendency of training toward specializing the work is true of all managements, for the reason that a man becomes more productive when working at his specialty, and while it is deplorable in certain ways (there is no question about it, there are various elements in this specialization that are deplorable), still the prosperity of the world and the development of the world—the fact that the average workman in this day lives as well as kings lived 250 years ago—that fact is due to a certain extent to just this very specialization.

This statement by the high priest of scientific management indicates that production, instead of the welfare of the workman, proceeds from mechanical specialization.

A recent magazine interview with Henry Ford, of the Ford Motor Company, runs as follows:

"You put the man at a machine, teach him to control it, and he stands there weeks and months and years mechanically producing one trifling thing. How does that affect him temperamentally?"

"It drives him crazy," said Ford, positively, as he had said everything else. "But we see to it that a man does not do one thing too long. We keep him moving through the shop."

The effect which Mr. Ford deliberately seeks to avoid is one which prevails almost universally. The state of the machine-tender is authoritatively described by Mr. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor. Mr. Gompers says:

Wage-workers in factory occupations tend machines, and by tending of such machines do not have the opportunity of making or completing any part of the whole, but only perform a minute and infinitesimal part of a part. As a consequence, the people who gain their livelihood by tending such machines become automata. They become part of a machine—thoughtless and spiritless to such a degree that they are unable to do the slightest thing, or perform in any way to their own advantage, or to the advantage of their employer, unless they have a prompter at their side in the shape of a planning master, a foreman, or a boss of some other title.

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It is the most pronounced in the textile industries—silk, wool, cotton, cordage, jute, etc.—the novelty industries—watch making, furniture manufactures, paper making, and many other of our basic industries.

Some American employers have commenced to see what a dilemma they are facing for men and women capable of directing their departments and divisions of departments. They have brought down upon their own heads the alarming situation of working for profit to such an extent that they have neglected to train men and women to take responsible official positions of administrative capacity in their own factories, and such manufacturers have at last commenced to appreciate the foresight of the American Federation of Labor in its efforts to establish vocational education and national trade training schools by federal aid in all of the states.

It stands to reason that, if men and women are reduced by force of circumstances, and through the folly of certain so-called efficiency systems promulgated in recent years by fanatics on that subject, like Messrs. Taylor, Gant, Emerson, Harrington, and others, the workers in our industries will be deprived of all opportunities to develop mentally or physically, because when the aspirations of men and women are submerged and stunted they become dependent upon the whim, the will, the direction of a superior, and there is nothing left to them but merely to become docile, obedient, willing servants. Such a situation is not only degrading to the individual, but is a menace to society.

Machine production is characterized not only by specialization and monotony, but by the centralization of intelligence in officers and overseers. There is a division of labor as between the physical and mental aspects of industry. The board of directors, the superintendent, and the boss largely monopolize the function of direction, while the employee takes orders and follows rules. The logical result of this is the creation of intellectual classes. The worker loses his power to initiate and to think, while on the side of the management there is a signal development of ability. A parallel case is that of officers and men in the army. It is the officer who undergoes mental development; it is the private who becomes a machine. Military obedience results in physical and in mental traits which are to a high degree mechanical. It is only too true that the well-drilled company or regiment is a machine; that is a peculiar condemnation of a military system.

Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.

It may be a good investment from the standpoint of production that the superintendent should do the thinking, but looking at it

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from the social point of view, it is disastrous. Especially in a democracy is the importance of widely diffused ability to solve problems to be emphasized. The increasing automatism of modern industry has in itself a power to create castes based upon intellectual traits.

Routine-afflicted operatives are dumb driven cattle before the political trickster and the domineering employer. The fact that after a century of factory conditions the successive generations of workers have been unable effectively to propose political and economic remedies for appalling industrial conditions and must still employ the self-defeating and short-sighted strike method is convincing evidence of a mental arrest which a factory dispensation encourages.

It is possible, of course, that the workman may be so privileged, as in the case of the Ford system, that the full force of a deadening routine would be avoided. The shortening of hours of labor, provision for recreation, avoidance of fatigue, and stimulating experiences outside of working hours might successfully be employed as an offset.

But too often such human considerations enter but slightly into the wage relation in manufacturing enterprises. Not rarely employers have desired workmen to be content under an injurious monotony. They have desired employees who were tractable and mechanized. An eastern manufacturer complained to President Harvey, of the Stout school at Menominee, Wis., that his experience with the graduates of certain industrial schools had been unsatisfactory. He said that boys whom he had employed from the schools were not contented when doing the kind of work he wanted done; as soon as the boys mastered certain processes they were anxious to go to something else and to rise, whereas he wanted workmen to "stay put." President Harvey replied that it was not the purpose of his institution to train boys who would "stay put." Along with the enormous social justification for trade schools, there is without any doubt, in certain quarters, a desire to use these as a tail to a dividend kite. The importance of vocational education is indeed great, but it should be guarded from the designs of employers who are interested in the workman only as a producer. The boy educated as a workman should also be

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educated for rising in his calling, and receive instruction which would make him capable of expressing himself effectively through government and of sharing in the fund of modern thought and culture.

There is evidence that less and less intelligence is called for in certain industrial positions, and that the demand is for many unskilled or narrowly skilled and for only a few really intelligent workers. Glass making at one time required skill and intelligence; but machinery is being introduced which dispenses with these qualities. With the introduction of improved machinery, a lower grade of labor is utilized in steel making and in mining. The very perfection of machinery tends to lessen the importance of really capable workmen. It is an urgent problem of society to utilize to the full the vast benefits of machinery and to minimize the deadening effects of industrial service. In industry as now ordered mental welfare is unthought of. Personal development remains to be promoted through labor-autonomy, the rotation of processes, and the recognition at every point of psychological factors.

The effect of machinery, however, is not limited to its influence upon the factory employee, but has a bearing upon occupations in general. The machine era has resulted in the development of a very large number of employments which are in a high degree mechanized. A division of labor originating in factory conditions and based upon industrial concepts is carried out into practically all fields of enterprise. There result many occupations or jobs which are essentially as monotonous as that of watching a loom or pasting labels. Routine characterizes an increasing number of employments. Take, for example, the work of a railway postal clerk. On certain runs the names of as many as eight or nine thousand post-offices must be borne in mind, together with forenoon and afternoon connections. Constant diligence is required to maintain efficiency; as a result, the postal clerk is thoroughly mechanized. An intelligent man who recently left the service contributes some interesting information on the effects of the system upon the individual. He testifies that the service narrowly limits the range of one's mental activities. The subjects discussed in off-hours are likely to pertain only to the technicalities of mail distribution. Conversation is confined to the details of the business, "Probably a man would know who was President of the United

States," said he, "but that is about all." This occupation is merely typical; in many others similar tendencies are discernible.

The sufficiency of one's intelligence comes to be popularly judged by its sufficiency in a routine employment. One feels no humiliation in confessing ignorance in regard to a multitude of matters if they are not in his line. There is a possibility that such modesty may become altogether too widespread and confirmed. One who aspires to general information is old-fashioned. One may safely blink ignorantly at thousands of marvels provided he has the requisite information pertaining to a specialty. It requires a syndicate to deal with any project having a variety of aspects. We insist upon having most of our thinking done by somebody else. The possible future development of this peculiarity of modern life constitutes a fascinating appeal to the imagination. Are we destined to evolve a society in which, first, the individual will be limited in range of information and in mental activity, and, secondly, become destitute of the power of self-direction and, like the fully automatized bee, as described by Maeterlinck, be absorbed in the spirit of the hive, whose organization and nature are far beyond conscious intelligence? Is the complexity of our industrial and social structure passing beyond the possibilities of the individual mind? The field of information which is occupied by all in common is narrowing and the apportionment of the intellectual world becomes more and more definite and minute.

An interesting phase of modern environment is that represented by the fool-proof machine. A multitude of such appliances are put on the market. Consider, for example, the automobile. Most of these machines are run by people whose ideas of the essential parts are about as clear as they are of darkest Africa or of the nervous system of a starfish. A public official in a western state who had run a machine for years, upon seeing the chassis of a car in an engineering laboratory, was full of wonder and admitted that he knew nothing about how his machine was made. People ride in street cars who have but the most airy conception of a trolley system. How many cooks have an adequate understanding of the principles of the modern range? The office-building elevator is accepted with that lack of wonder which Carlyle described in connection with a second rising of the sun.

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A modern city with its telephone lines, its water supply, its sewer system, its electrical distribution, and its subways, is seen in its mechanical wonderfulness only by a discerning few. Those who plan and organize profit by an intellectual stimulation; but those whose only interest is convenience, those out of respect for whom fool-proofing is done, go scot free of even the slightest cerebral excitement. A coffee percolator turns out a uniform product for one who can watch a clock; even the flame will be shut off at the proper time so that the user need exert himself mentally only to the extent of stirring in the sugar. Prosperous young people and often their elders, too, for that matter, exhibit an innocent composure apparently never disturbed by any disposition to resolve the problems of their mechanical environment or to go behind a luxurious adjustment to perfected conveniences.

There is no question but that one may be made inquisitive, curious, inventive, or indifferent, dulled, and conventional, by environment. We know that the level of intelligence in society may be greatly raised or lowered according to culture conditions and of these conditions machinery represents one of the most potent. If in large sections of the population there is a dementalizing, this fact becomes of great importance, for the need of initiative and self-dependence is surely great. The social order should lend itself to the development and availability of the highest possible intelligence. While the production of wealth is of great and fundamental importance, it is of less importance than the preservation of conditions favorable to the development of every individual, and indeed in the long run even the production of wealth must be guaranteed by preserving the most favorable conditions of individual development. Society does not profit most by people who are routine slaves, dulled, regimented, and automatized. Democracy requires that the average man should be a thinker. Skilled craftsmanship or drudging labor may alike be divorced from general ability and vital knowledge and from those mental traits and habits which are necessary for the good of a people, while the spread of a routine throughout all sorts of occupations and the slight demand for intelligence in the operation of perfected devices alike constitute a dementalizing circumstance.

[To be continued]

WEALTH AND ITS WAYS

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I

Wealth is a word of several significations, for the first of which see St. Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians: "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth"—an injunction followed to the last figure by financial brethren highest in the faith. Wherefore—lest those accustomed only to capitalistic concepts should mistake St. Paul's intent—revisionists, with scholarly naïveté, have altered the original rendering to read: "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's good." The Church of England is more conservative. Her communicants cut down the civil list, to be sure; for their king, however, they still pray: "Grant him in health and wealth long to live." And we—with our own plutocrats and proletarians, our billionaires and beggars—call our country the American commonwealth!

What is wealth? "All useful or agreeable things, except those that can be obtained, in the quantity desired, without labor or sacrifice," says John Stuart Mill. A concept quite irreconcilable, it would seem, with St. Paul's, unless end and means are identified. Wealth in the Pauline sense—signifying weal, welfare, well-being—constitutes the end in this instance. Among the means thereto are "all useful or agreeable things"—wealth in the Mill meaning: material possessions. For some reason—sufficient, I suppose—the concept seems to have forsaken its ideal end and attached itself to these material means—to the disparagement, be it said, of social morality and to the prejudice of common-sense besides.

Withal, were you to ask a modern merchant, "What is your wealth?" he would answer in dollars and cents. A third signification, forsooth! And as irreconcilable as the second—with social morality, at all events; as for common-sense, class-consciousness

seems to have taken its place, so it is hard to say. But this is beyond the mark. Etymology, at all events, is of no further avail. To resolve such a trinity of significations—well-being, material possessions, and money—into anything approaching a consistent concept, I shall have to resort to the dialectics of political economy.

According to the exegesis of this doctrine, welfare results from the satisfaction of wants, and wants are satisfied through the acquisition of that elusive quality called utility. So to start again from the first signification: Wealth means an amount of welfare, welfare results from the satisfaction of wants, wants are satisfied through the acquisition of utility—consequently, wealth, in its original sense, connotes a *quantum* of utility. Quanta of such sort are comparable, of course, but numerically incommensurable. When bidding goodbye to your hostess you may remark: "I've had *such* a nice time," or "an *awfully good* time"; but you can't say: "I've had a seven, eleven, or forty-four time." There being no commonly accepted units of utility, epithets in such instances are your only resort.

Yet utilities attach themselves to goods—yes, and to services sometimes. So it is easy to see how a collection of goods—to say nothing of a series of services—comes to represent, in a rough-and-ready way, a corresponding quantum of utility. Consider, for example, the Indian's outfit of bows and arrows, blankets, tomahawks, tepees, and canoes—or the small boy's collection of marbles, tops, jackknives, cigar bands, postage stamps, and such like miscellaneous store. Schedules of such sort symbolize welfare and serve to distinguish the well-to-do. Whence the second signification of the word wealth; "all useful or agreeable things—except those that can be obtained, in the quantity desired, without labor or sacrifice."

But why these exceptions? Surely satisfaction is derived from utilities acquired without labor or sacrifice—from sunshine, for instance. Yes, but no *importance* attaches to the possession thereof. Because abundance prevails, "you never miss the water till the well runs dry." As scarcity enters in, importance appears and waxes with scarcity's degree. Whence the third signification of the word wealth—a sum of values—which again only economics can explain.

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Like quanta of utility, amounts of importance are comparable, and commensurable besides—numerically at the outset, and still to some extent, in commodities. Not in ordinary commodities, however; only in such extraordinary commodities as, according to the philosopher Locke, are “both lasting and scarce and so valuable as to be hoarded up.” The utility of ordinary commodities—those that are perishable and freely reproducible withal—declines under accumulation. Aristotle instanced “shoes”—though the Empress Elizabeth of Russia is said to have possessed five thousand pairs. Otherwise the utility of extraordinary, or lasting and scarce, commodities—the more of these a man has, the more, it seems, he desires to possess. Why? Because the larger his supply, the higher his social station, and sycophants kowtow to him accordingly. To cite a few examples: among our American Indians, scalps and shells; among the Homeric Greeks, oxen and female slaves; during feudal days, vassals, fees, and demesnes; in the Orient, the luxury-loving Orient, treasure of divers sorts, frankincense and myrrh, alabaster and ivory, and especially precious metals and precious stones. These, and other lasting and scarce commodities, accord their possessor not only sensory satisfaction, but social prestige besides. In obedience to the general law of the declining scale of utility, sensory satisfaction seems to decline with the extent of the store; whereas social prestige appears to expand. Experiment a moment in imagination, considering, for examples: shells, “shining pieces of silver,” or even female slaves. To be sure! The result is: all, save freemen and philosophers, attach importance to the possession of such lasting and scarce commodities, not so much for the sensory satisfaction they afford, as for their prestige-conveying qualities—socially insufferable qualities, but that’s by the way. Then again—owing to individual idiosyncrasies, sectionalism, and the spirit of the times—sensory satisfaction seems to be a somewhat uncertain, in many instances even an evanescent, circumstance of all sorts of commodities. To what two individuals, within what two territories, at what two epochs, is aesthetic appreciation precisely the same? On the contrary, the prestige of proprietorship appears to be a sure and persistent circumstance, clinging tenaciously to its special commodities and accompanying

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them in their passages from person to person, from place to place, or from time to time. As modern instances, consider Millet's "Angelus" or the Peachblow Vase. Strange to say, and not to be explained by aesthetics! The result is: all, save freemen and philosophers, attach something like the same, and very nearly constant, importance to the possession of these extraordinary commodities, being assured from social experience that such possession will accord them corresponding prestige. It is owing then, I take it, not so much to the sensory satisfaction they afford, as to their peculiar prestige-conveying qualities, that certain lasting and scarce commodities preserve their value even under accumulation, and vary so slightly in value from person to person, from place to place, or from time to time. This being the case, it is natural enough that commodities acquiring such qualities should have been selected to serve as commonly accepted measures of importance—"standards of value," so called. The Indian, you know, was wont to reckon his wealth in wampum, the Hebrew patriarch in cattle, the feudal lord in land, the Asiatic in shekels, and so on. What these proud proprietors were really reckoning in this wise was not quanta of utility, nor even collections of goods in first instance, but *amounts of importance*, social importance, sums of *prestige value*, I should say.

Established standards are likely to last, especially when there are vested interests to be subserved. So in this instance. As commercialism—to the smiling satisfaction of missionaries and expansionists—spread its capitalistic consequences over the face of this fair earth, one and all of the old established standards were employed to calculate the exchange value of goods and services. They served the stead and seemed to the "sound" satisfactory. Though I might perhaps remark, parenthetically, there was really no necessity for such a standard. Any ideal unit would have answered as well, since, as every authority asserts, the exchange value of goods and services constitutes a ratio. And to speak of a standard in connection with a ratio is an anachronism. But then there were vested interests to be subserved. In this, their extended capacity of exchange standards, there was not much to choose among prestige-conveying commodities—to measure the relative

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importance of goods and services, cattle and slaves serve as well as silver and gold. But in their consequent capacity of media of exchange there was much to choose. Cattle and slaves cannot be cut up into small change; land cannot be carried around conveniently—the titles thereto perhaps, assignats, for instance, but the Mississippi Bubble burst. Fortunately the precious metals measured social importance as well as any prestige-conveying commodities, and were divisible and transportable besides. For these reasons silver and gold were chosen by civilized folk to serve the double stead of standards of value and media of exchange. When this occurred a new quality attached itself to the money metals. Prestige power they possessed before; henceforth they acquired purchasing power to boot. So when your modern merchant answers: "My wealth amounts to so many dollars and cents," he signifies two sums: subconsciously, his sum of prestige values; consciously, his sum of exchange values—indicating thereby both his position in the world and his ability to buy, which come to the same in these capitalistic times.

II

The moral of all this is obvious, but before proceeding upon its application, get the goal again in view. The end of human activities is the acquisition of wealth—in its original sense, understand, signifying a quantum of utility. "All of us have many wants," so Plato says, and I may add: wants are the mainsprings of our existence, expanding, so to speak, in spirals from our concupiscent centers. One series ascends in this wise from the organic, through the sensory, toward the spiritual; another series extends in the same fashion from the individual, through the familial, toward the social. I am not going further in the psychology of the situation; suffice it to say: We all seek to satisfy our expanding wants; with the result that our activities are directed toward the augmentation of utility—ideally, at all events; why they are not actually, I propose to explain. Accordingly, the larger the quantum of utility acquired, the greater our wealth in the original sense of the word. Which is, less concisely, to say: the more inclusive the unity and the more extensive the variety of our want-satisfying

qualities, the higher the stage of our organic, sensory, and spiritual; the broader the plane of our individual, familial, and social satisfactions. So you see the pursuit of happiness is synonymous in last analysis with the production of wealth, with the acquisition of want-satisfying qualities, which, as I said, is the end of all human activities.

With the end in view, now consider the means, in first instance: the goods and services to which utilities attach. Instead of producing these ourselves, singly or co-operatively, to suit our individual or social fancies, we purchase them nowadays on the market—under the existing exchange system there is no other alternative. Economists are encomiasts of commercialism; don't listen to them. Granting its capitalistic productivity, this much-vaunted exchange system would be well enough in its way were the producers of goods and the renderers of services concerned in first instance with the satisfaction of your wants, interested primarily in your welfare. As a matter of fact, they are not; like you and me and all the rest of us, they are concerned in first instance with the satisfaction of their own wants, interested primarily in their own welfare. From yours, the consumers' side of the market, you regard the goods and services you propose to buy as possible want-satisfying qualities; from theirs, the producers' side of the market, they regard the goods and services they expect to sell as potential money-making quantities. Briefly, if not altogether accurately, you are seeking pleasure; they are pursuing profit. Hence it comes to pass under the exchange system that the same goods and services serve as means to opposite ends (an impossibility on the face of it, one of the ends must inevitably be abandoned); as means, on the one hand, to the acquisition of wealth in its first signification, namely, the weal or welfare of the consumers thereof; as means, on the other hand, to the acquisition of wealth in its third signification, to-wit: the money to be made by the producers thereof. Wherein will be found the first antinomy of the exchange system: that between the producers and consumers of wealth; the second, between capitalists and laborers is like unto it—but of this only in passing by the way.

In your pursuit of happiness, put yourself in the place of a producer. From the first your path points to profit. To approach

this point, like a peddler on your way, you will be obliged to sell your goods and services, which comes pretty close, so far as I can see, to selling yourself these days. Your immediate object being to make as much money as possible, you will endeavor to sell your goods and services as far above cost as possible—on the delectable legal principle, *caveat emptor!* In order to secure a fair start and acquire a clear road, you will insist upon, and clamor for, free competition. But in your desire to forge ahead you will make straight-way for monopoly, or resort to chicanery perchance, since this is the short-cut to profits.

Suppose I set you up in business, with goods to sell. Very likely you will fail, in which case I will include you in the salary list—of your successful competitor, perhaps. But maybe you will succeed—who knows? It's mostly a matter of luck—and the world will commend your "business ability." Successfully engaged, you will soon become engrossed. In your business? I mis-doubt much; more probably in "the game"—the game of money-getting and accumulation. To what end shall I say? The margin of legitimate profits is long since passed. But prestige is before you—the prestige of proprietorship and the power it brings! As for the pursuit of happiness, your youthful ideal, I can quote you the fable of Midas, "whose insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold," and point to its moral: "Men should seek after a better notion of wealth than the mere acquisition of coin."

Or suppose I include you—as I promised I should in case you were unsuccessful—among the vast majority, among those who work for their living and have simply their services to dispose of. You will find the market for these overstocked, and monopoly all but impossible to approach, though there is still the chicanery short-cut as a first, or last, resort. By this road, or another, some few have arrived; successful corporation lawyers, eminent physicians, several new-school artists, a novel-writer here, a playwright there, certain actors of repute and singers of renown, a few violin virtuosos, piano-players (of the flesh-and-blood variety, be they ever so mechanical), to say nothing of vaudeville celebrities, concert-hall stars, prize-fighters, and so on. It seems like a long list, and still far from inclusive; nevertheless, after all the efforts

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of advertisers and machinations of agents, personal monopolists are exceptional. For most of us—I'm including you in this longer list—organization is the only alternative. But even under the most effective organization it requires prodigious pressure to raise salaries, wages, or the price of piecework above the pittance assigned under the established standards; there are so many "scabs" and "strike-breakers"! I am sorry for you—I can sympathize with you also, if that's any satisfaction, since I am one of the many myself. If you are only a laborer with simply services to dispose of, you are likely to be left behind—at the post—if it is profits you're pursuing on the run toward the prestige of proprietorship. But there is the prestige of prowess before you, with fame and the laurel wreath at the goal. And happiness, some affirm; others, that it is a hallucination. I'm not in a position to say, only I'd advise you to stick to your job; don't forsake your organization, at all events, for any such illusive jack-o'-lantern.

And as the outcome of all this, what of the goods and services themselves, offered for sale under our exchange system? Such as to catch the unwary, rather than satisfy the wary's wants—but this is a mere phrase and a strained one besides. Let me put you back in your proper place among the fortunate, or successful, that you may see for yourself. Having the ability to buy—and I assume also the capacity to enjoy—you should be able to satisfy your expanding wants, acquire a full quantum of utility, and so arrive at salubrious well-being. To be sure you should; only I warn you (it isn't sour grapes on my part), on your way you will be met by monopoly, decoyed by commercialism, and preyed upon by philanthropy. Perhaps you will come through in some semblance—let us hope so. In any event, and all along the line, you will live and move and have your organic being precisely as the existing system prescribes—rich folks can't afford to be distinctive—that is to say, you will eat just such food, provide yourself with just such shelter, cover yourself with just such clothing, as monopoly or fashion, which is the advance agent of monopoly, says you should, and pay the price besides. Still, the high cost of living will not affect you seriously—except as a subject of conversation. With your money means you will match monopoly—which is more or

less of your own making maybe—and come through all right, robbed only of a percentage of your income and a portion of your individuality. With what remains, a goodly sum I grant, you will ascend above organic necessities into the higher sphere of sensory satisfactions. Be on your guard! Like Parsifal in the garden, you will be beset on all sides by seducers—not by fascinating flower-girls in your extremity, but by a jostling crowd of commercialized artists and craftsmen, who have forced their way even into the Palace of Delights in pursuit of profits: architects and interior decorators advocating the “home beautiful”; landscape gardeners offering to lay off “Old English,” “Sunken,” or “Italian Renaissance” at so much per square yard; publishers and stipendiary reviewers advertising their “limited editions” and “art buildings,” their “latest” and “best sellers”; theatrical magnates and professional first-nighters heralding “long runs in Chicago and New York”; operatic impressarios announcing imported novelties—with “Wagnerian dramas” and “classic revivals” interspersed; orchestra directors and modernists in music acclaiming cacophony and producing “program” effects; picture dealers and art critics exhibiting “new schools” of esoteric design—and so on in seemingly endless array. Commercialized aesthetics surround you; you cannot escape—better accept the situation and console yourself with the reflection: “America is still a young nation”—as if age had anything to do with art! A greater percentage of your profits and therewith also a larger portion of your personality is gone—I shan’t say squandered. But suppose your balance big enough to enable you to ascend still higher, above the aesthetic satisfactions into the purer air of spiritual consolation. Be on your guard again—buzzards and vultures fly high—you’ll be preyed upon by professional philanthropy. Reform movements maintained by civic associations, religious sects with their revival meetings and missionary societies, eleemosynary and educational institutions soliciting subscriptions and demanding endowments, ameliorative idiosyncrasies and fads of all sorts encompass you—even upon this higher plane of development. You cannot resist their importunities, bodyguarded though you be by a private secretary; rest assured they will reduce your accumulation (unless your heirs

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intervene)—by continuous pressure, if not by artfully aimed attacks. If you don't derive the solace sought for, remember the intermediaries do, and maybe there'll be a little left over for the final recipients of your benefactions; you'll die poor at any rate, and that, according to high philanthropic authority, is some satisfaction. I suppose I am exaggerating—how should I know? From observation, however, I can predict you will not be able to satisfy your expanding wants—organic, sensory, and spiritual; individual, familial, and social—under modern commercialized conditions, even though, or paradoxically, precisely because, you possess the money means.

The difference between Dives and Lazarus is apparent rather than real; to both the portals of substantial wealth are barred—by the exchange system in our day with its capitalistic combination. And Lazarus lies without them as of old. Let us consider his case. Don't be alarmed, I am not going to call you down again from your high estate to serve as an example—there are so many to choose from among the masses. The poor ye have always with you, which, when modernized, means: Under our existing exchange system, those who have simply services to dispose of are become immensely more numerous than those who have goods to sell besides—with the result that working men, working women, and working children withal constitute the vast majority of American consumers. To speak of these working folks' wealth in any sense, except the sardonic, is anachronistic, so largely has their pursuit of happiness resolved itself into a struggle for existence.

Consider first the unemployed—I can't in any calmness. With all that has been said of the "underconsumption" of the "submerged tenth," an exclamation escapes: What a system, forsooth, within which able-bodied and sound-minded men and women, who have services to dispose of, and are content to sell such services for the mere minimum of subsistence, should still starve, submit to charity, or go to prison perhaps! If it weren't for the iniquity of the thing, I could scoff at the absurdity of such a system. Like swearing, an exclamation is some relief, so I'll pass on to the employed.

At the present stage of "industrial unionism" and "restricted immigration" the services of the unskilled are subject, in large extent, to competition; whereas, the goods they are compelled to purchase are monopolized for the most part, and procurable, very probably, from the "company store." Under conditions of this kind where marginal wages and monopoly prices prevail, the high cost of living is not a speculative phrase; it's a formidable fact. Under such conditions it takes tight pinching, I can tell you, for the unskilled laborer to survive, even though his wife and children sell their services also to eke out. In which case what becomes of his family, for the satisfaction of whose organic wants he is supposed to provide food, shelter, and clothing? And such food! such shelter! such clothing! If you don't believe me, go a-slumming and see for yourself; you'll not be edified, but you may be aroused.

Or: if it's more agreeable, regard the aristocrats of labor, substantially fed, neatly clad, and comfortably housed—signal instances and laudable examples of opportunity! Or is it organization that is accountable for their superior estate? In any event, skilled artisans are enabled to confront monopoly, single-handed or in phalanxes, and impose contractual conditions. Out of such conditions, despite the high cost of living, in numerous instances a surplus issues for the satisfaction of sensory wants. But consider with me a moment the opportunities offered in modern America for the expenditure thereof. Pursuing profits as is usual, or somewhat extraordinary in this case, cheap-John producers have gone to incredible extremities in providing imitation luxuries for the special consumption of high-wages earners, and low-salary recipients also, if you please. Look in the windows, or cast your eye over the counters, of ten-cent stores; isn't it amazing? Some say it is a blessing; I'm not so sure, with an eye to the artistic, at any rate; but to puncture the prestige bubble, perhaps? Excursions also are cheap—for this reason overcrowded and, despite their glowing prospects, none too delectable in the end. Saloons serve as substitutes for clubs, public dance halls take the place of private parlors—both highly profitable, if not overelevating, institutions. As a makeshift for the theater, there are the moving-picture shows—equally profitable and not quite so degrading as the foregoing.

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Then occasionally free band concerts are afforded in the city parks or on the piers; art galleries, zoölogical gardens, aquaria, and other quasi-public exhibits are open on certain working days, and libraries withal, "wherein the enforced leisure of the unemployed may be whiled away in relative contentment."¹ Farther from city centers, chromos, plaster casts, piano-players, phonographs, and other aesthetic gas-logs are offered—by mail order, mind you—to those who fancy they can afford them, on the instalment plan. Come to think of it, there are opportunities for evening entertainment (if you are not too tired) and for holiday amusement also (if you can afford the fare). And, at the close of your long service, clerks and artisans, rise and give thanks with the entire congregation of Fans, in gratitude unbounded to the great American spirit for vouchsafing us our national game, and for preserving its purity amid the pitfalls of plutocracy! When it comes to spiritual satisfactions, I shall have to warn you workingmen as well. Like Caius Gracchus of old (Tiberius was wiser, though his sagacity cost him his life), you are likely to become ensnarled as a recipient of philanthropic favors—I could quote you such significant examples both from America and from abroad. This is far worse for a freeman, I assure you, than falling prey to philanthropic exactions. Be on your guard against these Greeks; the gifts they bring are bribes.

Enough! I know I am not exaggerating this time. The ordinary workingman of America, even when assisted by his family, is restricted to the satisfaction of his organic wants. How many fall short of this, charity statistics show. And with all that is being laid out superficially to alleviate his lot, little is being effected fundamentally to meliorate his condition. Yet according to our Declaration of Independence, his claim to sensory and spiritual satisfaction is precisely as good as yours. Realizing this in the course of his limited education and restricted experience, the democratic laborer is now going in for "direct action," "industrial unionism," "syndicalism," so called. To be opposed by oppression, perhaps—even so, if equal opportunities are not accorded, they are bound to be acquired. As for the skilled aristocrat, he receives a

¹W. J. Ghent, *Benevolent Feudalism*, p. 10.

surplus. So much I concede. The question is concerning the relative size of this surplus, and the comparative opportunities afforded for the expenditure thereof. Not such, I should say, as to carry him very far in the direction of sensory or spiritual satisfaction. Compared with monopoly profits, union wages are as a pebble in a pile. Yet when you contrast the productive contributions of the skilled artisan with those of the shrewd capitalist—quite right, your point of order is sustained, I am considering consumption. To conclude accordingly: Before the masses of the unskilled the high road to happiness has become obliterated by the struggle for existence; before the classes of the skilled an obstructed footpath proceeds. Will the aristocrat continue on this obstructed way, following the *ignis fatuus* of his plutocratic precursor, or will he go back and aid his democratic brethren in blazing a broader trail? Upon his decision, as I see it, the epiphany of socialism depends.

III

I will not have you infer from this I am entering on an argument. It is not necessary; analysis is enough. And such analysis shows: Producers and consumers at cross-purposes; capitalists and laborers at loggerheads; sellers of goods overreaching one another; renderers of services wrangling among themselves; the many poor struggling for sheer existence; the few rich seeking silly pleasures and pursuing absurd prestige. Looking backward, you point with pride to patriotic citizens of the great American commonwealth; pressing about you are bickering competitors of a petty American private-wealth; and immediately before you, prospects of restoration through reform. Prospects particularly pleasing to the purblind, but illusory, owing to the conjunctures of the exchange system. To correct such astigmatism, and encourage hyperopia, I will ask you to reconsider the logic of the situation.

Wealth in the original sense of the word, signifying weal, welfare, well-being, results from the progressive satisfaction of wants. In accordance with this ideal, we all seek to satisfy as many of our expanding wants as possible. The means thereto are goods and services to which want-satisfying qualities, or utilities, attach. Ideally, therefore, our activities are directed toward increasing our

supply of such goods and services; not at random, be it said, but with due regard to unity and variety, since the more inclusive the unity and the more extensive the variety of want-satisfying qualities, the larger the quantum of utility acquired, and, accordingly, the greater our wealth in the original sense of the word. Now note you: under the exchange system—which is to remain intact throughout and after the restoration—goods and services are acquirable only by purchase on the open market; we are compelled to bargain for and buy our welfare, these days. The extent of such purchases depends upon the amount of money in hand. What is the result? Directly before, and so as to obscure, the ideal end of satisfying as many wants as possible, there appears in the foreground of our imagination the immediate end of making as much money as possible. Now reverse the shield: Under the exchange system—which is to remain intact throughout and after the restoration—money is acquirable only by the sale of goods and services on the open market; we have to haggle and sell to be well-to-do these days. The more extensive the sales the larger the amount of money received. To be sure; but this is half said. There are the comparative advantages of competition and monopoly to be considered besides. Under competitive conditions of sale, prices oscillate about the cost of production, and money is disseminated among many hands; under monopoly conditions of sale, prices may be maintained above cost as far as effective demand, and, what is more, money becomes concentrated in the hands of the few. With the immediate end in view of making as much money as possible, which appears the more advantageous means? With your eyesight adjusted to the logical conjunctures the illusion disappears. Monopoly is the profitable choice. In fact, under the exchange system, there isn't any alternative at all. Any producer with a bit of business sense, be he a seller of goods or a renderer of services, will strive, in his own interest and those of the class to which he belongs, to clear himself from competition; whether he makes for monopoly or resorts to chicanery is incidental and fortuitous besides.

Pertinent, I take it, at this juncture is the remark of a certain socialist (Victor Berger, I believe): "Attempting to restore com-

petition is like trying to unscramble eggs." And yet this is precisely the plan proposed by the party in power. Whether, considering comparative efficiency, increasing cost, diminishing returns, and other economic incidences, such a restoration would be beneficial at best to the small capitalists and middle-class consumers who are behind the movement, I am not so sure. But this is not the point. Overlooking even the ruthlessness of such a procedure, it's the sheer impossibility of the proposal that impresses me. If under the exchange system—which is to continue intact—it is to the economic interests of producers to combine, how are you going to compel them to compete? By invoking the sovereign power of the state. At last we have arrived at the source of the fallacy—the doctrine of popular sovereignty! No fallacy at first, I assure you, but nowadays, under the existing order. As Charles Edward Russell has so well said, it is no longer the People but Business that prevails. Business is the heart of the nation, distributing life-blood, in the guise of goods and services, to the body politic. But the flow is become polluted—correct the diagnosis—blood-poisoning has set in. Even so, you mustn't interfere with the action of the heart. Content yourselves with prophylactics, my Democratic confrères. Regulate the system with laxative legislation; if this doesn't effect the desired results, try drastic doses of judicial decision. Or in an emergency you might resort to the antiquated remedy of blood-letting; confine your patients if they won't submit willingly to the operation, and preserve for analysis the corpuscles you withdraw in the way of fines. Enough of the analogy; it isn't mine anyway and it is carrying me too far. What I want to asseverate is this: you cannot restore competition among producers, because competition among producers is not good business. Continue the attempt: business will either frustrate your efforts or ingeniously avoid the issue. Surely you have had enough experience in the past to appreciate this statement. Business in modern America stands supreme.

IV

Wealth in the original sense of the word, signifying weal, welfare, well-being, rules by divine right on the throne of the ideal.

Opportunity is his prime minister, charity his social ambassador; honest goods and unselfish services minister to his behests. Wholesome workmen co-operate in production; in consumption, cheery comrades sit about the board. Such is the Golden Age—or call it with Glaucon “a city of pigs,” if you please. Under the guise of the exchange system a usurpation has been effected. Tricked out as a legitimately derived signification of his ancient ancestor (though himself a sheer sum of exchange values), the money-power impostor at present prevails. Monopoly is his prime minister, chicanery his business ambassador; dishonest goods and selfish services contribute to his prestige. Conniving capitalists and class-conscious laborers compete in production; in consumption, a few sit, many serve, and outcasts gather up the crumbs. Such is the Commercial era—call it with Socrates “the luxurious state” if you like. In view of this contrast a restoration is devoutly to be desired. Granted—only you mustn’t expect it to be effected through reform. For one reason, Nature doesn’t operate that way.

We are accustomed to contrast evolution and revolution; this is all wrong; they are one and the same. Throughout the organic realm, if DeVries is right, mutations occur in cycles, suddenly, *per salta*, so to speak. To be sure, the preparation is gradual but the fulfilment is abrupt—in the social world, at all events. Can you recall a social transformation of any significance that has been brought about gradually through reform? I thought not. Reform, you will find, is only a concomitant, never the cause of progress; it serves as an index also, appearing as a precursor and multiplying upon the approach of a cataclysm. Below the social surface, economic changes go on continuously, and so gradually as to be all but imperceptible, were it not for the index of reform. When the cycle is completed, the cataclysm occurs; reforms are swept away and revolution proceeds to complete the work of restoration. Whether the revolution be bloodless or sanguinary is only a dramatic incident. The essential is that social transformations are effected in this way. As for existing signs, the reform index points conspicuously, and significantly it seems to me, though I am not in a position to prophesy. Whether the cataclysm will overflow ere long, or be walled back for a generation or so, depends, so far

as I can see, on the attitude of skilled labor and, since conservatives are committed to fatuous reforms, upon the policy of progressives toward the economic changes occurring the while. Though of this I am quite convinced—sorrowfully from experience in the past—when the revolution does occur, there will be resistance all along the capitalistic line and acrimony no end, between social classes and geographic sections besides. Yet there is no real reason for such antagonism; it doesn't arise from the innate iniquity of mankind, at any rate; perhaps it is due to the inequalities of property that have prevailed so far. Let us say so to save our respect for universal suffrage, and in conclusion I ask you to meditate meekly upon the changes that are destined to occur. Amid the tumult and turmoil of the times it is impossible to pick out the details. But in broad outline the contrast is inspiring, and illuminating withal: between the existing competitive private-wealth I have endeavored to describe, and the coming co-operative commonwealth, I leave for your imagination to depict.

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF RURAL EDUCATION
EXAMPLE: KLINKITAT COUNTY, WASHINGTON

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There are four general principles involved in the successful administration of rural education which may be stated as follows: (1) There must be sufficient financial support to give the kind of education needed in rural life; (2) Financial support should be given with as little waste as possible and should be equalized among the several school districts on the basis of ability to pay as far as practicable; (3) An effective system of administration and supervision must be established and maintained; (4) The schools should be centers of local community interest.

For the purposes of this discussion let us consider a sparsely settled region in the southern part of Washington just east of the Cascade gap of the Columbia River, comprised within the county of Klickitat.

The people generally are vigorous and ordinarily intelligent, and some of them are exceptionally progressive farmers. The soil of the entire county is very rich and productive. The middle and western portions of the county have sufficient rainfall to raise a variety of farm products. Irrigation is necessary for the eastern part before any crop except wheat can be produced. Approximately 75 per cent of the farms are each one hundred acres or more, and there are one hundred farms each of five hundred acres or more. However, since 1910 a movement toward small farms ranging from ten to fifty acres has begun. As yet only about 50 per cent of the possible farm lands are held for farm purposes, and only about 40 per cent of these lands are improved. Transportation facilities in the county are comparatively meager and undeveloped. The S.P. & S. Railroad runs along the entire southern border of the

county on the north bank of the Columbia River. A branch of this road leaves Lyle and extends into the interior of the county as far as Goldendale, the county seat. However, in the absence of steam or electric transportation a large number of good wagon roads have been constructed in all parts of the county which run on converging lines to several trade centers. To sum up, there are rather remarkable agricultural possibilities in this county and they are being rapidly developed. But when we turn to the possibilities of educational development we are forced to the conclusion, after making a recent survey, that the schools are not going ahead and that there is really little thought given to the matter.

When it can be fully demonstrated to the wide-awake agriculturalists and townsmen of this region that a rational system of rural education is part and parcel of the larger social economic development, then the rural-school problem will bid fair to be solved. The solution of this problem can never be initiated, much less consummated, by the teachers employed to teach the present district schools. These teachers are employed for a year, or usually at most for two years, by each local board, and then they travel on to find greener pastures, only to repeat again and again the same deadening routine of instruction, which fulfils the minimum requirements of the state law. This is said to be a "democratic education."

The problem is how to get the social and economic consciousness that already exists in this county to include the school as an essential institution in the social and economic development of the community. At this moment I have before me a small bulletin of a land company which is operating in that county. Among other statements which are calculated to induce people to invest we find the following: "To buttress every investment by creating a social neighborhood and a community of interest that will insure property values, remove the social disabilities of country life, and make business co-operation easy and agreeable." Such a company as this could profitably enlist the co-operation of the other land companies and that of the individual farmers of the county, for nearly every farmer desires to sell a part of his large holdings, and could initiate an effective system of rural-school administration on the one

basis alone of settling up the county. In the more settled portions of the county where productivity and farm management complicate the problem, the certain effect of well-supported, well-equipped, well-manned, and well-supervised schools could be demonstrated. But where are the missionaries of the public schools that will go out and preach such "sordid doctrine" that a much better rural school than the present must be secured to help the inhabitants to be successful in raising pigs? And then who will follow up the conversion with the higher values to be secured through an educational system based upon economic needs? The present school system is simply tolerated by most of these hard-headed farmers. A little of it they admit is good, perhaps, but more is useless. Many of these men do not recognize the present school education as having anything to do with their problems, and are they not right? Furthermore, they do not understand that any kind of activity that is called "education" could possibly have any value for them. In this respect, of course, they need enlightenment. A short time ago the writer visited a county fair. He chanced to talk with the father of the boy who had been awarded the blue ribbon for raising the best exhibit of vegetables. He said, "Just as soon as John [referring to the prize-winner] is fifteen [the legal age when compulsory education ceases], I'll take him out of school, because he will be a first-class farmer." Later on he said that John's brother would probably continue his school work longer, because he showed no signs of becoming a good farmer.

Not only has the school developed in isolation from the society which it is designed to serve, but administrators of education have attempted to carry on their work in managing and improving the system by themselves. In the conduct and improvement of the other branches of the civil administration there are frequent appeals made to the people, and campaigns of education on the questions of administration involved are carried on among them. But when there is a question of administration of education up for consideration it is kept, in nearly every case, within the ranks of the profession. With some notable exceptions, the history of school administration in the United States since the days of Horace Mann presents a complex system of legislative "patchwork" sur-

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passing understanding. The one discernible principle threading through it all is the desire to "keep the schools out of politics." The schools have been kept out of big politics only to be kept in petty politics. Our elective school officials consistently refuse to consider the administrative problem involved in the relationship of the lay authority to the expert authority. For example, they contend that the people can elect as good a county superintendent as a county board of education elected by the people can appoint. Whenever a proposition to raise the standard of certification of teachers is made, they become active with the legislative committee to keep the standards down, because, perchance, the proposed standards are too high for them. We need, as Massachusetts needed in 1830, strong laymen to step in and "bowl over" the schoolmasters in the interests of rural education. Only now we need such men in every state and in every county. For the great majority of these so-called elective school experts the present system of district organization is good enough, in their own thinking.

The present system of district organization in vogue in our state takes little, if any, account of necessary valuations to provide for instruction now needed, much less for instruction which should be provided in the near future. There is little consideration of the principle of equalizing educational opportunities and school support. The educational and economic waste involved in forming district lines is rarely considered under our present irrational system of district organization. The whole scheme is built upon the basis of the "length and strength of the smallest child's legs," and it is perpetuated by the desire to hold the office of director and by the teachers and county superintendents who find the present system good enough for them.

And yet what this county and many, many others need cannot be provided under the present system. As this county becomes more thickly populated small farms will become the rule instead of the exception. There will be less wheat grown, and a variety of farm products will take its place, as fruit, forage plants, hogs, cattle, poultry, etc. As diversified farming is introduced the problems of farm management will be increased. The economic status of the farmer lies at the basis of his improvement in all other social

matters. Vocational and prevocational instruction adapted to the needs of the rural communities will not be fads but necessities. Not only must new courses be given in the schools, but the present courses must be reorganized and applied effectively to rural problems—not rural problems in general, but rural problems in Klickitat County: home economics for the farm home, a many-sided course in agriculture for this diversified farming region, commercial work applied to the market for farm products, manual training applied to the construction of farmhouses, barns, silos, etc., and the uses, repair, and care of farm machinery. Arithmetic will deal with problems of farm management.

A new kind of training in arithmetic will be applied to the big agricultural and home problems, farm management, and farm-home management. Farm accounts will be one of the important parts of the agricultural instruction, and household management will be one of the important parts of home economics.

The actual data of the farming business will be gathered and interpreted: the value of the land of a given farm will be considered, the cost involved in preparing the land for the various crops, the cost of seeding, of cultivating, and irrigating. Next in order would be a consideration of the capital invested in tools and machinery, and the depreciation in the value of the same owing to wear and tear; also the cost of harvesting the crops and the marketing of them; the cost of the haul to the market or shipping-point, freight rates, etc., would be important items in the big problem. Following this the gross and net incomes from the sale of products would receive attention; after which would follow a consideration of the most profitable crops and the cost of keeping land up to the maximum productivity. The pupils then could profitably be employed in solving the problems of the percentage of net income on the capital invested. They could compute the wages of the hired men and of the men owning the farm and the cost of the living of the family on the farm. After all the facts were in they could determine whether or not the owner of the farm had realized a fair wage for his labor, a fair interest on the capital invested, and whether or not there was any profit over and above wages and interest.²

It is one thing to be able to raise good crops, but it is often another thing to raise profitable crops. If cows are to be kept on the farm, are they profitable? The boy should keep accounts with the cows so that the star boarders of the herd may be eliminated. These problems and many more would be included in

² Lull, "The Expanding Elementary School," *The American Schoolmaster*, March, 1914.

arithmetic under the heading of prevocational instruction in the rural schools. Arithmetic will be used in opening up the possibilities of the farm in the pupils' own community. Used in this way arithmetic will become a strong instrument in vocational guidance, which is the main element, after all, in prevocational instruction. In like manner the girls should apply their arithmetic to their problems of home management and should at the same time share in the work of the home. There is great promise in the system of school credits for farm and home work done in connection with prevocational instruction. Similar modifications of the course of study as it now exists may be worked out for English, geography, history, civics, and hygiene instruction. English composition should concern itself less with the "Man in the Moon," "A Summer's Outing," "The Adventures of a Brownie," and "Beyond the Alps Lies Italy," and increasingly more with topics pertaining to the civic and economic problems of the community. The composition should assist the pupils in giving accurate and elegant statement of the farm and home-life problems being studied in other courses. There is little need in these days of quickened social interests to go far afield for composition content by stringing together a series of collections from the encyclopedia.

Geography should constantly make the home weather conditions, the home soil, the home agriculture, home industries, home transportation of commodities, and other home institutions the points of departure for remote geography, and the points to which remote geography is referred. "The Inhabitants of the Isles of the Sea" may be an interesting topic, but scarcely pertinent when the boys and girls are strangers to the vital geography of their community, state, and nation.

History must be reorganized to emphasize those constructive movements of civilization. Mendel, in establishing the laws of plant and animal breeding and growth, did more to add to the real wealth and happiness of mankind than hundreds of men who are given important places in history textbooks and history instruction, and yet he is unknown by the teachers and pupils of the rural schools. There were and there are heroes of agriculture, industry, labor, and social improvement. These must find their rightful

place in our instruction. The great constructive forces of civilization must find a larger place in education if we are ever to be able to avoid the great social cataclysms like that of the present. The need for better instruction in civics and hygiene is too obvious for discussion in this paper. This all means that better teachers must be trained and employed, better administration and supervision must be secured; in short, the vital education of the masses must become the social passion. With these matters in mind let us return to our theme.

Without further consideration of the problem of bringing the course of study and instruction up to a respectable degree of efficiency, suppose the school districts of Klickitat County should undertake to introduce prevocational instruction in all schools and vocational instruction in the larger villages, what would be the problems presented? Out of a total number of eighty-five districts only nine had as high as thirty or more pupils in average daily attendance for the school year ending June 30, 1913. At the present time there are possibly fifteen districts out of the eighty-five that have two or more teachers per district. An average daily attendance of thirty pupils for nine months would give a total attendance of 5,400 days. The state and county apportionments amount approximately to 15 cents per day's attendance of each elementary-school pupil.¹ At 15 cents a day the state and county apportionments for such a school would amount to \$810.00. With an assessed valuation of \$100,000.00 and with a special tax of 10 mills (which is as high a rate as any district ought to have), the income from the local district tax would be \$1,000.00. Therefore the annual income for the school district would be approximately \$1,810.00. Then if we should include the proposed attendance apportionment from the state of one and one-half days for each day's attendance for each, say, of ten prevocational pupils in average attendance, the total income of this school would be increased from \$1,810.00 to approximately \$1,877.50.

What do these figures mean? First, the average number of pupils in daily attendance; secondly, the number of two-teacher

¹ This amount includes one-third of the county apportionment made on the basis of the number of teachers employed by the district.

schools; and, thirdly, the annual income of the districts. In the first place, there are seventy-six districts having less than thirty pupils in average daily attendance. These districts should not even establish prevocational instruction, because two teachers for less than thirty pupils in average daily attendance would be too expensive. Yet at least two teachers are absolutely necessary and three teachers would be advisable in any elementary school attempting to give prevocational instruction. One teacher already has more work than she can well do in carrying on the regular work through the six or eight grades of the elementary school. To accomplish anything worth while in this line would require at least two teachers for eight grades; a woman, to do the regular work of the primary grades and the home economics work of the grammar-grade girls; a man, to carry on the regular work of the grammar grades and the agricultural and industrial work of both the grammar-grade boys and girls. On this basis of organization, however, only fifteen schools of Klickitat County could at present qualify for prevocational instruction. Again, scarcely twenty-one schools out of the eighty-five have sufficient valuations to support prevocational instruction. We have seen that a district of \$100,000.00 assessed valuation, having an average daily attendance of thirty pupils for nine months, would have an annual income of approximately \$1,877.50. To secure teachers in this county who could really do the work the woman would have to be paid \$80.00 per month for nine months, or an annual salary of \$720.00, and the man, \$100.00 per month, or an annual salary of \$900.00; the two together, \$1,620.00. There would be left only \$257.50 for other maintenance expenses, and this amount would scarcely be sufficient. Finally, probably not more than twelve of these twenty-one schools have sufficient attendance to warrant the employment of two or more teachers, and therefore, only twelve schools of the eighty-five would be justified in introducing prevocational instruction.

Under the present organization only two towns of the county, White Salmon and Goldendale, could introduce vocational instruction. Probably a third town, Bickleton, could qualify for vocational instruction in a short time under the present organization.

Under a better organization practically all children of the proper ages in the county could be given vocational as well as prevocational instruction. There is enough wealth in the county to support all necessary phases of elementary and secondary education, providing the entire county could be organized in such a way as to eliminate unnecessary waste. For example, district No. 86 with a total average attendance of 1,260 days and with a local tax of 10 mills on an assessed valuation of \$139,704.00, would have an annual income of approximately \$1,586.00. For its seven children in average daily attendance this would be \$226.00 per child, an enormous sum to spend upon each child, yet under the present organization the kind of education needed by these children could not be provided even at this cost. There are a large number of such districts in this county and in this state. District No. 1, on this basis, would expend for each child annually \$758.00. Of course, these districts do not expend such large amounts, for if they should they would waste much more than they do now. On the other hand, a 10-mill tax under a rational district organization would be more than enough to furnish rural-educational facilities unsurpassed by any similar county in the United States. Under present conditions the districts pay high costs per child and receive little in educational returns. District No. 1 actually expended per child for the year ending June, 1913, \$153.72, and this on a 1-mill tax levy. In that same year district No. 66 levied a 10-mill tax and raised \$53.17 per child. In the Russell Sage Foundation report on *A Comparative Study of Public-School Systems in the Forty-Eight States*, the state of Washington was given the highest rank for public-school efficiency; but notice the values given to the different educational features. Washington expends more than any other state per child and is ranked second in expenditure in proportion to its wealth, while it ranks only twelfth in the number of days the schools were open, and only twentieth in the percentage of school attendance. Considering the number of states (in the South) that have no compulsory attendance laws, the rank of twentieth puts Washington well down in the list. The one score which gave Washington the first place was the amount expended per child, and this is really a count against us when we consider it in relation to the economic waste and educational inefficiency of our rural education.

The Russell Sage Foundation report was undoubtedly well meant, but it lacks many essentials of being an accurate report of the relative educational efficiencies of the several states. The report has helped to retard educational progress in Washington by establishing the boast that "our state holds first rank in education"—a statement frequently heard from the lips of unthinking persons employed in educational capacities and from school boards, business men, farmers, and legislators, who answer all proposed educational innovations in terms of "economy," which for them simply means doing nothing.

Supposing these inequalities and wastes in the educational expenditures of the county could be entirely eliminated, what should we find? Under the present system of state and county apportionments a 5-mill local tax income on all the assessable property of all districts of the county added to the income from the state and county apportionments would provide approximately \$50.00 per child attending school. Under ideal conditions this amount per child would provide for all needed phases of education in the entire county. This ideal, of course, for many reasons is impossible. The practical question remains, however, how far can present school conditions in this country be improved in the direction of this ideal? There exists in this county the wealth requisite to give all children of school age excellent educational opportunities adapted to the needs of rural life, without being too great a burden on anyone. What can be done? What is practicable?

The accompanying map shows in a general way what could be done in this county if the educational administration were really organized for business. To secure prevocational and vocational instruction it will be necessary to divide the county into larger district units to provide sufficient valuations and a sufficiently large number of children to conduct the work efficiently and economically. The question is, shall such a division be made rationally by a competent authority representing the entire county, or shall it go on forever without getting anywhere under the present law for consolidation of districts, placing the initiative and responsibility with the local districts themselves? To enhance the tendency to consolidate the state has offered a bonus of 2,000 days' attendance

for every district that comes into a consolidation minus one, i.e., a three-district consolidation would receive an annual bonus of 4,000 days' attendance. In spite of this liberal bonus there is no tendency at present in the state as a whole toward consolidation, and there are few consolidations effected or contemplated in this county. But this principle of consolidation is impracticable, for when the consolidations are made, the old inequalities among districts still remain. Stranded districts are left which cannot get into consolidations, because, perchance, they may have many children and low valuations. Then, too, in this state the law does not require any supervision of schools not already given to the small districts by the county superintendent. Nor does it require any changes in the grouping of children in the schools or transportation to a centrally located high school. Districts consolidating usually go in simply for the bonus. Out of five consolidations recently effected in Lewis County of this state only two have provided for supervision and none of them have provided transportation. One consolidation has twenty-two districts in it. What then is the solution?

First, what principle of district organization could be applied? The places indicated on the map as centers around which circles are drawn are all natural trade centers. There are other country crossroads centers consisting of a general merchandise store, a blacksmith shop, etc., but they are not properly classed as trade centers, not being shipping-points, and lacking means of money exchange. Some of these smaller places may some time develop into trade centers, of course. On the other hand, some of the centers indicated on the map are at present only potential, but as the land is settled they must become trade centers because of their locations. The farmers bring their produce into these towns, buy their supplies, do their banking, and become well acquainted with the business men, shippers' association men, etc. Here they attend grange, shippers' association meetings, lodge meetings, and avail themselves of church facilities when they desire an intelligent delivery of the gospel message. Here they "swap" yarns and visit the movies and the county fair. These are the real social centers as well as trade centers. This economic and social situa-

tion is just as essential for the success of the school as it is for the other local institutions and enterprises. The same solidarity of economic and social interests necessary to the industrial and civic development of a community is necessary for its educational development.

There is a mutual interdependence between these trade centers and the land which is naturally tributary to them. The business of these towns is dependent upon the success of the farmers living within their tributary trade areas. Why should not the boundaries of the social and trade unit be also approximately the boundaries for the educational unit? Then as the boundaries of the former change, the boundaries of the latter should also change. The present irrationally formed, isolated districts generally do not coincide with any real social unit at all, and no social-center movement, however well initiated and directed, can ever make them anything but superficial social units.

The problem of transporting pupils to the central schools of the proposed districts would be easy of solution. The roads leading to the trade centers must all be in good condition to carry the heavy loads to market, and now they are coming to be constructed for heavy automobile trucks. Neighborhood schools in the same district could be maintained for the little children, and the high-school pupils could be transported to the high school in the trade center. At first, no doubt, it would be advisable, also, to transport the pupils of the seventh and eighth grades into the trade center in order to give them the advantages of prevocational instruction. The distance that pupils could be transported profitably would depend, of course, upon the condition of the roads and whether there were a sufficient number of pupils living at the longer distances to make up a load. With good roads and automobile service upper-grade and high-school pupils could be carried ten miles, or possibly even fifteen. Some transportation would become necessary for the smaller neighborhood schools, also, but the distances would be comparatively short. There would always have to be in each neighborhood school from fifteen to twenty children to make the employment of at least one teacher economical. Very few of the present district-school buildings could be used, for they

are neither suitable for the work which should be done nor located in the right places. Fewer and better buildings should be located on the main roads leading to the trade center.

The assessed valuations of the proposed districts indicated by the map vary at present from \$259,555.00 to \$1,763,811.00, and the total attendance days of the proposed districts would also vary correspondingly. The variations both in assessed valuation and in total attendance days would be very much less than under the present district organization. At any rate all districts as proposed would have sufficient valuations to support elementary instruction including prevocational instruction and some high-school instruction, and at least five of the proposed districts could also include vocational instruction.

But the big question still presses for answer, How can such an organization of education in this county or any other county of the kind be accomplished? We have seen why the present consolidation scheme fails. There must be a competent authority representing the people of the county to make a study of the county as a whole and then make the division of the districts on the basis of the principles above discussed. Happily the problem of rural-school administration is passing beyond this stage of theory into that of practical experiment from which most desirable results in a few places have already been secured. Notable gains have been made in this direction in Utah. A few counties in that state are organized on a plan known as the "county-unit plan." A few other states have the county-unit plan, although the administrative machinery is more or less cumbrous. After making a study of rural education in all the states of the Union, Mr. A. C. Monahan, the specialist of the United States Bureau of Education in the administration of rural education, has recently issued a bulletin on *The County-Unit Organization for the Administration of Rural Schools*. As a result of his studies the United States Bureau of Education suggests the essentials of the county-unit organization. The plan seems admirably adapted for applying the principles of rural-school administration, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, and is therefore given below. This plan would meet the requirements of the sparsely settled counties, which present the most difficult problems for school administration.

THE COUNTY-UNIT¹

1. The county, the unit of taxation and administration of schools (except that, in administration, independent city districts employing a superintendent would not be included).

2. A county school tax levied on taxable property in the county, covered into the county treasury, and divided between the independent city districts and the rest of the county on a basis of the school population.

3. The county school funds, including those raised by taxation, and those received from the state, expended in such a way as would as nearly as possible insure equal educational opportunities in all parts of the county, regardless of the amount raised in any particular part. (Any subdistrict should be permitted to raise, by taxation or otherwise, additional funds to supplement the county funds, provided the subdistrict desired a better school plant, additional equipment, or a more efficient teaching force than could be provided from the county funds.)

4. A county board of education, in which is vested the administration of the public schools of the county (except those in independent city districts) composed of from five to nine persons, elected or appointed from the county at large; the board to be non-partisan; the term of office to be at least five years, and the terms arranged so that not more than one-fifth would expire in one year.

5. A county superintendent of schools, a professional educator, selected by the county board of education, from within or without the county or state, for a long term (at least two years), who shall serve as the secretary and executive officer of the county board and as such be the recognized head of the public schools in the county (except those independent city districts).

6. District trustees in each subdistrict of the county, one or more persons, elected by the voters of the district or selected by the county board, to be custodians of the school property and to serve in an advisory capacity to the county board. The expenditure of local funds raised by the subdistrict would rest with the trustees subject to the approval of the county board of education.

7. The powers and duties of the county board of education:

a) To select a county superintendent, who would be its secretary and executive officer in the performance of all of its other functions, and to appoint assistants as required.

b) To have general control and management of the schools of the county.

c) To submit estimates to the regular county taxing authority of the amount of money needed to support the schools.

d) To regulate the boundaries of the school subdistricts of the county making from time to time such alterations as in its judgment would serve the best interests of the county system.

e) To locate and erect school buildings.

f) To supply the necessary equipment.

¹ *Bulletin, No. 44, 1914, United States Bureau of Education, p. 8.*

g) To fix the course of study and select textbooks (using the state course and state-adopted textbooks where action has been taken).

h) To enforce the compulsory-education law.


i) To employ teachers, fix their salaries and the salaries of other employees.

In anticipation of the argument which may be made that the concentration of the administrative authority in the hands of one central county board of education will reduce the opportunity for the exercise of local initiative and hence will destroy community interest in the schools, it may be said, in addition to reasons already given, that the present system certainly does not stimulate community interest because the school unit is not a part of the existing social unit. Furthermore, the possession of authority, which, by its very nature, belongs to a larger unit than the single community, retards school interest. The county-unit system as above outlined leaves to the community precisely those educational duties which it is best fitted to perform and eliminates those which a century's experience has shown to be beyond its ability. The community is given a standard school and then it may, on its own initiative, individualize and improve the buildings, grounds, and the work of the school as far as community enthusiasm will warrant. The community under the county-unit system is released from administrative detail to work upon the more vital problems of educational service. On the other hand, we are not without testimony that the county-unit system, as a matter of fact, increases the school spirit of the community. President Galbreath of the East Tennessee Normal School says:

With the county as a unit the interest of the patrons in the progress and real worth of the schools has been intensified and all have been given a clearer understanding of the problems that must be worked out through the public schools. There is a more intense interest on the part of the patrons in the activities and needs of the schools than could have been experienced under the old law where each school was a unit in administration, support, and interest.*

The writer wishes to state that much of the material used in this paper was used by him as a part of the report of the State Vocational Commission of which he was chairman. The commission's report is as yet unpublished.

* *Bulletin No. 44*, 1914, United States Bureau of Education, p. 56.



Note:-
The following districts have
two or more teachers - 7, 9,
13, 19, 27, 35, 44, 54, 63, 94,
Con 1, Con 2, Con 3, and Con 4.

Note:-
Centers of mile circles taken
of trade centers.

LEGEND
Rivers
Railroads
County Roads
District Boundaries
Consolidation Boundaries

MAP OF
Klickitat County
WASHINGTON
SHOWING PRESENT SCHOOL DISTRICTS
AND PROPOSED CONSOLIDATIONS

PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

ROBERT H. LOWIE
American Museum of Natural History

What are the relations of psychology and sociology? It is clear that the sociology of both primitive and higher civilizations yields new data for psychological interpretation. But can psychology as the older science, dealing with more fundamental phenomena, throw any light on the problems that confront the sociologist and ethnologist?

The question, even in this drastic form, is hardly absurd at the present stage of sociological and anthropological thinking. On the one hand, we find Graebner, the leader of the German historical school, resolutely turning his back on anything that savors of psychological interpretation. The sum and substance of ethnology, he tells us in his *Methode der Ethnologie*, is to determine the actual development of cultures; and this he forthwith outlines as the result of contact between different peoples, leading to intermixture and superposition of cultural traits. From this point of view any similarities observed in different regions must be traced to a single point of origin, for there is no criterion, no certain proof, of independent development, while cultural borrowing is not only in some cases an established historical fact, but may be considered demonstrated when a resemblance of form between the particular features compared is accompanied by a corresponding similarity of associated traits. It matters not to Graebner whether a division of society into exogamous moieties may mean one thing in Australia and quite a different thing among the Iroquois or the Tlingit. He is interested in classifying cultural results, and one moiety appears no different from another. If a bungling schoolboy by a double blunder attained the same sum as a calculating machine, Graebner

Very different is the position assumed by such writers as Levy-

not a purely objective cultural epiphenomenon that we are dealing with in culture, but that it is precisely the subjective aspect of the problem that tempts and repays study. The opposition of the writers mentioned to current psychologizing rests on very different motives and seems to be associated with certain notions as to the hierarchy of the sciences. Precisely as many biologists now hold that vital phenomena cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry but require a distinctively biological explanation, so eminent sociologists and ethnologists now tend to believe that sociological data are *sui generis* and defy interpretation by individual psychology. The collective ideas encountered by the sociologist, thinks Lévy-Bruhl, are generically different from the ideas evolved by the individual mind and obey laws other than those derived from an analysis of individual psychology. Similarly, Wissler has suggested that psychological and cultural processes belong to different levels or cycles and should be interpreted independently of each other. Rivers, to be sure, does not exclude the possibility that for an ultimate explanation of cultural data recourse may be had to psychology. Nevertheless he, too, insists that in the treatment of immediate problems we must attempt "the correlation of social phenomena with other social phenomena, and the reference of the facts of social life to social antecedents."

Anyone who has delved into the semi-popular ethnological literature of, say, the last two decades will hardly fail to sympathize in very large measure with the views just cited. The cheap plausibility about many current attempts to bring primitive or modern social thought nearer to us has been admirably exposed by Lévy-Bruhl. Yet the trouble with many of these interpretations is not that they are psychological but rather that they are folk-psychological: they rest, not on the established results of scientific psychology or at least on points of view that have proved fruitful within that science; but rather on the sort of offhand guesswork with which in everyday life we attempt to fathom the motives and thoughts of our neighbors. And even where the ethnologist does not indulge in this form of popular psychologizing he is likely to offer as a psychological explanation what cannot by the most strenuous exertion of the will be twisted into the semblance of one.

An example is furnished by Professor Kroeber's "psychological explanation" of kinship terminologies. Professor Kroeber has it that relatives are not classified according to social but according to psychologico-linguistic categories, which he lists accordingly. His enumeration is one of the most notable feats in the history of the subject, but in what way has it anything to do with the science of psychology? What psychological processes cause many peoples to classify collateral and lineal relatives together, or to use a distinctive set of terms for a male and for a female speaking? These are linguistic phenomena that may call for a psychological interpretation; but merely to say that psychological factors have been at work is not producing the factors (such as we know from our textbooks on psychology), is not, then, a psychological explanation at all.

Yet, when all is said and done, the spirit of skepticism that has invaded sociological and ethnological circles may be carried too far. I venture to believe that some facts may not only become more intelligible when viewed from the angle of individual psychology, but it may be advisable not to defer this mode of looking at them until an indefinitely remote future. Even where individual psychology has not yet advanced far enough to give a solution of the problem, the new data may well prove a goad for further development of that branch of the science. And again an ethnologist conversant with psychology may give a more accurate description of his observations than his less sophisticated colleague.

All this becomes clearer by concrete illustration. I will begin by offering some remarks on a subject that figures largely in discussions of religion—dreams and related phenomena. Every sociologist knows of Tylor's attempt to account for the savage belief in a hereafter through visits from or to the dead as experienced in dreams or visions. This theory can of course be assailed on Lévy-Bruhl's principles; it may be said that an individual will interpret his dream only in a way more or less predetermined by the mode of thought prevalent in the society about him. But the point is that some psychologists, such as Radstock and Wundt, have not been able to give any account of the facts of the dream.

perfectly natural that the thoughts of surviving relatives should continue to busy themselves with the recently deceased, and that accordingly their dream life should be haunted by the figures of those who have just departed. Nevertheless this argument is no more than a piece of plausible folk-psychologizing. Yves Delage, on the basis of personal observations, arrived at the conclusion that ideas which preoccupy the mind in waking do *not* appear in dreams and that one does not dream of important events of life except when the period of pre-occupation has ceased. More particularly he found that one does *not* tend to dream of a recently deceased relative.¹ With qualifications that seem immaterial in this context Delage's views are corroborated by Professor Mary Whiton Calkins' "Statistics of Dreams."² She, too, finds a strong tendency for unimportant events of waking life to crop up in dreams, while events of real significance occur with amazing infrequency; and her independent examination of dream records confirmed Delage's special point as regards the apparitions of the recently deceased.

The particular facts of this case are of course unessential. I have not followed recent dream-study sufficiently to be able to vouch for the correctness of the views cited. But one thing is clear. The sociologist who is acquainted with Delage's and Professor Calkins' observations will avoid the pitfall of a "psychological" interpretation that might otherwise seem axiomatic; the knowledge of what at least some inquirers have advanced against that interpretation will serve as a prophylactic against accepting plausible guesswork for scientific truth.

So far, to be sure, scientific psychology carries us no farther than Lévy-Bruhl's collective ideas. We have argued the merits of a particular psychological explanation from its own point of view and found it wanting; Lévy-Bruhl's principle would preclude error by simply shutting out *any* explanation of this type. In order to vindicate the claims of scientific psychology in sociology we must therefore prove that it has something more than a purely corrective value. This additional function consists partly in the more accurate determination of facts. Ethnological and sociological literature

¹ "Essai sur la théorie du rêve," *Revue scientifique*, XLVIII (1891), 40 f.

² *American Journal of Psychology*, V (1893), 311-43.

fairly reeks with such phrases as "crowd psychology," "hypnotism," "suggestion," "influence of dream life," yet rarely are these terms more than exceedingly loose and misleading catchwords. To stick to the last-mentioned topic, in ordinary savage parlance such phenomena as "dreams" and "visions" are often thrown together under a single term. Here it is the duty of the field worker to discriminate lest his record become worthless. The difference between the religious life of two tribes may center precisely in the fact that in one of them supernatural revelations are sought through artificially induced visions while in the other they come through the natural medium of dreams. And in either case by no means all the experiences are of the same significance. We know that among the central Algonkian tribes revelations through visions may be declined under the influence of the preconceived notion that a particular kind of revelation must be secured. Here, clearly enough, a collective idea overrides the individual psychological experience, but in order fully to appreciate the significance of this very fact we must know definitely what the individual experience has been, and any analogous instances from psychology and psychiatry are of value. If, on the other hand, communication with the spirit world takes place through dreams, the question arises *which* dreams become significant, and here an intensive psychological analysis may become necessary. An ethnologist who knows what is going on in psychology may ask whether the dreams that are culturally important conform to certain types suggested by current psychological discussion, say, whether they present the Freudian character of a repressed wish fulfilled. It may, of course, turn out that the dreams in question are wholly predetermined by social thought; but this should be the *result* of the investigation, not a foregone conclusion. Thus, scientific psychology may assist in greater precision of statement as to recorded facts and prevent the lumping together of disparate phenomena; and it may further suggest lines of inquiry closed to those not conversant with what psychologists are doing.

It is important to note that the study of psychology is in connection with the ever-vexing problems of the unity or diversity of origin of similar cultural traits. Discussion of this point has

always loomed large in the annals of anthropology; in recent times it has become the storm center in the whirlwind movements of the Graebnerian school. For, as already stated, Graebner denies that there are any objective criteria of independent development. To say, for example, that the same mythological ideas may develop independently in different parts of the world seems to him worthless, subjective twaddle. The thing is conceivable, he admits, but this does not prove that it has really taken place. Now, as I have pointed out elsewhere,¹ this is true but applies in equal measure to the supposedly objective proof for historical connection. Here, too, what can be demonstrated is simply the fact that two features are similar; that such similarity means unity of origin is pure inference, not a whit less subjective than the alternative hypothesis of diversity. But in weighing the evidence pro and con we cannot but attach great significance to whatever results scientific psychology may have ascertained as to general traits of the human mind.

Take, for example, the hideous ogres that infest the mythological world of widely separated races. Shall we accept the conclusion that they took shape in a single locality and thence spread over the entire globe? If so, how did such unrealistic figments of the imagination arise? And—even if we choose to ignore the psychology of origins—why should such fantastic imagery be uncritically adopted the world over? These questions are at least answered intelligibly, if not correctly, when we learn that the unrealistic figures of mythology do occur rather frequently in dream life. For even if their *origin* should not be traced to this source, we can at least understand why a type of imagery familiar from dreams should be accepted as part and parcel of a conceivable mythic world. This seems, indeed, to be the verdict of psychology. Wundt distinguishes a type of dreams peopled with grotesquely distorted shapes: there are faces with enormous probosces, projecting tongues, and gnashing teeth, while the head may rest dwarf-fashion on a stunted body. On apparitions of this type, Wundt believes, have been patterned the Gorgons and satyrs and pygmies of mythology.² Other students support the general psychological

¹ "On the Principle of Convergence in Ethnology," *Journal of American Folklore*, 1912, pp. 24-42.

² *Völkerpsychologie*, II, Part 2, pp. 114-18.

fact. Maury often saw in dreams a sort of green-winged bat with a red head and a grimace on its face. Mourly Vold reduces all these phenomena to a physiologico-psychological basis: in sleep tactile and motor sensations give rise to visual hallucinations, embracing those of the type now under consideration.¹

However cautious we may be about accepting Wundt's interpretation as a final one, it is clear that the case for the theory of independent development becomes very much stronger when we find that the strange ogre figuring in myths can and does recur in individual dream life over and over again and may be referred to rather definite physiological conditions. As against Graebner we have thus scored a point. But the indefatigable disciple of Lévy-Bruhl who is dogging our footsteps may object that when an individual dreams of, say, a Gorgon, it is because the Gorgon is a "collective idea" common to his social group, an idea with which his mind has been saturated since infancy and which thus naturally appears in his dreams. In other words, the phenomenon is essentially not psychological but sociological; as a modern philosopher inverted the commonplaces of materialism by inquiring why the mind has a body, so Lévy-Bruhl's follower nowhere sees products of individual minds becoming socialized but only social ideas shaping individual thought.

Here a twofold answer is possible. In the first place, to abandon a psychological explanation for the Gorgon is to abandon *all* explanation; the Gorgon enthroned as a collective idea may be inexpugnable but it is also incomprehensible and barren. Collective ideas are blind alleys; to make headway we require the admittedly fragile aircraft of individual psychology. Secondly, Lévy-Bruhl's theory involves as an essential part the doctrine of the diversity of human psychology. Why, then, we may reasonably ask, have diverse social groups produced similar mythological concepts? To this no answer is forthcoming from the opposite side.

Let us turn now to another field of inquiry. For a long time it seemed to have been struck by the outburst of associating ideas found among primitive peoples. In some cases, to be sure, one

¹ Vaschide, *Le Sommeil et les rêves* (Paris, 1911), pp. 197-225.

peculiarity may be due merely to our ignorance of an intermediate link that has dropped out. When I am told by a Hidatsa Indian that the maize he plants and the wild geese he shoots are one and the same thing, I am puzzled; but when I learn that both maize and wild geese are attributes of the same mythic character, a logical and possible (though not necessarily the historically correct) bond is supplied. So an educated Hindu might wonder at the emotional suggestions of the cross, but they would at once become intelligible from scriptural history. However, in most instances the search for the missing link seems hopeless; and, what is more important, the very principle of such a search seems subject to doubt. For it assumes that there is a rational bond, while the trend of modern research is certainly to emphasize not logical but "pre-logical" associations and to view the rationalistic as a secondary, super-imposed feature.

Before going farther it will be well to cite some examples of the types of association I have in mind. Among the Crows I have been told that everything in the universe exists in fours. As a matter of fact, the predominance of Four as the mystic number is very striking, not only in this tribe, but throughout an immense region of North America. Processions must make four stops; songs must be sung in sets of four; mythic heroes accomplish miraculous deeds at the fourth trial, and so on. In Oregon, the place of Four is taken by Five, while in the Old World both are overshadowed by Three and Seven. M. Lévy-Bruhl has well expressed the essential fact in all these cases by describing the mystic numbers as categories into which reality is fitted: "Au lieu que le nombre dépende de la pluralité réelle des objets perçus ou imaginés, ce sont au contraire les objets dont la pluralité se définit en recevant sa forme d'un nombre mystique fixé d'avance."¹

But it is not merely numbers that are associated with apparently fanciful ideas. To a Crow a diamond represents a navel cord; a rectangle, quadrilateral, right angle, and certain combinations of figures suggest to the Arapaho the notion of life and prosperity; and among the western Dakotas a form of lozenge symbolizes the whirlwind.

¹ *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, pp. 256 f.

Finally (for our present purpose), there are strange associations with color. In addition to color associations that are self-explanatory, such as the connection between red and blood, white and snow, green and grass, there are others of a puzzling character. In several Plains tribes black symbolizes victory and joy; the Cherokees associate white with the south, red with the east, black with the west, and blue with the north; the Dakotas symbolize both the north and the south by blue, etc.

How are we to account for such associations? The interpretations usually given are manifestly unsatisfactory. It will not do, for example, to say that geometrical designs are derived from realistic representations of objects in nature through a process of degeneration, the name of the original model having been retained for the conventionalized, geometrical form. First of all, this does not account for symbolism of an abstract character. Secondly, it has been found that often the same pattern symbolizes one thing in one tribe and another in a neighboring tribe, or even different things within the same tribe. As for numbers, it has been suggested that the mystic qualities of Four are due to the existence of four cardinal directions and winds, the idea of which is again associated with four sacred animals, colors, and what not. Lévy-Bruhl has given an admirable critique of this and other so-called psychological theories of the same nature. In the primitive mind, he argues, there is no conception of north as a spatial division, with west at the left and east at the right, to which there are subsequently added the ideas of cold winds, snow, the bear, blue, etc. Rather are all these ideas bound up in a single complex collective idea, with the mystic elements masking those which we call real, and within this complex is comprised the element Four. When the mystical "participations" are no longer felt, there are precipitated the associations that everywhere persist in some measure. Now they are associations because the inner bond that integrated them has disappeared; but originally they were of quite a different character.¹ Again, the mystic properties of Seven among the Malays have been derived from the fact that the Malay believe that man has seven eyes, looking in a way that must be absolutely convincing to every unbiased

¹Lévy-Bruhl, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

ethnological thinker, Lévy-Bruhl inverts this supposed explanation. Seven does not play the part of the mystic number because the Malay believes in seven souls, but the Malay believes in seven souls because the pre-existing numerical category predetermines his speculations as to the number of souls.¹

Nevertheless this point of view cannot be a final one. It may be that the Malay conception of Seven has been an established category for untold aeons, and that the complex collective idea of Four is of corresponding antiquity in North America. Nevertheless, somehow and somewhere these complex "collective ideas" must have taken shape in an individual mind; to "explain" them psychologically, i.e., to class them with related phenomena of individual psychology, seems to be indispensable for a proper understanding of the facts.

In his *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development*, Francis Galton has collected data at least generically related, I believe, to those under discussion. He found that imaginative persons almost invariably think of numerals in some form of visual imagery.

If the idea of *six* occurs to them, the word "six" does not sound in their mental ear, but the figure 6 in a written or printed form rises before their mental eye. . . . Those who are able to visualize a numeral with a distinctness comparable to reality, and to behold it as if it were before their eyes, and not in some sort of dreamland, will define the direction in which it seems to lie, and the distance at which it appears to be. If they were looking at a ship on the horizon at the moment that the figure 6 happened to present itself to their minds, they could say whether the image lay to the left or right of the ship, and whether it was above or below the line of the horizon; they could always point to a definite spot in space, and say with more or less precision that that was the direction in which the image of the figure they were thinking of first appeared.

To a person of this type, series of numbers arrange themselves "in a definite pattern that always occupies an identical position in his field of view with respect to the direction in which he is looking." These patterns or "forms" vary individually, but are stated in all cases to date as long back as the memory extends, to come into view independently of the will, and to be nearly constant for a given individual. Moreover, there is the strongest evidence that the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

peculiarity is hereditary "after allowing and over-allowing for all conceivable influences of education and family tradition."

Galton discovered not only an association between series of numbers and definite patterns, but an additional association, in some cases, between series of numbers and colors. And what is perhaps of still greater immediate interest for the present purpose, he found that numbers are often personified and invested with a definite character. Three was described by different informants, respectively, as a treacherous sneak, a good old friend, delightful and amusing, etc. Galton himself "had absurdly enough fancied that *of course* the even numbers would be taken to be of the male sex, and was surprised to find that they were not." The association of color with sounds had been known prior to Galton. Galton notes cases of the association of definite colors with certain letters and with certain days of the week. One of his correspondents not only associated letters with colors, but conversely collected "scraps of various patterns of wall paper, and sent them together with the word that the colour of the several patterns suggested to him." A blue bottle-shaped design on a like background suggested "sweet," yellow leaves on a yellow-red background striated with black vertical lines meant "range."

The psychological phenomena presented by Galton seem to me, I repeat, connected with the cultural phenomena under discussion. The association between a blue bottle design and sweetness does not seem to differ generically from the Dakota's association of a lozenge with the whirlwind. If an English-woman thinks of Tuesday in association with a gray sky color, while Friday suggests a dull yellow smudge, why should not the Indian associate the north with blue and the south with white? And if numbers are endowed with individual personalities by Europeans,¹ what is marvelous in the fact that primitive tribes attach a preferential estimate to one (or, it may be, more than one) particular number? To be sure, the nature of *all* the associations, individual as well as sociological, is obscure, i.e., irreducible to a *logical* basis. But we have at least classified the sociological phenomena with those phenomena of individual psychology that are akin to them. For that very trait

¹ This trait is shared by the present writer.

emphasized by Lévy-Bruhl as characteristic of the sociological ideas, to wit, their initially complex character, is in the highest degree characteristic of the Galtonian phenomena. The letter *A* is not first conceived independently by a Galtonian subject and *afterward* associated with a color. To the subject "*A*-brown" is an ultimate datum, "*une représentation complexe*," which can indeed be analyzed by the psychologist, but the analysis of which cannot, without committing the psychologist's fallacy, be projected into the subject's psychological experience.

To avoid misunderstanding, a word as to the relation of the psychological and sociological elements in a concrete case may be desirable, even at the risk of repetition. When a Crow Indian originating a new ceremony prescribes *four* sacred songs, his psychological condition with reference to Four may be quite different from that of an individual to whom Four appears as the incarnation of everything good and beautiful. He may be individually quite indifferent to the number Four; and even if he were not, his attitude toward it would be inextricably bound up with his attitude of unconsciously bowing to the traditional category. In other words, his psychic state is characterized, in all probability, not by a spontaneous reaction to Four, but by a spontaneous reaction to the tribal lore. Substitute Three for Four as the tribal mystic number, and his psychic reaction would not vary a jot. We may go farther. Owing to the wide distribution of Four as the mystic number, it would be rash to assume that its use as such originated with the Crow Indians. Hence we are probably dealing, not only with the sociological problems of the predetermination of individual reactions by the social group, but also with the psychological problem of a social group borrowing a cultural phenomenon from another group which, for the sake of simplicity, we will assume to be the originator. Now, within this hypothetical group, I repeat, the endowment of Four with certain attributes must somehow have taken shape in an individual mind, and the acceptance of that individual evaluation of Four—its promotion from a psychological to a cultural position—is an example of the influence of the individual on the group. That acceptance becomes the more readily intelligible when we recollect the highly hereditary character of the Galtonian phenomena and

the fact that primitive communities are very largely constituted of blood relatives.

My general conclusion as to the relation of psychology to sociology may therefore be summarized as follows. There can be no doubt that the psychological interpretation of cultural data is fraught with serious difficulties. We have not only to disengage the psychological fact from complicating conditions of a historical order, but we must also reckon with the additional obstacle that the individual psychic phenomenon as it confronts us has already been in some way molded by sociological factors. We may, of course, cynically eschew any and every explanation of the subjective aspect of culture. If we are not content to mortify the spirit to this extent, we have no choice save between popular and scientific psychology. Scientific psychology will not solve all our sociological problems, nor many at the present time, but while not omnipotent neither is it powerless. It will not only act as a corrective in speculative interpretation, but will lend greater rigor to our formulation of fact and open new prospects of inquiry and explanation.

FRIENDSHIP, A SOCIAL CATEGORY

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS
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"As I grow older, the weight of conventions, their property of standing in the way of life, grows greater and more formidable," writes to me a man in Iowa. He adds, "Why haven't you written about the conventionalities of friendship?" Because, I answer him as best I may, because one's colleagues, ethnographer and ethnologist, have for the most part ignored them, and because in one's intimate experience friendship has occurred untrammelled by conventionality—at least it seems so. Neither as scientist nor as a member of society was presented to me a picture of friendship as a social category; in no way was the categorical aspect of friendship brought home to me.

How has it been brought home, I wonder, to the man in Iowa? What has been his experience? Has he been called a false friend because he has been true to himself, meeting change as it comes? Or is it his friend who has failed to honor a draft of friendship? Has he a bad taste in his mouth from having borrowed money from a friend or loaned it? Does he resent having that taste? Have his friendships clashed with the other interests of his life? Has he found that you can't get married and keep your friend; that however much you prate of it, a wife is not always a friend; that when you make money or lose it or go into politics or become the fashion, friendship is tried or tainted; that you have at times to choose between your friends and your family or tribe? These circumstances, one and all, would present difficulties in Iowa or elsewhere to the most conventionally minded. To the social rebel they might be trying indeed, and to him not quite rebel enough or critical enough, highly confusing and bewildering.

As an institutional relationship friendship cannot expect to escape the trouble all the other institutional relationships are facing in this modern world. It is only as an attitude, a state of

responsiveness, that friendship has no "problems," or—shall we say?—its problems are then too personal to be generalized, too variant for exemplarization. They cannot be caught and fixed, for they refer to contacts between personalities and themselves partake of the elusiveness and evanescence of personality.

But as an institution or rather a social category there are "problems" for friendship, problems due to the challenging of its old standards by our new conceptions of personality. What are these standards? what the characters qualifying friendship for a place among the social categories? They are, would you summarize them, the spirit of exclusiveness, the sense of union, the promise of permanence.

"He who has many friends has no friends" is a maxim of Aristotle and in various forms a saying at home in every European language. Friendship "cannot subsist in its perfection, say some of those who are learned in this warm lore of the heart, betwixt more than two." No doubt Emerson had Cicero among others in mind. Cicero's spokesman, Laelius, refers to Scipio as a friend such as he had never had before and never would have again. To the Romans friendship was "an affection confined to two or at any rate to very few." Model friendship, the friendship of Damon and Pythias, of Orestes and Pylades, of Roland and Oliver, has ever been thought of as a pairing. "My best friend," we still say, "my only friend," "my bosom friend."

Friendship has the exclusiveness characteristic of the social category. It is impregnated also with the complementary spirit, the sense of union with those admitted into your group. "A friend—one soul, two bodies," is the oriental definition. In his friend each "loves his own soul," says Emerson; each looks "upon a kind of image of himself," says Cicero. The strength of friendship lies in "a complete union of feeling on all subjects." "To live in friendship," writes another Roman, "is to have the same desires and the same aversions."

And that they may remain the same, Sallust might well have said. They must be stable. Friendship, true friendship, is held to be a stable relationship, imparting the same sense of permanence the other social categories assure us of. What could be more

uncompromising with change than *Qui cesse d'être ami, ne l'a jamais été?* For friendship there is no death, glows Cicero, it is "eternal," *sempiterna*. To that attribute we, too, take oath.

The standard-bearers of friendship are not inarticulate. Less certain of its position in society than the other categories, friendship is even more self-assertive. But because it knows itself an upstart, a newcomer, it is also diffident. It not only asserts its respectability; to get it, it is willing to wear borrowed feathers, the plumage of the other social categories. Friends describe themselves as "thick as *brothers*," as "*kindred* spirits," as "the nearest of relations." Among many peoples the covenant of friendship is a form of adoptive brotherhood. A friend must be of your own blood or pretend to be. He must be too of your own age-class, your contemporary. In some of the Melanesian hamlets of New Guinea, for example, boys born on the same day are made friends for life by an interchange of presents by their fathers. Such fast friends—*eriam* is the New Guinea term—are expected to lend one another fishing-nets, garden produce, wives. They hunt and do irrigation work together. They "entertain" one another; and before going to war or on returning from communal hunts they feast together. They wait for one another at death and help dig the grave.¹ There is no shirking of the obligations toward friends and contemporaries in New Guinea.

By caste, friendship is also buttressed. We have business or professional friends, political friends, friends made friends as among the Koita of New Guinea by a smoke or chew, those we so quaintly call "social friends," meaning that they are so much of our own class that in association with them there is no discomfiture or peril, no call upon us to change our ways, adapting them to theirs. "The most valuable and lasting friendship is that which exists between persons of the same rank"—the wording is Javanese.²

Now and again, however, friendship protests against its ambiguous position. It repudiates its caste-borrowed feathers. "A table friend is changeable," we say. Friendship may rebel too

¹ C. J. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, pp. 69, 70, 472-73 (Cambridge, 1910).

² T. S. Raffles, *The History of Java*, I, 289 (London, 1830).

against its subordination to kinship. "Better a true friend than a relation," says the Turk; "better than a brother," says the South Slav.¹ And was not Jonathan more beloved by David than a brother?

This is explicit rebellion. But even at its meekest moments friendship is well aware that ranged against it are all the social conservatives—the very young, the old, the priesthood,² and, if I may be pardoned so sweeping a generalization, women.³ And these conservatives are against it, friendship knows too, not openly, not directly, but indirectly, in ways hard to counteract, from ancient prepossessions. For friendship, even well-institutionalized friendship, challenges by its mere existence the validity and influence of the categories the conservatives so greatly cherish, the categories of age, of sex, of caste, of place fellowship, or of nationality. Besides, even in its crude institutional beginnings friendship makes an implicit criticism of category as category. It has been the harbinger of those free relations between personalities from which the indubitable and legitimist categories protect society.

¹ F. S. Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, p. 621 (Vienna, 1885).

² Consider, for example, the rules of the Catholic orders against friendly intimacies.

³ In the Koita tribe of New Guinea girls may become *henamo*, friends from infancy, in the same way as boys, "but the relationship is not by any means so serious, and is often allowed to drop when one of the parties marries." A Koita explained to Seligmann that experience had shown that girls were "no good for *henamo*." That women are comparatively poor friends is, I believe, world-wide opinion.

THE MOBILITY OF THE GERMAN WOMAN

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I. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION

In nothing, perhaps, is the change from the old to the new in Germany more manifest and more significant than in the revolution resulting in the present position and outlook of woman.

A century ago Mary Wollstonecraft, speaking to the German across the waters as well as to her English sisters, received little or no sympathy—and still less encouragement—when she ardently pleaded in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* for woman's equality and her woman's right to be a woman. At that time woman was a marketable commodity, and a man reckoned her worth in cold cash, i.e., how much capital she could command and how great was her capacity for work. She had no voice in the assignment of her place in the world's program, for the place of woman and the laws of marriage were predetermined and had been in vogue, according to Tacitus, more than two thousand years.

Herr Riehl, though writing at a later period, voiced the spirit of those days when he maintained that woman was made for man and that if she had clothes and keep according to her lord's status she had all she could possibly wish for. If she were a peasant, she must work in the fields; if she were a member of the middle classes, her place was in the kitchen or nursery. So, as if by divine allotment, woman was relegated to her sphere. To have asserted her "rights" for even a voice in the program or the disposition of her life would have been folly; and to have demanded them would have been sheer madness!

Yet today the German women, after many hard-fought skirmishes, if not veritable battles, are enjoying many equalities—economic, social, and political—with men. But they are pressing on and on, and now are attempting to construct a new morality to

meet the new conditions in which they find themselves. Away with the old, the conventional, which is useless and outworn, they cry. And their slogan, first uttered by Mary Wollstonecraft a century and a quarter ago, "the woman's right to be a woman," is being championed by men and women alike. It affords a glaring contrast to the old German proverb, "Every woman without a ring on her third finger is a witch"; or to the centuries-old motto, which seems to have been, "She has not a woman's right who is not married."

Bewildering though this change of attitudes and sentiments may at first seem, if we seek the underlying causes and follow them to their logical conclusion we shall see that this is not only a natural, but an inevitable, transformation.

I. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN GERMANY AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The beginning of the nineteenth century found Germany extremely backward, exhausted after centuries of warfare. The twenty-four and a half million people were dependent almost entirely on agriculture for their maintenance. The country was broken up into innumerable small provinces. Neither land nor labor was free, for the former was owned, and the latter controlled, by petty princes, who were often despots. There was no free labor, the mass of people being bound, not only to the land, but to certain definite places, at first by law and then by habit. The manor was the pivot and the capitol of each community, for the population was primarily rural.

Gradually with the introduction of machinery and other inventions, with the consequent reforms of individual rights, the change in the system of land holdings and agrarian cultivation modified the life of the people. Villeinage was abolished. Land was free. And so was labor! And as labor became mobile new occupations opened up. More personal freedom was forthcoming, and the hope of individual rights furnished a new incentive for the hitherto

The first *Zollverein* was established in 1834-35 by Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, Baden, Hesse, Nassau, Thuringia,

and Frankfurt. It was a step toward political unity, and it gave a new and more binding lease of life to trade and industry. It made intercourse and travel between neighboring states not only possible but inviting. It developed national consciousness and strengthened the ties of kinship and common life.

Factories sprang up like mushrooms, overnight. Yet, in spite of this industrial awakening, with its multiplicity of inventions, handwork was still a controlling factor. In 1846, though there were as many cotton looms in the factory as in the home, the latter were mostly handlooms; and there were twice as many woolen looms in the home as in the factory. In spinning, the comparison was even more striking, for little wool, and far less linen, yarns, were being spun outside of the home. Of those engaged in textile-weaving trades, over 12 per cent of those employed in wool, and over 80 per cent of those employed in linen, were partly engaged in agriculture.

Towns had increased, but were small and agricultural rather than industrial. Of the whole population in 1850 under 30 per cent lived in towns, whether rural or urban (i.e., with a population of two thousand inhabitants); and only 3.5 per cent of the entire population lived in towns of fifty thousand. Thus Germany was a rural country and her industries were home industries. Her foreign trade was just emerging.

Living in a poor country with very low wages and small incomes, the average German was unable to support his family alone. Consequently the woman was called upon to assume some of the burden, and so she was a contributor to (as she always had been), rather than a dependent upon, the family income. She worked as hard as her husband did in the fields, in addition to performing her household duties, which included spinning, weaving, candle-making, soap-making, sausage-making, bread-making, etc. When the factories came into existence and took over much of the work of the home, the women and girls entered their employ, for machinery operation required little skill or strength and could easily be performed by women and children. However, the wife was not regarded as a co-operator with her husband, but as his employee and body servant. She was his equal only in that she worked as hard

as he did; otherwise she was his serf. But his attitude was most natural, for he had been oppressed, and had been compelled to work hard and faithfully without the slightest consideration and for scarcely a living. So he was prone to regard life with hardness and to make exactions from those weaker than himself, over whom custom and law had given him power and right. He was harsh with his wife and gave her no privileges. He treated his beasts of burden with far more regard.

Still we must not jump at conclusions and convince ourselves that the German woman must have been very unhappy. She was not. Tradition had given her but one vocation—marriage—and to be married was to achieve the height of her ambition in life. By that she measured success or failure. Had she been so unfortunate as to have remained unmarried she would have lived in vain. Marriage, though the very portal to subjection and hard work, was infinitely sweeter than celibacy with its attendant ostracism. She who was not married was indeed to be pitied; she was out of tune with life. Fortunately at this time there needed to be few husbandless women, for the ratio of the sexes in Prussia was:

	1810	1820	1840
Males.....	495	495	499
Females.....	505	505	501

This state of affairs, together with the further fact that the only work open to women was the tending of the hearth, and yoking herself to a hard-working man, made marriage the essence of life.

However, it must not be supposed that everyone believed in the conventional marriage system of the day. Such was not the case. For at the beginning of the century animated discussions involving the problems of love and marriage were frequent as a result of such works as Friedrich Schlegel's *Lucinde*, and Goethe's *Wahlverwandtschaften* ("Elective Affinities"). Goethe realized the ideal of free love, as is evidenced by his associations with Charlotte Schlegel and with Christine Tulpin, with the latter of whom he lived eighteen years in a "free marriage of conscience," and whose son August, the offspring of this association, he adopted long before

the marriage was legitimized. But the masses, scattered and hampered as they were, regarded the thousand-year-old monogamic marriage ties with due respect.

2. THE INDUSTRIAL AWAKENING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The participation of so many men in new occupations with new conditions, new environment, and new contacts bred dissatisfaction with the old, restricted privileges. New educational facilities were necessary to fit men for their new labors. They demanded more and better schools for their boys, and it was here that the foundation of the present efficient school system was laid. The more freedom they secured, the more they demanded. Freedom bred freedom. Soon they realized that the old political institutions were no longer adequate for restraining them and could be easily overthrown. They recognized the feasibility of uniting to secure their aims, though the purpose of this organization was to lend added force to the enhancement of their individual rights. Thus in 1848 they rose as a unit and rebelled against the old methods under which they had barely secured an existence. They demanded that society, and particularly the government, regard them as individuals and not *en masse* as a herd of cattle or beasts. They demanded a voice in the management of that administration under which they labored and lived. They were triumphant!

The women, too, who were entering the industrial field in amazing numbers, began to get restless and impatient with their conditions. They had far fewer privileges than the men had. Stirred by the example of the men, they began to assert themselves. And so it is not strange that

in the turbulent year of 1848 when the whole country was aroused in the general struggle for national liberty, . . . the German woman should awake to a sense of the inferiority of her position and to her lack of opportunity for higher culture and feel impelled to fight for a larger sphere of action.¹

Their first scattered efforts met with no success. For centuries the German had regarded the care of the hearth as the only and ultimate goal of woman.

¹ Mrs. Sidgwick, *Home Life in Germany*.

The German view has been that the individual lives for social good. The claims of the personality must therefore be subordinated to the claims of the community, and this devotion must begin in the smallest community, the family. Man and woman must live not for their own sake but for the family's sake. Hence the individual wishes of the woman must be subordinated to her functions as a member of the family.¹

While it is true that her labor had been transferred from the field and home to the factory, it did not imply, in her case, any additional or changed condition. Now, as formerly, she was not to be considered as an entity, but only as one subservient to the interests and welfare of the family. So the German women crying out against the unjust conditions (for they did the same work as the men at a lower wage, and enjoyed none of the privileges of political right and education which the men had) may as well have been in the wilderness for aught it availed them. Singly, their objections lacked force and weight in the face of traditional opposition and were unrewarded.

New ideas and initiative come from towns where interaction is greatest, and so it is not strange that at this time Miss Sieveking hoped to raise the position of the women of Hamburg through education. She started a school where fourteen to twenty scholars from the most influential families were instructed by her gratuitously. She wanted to implant her own ardent religious convictions and her ideas of woman's duties in the minds of her pupils. With a woman's instinct, her heart went out to the poor and needy and weak. She called upon the first ladies of Hamburg to help her in her welfare work, and they responded nobly by sending their daughters to her for instruction. Many of these young ladies later led movements for spreading "purer and more practical piety." One, a lady of rank, became the overseer of the Hospital for Women in Berlin; another was court-chaplain, and many others carried on the work of reform.

Probably one of the first effectively organized societies was one which Miss Sieveking organized of ladies in Hamburg. Its object was thoroughly to investigate the conditions. The city was divided into districts. Each lady was assigned a district over

¹ Hugo Münsterberg, *Social Studies*, chapter on "The German Woman."

which she went every few days, making note of those needing relief or work, talking with those in sorrow, and carefully inquiring as to those who had no religious instruction. The reports thus made were read at each general meeting and measures there adopted for relief—their great principle being to give people work, not alms.

The work of this society was entirely voluntary, the volunteers for the social work being people of the better classes. Miss Sieveking had owned some property which she used for promoting the objects of the society; many of the members were in the habit of contributing; and wealthy citizens of Hamburg often left a bequest to the society. Its work increased as town life became more and more complex.

With economic changes also came rapid increase in the population of towns. There was also an increase of communication, due to the establishment of post, telegraph, and railway, which were all now safely launched. From 1853 to 1857 almost \$100,000,000 was spent on railways. The Prussian Census of 1867, which is fairly indicative of Germany as a whole, shows the following distribution of laborers:

	Males	Females
Agriculture.....	5,613,000	5,915,000
Manufactures.....	2,965,000	2,473,000
Mines.....	344,000	284,000
Commerce.....	430,000	400,000
Various.....	2,519,000	3,029,000

More than half the working population was now engaged in industry, whereas the Prussian Census of 1843 shows that farming was the main work; the rural population at that time was 11,208,000 and the urban only 4,263,000 (and many of the urban population were engaged in agriculture in part). In 1867 more than 7,096,000 women were employed outside of the home. But the most significant fact of all is that there were now 18,095,000 women to 17,785,000 men. It is this more than anything else which forms the turning-point in the history of the German woman.

3. THE TRANSITION

There was no longer an opportunity for every woman to be married under a monogamic régime when there were almost a million more women than men. That was the situation in which the Germans found themselves in 1865.

The women of the working classes, receiving training which awakened in them only modest demands, could readily satisfy these through almost any kind of labor, and naturally found work readily. But the tradition which confined woman's sphere to the K's—*Kinder, Küche, Kirche*—restrained the better and middle-class women from seeking service in exchange for wages. Yet many of the things formerly done in the home were now performed in the factory. Moreover, these girls were not fitted to do any work requiring either training or skill. So the movement for woman's right to education and work originated first of all in the middle classes, as it did in almost every country. It was a real blessing for the cause that its first leader, Frau Lise Otto, who by the way was one of the unsuccessful women agitators in 1848, was a large-minded woman who had shared in all the available intellectual privileges of her time. With other like-minded women, Auguste Schmidt, Lina Morgenstern, and Henriette Goldschmidt, in 1865, on the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig, she founded the "Allgemeine Deutsche Frauenbund," or the "General Association of Women." It is singular to note that two years previous to this LaSalle had founded in Leipzig the first German workmen's association. The women demanded: (1) an education equal in worth to that of the men; (2) the right to work; (3) free choice of professions. The majority of women heralded the organization as a godsend, but not a few, together with the greater number of men, looked upon it with either cynicism or utter contempt. This attitude toward the association, which was reasonably modest in its claims, of course materially hindered its progress and kindly reception. But in the face of derision it gradually shook off its shackles and advanced.

The Leipziger Association of Women was the first to demand the same education for girls that boys had, particularly in preparation for the university. They did not confine themselves wholly

to propaganda work, but sought a practical solution of the problem by educating the working women. Auguste Schmidt, Henriette Goldschmidt, Maria Loeper-Houselle, Helene Lange, Maria Lischnewska, and Mrs. Kettler were among the leaders of the movement. They established kindergartens, offered courses in liberal professions for adult women, and sought to give courses to meet the educational requirements for principals of high schools and for women in *Gymnasien* and *Realgymnasien*. As early as 1867 Frau Henriette Schmidt petitioned the government to permit women to enter the universities, but time after time the request was refused, though each time with less force. Even the founding of preparatory schools met everywhere with the most violent opposition, which was gradually overcome.

It was in 1865 also, shortly after the organization of the General Association of Women, that Adolph Lette and his wife undertook the initiative in Berlin and founded Lette House, a school for industrial training for girls. Their example spread gradually, and then like wildfire, so that today there are many schools of this nature for girls throughout the larger towns of Germany. The municipalities were more likely to regard industrial training with favor than they were to look kindly upon liberal education for girls.

Just when these organizations were struggling for a foothold during their most difficult years, when new fields of labor were needed for middle-class women, two things occurred which gave added vigor to their movement: the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and the introduction of civil registration as the necessary marriage ceremony in 1875.

The unification of the German states into the German Empire sent industry, commerce, and foreign trade booming more than it had ever done before. Intercourse between sections of the same town or different parts of the country was comparatively easy. The post, telegraph, telephone, and railway were eagerly carrying on the work of transmitting thought. This can perhaps be best emphasized by the statistics given in Table I.

In 1872 the 7,518 post-offices and 4,033 telegraph offices employed 55,514 people. In 1890 the 24,970 post-offices and 17,452 telegraph offices employed 128,687 people. And in 1905

the 39,082 post-offices and 32,312 telegraph offices employed 278,061 people. This gave employment to many of the middle-class women and increased their contacts. It made women think! They had to, for they were in new situations which their traditional attitudes no longer could or would fit. The war had

TABLE I
POST-OFFICE

YEAR	NUMBER OF LETTERS	
	Millions	Per Inhabitant
1871.....	339	85
1877.....	771	160
1888.....	956	200
1904.....	3,669
1911.....	3,855

RAILROADS

1880.....	22,239.1 kilometers
1895.....	41,538.2 "
1905.....	50,578.2 "

TELEGRAPH

YEAR	TELEGRAPH OFFICES	INCOMING TELEGRAMS	
		Millions	Per Inhabitant
1872.....	4,033	9.7	0.24
1890.....	17,452	22.2	.45
1905.....	32,312	42.6	0.71

reduced the percentage of marriageable men in the population. More women consequently were compelled to earn their own living. They had to adjust themselves to their new environment and to the hundreds of new incoming suggestions presented through the new communications and interactions.

It is interesting to find our figures on the increase of the population of Germany during marriageable years. It is interesting to find that the population tends to increase in geometrical progression and that it is a geometrical progression. It is interesting to find that

"Marriage is to be concluded in the presence of two witnesses by the betrothed persons severally declaring their agreement, when asked by the proper officer whether they announce their intention of uniting in marriage with one another, and by his thereupon proclaiming that they are legally married." It made candidates for marriage appear before official boards and prove that they had fortunes which could dower daughters and set up sons for life. Soldiers and government officials were not allowed to contract unions without special authorization. With a larger proportion of women than men, and with these objections to a large percentage of men, it meant enforced celibacy for many women, and what was worse, a huge stride in the direction of increased prostitution. It meant more than anything else that women had to provide for themselves.

So when in Weimar, on March 30, 1880, a call was made for the formation of a society (called the Woman's Reform Movement) to enlarge the circle of vocations possible to women, many responded. They wanted: (1) the creation of institutions of learning in which women could gain the instruction demanded for skilled vocations; (2) the official consent to practice, when necessary, when sufficiently prepared for these professions. From town to town the gospel was spread and one by one similar organizations sprang up throughout the country.

In 1888 Frau Cauer established a magazine called *Frauenwohl* ("Woman's Welfare"). In this manner the younger and more radical women interested themselves in the educational field. The radicals now entered the sociological and political field. The women making radical demands allied themselves with Frau Cauer; they befriended and co-operated with her.

It was Frau Cauer who organized trade unions for women not exclusively of the middle class. In 1889, with Mr. Julius Meyer and Mr. Silberstein, she organized the Commercial and Industrial Benevolent Society for Women Employees. The society now has twenty-four thousand members.

One observer of the times says:

Writing women came up like mushrooms under an autumnal rain; then sprouted a certain number of women doctors, and after them followed a cloud

of teachers and telephone workers. They all claimed the right to study, to practice law, to hold local and government offices; above all—to vote. The single right about which they said nothing was the right to love. Woman became a neuter being, capable of thinking and producing; incapable by the same token of fulfilling her true mission.

. . . Her orderliness, feminine honesty, and devotion—and probably more her modest demands of compensation—made the state as well as private employers favorably disposed to employ women in increasingly greater numbers in the different branches of commerce, in the post-office, railroads, telegraph, telephone, as also in banks, counting-houses, agencies, or stores, and also as secretaries and stenographers.²

In 1889 the women were first employed as telephone operators, and six years later, in 1895, there were 2,400. In this year also the first woman was used as an employee in the civil service; while in 1895 there were 273, in 1901 there were 2,409, and in 1907 the number was increased to 6,432 women. In 1890 the telegraph and post followed this example and at the end of 1901 there were 498, and in 1907 there were 20,638 postal and 7,628 telegraph female workers.

Meanwhile the various women's organizations with their diversified interests were taking immense strides. The General Association of Women which had been first organized in Leipzig had found many sympathizers. When Germany became an empire in 1870 the German General Association moved its headquarters to Berlin, where the propaganda work was carried on in a most thorough and businesslike manner. In 1894, receiving their stimulation and example from the International Congress of Women in Chicago in 1893, the various organizations were brought together and united. They called themselves the "Bund Deutscher Vereine," or the "League of German Women's Association." It was shortly after this that they joined the International Congress of Women and they have been active members ever since.

In 1896 the International Congress of Women met at Berlin and it marked an epoch in the German woman's movement. At this time the press, which had hitherto either made repulsive creatures of these aspirants or else ignored their aims and claims, took up their cause. Together with the so-called radical women under the

² Ellen Key, *The Women Movement*.

leadership of Frau Minna Cauer, Dr. Anita Augsburg, Maria Lischnewska, Lida Gustava Heymann, they presented the cause to the public. Thus they became a factor with which public opinion and legislators had to reckon.

The progress which has been made in this respect during the last five years [1894-95] in Germany has surpassed our boldest expectations. We say today, quietly, and as a matter of course, what a short time ago we scarcely ventured to think. What, however, has most value for us is that the Bund has cultivated not only the understanding of the modern woman's duties and tasks, and aroused in us a social conscience, and promoted amongst us the recognition of solidarity, but it has also taught us to extend our aims continually, and, on the ground of our new duties, to demand new rights for our sex.¹

The work of the Bund has been divided up among seven committees, or: (1) Labor Legislation; (2) Legal Questions; (3) Equal Moral Standards; (4) Temperance; (5) Education; (6) Opening up Industrial Employment for Women; (7) Protection of Children.

The movement is singularly well organized, for there is scarcely a small town which has not been visited by lecturers, who generally succeed in forming local groups, all branches of the larger federation. In 1904 they had 190 associations, and in 1909 about 750. The more energetically the women advanced and fought, however, the more obvious became their division into distinct groups. This is proof that the woman question is not the same for all classes of women, and that it requires a different solution for each.

The Socialist women have joined and are a part of the Social Democratic party. They oppose class differences and in 1895 Lily Braun and Clara Zetkin, both Social Democrat leaders, declared they would never co-operate with the middle-class women. They regard class hatred as their chief means of agitation and are fighting capitalism. They regard the question as purely economic. They believe in free marriage or free love, woman being economically and socially independent, and politically equal with man. The training of children will become a duty of society, which will take charge of infants as soon as they can leave their parents. The sexes will be brought up together.

¹ Marie Stritt.

They are attempting to organize working-women into trade unions and are agitating for the protection of the working-woman. They have organized the Home Workers' Association in Berlin and are editing a magazine for the working-women. In 1907 they had 140,000 working-women and female domestic servants in the trade unions. The Social Democrat program includes: (1) one vote for every man and woman; (2) equality of man and woman before the law. They object to "militarism, the exceptional position of the official classes, prerogatives of privileged classes, and widespread immorality which has undermined and debased the position of woman in Germany."^{*} Nothing can better illustrate this latter point than reference to daily papers. For instance, in a number of the *Lokalanzeiger* the following questionable advertisements appeared:

- 74 marriage ads (some doubtful).
- 40 ads of lady masseuses (all doubtful).
- 9 demands for small loans, usually of \$25.00, by "modest widows" and other single ladies (all doubtful).
- 5 widows' "balls," "gentlemen invited, admission free."
- 30 apartments and rooms "without restrictions" by the day (all doubtful).
- 47 maternity homes, "discretion assured"; no report home (all doubtful).
- 16 babies to be adopted.
- 16 specialties for contagious venereal diseases.

These justify the attitude of the Social Democrat toward the moral situation. That the Social Democrats are steadily gaining is evidenced in Table II. The sevenfold increase shown has been evident in many changes.

TABLE II

	Social Democrats	Total Votes	Percentage of Social Democrats
1881	312,000	5,097,800	6.12
1884	550,000	5,663,000	9.68
1887	763,100	7,540,900	10.11
1890	1,427,300	7,228,500	19.74
1893	1,786,700	7,674,000	23.30
1898	2,107,076	7,752,700	27.18
1903	3,010,771	9,103,586	31.71
1907	3,259,000	11,267,800	28.91

^{*} Charles G. Dawson, *Socialism in Germany*.

The Radicals have the most systematic method of propaganda. They want political equality and demand complete woman suffrage. It cannot be said that the average German woman is as eager to vote as her English or American cousins. This may be due in part to the fact that the individual German is not as thoroughly aroused over political rights as are the men of other countries; consequently neither are the women. They have achieved some success in the matter of political rights, however, for now women are allowed to meet for political discussion, whereas they were formerly forbidden this right. Also in many parts of Germany women owning land are allowed to vote by proxy. They are led by Frau Cauer, Dr. Augsburg, Miss Heymann, and Dr. Schirmacher, and belong to the International Woman Suffrage Association, as well as to the Bund. Frau Minna Cauer publishes the official paper of the club, called *Die Frauenbewegung*.

The Moderates limit their field to the reform of education and to social questions, hoping gradually to educate people and to secure legislation and attitudes that will enhance the welfare of both woman and society. They have been very successful, for there are schools in great numbers now and social reform is on the tongue of the masses. Fraulein Helene Lange is one of the foremost workers in this field and publishes *Die Frau* and *Mutterschutz*.

Then there is a denominational schism. In 1899 the German Evangelical Woman's League, with Paula Muller, of Hamburg, as president, came into existence. Many of the women felt that they could not belong to a movement so free from religious belief, so they formed a church league. In 1908 they became convinced that many of their sympathies were shared by the Bund Deutscher Vereine and so joined the latter in that year.

There is also a Catholic Woman's League, patterned after the German Evangelical League, but it does not belong to the Bund and seems to be nominal merely—at least as having in common the aims of the Bund, i.e., greater freedom and emancipation of women. No doubt the attitude of the Catholic church regarding the place of women accounts for their inactivity.

All these various groups, whether striving for economic, political, or social emancipation, belong to the Bund and are working

strenuously for their cause. Realizing the power of organization, they are united in that they want greater freedom for women; they are divided and separate in that each group seeks the freedom in a different field.

While none of them have realized all their ambitions, still they have certainly made progress. Schools for industrial guidance for girls and women have been established; schools of training for liberal professions have been formed; schools of salesmanship, commerce, business, etc., have been founded. In 1907 there were 1,371 high schools for girls, and they had an attendance of 184,000; there were 5,000 men and 9,500 women teachers. Thus not only has the preparatory school been introduced, but women teachers are instructors in the higher grades, a condition heretofore almost unknown.

Baden was the first to permit women to study for credit at the University of Heidelberg in 1901. In 1906 Prussia followed, and since then all the universities have women students. That the women have already availed themselves of this privilege is seen in the fact that in the summer session of 1910 (which was a normal year) there were 2,552 matriculants—about 5 per cent of the total number of students enrolled.

TABLE III

Occupations	Married	Single	Widowed	Total
Agriculture.....	615,301	1,377,787	486,329	2,479,417
Industry.....	250,666	943,805	221,634	1,416,105
Commerce.....	129,176	298,391	126,466	544,033
Credit (banks).....	28,595	106,768	83,004	218,367
Domestics.....	11,214	1,079,609	339,308	1,130,131
Various.....	22,643	134,351	18,190	175,184
	1,057,595	3,940,711	974,931	5,973,237

That women have distributed themselves in many fields of labor is noted in the 1907 Census, as shown by Table III. The Industrial Census of 1905 shows the distribution of woman laborers given in Table IV. That there has been an increasing proportion of females engaged in occupations is shown in the

TABLE IV

Occupations	Male	Female	Total
Mining and quarrying.....	13,220	260	13,480
Agriculture, gardening, etc.....	431,600	331,910	763,510
Silviculture, hunting, fishing.....	19,220	320	19,540
Food products.....	42,020	22,680	64,700
Clothing, etc.....	38,070	72,100	110,710
Textiles.....	60,330	120,690	180,020
Commercial.....	69,860	46,290	116,150
Hotels, restaurants, etc.....	32,220	69,530	101,750
Transport.....	75,950	10,850	86,800
Public administration, etc.....	21,090	12,290	33,380
Building, furnishing, etc.....	191,780	5,640	197,420
Metals, bookbinding, etc.....	13,940	4,750	18,690
Others.....	20,890	3,320	24,210

following comparison on a percentage basis. (This is exclusive of those in domestic service and living in the household of their employers. These percentages were 5.6 per cent, 5.0 per cent, and 4.0 per cent, and are included in percentages of dependents.)

	1882	1895	1907
	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent
Occupied.....	18.5	20.0	26.4
Dependent....	78.5	75.8	67.9
Independent..	3.0	4.2	5.6

That the demands for a higher salary and wage among the women doing the same work as men has not been granted is deplorable. It is a sad fact that women are receiving from 50 per cent to 60 per cent lower wages than men in the same industry, as Table V, which gives the weekly wage, shows.

Women teachers are now not only allowed to pursue the same courses as men, but they can also take the same examinations for the same positions. However, as is the case with women in all professions and vocations, they do not receive the same wage as men. Table VI shows this.

The women teachers are attempting to remedy this lower wage question. They are very well organized, there being 38,000 in the Society for the Welfare of Women Teachers, and 23,000 in the General Women Teachers' Society. In spite of their efforts

to solve the wage question the government remains obdurate, though they have been allowed equality in preparatory work, in university work, and in securing positions for which they have fitted themselves.

TABLE V

OCCUPATIONS	FEMALE		MALE
	Piece-Work	Time-Work	
Joiner.....	\$2.68	\$2.27	\$6.21
Music instrument makers.....	3.22	2.29	6.55
Chair makers.....	3.13	2.14	4.68
Clock case makers.....	2.29	2.29	4.85
Sewing machine makers.....	2.83	2.08	5.80
Photographic apparatus makers.....	2.45	6.45
Parquetry makers.....	2.14	2.01	6.84
Harmonic makers.....	3.57	2.17	4.52
Woodenware factories.....	2.26	1.95	4.96
Wagon and carriage factories.....	3.43	6.50
Sawmills, etc.....	2.12	1.83	4.61
Turners.....	2.71	2.02	5.25
Cane makers.....	2.59	2.30	6.12
Brush makers.....	2.23	2.24	4.42
Basket makers.....	2.60	2.43	4.78
Cork cutters.....	2.63	2.34	4.30
Gilders.....	3.23	2.74	6.00
Wooden shoe makers.....	2.22	1.92	4.14
Box makers.....	2.47	2.71	5.28

The first woman doctor who hung out her shingle was requested by her hotel-keeper to leave because he considered her profession "improper" for a woman, and detrimental to his business. Today

TABLE VI

Occupations	1909		1910	
	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum
Assistant teacher, female.....	M. 1,000	M. 1,200	M. 1,400
Assistant teacher, male.....	M. 1,400
Teacher, female.....	M. 1,400	M. 2,600	M. 1,600	M. 3,000
Teacher, male.....	M. 2,000	M. 4,400	M. 2,400	M. 4,600

There are more than seventy doctors practicing, and many are in the employ of the government and municipalities, in hospitals, schools, etc. Their practice is by far larger than they can care for.

An increase is also manifest in the free vocations, as shown below:

Occupations	1890	1900
<i>Geistliche</i>	1,143	3,405
Journalism.....	888	2,193
Architecture.....	327	1,937
Lawyers.....	1,010	1,208

Hundreds of girls and women of the better classes have become saleswomen, buyers, kindergartners, librarians, school-teachers, milliners, dressmakers, chemists, social workers, doctors, lawyers, relief workers, matrons, factory inspectors, police assistants, dwelling inspectors, nuns, deaconesses, nursing sisters, gymnastic teachers, dentists, apothecaries, telegraphers, telephone operators, and so forth. They have fitted themselves for these positions through the efforts of the Bund. There are schools offering courses in salesmanship, commerce, social service, hygiene, domestic science, sewing, medicine, pedagogy, law, and almost every conceivable subject. And they have progressed in the face of colossal prejudice and opposition, not by violent means, but by making themselves efficient workers, and by means of that superb organization so characteristic of German methods and life.

In unison the German women echoed the battle cry of Olive Schreiner, so well illustrated in *Woman and Labor*:

Give us labor, give us labor, and the training which fits for labor,
We demand this, not for ourselves alone, but for the race!

II. THE NEW MORALITY MOVEMENT

I. MUTTERSCHUTZ: ITS AIMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Germany of today is not the Germany of even twenty years ago. The immense industrial development of the whole country touched every problem of German life. Having realized to a fair degree economic independence, many of these earlier educators took up a new angle of the question and turned their attention to the problem of the woman as a woman. A new movement might be said to have arisen, a sociological one, save

that its roots are firmly imbedded in the previous struggle for economic independence, and that we find the same leaders in the earlier movement have been led into fresh and adjoining fields. Havelock Ellis in his article on "Awakening of Women in Germany" probably best describes and explains this new departure when he says, in part:

If we attempt to define in a single sentence the specific object of this agitation, we may best describe it as based on the demands of woman the mother, and as directed to the end of securing for her the right to control and regulate the personal and social relations which spring from her nature as mother or possible mother. Therein we see at once both the intimately emotional and practical nature of this new claim and its decisive likeness to the earlier woman movement. That was definitely a demand for emancipation; political enfranchisement was its goal; its perpetual assertion was that woman must be allowed to do everything that men do. But the new Teutonic woman's movement, so far from making as its ideal the imitation of men, bases itself on that which most essentially marks the woman as unlike the man.

The basis of the movement is really *Mutterschutz*—the protection of the mother—borne by a journal for the reform of sexual morals edited by Dr. Helene Stöcker of Berlin. All questions that radiate outwards from the maternal function are here discussed; the ethics of love, prostitution, ancient and modern; the position of the illegitimate mother and illegitimate children; sexual hygiene; sexual instruction of the young; etc. It must not be supposed that these matters are dealt with from the standpoint of a vigilance society for combating vice. The demand throughout is for the regulation of life; for reform, but for reform quite as much in the direction of expansion as of restraint. . . .

Mutterschutz is the organ of the association for the protection of mothers, more especially unmarried mothers, called the "Bund für Mutterschutz." Its aim is to rehabilitate the unmarried mother, to secure for her the conditions of economic independence, and ultimately to effect a change in the legal status of illegitimate mothers and children alike. The Bund is directed by a committee in which social, medical, and legal interests are alike represented, and already possesses branches in Munich and Hamburg, in addition to its quarters in Berlin.

Since the seventies (and not infrequently before that time) many writers, forerunners of their times, have written on the need of marriage and sexual reform, and on prostitution and illegitimacy. But probably the first step toward practical social reform was in 1903, when twenty-six bureaus of free legal consultation, directed and managed by women, especially in Berlin, Bonn, Bremen, Breslau,

Dantzig, Dessau, Dresden, Frankfurt-am-Main, Freiberg, Gorlitz, Halle, Hamburg, Hanover, Heidelberg, Kiel, Königsberg, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Mainz, Mannheim, Munich, Stuttgart, and Weisbaden, were established. These cities have a minimum of fifty thousand inhabitants. It was due to a conference called by Frau Emilie Kempin, Doctor of Laws, that the first bureau was established in Dresden in 1894 under the presidency of Frau Marie Stritt. The leaders of the General Association of Women at Leipzig recognized how completely ignorant the masses were of judicial affairs, and how prejudicial this was to their cause. The association appealed to Frau Kempin, at that time the only woman Doctor of Laws in Germany. She was asked to conduct a series of conferences on the legal condition of women and to publish a popular manual upon the same subject. These conferences resulted in the establishment of bureaus for free consultation for women. Offices were rented, publicity obtained through the press, advertisements were placed in stations, tramways, hospitals, and bureaus of public societies, all inviting women who needed legal aid to come to these bureaus. Women advisers generally question clients intelligently and advise clearly. In 1901 there were 5,046 cases examined by them. And the majority were settled outside of court! It was evident that married women used these bureaus more than the unmarried or widowed—and the greatest number of clients were found among the working-women, domestics, and servants. These twenty-six bureaus have been federated, and the central branch or headquarters is in Berlin. Frau Marie Raschke, Doctor of Laws, directs the central branch and answers the various questions which arise in the branches. She also collects statistics and publishes the *Popular Legal Review*, which is sent to the clients.

This league has sought to protect the legal interests of women. Men and women became interested in its work, and in trying to solve its problems they came face to face with the deteriorating effect on society and on women that the present system of marriage is producing. The number of women of loose morals in Berlin alone has been estimated at 150,000. Prostitution is protected, and actually encouraged by legislation, for places of ill fame are registered, licensed, and controlled by the government.

Illegitimate births number 180,000, over one-tenth of the total number of births. It is just such an instance as the following that added more converts to this new movement for sexual reform:

A poor hunchback girl was drugged and seduced by a policeman. She was a pretty little thing, but alone in the world—an orphan—and worked in a laundry. When she knew that she would become a mother, she begged the policeman to marry her, but he brutally answered, "What! Marry a hunchback?" The girl was driven from the laundry because of her condition. The child was born and she was destitute. In the midst of her dire distress she was brought up before the bench of magistrates and charged with neglecting her illegitimate child. No one troubled about the cause of neglect, no one asked for the name of the father of the child, who was solely responsible for its birth, no one believed her, and she was sent to six weeks' imprisonment. Afterwards it was found out that the very policeman who had brought about the poor girl's ruin was the instigator of her being tried and condemned for the neglect of her child. This he did because she followed him about, and worried him to take his share of the responsibility. No redress could be done—a policeman is an official and his word was taken before a penniless, hunchbacked, unmarried mother.¹

Thus the latest phase in the woman movement is in the direction of motherhood protection. At the head of this movement stand men and women of all scientific and political opinions; well-known lawyers, such as Professor von Liszt; well-known authorities on sex science, such as Dr. Forel, Dr. Havelock Ellis, Dr. Albert Moll, and Dr. Iwan Bloch; the Socialist, Lily Braun, and Maria Lischnewska. In 1905 they organized the Bund für Mutterschutz ("Motherhood Protective Association"), with the aim of protecting mothers, be they married or unmarried. Children are allowed to go to ruin at present simply because a rigorous moral view bans unmarried mothers. The mortality of illegitimate children during the first year of life is 28.5 per cent, as compared with 16.7 for mortality of all children born. To meet these conditions the Bund was formed and has a threefold aim: (1) to protect unmarried mothers and their children from economic and moral dangers; (2) to counteract the dominant condemnation of such mothers; (3) to bring about reform of the existing views on sexual morality. The Bund began to form local groups, first in Munich, March 20,

¹ *Concorda Fairweather, An Englishwoman in Germany.*

1905, then in Berlin, 1905, in Hamburg a little later; and now most of the large towns have chapters.

Crèches, foundling homes, and other homes were established. They were influential in securing legislation for women in factories so that the latter receive maternity benefit for six weeks during childbirth (two weeks before and four weeks after childbirth), but they are still agitating for a general insurance of motherhood. The cost of this should be defrayed by contributions from both sexes, as well as supplemented by public money. Not only should every woman be provided with medical assistance and skilled care during childbirth, but she should receive full wages during twelve weeks, free medical attendance, and an allowance for six months after childbirth. The cost of this unique plan has been estimated at about seventy million dollars, but the state would be asked to pay only between five and ten million dollars, the rest to be paid out of premiums which would amount to about 2 per cent per annum on the wages of the workers concerned.

The Bund is doing splendid work in organizing homes for expectant mothers. It publishes a monthly magazine. Dr. Helene Stöcker, who was its first president and who was professor at the Lessing Hochschule, Berlin, is the editor. She is a woman of unusual initiative and education; and having chosen the social field for her work, is giving her attention to the protection of motherhood. It was due to her efforts that the motto "We are not here to judge" was placed over the entrance to the headquarters in Berlin.

The practical side of the Motherhood Protective Association is indeed uplifting. Its members are softening the economic hardships of mothers, and they are making public opinion more lenient toward unmarried mothers. But what they hope to achieve is equally wonderful. They are convinced that the present system of marriage has outlived its time; that the present morality, though conventional and based upon thousands of years of tradition, is ill-fitted to the present-day conditions. So they seek to construct a new morality to meet these social problems, while they are administering relief to the sufferers under the present code.

2. ELLEN KEY: HER PHILOSOPHY AND IDEALS

One of the leading exponents of the new morality movement is Ellen Key, a Swedish woman by birth, but who receives a more royal welcome in Germany than anywhere else. In fact her books, *Liebe und Ehe* ("Love and Marriage"), and *Liebe und Ethik* ("Love and Ethics") have been the basis upon which the Germans attempted to construct their new sexual morality. It is the ideal for which many of them are striving. It is now their ultimate goal!

She considers the present legal marriage system as not only debasing, but positively immoral, because, (1) it fosters prostitution; (2) it demands from the woman sexual continence and intactness until the time of marriage, but not from the man; (3) it makes woman economically dependent on man, and crushes her individuality; (4) it makes binding unhappy unions; (5) it permits parentage without love; (6) it permits irresponsible parentage; (7) it encourages parentage on the part of immature or degenerate human beings; (8) it sanctions voluntary infertility on the part of the married pair who are competent to reproduce their kind; (9) it drives unmarried mothers to death, prostitution, or infanticide; (10) it places the responsibility for illegitimacy upon the mother alone; (11) it no longer does what it pretends to do.

That marriage is no longer adequate is apparent in the fact that fewer people marry; that people are older when they do marry; that divorce has increased; that prostitution is alarming; and that illegitimacy is greater than it has ever been in Germany. In Berlin alone there is 17 per cent of illegitimacy; and in the same city more than 40 per cent of all legitimate first-born are conceived before marriage. In the rural provinces (where the proportion of illegitimate children is lower) the percentage of marriages following antenuptial conceptions is much higher than in Berlin. But we must take into account the fact that previous to the civil registration law in 1875, before referred to, the betrothal carried with it the privileges of marriage and the marriage was only a final sanction. Although the new law viewed only marriage itself as binding and the betrothal as a mere pledge, still the custom of centuries was not to be lightly cast aside for this new fangled law. At all odds illegitimacy is a serious problem.

Among the lower classes who "follow the dictates of their own hearts," the dangerous utilization of prostitution is far more limited than among the higher classes, with which Blaschko's statistical data regarding the far greater diffusion of venereal diseases among the higher classes of society are in substantial agreement. . . .

Conventional marriage despises and brands with infamy every sexual relationship of two adult independent persons based upon free love, and sanctions quite openly casual transitory extra-conjugal sexual intercourse, devoid of all personal relationships, not only with prostitutes, but also with respectable women. The same coercive marriage morality demands sexual continence and intactness until the time of marriage.¹

Ellen Key maintains that the ideal form of marriage is the perfectly free union between man and woman. But this ideal can in the meanwhile only be attained through transitory forms. The real character of love can be proved only by the lovers actually living together for a considerable time; and so only thus is it possible to demonstrate that their union will have an elevating influence on themselves and their generation. They must prove for themselves that they are morally justified in living together.

Although this new form of marriage is to give complete freedom to a couple, there must be no bigamy, sexual relationship, etc. Ellen Key would require these conditions for marriage: (1) both people of full age; (2) neither one should be more than twenty-five years older than the other; (3) they should not be closely related or connected with each other; (4) neither one should simultaneously enter upon another marriage; (5) the proposed marriage should be forbidden when either one suffers from disease that is transmissible to children. Above all, she insists upon self-control and sexual continence for both until at least twenty years old.

She would have the marriage without any special ceremony. The contracting parties appear before the marriage assessors of the commune and four witnesses. They sign their names on the register. The husband and wife retain all their personal rights that they enjoyed before marriage, particularly over their own persons, names, property, work, wages, etc. There is need of laws to some

¹ Iwan Bloch, *The Sexual Life of Our Time*.

extent limiting individual freedom; but these laws must admit of an advance toward perfection in respect of the freer gratification of individual needs.

She believes in monogamy and argues in behalf of her theory that "the civilized development of personal love removes all danger of the growth of polygamy. Free love is not the abolition of marriage nor the equivalent of extra-conjugal sexual intercourse."

She believes that under these conditions not only individual happiness will be enhanced but also the welfare of the race. Parents will be bringing into the world children of love—and they will be physically and psychically healthier than the present generation! The atmosphere of the home will be more wholesome, more attractive, and more conducive to higher ideals.

Every woman who anticipates or would enjoy motherhood must perform a year of "feminine military service," i.e., she must take a year's course of instruction in the care of children, in the general care of health, and in sick nursing, as well as the performance of duties such as are performed in the home. The state should support the mother during the first year after the birth of the child, and should see that the child is supported by both parents and that it inherits from both. Though the child is one of love, it belongs to society, and the latter must see that its claims and rights are observed.

There should be a more liberal law of divorce. She would establish a Council of Divorce composed of four men or women. They ought to try to reconcile the estranged couple. But if their efforts are unsuccessful, they should send the matter to the marriage assessor of the commune, after six months. If there are no children and the husband and wife have lived apart for one year since they started suit, the divorce may be granted. But when there are children the situation is more delicate and needs special attention. A "special jury for the care of children" is required. If either parent is irresponsible, a guardian should be appointed—a man to represent the father, a woman to represent the mother—who, with the other parent, will look after the education of the children. If both parents are united, the education of the children is left in the care of two guardians. On the other hand, if both are capable,

the children remain with the mother until fifteen years of age, after which they have the right to choose the parent with whom they wish to live.

But in this new philosophy the woman with the mother instinct who does not, for various reasons, wish to be united in marriage and yet who craves the exercise of her natural right is not to be denied that privilege. The exercise of the right of motherhood is not inherent in marriage, for many married women do not want children, and yet society approves their action. Then why should this right be considered the inalienable right of only the married woman? It should not be so decreed. Every woman, by virtue of the fact that she is a woman, has the right of motherhood.

However, the right of motherhood should not be indiscriminately nor unreservedly encouraged. No woman has a right to become a mother without love, be she married or unmarried. And further, an unmarried woman who desires motherhood must fully weigh all its possible consequences, not only to herself, but to her child. In the words of Ellen Key, she must be a woman of unusual endowment and "not only be pure as snow, pure as fire, but also must be possessed of the full conviction that with the child of her love she will produce a radiance in her own life and will endow humanity with new wealth." In short, the woman who desires motherhood must not do so from purely selfish motives, but must make society all the happier for the exercise of this right. Whenever her welfare and that of society clash, society should be considered first. To her child she owes even a greater responsibility. She must be able to provide for it; to love it; to educate it; to present life in fullest measure to it. She must make up to it for the loss of its father's influence.

"Thus for the majority the ideal must always remain that of the ancient proverb, that man is only half a human being, woman only half; and only the father and the mother with their child become a whole one."¹

CONCLUSION: THE OUTLOOK

The nineteenth century was dumbfounded when its women demanded equality—when they merely asked for the privilege of

¹ Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*.

being considered as human beings, as co-workers in solving the economic problems of the day. Yet in the face of prejudice they created new conditions and by sheer steadfastness and singleness of purpose were triumphant. The twentieth century entering upon its life's cycle is confronted with an even more complicated problem. It has broken with tradition and is attempting to create a new morality to meet the present social conditions. It is pleading, not for the right to be like man, but to be unlike man. It is making one of the most startling individualistic pleas ever uttered. Little wonder, then, that this newer movement should have at first startled the more conservative people, and particularly the government. But its message is spreading, and public opinion is reviewing its demands more calmly and carefully because the practical results of the Motherhood Protective Association have so won their admiration that they are lending a willing ear to its ideals.

Already many measures to meet these ideals have been taken. In many of the larger towns of the Rhineland province, house-keeping schools with compulsory education have been established. For those who have passed the secondary schools Halle has a "Woman's School" to train girls for their duties as women and mothers. The curriculum includes languages, civic science, hygiene, political economy, domestic science, pedagogics, history of art and culture, natural science, history, geography, and "social ethics."

The system of municipal guardianship until the child becomes fourteen years of age (*Vormundschaft*), under which illegitimate children become at birth the legal wards of officers appointed by local authorities, is an effective measure against infant mortality.

One of the most important duties of public guardians is "to see not only that the mother and children are cared for but to see that the father discharges his legal liability. So energetically do the municipal guardians protect the interests of unmarried mothers that an 'Association of Fathers of Illegitimate Children' has been formed for mutual counsel and defense."

The Charlotenburg, a woman married or unmarried, who is undergoing the physical and mental strain incidental to childbirth need lack friends, food, or shelter. Both this town and Frankfurt

ANNOUNCEMENT

The next regular meeting of the American Sociological Society will be held December 28 to 31, 1915, not in Lexington, Kentucky, as was announced in the May issue of this *Journal*, but in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress under the auspices of the Pan-American Union. Several other learned bodies will participate in this meeting, which promises to be one of the most interesting and important gatherings in the history of the Society. The program of the American Sociological Society will concern itself with "War and Militarism in Their Sociological Aspects." This will doubtless enable the Society to make some valuable contributions to the understanding of our international relations with both Europe and the Pan-American states. Members of the American Sociological Society will receive copies of the program as soon as issued.

REVIEWS

Societal Evolution. By ALBERT GALLOWAY KELLER. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. xi+338. \$1.50.

The belief that social science needs an evolutionary orientation similar to that given by Darwin to the natural sciences has led Professor Keller to write this book (p. 326). The terminology of the Darwinian theory of evolution has been retained and the chapters have been grouped under the headings "Variation," "Selection," "Transmission," and "Adaptation." A distinction is early made in the book between biological and social evolution. The former deals with change in the individual type and is limited largely by its heredity, while the method of social evolution applies to society as a whole and not to the individual as such. It, too, is rather rigidly controlled, in this case by the folkways and mores. Social variation is therefore within the folkways, and social selection is a process of selecting the best (or of eliminating the worst) folkways and mores as determined by the survival process. Rational (in the sense of foreseen) selection enters here only in the upper stages of civilization and as to quantity is always minor, but its quality is of the greatest significance for social progress. There is a conflict between biological and social selection which is evidenced by what Professor Keller calls counter-selection. This last, though biologically abnormal and potentially destructive of the type, is usually socially normal because it creates a social (and therefore an intelligent [?]) plane of selection and adaptation to take the place of the biological tests (p. 192). Social transmission is through the folkways (tradition), and social adaptation is the response of the folkways to the pressures of the physical and social environments. Professor Keller's theory that adaptations of the folkways and mores first occur in the maintenance (economic) mores, and later by induced adaptation of the non-economic mores, such as law and religion, constitutes an interesting, and, the reviewer believes, illuminating—though not altogether new—restatement of the theory of economic determinism.

The foregoing is an altogether too brief and inadequate analysis of the main contentions of one of the more interesting and stimulating recent contributions to objective social psychology. Its chief claim to

originality does not consist in the facts it presents, but rather in their alignment with a classification which, though simple and perhaps not particularly valuable in itself, permits of clear and forcible statement. That the author has accomplished his main intent of describing social evolution in a way analogous to (Professor Keller repudiates the idea of reasoning by analogy) the description of organic evolution by Darwin may in general be admitted, even if its major significance must be denied. If he had hoped to convince us that there is social evolution in this general sense his work is rather superfluous because of its lateness. A more fruitful task would have been to work out the concrete methods of social change, not in the general terminology of Darwin, but in a way comparable to the contributions of Weismann, DeVries, and Mendel to the methods of inheritance. While his contributions in the latter field are valuable, they do not appear to be either so fundamentally different in kind or so much more numerous (if as numerous) than those made by other social psychologists as to warrant him in the hope that he has set a new mode in social science.

It may be said by way of minor comment that more is made of the theory of recapitulation of race experience in individual development (p. 222) than many sociologists would agree to. In his lucid distinction between biological transmission through the germ-plasm and social transmission through the nervous system by way of the various senses (p. 212), he fails to mention a vast amount of technique of communication and objective symbolization which act as the correlatives of the senses in this social transmission function and which are more truly objectively social in their functioning than are the senses themselves. Many also would not agree with his restriction of religion to "unreasonable fear of the unknown" (p. 200), but his insistence upon the need for, and the difficulty of, finding a more rational and therefore progressive substitute for this type of control perhaps deserves more attention than it is likely to receive. Following Lippert, he also makes a valuable point (p. 228) regarding our increasingly abstract education, saying, "What makes the education of the modern child so hard is the distance and indirectness of attainment of recognizable satisfactions, and so the difficulty of correctly valuing the process; and likewise the absence of sanctions of an awe-inspiring order." In the reviewer's opinion his best contribution is in his concrete descriptions of social adaptation to typical anthropogeographic and economic environment. In themselves general contributions to the method of social change.

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The Middle West Side. By OTHO G. CARTWRIGHT. Pp. 67.

Mothers Who Must Earn. By KATHERINE ANTHONY. Pp. 223.

In one volume, published by the Russell Sage Foundation.

New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1914.

The first of these studies presents an interesting account of the transformation of four hundred acres of farm land into eighty dismal city blocks now forming part of New York's West side. It is the familiar story of unexpected increases of land values, absentee landlordism, makeshift housing, and "helpless and uncritical tenants." The author finds that the land increased in value during the nineteenth century about a thousand fold, which is equivalent to nearly 100,000 per cent. "It is estimated, for instance, that the farm purchased by the Astors in 1803 for \$25,000 would now sell for \$25,000,000. But the Astor Estate does not sell any more land. It gives leaseholds for twenty-one years with the privilege of two renewals, at the end of which time the land must be surrendered to the owners. Tenement builders on such leases must therefore make their houses pay not only the original investment in full, so that the houses may be pulled down at the end of sixty-three years without loss, but must derive an income therefrom in addition to the return of the capital. Moreover, at each renewal of the lease it is the custom to increase the ground rent, so that the tendency of rentals for tenement flats built upon this land is almost inevitably upward" (pp. 20-21).

Miss Anthony's intimate study of the lives of *Mothers Who Must Earn* is recommended to all persons of either sex, who have leisure enough either to worry or to complain, and particularly to all women who are contemplating nervous prostration in any of its forms. The record of the lives of these working women, often heroic and always strenuous, is wholesome reading. But quite apart from its tonic value, it throws much light upon certain aspects of the great and growing problem of women at work. The last census shows that the percentage of women employed at gainful occupations increased during the years 1900 to 1910 for every age group, and in every state of the Union with two unimportant exceptions. Thus out of every one hundred girls sixteen to twenty years old, forty were at work in 1910, while only thirty-two out of a hundred were at work in 1900. Similarly, out of every one hundred women twenty-one to forty-four years old, twenty-six were engaged in gainful work in 1910 as against twenty-one in 1900.

This study comprises 370 cases. "They were the wives and widows of underemployed and underpaid men and were compelled to contribute to the family whatever earning value their labor possessed." Racially, they were, to a considerable extent, English-speaking women of German or Irish antecedents. The principal occupations followed were: housework by the day, 90; manufacturing and mechanical pursuits (including 33 laundry workers), 86; public cleaning (hotels, office buildings, etc.), 82; janitor work, 49. Occupations requiring a neat and attractive appearance, or a considerable degree of skill or adaptability, were pursued by only a few of these women, who, for the most part, had only strength or industry to offer in the labor market. The average earnings of the whole group were between five and six dollars a week. Some of the laundry workers received but \$4.50 for a sixty-hour week!

From \$8.00 to \$10.00 a week may be regarded as a fair minimum wage for single women with no one dependent upon them, but 55 widows in this group supported families averaging 3.2 persons, on an average weekly income of \$7.60 or \$353 a year. No wonder that "Even in the coldest weather a fire is made in the kitchen stove only mornings and evenings."

In a concluding note the author records her conviction that not one of these 370 mothers, 163 of whom had husbands at work, "could afford not to earn. . . . Their children would have suffered seriously had they failed or refused to earn." Thus on the Middle West Side, as in many and many another corner of the land, the comfortable American theory that a family looks for support to the husband and father has proved ominously at variance with the facts.

ERVILLE BARTLETT WOODS

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Out of Work: A Study of Unemployment. By FRANCES KELLOR.
Putnam, 1915. Pp. xii+569. \$1.50.

The relative emphasis which Miss Kellor gives to the various aspects of unemployment is an accurate and discouraging index of our American knowledge of the subject. However, considering that this is the first important study of the kind published in this country, the emphasis no doubt has a certain practical justification. There is no question as to the need of labor exchanges, but to treat of this need through over five-thirds of the volume seems an undue stress. Of course it is to be remembered that in the United States these exchanges are still new and few; admittedly the first attention must be to them. That more is not made

of the other proposals of her "program" is in no small part due to the poverty of our thought and experiment in relation to this problem. We seem destined to stumble in a mist of long anecdotes and much personal woe in all our maladjustments before there is sufficient intelligent interest to allow an author to be scholarly, drastic, and far-reaching.

The first two chapters indicate for all popular purposes the fact that unemployment exists and has existed in this country for twenty-five years. The meagerness of treatment is here again partially to be excused on the ground that information is not available; although by no means all our statistical sources are drawn upon. Witness the omission of any mention of the data of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics!

The discussion of "Children and the Labor Market," while it presents no new material, is a telling argument for the rapid extension of industrial education. The insistence, however, is rightly upon a rounded and balanced training from the primary grades—not upon an extraneous and superimposed trade or business education. "A system of public industrial training, instituted not merely as an adjunct to secondary education, but as an integral part of elementary education, as well, is the crying need. . . ." The further demand is made that the placement of children in industry be assumed by the city or state as a natural outgrowth of its training function.

In treating of "Immigration and Unemployment" the author shows a refreshing fairness. It has been easy to attribute to immigration the first cause of many woes. The fact is irrefutably set forth that the unemployment problem is far too deep and universal for us to find in any immigration policy a possible solution—this, however, not to the exclusion of the fact that much ingenuity must be rallied toward immigrant protection, distribution, and education if we are to disavow restriction.

The most effective portion of the book deals with the waste, criminality, and anarchy which attends the marketing of labor, that is, the securing of jobs. Labor camps, intelligence offices, philanthropic bureaus, and public employment offices all come in for searching criticism. The constructive proposals made are sound, and, let us hope, inevitable. Much more argument could be called to their support—and will have to be if we are to see a truly effective system of labor exchanges realized. But the array of sordid, vicious practices attendant upon getting work will stand as a goodly thorn in a rather pachydermic public flesh.

"Unemployment Insurance" receives a most cursory treatment, especially in the light of England's achievement. The timid indorse-

ment given it indicates either roseate faith in other measures or distrust of our administrative capacities not wholly justified by experience. A decreasing group in the community will be satisfied to tide over each distress period with frantic relief work. Some unemployment will exist for years and decades. A statesmanlike, self-respecting method of compensation for those deprived of work is the immediate need.

In unemployment insurance there exists that method, and it must be undertaken in the United States with the same high courage that actuated Great Britain, which country wrote it into their law in less than four years. In the experience of England we have not only the spirit but to a large extent the model for our enterprise.

The preventive program which is briefly suggested in the last chapter is sound but proportionately much too summary. In the light of the preventive program issued by the American Association on Unemployment, the context of Miss Kellor's chapter seems hasty and unthorough. Clearly her main interest and knowledge are in the chaos of the labor market and the questionable practices of employment offices.

We still await a book which shall give adequate discussion to causes, facts, European experience, long-time remedies. Meanwhile, Miss Kellor's work stands as a spirited challenge to our inertia and befuddlement. If the winter of 1914-15 marks the inception of a finer zeal in the treatment of unemployment, it is well that this volume is written, for it is eminently readable. But may the ultimate outcome be a profound study of this which is the essence of our industrial problem.

ORDWAY TEAD

Secretary Massachusetts Committee on Unemployment

Fundamental Sources of Efficiency. By FLETCHER DURELL, PH.D.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1914. Pp. 368. \$2.50.

This is not an inspirational book written in the spirit of James's *Energies of Men*, but a very detailed analysis of the factors entering into "the general efficient organization of the universe." Another definition in the author's own words, not quite so sweeping in its scope possibly, is the statement that the subject of study is "the science, art, and philosophy of obtaining results."

The expression "the psychology" of this or that (e.g., the psychology of intuition or of conversion) is a familiar one and seems to mean a reasoned account in terms of motive and mental tendency. Dr. Durell seeks to delve still deeper into the mystery of results, human and cosmic,

which he analyzes into a dozen or a dozen and a half logical and mathematical categories. Since the whole world of which we have any knowledge is the subject of investigation, this undertaking involves a very high degree of generality. Readers will probably be restricted to those willing to follow the author's close-wrought analytical argument.

The book lies at the frontiers of logic, mathematics, philosophy, and economics. It had its inspiration, we are told, in the writings of Herbert Spencer, and it may aptly be described as a synthetic philosophy of the accomplishment of results throughout the known universe. Such synthesizing, it need hardly be pointed out, has usually to be done over very often, and at best seldom permanently satisfies more than a few minds. In spite of these unavoidable objections, the book shows a vast amount of insight into the nature of reality, and clarifies some highly important and useful modes of activity, such as re-use, unit and multiplier, groupings, rhythm, limitation, externality, and others. The short, clear-cut illustrations scattered through the various chapters are very suggestive. Extended lists of questions and exercises are appended.

ERVILLE B. WOODS

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

The Pittsburgh District: Civic Frontage. The Pittsburgh Survey.

Edited by PAUL U. KELLOGG. New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1914. Pp. xx+554. \$2.50.

Industrial relations and civic conditions, especially of the wage-earning population, were the two general objects of investigation in the Pittsburgh survey. Five volumes were allotted to the reports on the former, one to the latter. The present volume contains, in addition to these minor investigations, all of the general material in the entire survey; it is *the* general volume, so far as the survey can be said to contain a general volume. The following reports are of such a nature: (1) a short statement of the most significant conclusions from the preliminary investigations by Edward T. Devine; (2) an interpretation of the growth of Pittsburgh by Robert A. Woods, describing the geographical situation, the racial composition of the population, the economic activities, the earlier mental attitudes, the recent political changes and the cultural institutions; (3) a description by Allen T. Burns of the progressive change from sectional interests to an interest in a unified organic development of the city; and (4) an appendix by Paul U. Kellogg on the field work of the survey. This statement of the purposes and methods of the survey by the director is of very considerable importance

from the standpoint of sociological methods. The purpose is said to be to test the institutions and conditions by a distinctly human measure—the household experiences of wage-earners; to relate the needs to each other so that a synthetic picture of the community may be formed, and, further, to be of immediate service to the community by graphic presentation of the findings and by co-operation with local agencies. This general purpose has been widely approved and generally adopted in subsequent surveys.

The principal part of this volume is the series of monographs on civic conditions. Four reports are on housing, and one on each of the following subjects: typhoid fever, the courts, the system of taxation, schools, playgrounds, public library, and the institutions for normal dependent children. These reports describe not only the archaic social institutions as they existed at the time of the investigations, such as aldermanic courts, the ward school district, family garbage disposal, and unregenerate charitable institutions, but also many recent modifications, due in part at least to the original investigations, in school administration, tax system, provisions for health, housing laws, and courts. For the findings were not reserved for a final formal report but were released whenever they promised to be immediately serviceable.

The table of contents contains a brief sketch of each author, showing his standing and equipment, and a statement of the place of previous appearance of each monograph.

This volume is a very essential part of the general plan of the survey. Most subsequent surveys, in fact, contain little else than the type of reports included in this volume. The volume is valuable, not only as a part of the most monumental of American surveys, but also for the great amount of accurately determined information in the special studies. Pittsburgh has had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with her civic conditions as no other city in the United States has. But it is not possible to pass immediately from these studies to social control. The editor states, in fact, that "with a few exceptions the intensive work has still to be done." And the studies of civic conditions are less exhaustive than the previous reports on industrial relations. In addition this volume, and consequently the survey as a whole, has no general summary or interpretation of results. The survey is a series of reports which are largely disconnected except for the fact that they are dealing with the same population at about the same date; they do not form a definite "synthetic picture." It is not only an exceedingly difficult task for the reader to piece these studies together to form such a picture, but it is

quite impossible to do so in the way it could have been done by the members of the staff who were in contact with the case studies and family biographies. While we are informed that each investigator found his work weaving into that of the others, we cannot clearly discover the extent to which the various institutions are related and cannot correlate the results. In this statement exception should be made, however, of the study of child-helping institutions by Miss Lattimore, which does show the correlations specifically and clearly.

E. H. SUTHERLAND

WILLIAM JEWELL COLLEGE

The Mental Health of the School Child. The Psycho-educational Clinic in Relation to Child Welfare. Contributions to a new science of orthophrenics and orthosomatics. By J. E. WALLACE WALLIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. Pp. xiii+463. \$2.00.

With the application of the experimental method to mental phenomena by Wundt, Helmholtz, and others some forty years ago, a purely rational and introspective discipline was transformed into a science. The early researches of the experimental psychologists seemed remote indeed from concrete, social life. Chronoscopes, plethysmographs, kymographs, and acoumeters seemed to have but little contact with life. William James, writing in 1890 on the methods and snares of psychology, has this to say about the experimental method: "But psychology is passing into a less simple phase. Within a few years what one may call a microscopic psychology has arisen in Germany, carried on by experimental methods, asking of course every moment for introspective data, but eliminating their uncertainty by operating on a large scale and taking statistical means. This method taxes the patience to the utmost, and could hardly have arisen in a country whose natives could be *bored*. Such Germans as Weber, Fechner, Vierordt, and Wundt obviously cannot; and their success has brought into the field an array of younger experimental psychologists, bent on studying the *elements* of the mental life, dissecting them out from the gross results in which they are embedded and as far as possible reducing them to quantitative scales. The simple and open method of attack having done what it can, the method of patience, starving out, and harassing to death is tried; the Mind must submit to a regular *siege*, in which minute advantages gained night and day by the forces that hem her in

must sum themselves up at last into her overthrow. There is little of the grand style about these new prism, pendulum, and chronograph-philosophers. They mean business, not chivalry. What generous divination, and that superiority in virtue which was thought by Cicero to give a man the best insight into nature, have failed to do, their spying and scraping, their deadly tenacity and almost diabolic cunning, will some day doubtless bring about. . . . It must be said that in some of these fields the results have as yet borne little theoretic fruit commensurate with the great labor expended in their acquisition. But facts are facts, and if we only get enough of them they are sure to combine. New ground will from year to year be broken, and theoretic results will grow. Meanwhile the experimental method has quite changed the face of the science so far as the latter is a record of mere work done."

The experimental method has justified itself by the fairly consistent body of fact and principle which constitutes the science of psychology. But the theoretic results, the absence of which from the earlier work caused James to complain, have led to practical applications of great social importance. The volume before us is witness to the fact. This book is one of a large number now appearing which have to do with the application of the methods of experimental psychology to educational problems. The particular problem in which the author of this book is interested is the problem of the mentally defective child. Such children have always occurred in the home and in the school. In the early part of the nineteenth century, Séguin and others showed that idiotic and imbecile children could be trained if proper educational methods were employed early in life. The responsibility of the state for the care of such children was speedily recognized by the creation of special institutions. But only the low-grade children who are incapable of self-help of any considerable amount found their way into these places. In recent years, by the study of retardation in the schools, it has been found that there are large numbers of children who are incapable of profiting by the methods employed in the early grades for the normal children. Such children are called subnormal. In the larger cities special classes with specially trained teachers and a special equipment have been provided for them. The laboratory methods have called for the training of experts who are competent to examine retarded children and prescribe an educational regimen adapted to the individual case. A clinical psychology, which is based largely upon the results obtained from the study of mentally defective children has been developed. Special methods have been devised to apply to this particular subject-matter.

Dr. Wallin's book is a collection of articles and addresses nearly all of which have been previously published. Inasmuch as they were prepared for audiences representing somewhat divergent interests, there is a notable lack of coherence and system in the volume as a whole. The most important item in the book is the statement of the results of the study of the epileptics at the New Jersey State Village for Epileptics.

H. C. STEVENS

PSYCHOPATHIC LABORATORY
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Liberalismus und Arbeiterfrage in Belgien (1830-1852). By HARRY ISAY. Stuttgart and Berlin: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1915. Pp. 102. M. 3.

This monograph treats of the relation of liberalism to the labor problem in Belgium in the period 1830-52. These years were characterized industrially by the rapid development of the proletariat and politically by the control of the party of the bourgeoisie. The efforts of the liberals in solving the labor problem were confined to securing minor reforms, such as the governmental guaranty of voluntary old-age insurance and the state recognition of the benefit funds of workingmen. The sentimental and superficial nature of the labor program of liberalism is shown by the fact that no proposal was made to repeal the law forbidding the combination of workingmen.

ERNEST W. BURGESS

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Carrying Out the City Plan. By FLAVEL SHURTLEFF and FREDERICK L. OLMSTEAD. New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1915. Pp. 349.

The appearance of this book marks the transition from the era of propaganda to the period of practical action in civic beautification. Its object is to facilitate the movement for removing the obstacles now present in local situations by presenting the most important variations in actual use with regard to the acquisition of land by the municipality, the power to tax, and the police power. An enumeration of the chapter headings will show the practical value of the book from the legal and administrative standpoint in carrying out the city plan: (1) "The Public Ownership of Land." (2) "The Acquisition of Land." (3) "The

Distribution of the Cost of Land Requirement." (4) "Excess Condemnation." (5) "The Use of the Police Power in the Execution of the City Plan." (6) "The Work of Administrative Agencies in the Execution of a City Plan."

E. W. BURGESS

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Normal Life. By EDWARD T. DEVINE. New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1915. Pp. 233. \$1.00.

"This volume," according to the introductory note, "contains the substance of a course of lectures delivered in Baltimore in February and March, 1915, under the auspices of the Social Service Corporation." The distinctive element in the book is the interpretation of the social movement by taking for a background "the normal individual life, from beginning to end" and by endeavoring "to determine what are the conditions and social provisions which are essential at each stage to secure it." With this emphasis upon the positive rather than upon the negative aspects of life the author treats successively the seven natural divisions of the normal life of man: before birth, infancy, childhood, adolescence, early maturity, full maturity, and old age. The authority of the writer, the clearness of his style, and the attractive organization and presentation of the material combine to make the volume a valuable manual for social workers and particularly for clubs and individuals interested in social construction.

ERNEST W. BURGESS

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Economic Theory and "Social Reform."—There is a fundamental lack of harmony between the basic notions back of economic theory and the reform program. The economist insists that the social reform movement is without fundamental principles; the social reformer condemns the current economic theory because it is based on the analysis of the industrial system of a previous age. There can be no real combat between the two because economic theory is intellectual and the reformers are passionate. The recent work of J. A. Hobson, *Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation*, gives opportunity for a partial and tentative statement of the points at issue. The chief contributions of Hobson are contributions to particular subjects. The book is also valuable as a contemporary theoretical document. Being an early if not premature attempt to reduce the social-reform movement to a theoretical statement, the discussion shows within itself the conflict of the assumptions that are striving for mastery. It reveals many of the disputed points between neo-classicism and the theory that progressivism implies,—Walton H. Hamilton, *Journal of Political Economy*, June, 1915. E. B. R.

Business and Democracy.—Many important forms of the social fabric are today in the melting-pot. New proposals are legion, old landmarks submerged. Men—and women—have found in democracy the opportunity and the occasion to give expression to a raw, untrained pride of opinion on the most difficult questions of law and economics. Democracy in its old significance bore on political affairs, but now we have industrial democracy—economic equality—social justice. The equality of political democracy is by facile logic transferred to industrial democracy. It is assumed that since one man's vote is as good as another's, one man's wages should be as good as another's. The difference in earning power of different individuals is not taken into account, but it is implicitly assumed that workmen are justified in demanding higher wages as long as employers and employees are not equally rich. Our system of property is being assailed. It is forgotten that this system has grown out of and in accordance with the felt needs of the people. Now comes socialism and proposes to put the control of capital into the hands of the state. Socialism is a philosophy of failure and is not likely to succeed in the end, but it is coloring industrial democracy through and through. We must fight every attempt to restrict the freedom of individual initiative in industry whenever it may be shown that it does not interfere with the rights of others. This situation makes it plain what business must face. Industrial democracy will no longer leave business affairs to the natural working out of the economic laws, but instead will substitute an artificial political control. One of the side shows of this industrial democracy, that has an important relation to business, is the "return of government to the people." Our whole past history has shown us that difficult matters of lawmaking should not be left to the untrained—to a hit-and-miss body of citizens. If present rule is bad, the remedy is to elect better representatives. We are most truly returning the government to the people when we are placing it in the hands of intelligent representatives and taking it out of the hands of the bigoted and ignorant.—J. Laurence Laughlin, *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1915. R. W. S.

The Movement for Public Labor Exchanges.—Since the establishment of the first public employment office in this country, in Ohio in 1890, 25 other states have established such offices and are operating in 80 cities. Most of these are operated by states, but some are under the control of cities. In addition to these, the Federal Bureau of Immigration has maintained labor-distributing agencies since 1907. The state and city agencies have been extremely inefficient in matters of interchange of data between the different offices, in following up results of assignments to prospective jobs, in

reliability of records, and in reaching others than the "down-and-outers." However, in 1907 Massachusetts led in developing an efficient system, and various states have followed in developing and adopting a business-like method, an intelligent and reliable system of records, care in selecting the office force, committees to advise in the management to insure impartiality in case of labor disputes, vocational guidance and protection bureaus for children and immigrants. There is, however, still a lack in uniformity of method, in co-operation, and in definite policies of management. Laws have not embodied safeguards that are shown by experience to be necessary. This criticism also holds against the federal laws advocated by the American Association for Labor Legislation, the North American Civic League for Immigrants, and the Bureau of Immigration. Experience shows that successful labor exchanges must include: (1) selection of officers under civil service; (2) a joint advisory committee composed of representative employers and workers; (3) an accurate and uniform system of records; and (4) co-operation and interchange of data among the various employment offices. The organization (1913) of the American Association of Public Employment Offices and the National Farm Labor Exchange (1914) marks a forward step. A great advance is to be gained also by the provision for a Bureau of Employment in the Department of Labor, which will co-operate with, extend, supervise, co-ordinate, and standardize existing bureaus but will not itself maintain local employment offices.—William M. Leiserson, *Journal of Political Economy*, July, 1915.
E. T. H.

Labor Legislation in the Clayton Act.—The justification of the adoption of the Clayton act is sought in the "declaration" that labor of a human being is not a commodity nor article of exchange nor commerce. This is the major premise from which the promoters of the Clayton bill proceed to justify their claim for exemption from the consequences of the Sherman Anti-trust law which was made effective against certain phases of labor combination and activities by the court decision rendered in the Danbury hat case. Combination for boycotting is declared by this decision to fall within the definition of restraint of trade and to be subject to the threefold recovery of damages produced by the restraint. The Sherman act had its origin in the evils of massed capital, but the application was so widened in the minds of the legislators that the source of restraint was regarded as immaterial. Hence the law stood as a deterrent against the unrestrained domination of unions. But the American Federation of Labor has constantly argued for the right of the boycott as well as for organization and strikes as a means of putting labor on a level with capital. In the Clayton bill labor has sought to secure equality of freedom and to establish a part of its larger struggle for personal rights. By this act the Anti-trust law shall not be construed as forbidding the existence and operation of labor organizations, nor held to be illegal combination or conspiracies in restraint of trade; nor shall labor organizations be forbidden or restrained from "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects of such organizations." The phrase "legitimate objects" lacks definition, but the act prohibits injunctions and restraining orders, and many acts are no longer unlawful. Notable among these are the boycott and the provision that an act which is not illegal when performed by an individual shall not be held to be illegal when performed by a group. These provisions of the Clayton act the author declares to be a violation of the principles of liberty and class legislation propounded by the Constitution and by court decisions.—George W. Wickersham, *American Federationist*, July, 1915.
E. T. H.

Trade Unionism versus Welfare Work for Women.—One-half of the eight million women classed as being in gainful occupations are industrial wage-earners. Modern methods of industry bear down oppressively hard upon young women with neither the ability nor the training to engage in interesting tasks. The labor is monotonous, poorly paid, and conducted at nerve destroying speed. The social conventions now in becoming opposed to the physical efforts of such toil. But until this condition is changed, some method of representation in legislation must take its place. The two agencies at work are trade unionism and employers' welfare work. These two represent distinct methods. The labor union is a movement by the wage-workers and for the wage-workers. Women are just beginning to realize the possibilities of

this method of self-improvement. They have been slow to avail themselves of the benefits of organization. Many feel that their stay in the industrial world is temporary and are indifferent to, or endure, the conditions under which they must work. Union men have not always been friendly toward women's unions, fearing it meant a lower wage scale, but this attitude is now changed. The welfare work in general includes improved physical conditions, opportunities for rest and recreation, educational work, and benefit funds. This plan has been successful in some cases, and those who have grown to distrust union methods are looking to it hopefully as a final solution of labor difficulties. The test of the value of each institution is the type of citizen it produces. The trade union holds up to its members the ideal of class betterment and they are thus stimulated to further endeavor. The principle for which the trade union stands is sound. In the other case the employee is the recipient of favors; it is a system of bestowing by the employer. This does not tend to strengthen and enrich character in the employees. It does not strengthen the laborers' power of initiative; it is likely to make them limp of will and uncertain of purpose.—Anna Marion Maclean, *Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1915.

E. B. R.

Work, Women, and Marriage.—The present war has surrounded woman with an entirely different set of conditions and is having important effects upon the process of development through which she has been rapidly passing. It is important to note the consequent effects upon working and marriage conditions. During the last century only a relatively small number of women were engaged in work outside the home and these were found largely in certain special districts. Now the demand for workers is country-wide in extent. The period of depression immediately preceding this new demand put most of those engaged in service, clerkships, dressmaking, the professions, etc., out of work. The present demand is for industrial labor and it is so great and the supply so small that the industrial woman can pick and choose. The increasing demand is then calling in greater and greater numbers of the middle and upper classes. It furnishes them what they have been striving for—an open field for women as well as men. This is no doubt having beneficial effects in breaking down the conventionalities, whims, prejudices, etc., which they have formerly held toward work. The good effects should not be rated too highly, however, as it is only into the lower, less desirable forms of labor that they are being called. This changing state of affairs will have important effects upon marriage. The number of unmarried in the industrial class is inconsiderable. The middle classes, however, owing to their impossibly high economic and social standards, were being more and more restrained from marriage. This fault has been largely due to the social whims and artificialities set up by the women. The fact that these women are now at work will serve to break down these barriers and bring marriage back to a saner, more natural basis. Romance is again alive. War is tearing aside pretenses, shattering artifices, and bringing us back to real things.—Ethel Colquhoun, *The Living Age*, July 24, 1915.

R. W. S.

Unemployment in American Cities.—The dominant problem in American cities the past winter was not economy, nor administration, nor politics, but unemployment. Chicago's 190,000 unemployed, Philadelphia's 200,000, New York's 350,000, and other cities in corresponding proportion presented the problem in an unprecedented extent. Of the real causes we have learned but little. Little was done by the federal government to relieve the situation, nor have state measures had a much more extensive effect, although Idaho has passed a radical bill requiring the several counties to provide emergency employment to propertyless, unemployed citizens. At least forty cities have had unemployment commissions. Emergency municipal workshops, special relief appropriations and donations, employment bureaus under the direction of city, church, and public or private philanthropic agencies—these have been some of the devices employed toward lightening the pressure. Most of the relief measures have been in no way constructive, but merely palliative. Soup kitchens, bundle days, the provision of temporary sleeping-quarters in city halls and police stations do nothing toward warding off a repetition of the misery another year. Unemployment insurance is still neglected; but the "back-to-the-land" movement has made encouraging progress. A great deal of preliminary and essential educational

work has been done, at least, and we may begin to hope for movements of industrial organization whose efforts to cope with the situation will be effective.—Frances A. Kellor, *National Municipal Review*, July, 1915. E. E. E.

The Economic Basis of the Decline of Ancient Culture.—The causes usually advanced to explain the decline of ancient culture seem no longer to be substantiated. Christianity was embraced by too small a proportion of the Roman populace to be held largely responsible. The explanation that Rome suffered from a drainage of its gold and bullion to India rests upon too slender evidence to be seriously considered. Depopulation cannot be advanced as a cause of decline; it was primarily a result. And slavery in the later centuries was not sufficiently common to be held responsible. The true cause seems to lie in the agrarian policy of ancient Rome. The agriculture of the Empire came to be maintained chiefly through the *coloni* or sub-lessees, who were, without being slaves, bound to the soil. The very protection which the state gave them from the abuses of the large, absentee leaseholders (*conductores*) compelled them to dwell within their fixed domain, and the fruits of their labor went largely into contributions to their overlords. Under their disinterested care production declined and much land became waste. Nor was it possible for the government to re-establish the strong peasantry which had been crowded off the land when slavery was the vogue. This weakened, depleted rural population declined in consumptive power, and the market upon which the city manufactories chiefly depended correspondingly diminished. With the decline of production which followed came the abandonment of the cities which lost their attractiveness as their industrial vigor decayed. It was "the loss of this economic freedom even more than the loss of political freedom which had such disastrous results upon private initiative, and finally undermined the ancient Graeco-Roman civilization."—W. L. Westermann, *American Historical Review*, July, 1915. E. E. E.

How the Commission-Manager Plan Is Getting Along.—The Commission-Manager plan is a very new thing in American municipal government, dating only from January, 1913, when it first went into effect in Sumter, South Carolina. Since that beginning twenty-four other towns and cities have taken it up, and five states have provisions enabling their cities to adopt the plan. The possibility of city managing as a distinct profession seems likely. In December, 1914, the first annual City Managers' Convention was held. The state universities of Texas, California, and Michigan have projected courses of training for prospective city managers. Men who have made good in the office in one city are being called upon to serve other cities in the same capacity. So far, the communities which have adopted the plan have found an almost uniform experience of lowered cost for increased service. The longer possible tenure of office and the freedom from political complications coupled with a presumably expert preparation for the task make for a higher efficiency on the part of this official than can be expected of the untrained mayor who holds his office as a result of the turning of the wheel of politics. To maintain this efficiency the office must by no means be allowed to become a political plaything.—Richard S. Childs, *National Municipal Review*, July, 1915. E. E. E.

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CHICAGO HOUSING CONDITIONS. X GREEKS AND ITALIANS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF HULL HOUSE^{*}

NATALIE WALKER
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In 1889, when Hull House was opened, the West Side of Chicago had already degenerated from one of the poorer suburbs, inhabited largely by Americans in moderate circumstances, into a crowded and unattractive immigrant neighborhood. Halsted Street, in the early days close to the city limits, with only a few scattered cottages to the west of it, but now lined with saloons, retail clothing stores, all kinds of shops and cheap lodging-houses, had become the backbone of the congested district that had grown up between the North and South branches of the river. It was a region of unpaved streets and filthy alleys, of flimsy wooden dwellings and dilapidated sheds, which were spared by the Great Fire of 1871 almost as if they were too easy prey.

After the Fire, however, the change in the character of the neighborhood and the corresponding change in the inhabitants

^{*} This article is the tenth in a series of studies of housing conditions in Chicago, based on a house-to-house canvass of selected districts by the students in the Department of Social Investigation of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy. The students of the department, with the approval of the former commissioner of health, Dr. George B. Young, and under the supervision of the chief sanitary inspector, Charles B. Ball, during the year 1914-15, made the canvass and shared in the work of tabulation.

became more noticeable; the Americans largely gave place to the Irish and the Germans, who in turn fell back before the Italians and the Russian Jews. The latter sought the district south of Twelfth Street, while the Italians, in ever-increasing numbers, huddled into the ramshackle tenements east of Halsted and south of Polk streets, where today one of the largest Italian colonies in the city is to be found.

Within the last ten years, a new race has appeared in this neighborhood—the Greeks, who have gradually made their own the district south of Harrison and west of Halsted streets. In 1894, there were but 77 Greeks in the Nineteenth Ward;¹ in 1908, the number had increased to 576;² and in 1914, there were resident in this ward 1,881 Greeks,³ the largest colony of that race in Chicago, and one of the largest in the United States. They are a sturdy people, swarthy, well built, often handsome, but lacking the vivacity and responsive friendliness which constitute so large a part of the Italian's charm. Keenly intelligent, shrewd, a little inclined to be clannish and to be suspicious of those of other nationalities, they have easily made a place for themselves in business, and have settled in the better-class tenements on the more important streets of the district. Blue Island Avenue, in the early days one of the plank roads that radiated like the spokes of a huge wheel from the center of the city to the surrounding prairie towns, is the main thoroughfare of the colony. Its sidewalks are for blocks lined with stores which bear upon their windows Greek characters. Here are the offices of the Greek newspapers, book stores, groceries, labor agencies, saloons, coffeehouses, poolrooms. In the directory of the large office building at the corner of Blue Island Avenue and Harrison Street are the names of many Greek dentists, physicians, and business men. As it is on Blue Island Avenue, so it is on Halsted Street, from Harrison Street south to Polk Street—everywhere Greek words, both written and spoken, and Greek faces. Mr. Fairchild says of it: "The district around Blue Island Avenue, Polk and South Halsted streets is today more typically Greek than some sections of Athens."⁴

¹ *School Census of Chicago*, 1894, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, 1908, pp. 12-19.

³ *Ibid.*, 1914, pp. 17 ff.

⁴ H. P. Fairchild, *Greek Immigration to the United States*, p. 123.

The portion of the city adjacent to Hull House, which stands at the corner of Polk and Halsted streets, has for a long time excited public interest, partly because it has served as the laboratory in which a pioneer social experiment has been tried, partly because of the cosmopolitan character of its inhabitants, but largely because of its utter wretchedness. For poverty and its attendant ills, for disease, for every kind of overcrowding and congestion, it has had an unenviable reputation. One of the Hull House residents, writing



LOOKING NORTHWEST FROM HULL HOUSE: THE GREEK DISTRICT

in 1895, just after the United States Bureau of Labor had completed a survey of the region south of Polk Street, undertaken in its investigation of "The Slums of Great Cities," says:

Rear tenements and alleys form the core of the district, and it is there that the densest crowds of the most wretched and destitute congregate. Little idea can be given of the filthy and rotten tenements, the dingy courts and tumbledown sheds, the foul stables and dilapidated outhouses, the broken sewer pipes, the piles of garbage fairly alive with diseased odors, and of the numbers of children filling every nook, working and playing in every room, eating and sleeping in every window-sill, pouring in and out of every door, and seeming literally to have every scrap of yard.¹

In 1894, the Chicago Department of Health, spurred to action by the fact that this ward had for a time the highest death-rate in

¹ *Hull House Maps and Papers*, v. 5.

the city, undertook a house-to-house investigation, at the end of which it was declared that the high mortality was due primarily to the filthy and unpaved streets and alleys, to the dampness of the many lots the surfaces of which were below street level, to the dilapidated and unsanitary frame houses, and to a dense and poverty-stricken population.¹

Again in 1901, when the City Homes Association was working for an improved housing law, forty-four blocks south of Polk Street were thoroughly canvassed. The district was chosen, not because it was the worst in the city, but rather because it was believed to be representative of widespread conditions of neglect and overcrowding.

Partly because of a desire to ascertain how the conditions brought to light by these earlier inquiries had changed, and partly because of the presence in the neighborhood of the Greeks, of whose way of living comparatively little is known, in the early winter of 1914 an investigation of housing conditions in sixteen blocks in the immediate vicinity of Hull House was undertaken by the Department of Social Investigation of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy. The district covered extends from Harrison Street on the north to Taylor Street on the south, from Morgan Street on the west to Desplaines Street on the east. Every building used for residential purposes within these boundaries was visited.

Crowded into these blocks, the entire area of which is little more than half a square mile, live 10,125 people—a population equal to that of a small city, greater than that of one of the counties of Illinois.² These figures, however, convey no real idea of the overcrowding which exists, for a large part of this section is occupied by factories, so that the net area—that is, the area used solely for residential purposes—is scarcely more than a quarter of a square mile. Table I shows that the density of population ranges from 101 per acre in Block 8, where Hull House, Firman House, the Ewing Street Mission, and the Mary Crane Nursery are located, to 342 per acre in Block 16, where large numbers of Italians live.

¹ *Report of Chicago Department of Health, 1895-96*, p. 64.

² Henderson County, Illinois, in 1910, contained only 9,724 people (*U.S. Census 1910*, Abstract, p. 35).

The average density for the sixteen blocks is 265 people per acre. It may be argued that this figure, when compared with the high density of the tenement districts of New York and other eastern cities, is not indicative of serious overcrowding. It should be remembered, however, that the New York tenement population lives in houses towering far above the street, with many apartments

TABLE I
NET AREA AND DENSITY OF POPULATION IN SIXTEEN
BLOCKS, WARD 19

Block Number	Net Area, Acres	Population	Density per Acre
1.....	2.57	392	153
2.....	2.53	579	228
3.....	1.67	387	232
4.....	1.91	616	323
5.....	2.28	658	289
6.....	1.82	493	271
7.....	3.08	700	227
8.....	2.34	236	101
9.....	3.11	1,011	325
10.....	4.06	1,277	315
11.....	1.56	484	310
12.....	2.09	563	269
13.....	0.30	83	277
14.....	2.90	981	338
15.....	1.78	246	138
16.....	4.15	1,419	342
Total, and average density.....	38.15	10,125	265

to a floor, while in Chicago few of the tenements are over three stories in height, and the typical house is the two-story frame cottage, containing from two to four small apartments. Hence the lower density figure for this city may indicate far worse overcrowding than the higher figure of the eastern cities.

Of these 10,125 people, 5,748, or 57 per cent, are adults living in families, and 3,067, about 30 per cent, are children under twelve years of age. The remaining 1,310 are adult lodgers. This last figure—representing the floating element of the population, largely composed of transient immigrants—living in the most overcrowded and unsanitary ways of living, should probably be somewhat increased to include a large number of non-family groups,

the members of which were counted as adults living in families. These groups of men living together, sometimes on a co-operative basis, sometimes under the direction of a "boss" who rents the apartment and provides the meals, are most common among the Greeks, who have come to this country so recently that comparatively few of them have yet brought over their women. The presence in the community of these men, restrained by no family ties, and with little conception of the elementary principles of hygienic living, constitutes a problem worthy of separate study.

The predominant nationality in this district is the Italian; 72 per cent of the families are of this race. Second in importance are the Greeks, who make up 13 per cent of the total. The remaining 15 per cent is divided among twenty-seven different nationalities, most of them represented by very small numbers.

The occupations followed by the heads of families—the only ones of whom an account was taken—are many and varied and largely unskilled in character. Over one-half of the Italians, and perhaps a fifth of the Greeks, are laborers, many of them dependent upon the highly seasonal work furnished by the contractors and the railroads. Barbers, bakers, candy makers, cobblers, saloonkeepers, peddlers, and tailors are also present in fairly large numbers among the Italians. A considerable number of the Greeks are peddlers, and there are also several candy makers, restaurant, saloon, pool-room, and lodging-house keepers. Among both the Greeks and Italians is a fair proportion of the more enterprising who have acquired a small business of their own. Of the 53 women who are recorded as heads of households, only 2 were Greek, while 28 were Italian. The women are chiefly housekeepers, seamstresses, tailoresses, and laundresses. Not much home work was observed, though some women were found finishing clothes, and a large number combined the care of a little store with their housekeeping duties.

Because of the industrial depression resulting from the war, there was, at the time this investigation was made, an unusual amount of unemployment. This, of course, made it difficult to get accurate information as to the occupations followed in normal times. Any investigation made in the winter into the industrial

conditions of a foreign colony would disclose a fairly large percentage of unemployment, for the men engaged upon the various kinds of construction work habitually live in idleness during the winter, supported by their summer's earnings. This, however, could not account for the large numbers found out of work, many of whom had been idle for months. In house after house the same



A TYPICAL FRAME COTTAGE

story was told: the father had been laid off, the lodger had lost his job, the rent was in arrears, the grocery bill was unpaid. A number of cases were discovered in which no one in the family could obtain work—a hopeless situation, faced, however, with a kind of bewildered resignation, as it became daily clearer that no work was to be had.

The population of this district is unstable, shifting readily at the slightest pressure. As Table II shows, only 9 per cent of the people own their homes, and of the 91 per cent who are classed as

"renters," over half have lived in their present quarters less than two years, while a quarter have been there less than six months. It is interesting to note how small a proportion of the renters and how large a proportion of the owners have lived in one place more than six years. It seems probable that most of the owners are survivors of the earlier period, people who, having invested what little they had in a home, were unwilling or unable to leave when the neighborhood changed.

TABLE II

RENTERS AND OWNERS TOGETHER WITH LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN APARTMENTS

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE	RENTERS		OWNERS	
	Number	Cumulative Percentage	Number	Cumulative Percentage
Under three months	211	15	2	1
Three months and under six months . .	252	27	2	2
Six months and under one year	211	39	4	4
One year and under two years	259	54	6	7
Two years and under three years	238	68	11	12
Three years and under four years	160	77	18	21
Four years and under six years	153	86	27	34
Six years and under eight years	77	90	25	46
Eight years and under ten years	53	93	27	59
Ten years and under fifteen years . . .	79	98	35	75
Fifteen years and over*	35	2	51	25
Total†	1,728	100	208	100

* Of these, 2 renters and 12 owners had occupied the same apartment for 30 years or over.

† This table does not include 185 vacant apartments, and 48 for which no report was given.

Most of the houses of the district are comparatively old, 566, or 86 per cent, of the 655 enumerated having been built before the law of 1902 was enacted, and only 30—less than 5 per cent—having been built since the law of 1910 was passed. Of the remainder, 41 were built under the law of 1902, 17 which were built before 1902 have been altered in accordance with the provisions of that law, and 1, built after 1902, has been rebuilt to conform with the law of 1910. This means that the majority of these houses are practically outside of the jurisdiction of the present law; whatever evils exist are permitted to continue unchecked, for, in general, the law takes cognizance only of houses built or altered after its passage.

Almost one-half—46 per cent—of the houses are frame buildings, many of them apparently slowly disintegrating. Of the remainder, 37 per cent are built of brick and 17 per cent are a combination of brick and frame. Many of the houses were apparently intended to accommodate only one family, but they have long since been partitioned off to furnish quarters for three or four.



A ROW OF ALLEY HOUSES

The evil results of this change can easily be traced in dark and windowless rooms, insufficient ventilation, and generally unsanitary conditions. An attempt has been made to modernize some of the old frame dwellings by giving them a new front, and an extra story of brick. From the street these hybrid buildings appear fairly well, but from the alley or patch of yard it is easily seen that the improvement is only apparent, that the result is a hodge-podge with the drawbacks of both styles of construction and the merits of neither.

Most of the houses, as has been said, are small. Less than a third are three stories or over in height, as Table III shows, and

TABLE III
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF BUILDINGS HAVING
A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF STORIES

Number of Stories	Number of Houses	Percentage
One story	64	10
Two stories	404	62
Three stories	168	25
Four stories	19	3
Total	655	100

10 per cent have only one story. Table IV brings out the fact that slightly over half of the houses have only one or two apartments,

TABLE IV
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF BUILDINGS HAVING
A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF APARTMENTS

Apartments	Number	Percentage
One	145	22
Two	195	30
Three	107	16
Four	88	13
Five	36	6
Six	40	6
Seven or more	44	7
Total	655	100

and only about 19 per cent have more than four. Of those containing more than four apartments, however, a number are very large: one, a brick tenement of the worst type, has forty apartments; and several others have each more than twenty. Then, too, among the houses containing only one apartment are several which, from their size and the large number of rooms, most of which are rented separately, should be classed not as tenements but as lodging-houses.

Only 21 per cent of the buildings were in good repair, whereas 45 per cent were in fair, and 34 per cent in bad repair. Five houses

were recorded as dilapidated; this number should probably be considerably increased as many dwellings which merited that descrip-



A BACK YARD SHARED BY FOUR FAMILIES

tion were given the benefit of the doubt and listed as in bad repair. This condition is probably due in part to the fact that so many of the buildings are of wood, a material which is peculiarly susceptible

to the ravages of the weather and ill fitted to endure long periods of neglect. Everywhere are rotting clapboards and shingles, walls from which the last flake of paint has long since dropped, rickety porches and stairs, sheds that are literally falling to pieces. The atmosphere is one of general neglect, quite as much on the part of the landlord as on that of the tenant—a reflection, perhaps, of the civic neglect that is so evident in the Nineteenth Ward. It is, of course, true that in this district there has been considerable depreciation in the value of real estate, and doubtless in many cases the landlords, who are themselves often foreigners struggling hard for a foothold in this country, have been unwilling to expend even a small sum for the repair of a house which might very soon be displaced by a factory.

In such a neighborhood as this, with many houses of varying heights and sizes crowded into a small area, one sees very clearly what one writer has called “the essential unrighteousness of the twenty-five foot lot.” This lot, often referred to as the “shoestring lot”—a piece of land 25 feet wide by 100 feet deep—is typical of Chicago. It is inevitable that buildings erected upon such strips of land should, in order to obtain the necessary width, extend to the very limits of the lot, and thus deprive each other of light and air. Furthermore, they must be fairly deep, in which case there are difficulties of construction hard to overcome, or else a very considerable percentage of the lot space will be unused, and, to all intents and purposes, wasted. The investor has the alternatives of erecting one large house, ventilated by shafts and courts, and extending over more than one lot, or of putting two or more buildings on one lot. In no case in this district were there more than two buildings upon a lot, but, out of 655 houses visited, 140, or 21 per cent, were rear buildings. This means, as a rule, that a frame house, already far past its prime, has been moved back to make room on the front of the lot for a brick building of about twice its size. The rear house is reached by a long narrow passage, usually gloomy, unpaved, or with dangerous holes in the paving, and too often filled with rubbish. The narrow space between the front and rear buildings, when it is not obstructed by sheds, is also frequently gloomy, and sometimes used as a dump. Decaying garbage,

thrown there for want of any better place, rubbish of every description, filth from the stables and yard closets fill this so-called yard, which serves as well for the home of various animals, and as the playground for many little children. Where such conditions exist, lot overcrowding is inevitable. Table V shows that almost one-tenth of the lots are entirely covered, while one-fifth are more than 90 per cent covered. The law of 1910 provides that in no event shall any existing house be altered, or any new house

TABLE V
NUMBER OF LOTS COVERED A SPECIFIED
PERCENTAGE

Percentage of Lot Covered	Number of Lots	Percentage of Total
Less than 50.	13	3
50 and less than 60. .	84	17
60 and less than 70. .	58	12
70 and less than 80. .	114	23
80 and less than 90. .	125	25
90 and less than 100. .	55	11
100.	47	9
Total.	496	100

constructed, so as to cover more than 90 per cent of a corner lot or more than 75 per cent of any other lot.¹ And yet, even among the comparatively small number of houses erected since this law went into effect, there are several instances in which the lot is entirely covered. It is generally understood that the standard prescribed by law is the minimum acceptable to the community; but in this neighborhood 45 per cent of the lots are so covered as to fall below even this minimum legal standard. When this condition of lot overcrowding is considered in connection with the high density figure, it is apparent that the problem of congestion is indeed a serious one, for thousands of people, recruited from the elements of the population most susceptible to bad conditions, are so huddled together that cleanly, healthy living is made practically impossible.

Within the apartment, conditions are better in some respects than in districts previously studied. Here there is no problem of

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 440.

the cellar or the attic apartment, and there are very few occupied basements. Of all the apartments 97 per cent are above street level. Furthermore, 828 of the apartments—38 per cent—extend through the house. Only 4 per cent are middle apartments, while 28 per cent are front and 30 per cent rear apartments. The large number of through apartments makes for good light and ventilation, as well as for increased privacy.

Table VI shows the distribution of families of specified sizes among the different apartments. Here, as elsewhere in Chicago,

TABLE VI
NUMBER OF PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN APARTMENTS HAVING A
SPECIFIED NUMBER OF ROOMS

NUMBER OF ROOMS	NUMBER OF PERSONS												VACANT OR NO RE- PORT	TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12 or More		
1.....	1	3	2	2	1	...	1	10
2.....	18	70	56	32	16	10	2	3	1	19	227
3.....	14	82	92	78	95	69	39	14	6	2	1	...	56	548
4.....	6	50	78	106	114	121	96	54	29	16	3	2	63	738
5.....	1	22	38	52	57	45	42	25	7	5	3	6	32	335
6.....	4	7	24	19	23	21	30	12	12	10	2	6	8	178
7.....	...	6	11	10	9	12	13	8	5	5	4	1	3	87
8 or more....	1	...	3	4	1	4	...	6	5	2	1	14	3	44
No report.....	1	1	2
Total.....	45	240	304	303	316	282	223	122	65	40	14	30	185	2,169

the four-room apartment is most common. There seems to be no typical family, those having three, four, or five members being almost equally numerous.

In any neighborhood such as this, where there is more than one person for every room, it is inevitable that many sleeping-rooms should be overcrowded. The law attempts to eliminate this by definite regulations as to the amount of air space with which each person must be provided. The section reads as follows: "No room in any tenement house shall be occupied so that the allowance of air to each adult living or sleeping in each room shall be less than 400 cubic feet, or less than 200 cubic feet for each person under 12."¹

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 447.

When we consider that Professor Huxley, working among the East London tenement population, estimated that a minimum air space of 809 cubic feet was necessary for each adult, it is evident that this is at best a low standard. Yet, here in Chicago, even this slight requirement, unencumbered by any provision for thorough ventilation, is not enforced. Out of 4,564 occupied bedrooms in this district, 1,636, or 36 per cent, of the total, were in use in direct violation of the law (see Table VII). The mere statement of the figures, however, gives little idea of the bad conditions which actually exist. Some of these overcrowded rooms are without windows; many others, though provided with windows, get practically no fresh air, and are either gloomy or dark. A few examples, chosen at random, may serve to illustrate this. In one case four children were found sleeping in a room which had only 722 cubic feet of air space. The room was windowless and quite dark, the only light and air coming from a small transom opening into the living-room. The parents of these children slept in a room which, though light, had scarcely three-fourths as much air space as was necessary. In another instance, five lodgers and a child were crowded into a room which could legally have been occupied by only three adults. Again, in a room large enough for only two adults slept three small children, an older boy and a girl, and their grandmother. The older girl and the grandmother occupied the only bed, and the others contented themselves with "shake-downs," which completely covered the floor of the small room. Perhaps the worst case of all was that in which what was practically only a wide shelf over a basement stairway had been walled up until a tiny light-proof, air-proof room had been constructed. In this box, containing only 125 cubic feet of air space, slept three men.

It is, however, not only in rooms that are illegally overcrowded that poor conditions exist. Many other rooms were found which, though satisfactory in the eyes of the law, are undesirable sleeping-places. There is the room which is made by partitioning off the rear part of a store and then used as bedroom, living-room, and kitchen for the entire family. There is the room which is in use by day and by night, in which the bed is rarely empty, and the air is seldom quite fresh. There is the combination storeroom and

TABLE VII
NUMBER OF PERSONS SLEEPING IN ROOMS OF SPECIFIED CUBIC FEET CONTENTS
Numbers above the Heavy Rule Represent Cases of Illegal Overcrowding

CONTENTS OF ROOMS IN CUBIC FEET	NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED BY										TOTAL	Number of rooms illegally occupied, 1,636—36 per cent†
	One Child	One Adult,*	Two Adults	Two Adults, One Child	Three Adults	Three Adults, One Child	Four Adults	Four Adults, One Child	Five Adults	Five Adults, One Child		
Less than 400	1	29	16	5	2	57	Number of rooms illegally occupied, 1,636—36 per cent†
400, less than 600	19	305	293	94	33	828	
600, less than 800	19	319	459	182	95	7	7	1	1	1,189	
800, less than 1,000	14	179	270	113	60	16	7	4	710	
1,000, less than 1,200	10	134	162	75	53	7	14	2	2	479	
1,200, less than 1,400	18	140	148	74	74	16	12	1	1	2	509	
1,400, less than 1,600	23	91	129	51	45	10	6	0	1	384	
1,600, less than 1,800	6	53	55	31	32	8	5	1	1	1	209	
1,800, less than 2,000	3	22	8	6	15	3	6	2	2	89	
Over 2,000	7	22	29	10	16	5	7	3	1	110	
Total	120	1,294	1,582	641	425	75	64	14	9	3	7	4,564†

* The term "one adult" is used wherever 400 cubic feet of air are required; it may mean either one adult or two children under twelve.

† This does not include 372 bedrooms in vacant apartments, 191 unoccupied bedrooms in occupied apartments, and 3 rooms for which there was no report as to contents.

‡ The percentage of violations has been computed upon the number of occupied rooms.

bedroom, such as that described in the following note: "This room contains, besides two lodgers, two barrels of wine and hundreds of quart bottles. The place is gloomy, and the whole apartment reeks with the smell of wine." Finally, there is the room which is used by night as sleeping-room and by day as dining-room, living-room; or, most common of all, as kitchen. The grave menace to health



ROOM CONTAINING LESS THAN 600 CUBIC FEET OF AIR SPACE

Two adults, two children, and a baby sleep here

in such arrangements, the moral danger and breaking down of standards resulting from the total lack of privacy, especially where, as is too often the case here, there are lodgers in every available corner, need scarcely be pointed out.

Quite as important as the prevention of overcrowding, from the standpoint of healthful living conditions, is the provision of adequate light and ventilation. Here again the law prescribes a standard for all houses: in every tenement built since 1910, every room must have a window or windows equal to one-tenth of the floor

area, and none of such required windows shall have an area of less than 10 square feet.¹ Furthermore, no room in any tenement is to be occupied for living purposes unless it contains a window whose area is not less than one-twelfth of the floor area.²

Definite though these provisions are, they are disregarded. Of the 5,130 bedrooms—no other rooms were measured—189 had no windows. One of these windowless rooms, it is interesting to note, is in a building which has been erected since 1910. In 260 rooms the window area was less than 8 per cent of the floor area—a distinct violation of the provisions of the code; and in 328 rooms, the window area, though over 8 per cent, was under 10 per cent of the floor area. This makes a total of 588 rooms, 12 per cent of the entire number, which fall below the standard set by the law of 1910. Furthermore, of the rooms having windows, 1,763, over 35 per cent, are either gloomy or dark. This figure does not include the rooms with no windows, some of which receive light from transoms, skylights, or adjoining rooms. Table VIII shows

TABLE VIII
CONDITION OF ROOMS WITH LESS THAN TEN
SQUARE FEET OF WINDOW AREA

Condition of Rooms	Number	Percentage
Light.....	386	37
Gloomy.....	385	36
Dark.....	280	27
Total*.....	1,051	100

* This total includes 189 windowless rooms, of which 22 were light, 57 gloomy, and 110 dark. There were also 8 cases, not included in the total, in which there was no report as to the condition of the rooms.

the condition of rooms having less than 10 square feet of window area. It is interesting to note that these rooms, though only 20 per cent of the total number, furnish rather more than a quarter of the gloomy rooms and over half of the dark rooms. It is obvious from this that a room which is to receive adequate light must have a window of at least 10 square feet in area, and yet several rooms in houses built since 1910 fail to comply with this provision of the law for new tenements.

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 448.

² *Ibid.*, sec. 475.

Perhaps the determining factor in the question of whether a room shall be light, gloomy, or dark is the outlook of the windows. A room whose windows open directly upon the outer air, and face a street, a yard, or even an alley, will probably be light, and fairly well ventilated. However, less than a quarter of the bedroom windows here open on the street, and little more than 5 per cent on an alley. Adding to these rooms the 12 per cent that open on a yard, the comparatively small number which look upon a roof or a porch, and those with two or more windows facing in different directions, we find that about 56 per cent of all the rooms considered have a fair chance for adequate light and air. It is only a "fair" chance, however, for, even though these rooms do open directly upon the outer air, a surprisingly large number, as Table IX shows,

TABLE IX
OUTLOOK OF LIGHT, GLOOMY, AND DARK ROOMS

OUTLOOK OF ROOMS	CONDITION OF ROOMS			TOTAL	
	Light	Gloomy	Dark	Number	Percentage
No outlook (windowless).....	22	57	110	189	4
Interior windows (room or hall)	10	53	112	175	3
Lot line.....	432	373	157	962	19
Passage.....	287	252	49	588	11
Shaft.....	26	113	64	203	4
Court.....	53	85	10	148	3
In two or more directions.....	239	68	47	354	7
Alley, street, etc.*.....	2,125	353	27	2,505	49
Total.....	3,194	1,354	576	5,124†	100
Percentage.....	62	27	11	100

* Includes rooms with outlook on porch, roof, or yard.

† Does not include 6 cases in which there was no report as to outlook of rooms.

are either gloomy or dark. This is usually due to the proximity of larger buildings, or to the crowding of two buildings upon one lot.


The close relation of lot overcrowding to the problem of light and ventilation is apparent when we consider the lot-line window—a term used to designate a window opening not more than one foot from the boundary of the lot. Any light or air that this window receives is practically stolen from the next lot. So long as that lot remains vacant, or has on it only a small building, placed, perhaps,

as should always be the case, several feet from the line, the house next door will receive abundant light and air. If, however, the next lot is covered by a house or a factory built to the boundary line, the side rooms in the buildings on both lots are effectually darkened. A striking example of this is to be found in one of the worst buildings in the district, a forty-apartment brick tenement, built somewhat on the dumb-bell plan. The house extends on both sides to the very limits of the lot. To the east is a vacant lot; consequently the rooms on that side of the house are pleasant and sunshiny. On the west, however, is a three-story brick house, the wall of which is within six inches of the wall of the larger dwelling. Not only is the smaller house darkened, but all the middle apartments on that side of the larger house, except the three on the top floor, are sunless and damp, though the window area of most of the rooms is theoretically adequate. Several of these middle apartments are so dark and damp that they cannot be occupied, and the front and rear apartments are made unnecessarily gloomy. It is only a question of time until the apartments on the bright side of the building will be reduced to the same wretched condition as those which have just been described.

This same building furnishes a good example of the failure of a court to supply light and air. In the center is a long, narrow space, 9 feet wide by 67 feet deep. Upon this open rooms from every apartment. Except on the fourth floor, almost all of these rooms are gloomy, for the sun seldom reaches the bottom of the court, and strikes the second story for only a short time each day. The investigator says of this building: "Practically no apartments in this house, except the very small ones in the rear, which open on a narrow yard, are sure of light in every room." In such a place live 30 families, made up of 114 people.

What has been said in the preceding paragraph as to the inadequacy of the court to furnish light and air is true of nearly every court in the district. It is a failure the more inexcusable because it could so easily have been avoided by proper planning of the house, and the adjustment of the width and depth of the court to the size of the building. Even now some of the gloom could be lightened by the simple expedient of whitewashing the walls of the court.

Of windows opening on passages there is little to be said that has not already been pointed out in the discussion of the lot-line window. The passage is, as a rule, a long, narrow opening between



COURT IN A LARGE TENEMENT HOUSE

Forty apartments have rooms opening on this damp, gloomy court

buildings, both of which are too close to the lot line. Often it is covered, and sometimes it is so filled with rubbish that the air it supplies is noxious in the extreme.

There remains, however, the window which opens on the shaft. Under the best of conditions this could not furnish much light, but,

if the shaft were open at top and bottom, it might furnish air. Just how well it does this is perhaps best told by the remarks upon some of the schedule cards.

"The shaft in this house is closed at the top all the time, and at the bottom during the winter, so that there is no ventilation. One toilet on each floor has a window opening on the shaft. The air is sickening."

"The light shaft is air tight above and below. One woman breaks out the panes in the skylight to secure adequate ventilation, and to be relieved from unbearable odors from toilet opening on the shaft."

"This building [one containing 23 apartments] has 4 light shafts, which are supposed to ventilate inner rooms and toilets. All of these are tightly closed at the top by skylights. Air passages are supposed to lead in at the bottom, but these are now closed, and will remain so all winter."

Perhaps no comments as to the kind of work done by the shaft are needed.

No less pressing than the problem of light and ventilation is that of sanitation. In this respect the law makes much less definite provision than in the matter of overcrowding and window space.

It has been enacted that in every tenement house built since 1910, every apartment shall have at least one kitchen sink with running water; and that in all other tenement houses there shall be a sink with running water easily accessible to every apartment which does not contain one.¹ This regulation has been very well obeyed. In only a few cases were hall sinks found; and there was but one instance of a sink without running water. Several times, however, tenants called the attention of the investigators to foul odors rising from the sinks. This was due, presumably, to defective plumbing.

Inasmuch as the law makes no provision for bathtubs, the fact that 324—15 per cent—of the 2,169 apartments are thus equipped is most encouraging. The number ranges from one in Block 13 to 54 in Block 10, which ranks second in number of population and third in density. Block 16, the most densely populated of all, has 44 tubs. It is interesting to remember that the United States Bureau of Labor, surveying somewhat the same district in 1894, found that less than 3 per cent of the families visited had bath-

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 471.

tubs.¹ The City Homes Association in its investigation in 1901 reports about the same proportion for approximately the same district. The last fourteen years have apparently witnessed very creditable progress.

In the matter of toilet accommodations, also, things seem to be undergoing a change for the better. The worst types of privies have almost disappeared, and while, as Table X shows, over one-

TABLE X
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS DEPENDENT ON SPECIFIED
TOILET ARRANGEMENTS

TYPE OF TOILET	NUMBER		PERCENTAGE	
	Families	Persons	Families	Persons
Yard.....	489	2,280	24	22
Hall.....	574	2,894	29	29
Apartment.....	865	4,535	43	45
Basement.....	39	227	2	2
Porch.....	24	117	1	1
Other.....	10	72	1	1
Total.....	2,001	10,125	100	100

fifth of the people in the district, and nearly a quarter of the families, are still dependent upon yard closets, and 29 per cent make use of hall closets, still over 45 per cent now have private toilets within the apartment. Furthermore, most of the yard closets are now so constructed that they will flush readily, and both yard and hall closets are frequently kept locked, so that none but the families to which they belong can make use of them. It is where yard and hall closets are used promiscuously by persons of more than one family, as is too often the case, that a thoroughly bad state of affairs results. The hall toilets are somewhat more objectionable in this respect than the yard toilets. There were only 12 cases in which one hall toilet was used by less than 6 persons, whereas there were 28 cases in which one yard closet was used by that number of people. At the other extreme there were two cases of 28 people using 2 yard closets, and one case of 25 people using 1 yard toilet, while in one instance one hall toilet was used by 31 people. 2 hall

¹ United States Bureau of Labor, *Survey of Great Cities*, p. 101.

toilets served 72 people, and there were several places in which from 30 to 80 people made use of from 2 to 4 hall toilets. Not only is there grave danger to health and morality in such a situation as this, but there is the difficulty—the practical impossibility—of keeping closets so used either clean or in good repair. Table XI

TABLE XI
NUMBER AND TYPE OF TOILETS OF SPECIFIED CLEANLINESS AND REPAIR

CLEANLINESS AND REPAIR OF TOILETS	TYPE OF TOILET									
	Yard		Hall		Apartment		Other†		Total	
	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage
Clean. . . .	87	26	130	33	465	53	13	26	695	42
Dirty. . . .	180	54	204	52	358	41	24	47	766	46
Filthy. . . .	69	20	58	15	50	6	14	27	191	12
Total. . .	336	100	392	100	873*	100	51	100	1,652	100
Good. . . .	70	21	184	47	493	56	18	35	765	46
Fair. . . .	166	49	140	36	296	34	14	27	616	37
Bad. . . .	100	30	68	17	84	10	19	38	271	17
Total. . .	336	100	392	100	873*	100	51	100	1,652	100

* This table does not include 11 toilets for which there was no report as to condition and repair.

† Includes 25 basement and 17 porch toilets.

shows the condition of cleanliness and repair of the different types of toilets. It will be observed at once that the percentage of dirty and filthy toilets, and of toilets in only fair, or in bad repair, is much higher among the hall and yard toilets, which are more or less public, than among the apartment toilets, which are used, as a rule, by only one family. The percentages for basement, porch, and other toilets, which are also semi-public, are based upon too small numbers to be of much value for purposes of comparison. It seems, on the whole, to be easier for people to keep toilets repaired than to keep them clean, a conclusion which is borne out by the fact that the number of toilets in good repair is considerably larger than the number of clean toilets. In a number of cases, however, foul odors seemed to indicate defective plumbing, though the toilet was apparently in fair repair. In the early winter, when the inves-

tigation was made, many toilets were already frozen, and the result was almost incredible filth, especially in the case of the yard closets. In several instances, manure from near-by stables was packed round pipes to keep them from freezing—a drastic remedy, which seemed likely to produce new conditions nearly as bad as those it was meant to alleviate.

One of the worst features of the sanitary arrangements of this neighborhood, which is not revealed by the tables, is the utter lack of any toilet provisions upon a number of premises. This forces tenants in these houses to make use of the toilet in the next house or the next yard, or, occasionally, that in a convenient store or saloon. This system, besides being undesirable from every point of view, works great hardship, especially in case of illness, upon women and children.

The chief point of interest about the apartment toilet, aside from the cleanliness and repair, is the place of entrance. Usually this is from one of the rooms of the apartment. In 76 cases, as Table XII shows, the toilet is entered from the bedroom. This is

TABLE XII
NUMBER OF APARTMENT TOILETS HAVING SPECIFIED ENTRANCE

Entrance from	Number of Toilets
Hall.....	327
Bedroom.....	76
Kitchen.....	411
Living-room, dining-room, or parlor.....	48
Storeroom, washroom, or pantry....	10
Factory, store, or saloon.....	12
Total.....	884

prohibited in tenements built since 1910,¹ and the law seems to be generally complied with. The large number of instances in which the entrance is from the kitchen is worthy of note, as this might easily bring about contamination of the kitchen by the toilet, especially those cases when the toilet is used as a storeroom for food. This was exactly the case in a few cases. The only safe entrance for the

¹ *Revised Building Ordinance*, Art. XV, Sec. 16.

apartment toilet is from the hall. Thus alone can the requisite privacy be maintained and the air of the living-rooms kept uncontaminated.

Another feature of the housing in this neighborhood which, while perhaps less important from the standpoint of health than the foregoing, nevertheless constitutes a grave problem, is the condition of the halls and stairs. Not only are they usually dirty, and often in a dangerous state of dilapidation, but in fully one-half the houses they are absolutely without adequate light. When a hall is so dark that at midday a person standing at the foot of the stairs can see neither the rear of the hall nor the top of the stairs; when, with bright sun shining outside, it is necessary for the investigator to use a pocket flashlight in order to ascend in safety a precipitous flight of stairs, then one may fairly say that conditions are unsafe for the people living in such houses. Time and again the schedule cards bear such notes as these:

"Hall and stairs entirely dark."

"Stairs dark and dirty."

"Hallways in this house very dark."

"Halls very dark. Landlord furnishes no means of lighting them."

"Halls very dark. Never lighted unless tenants place lamps there. Because of the darkness it is unsafe to go to hall toilets, even in the daytime."

The law provides that stair halls in houses built since 1910 shall be lighted either by windows or skylights of specified size;¹ and it also prescribes that in tenements over two stories in height proper lights shall be kept burning all night.² In many houses, however, no lighting fixtures were discernible in the halls; in others, they were so high up that no one could hope to reach them; and on still other places, where they were within reach, they were out of order.

The fact that the Great Fire of 1871 started only a few blocks south of this district, at the corner of Jefferson and DeKoven streets, naturally raises a question as to whether a fire hazard still exists. One cannot but feel that it does; that the majority of these buildings would vanish like straw before an onrush of flame. Every patch of yard is littered with combustible material; everywhere

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 444.

² *Sanitary Code*, Art. XXV, sec. 1422.

there are dilapidated wooden sheds. Only 3 per cent of the houses are provided with fire escapes, for the law does not require buildings of less than four stories in height to be thus equipped.¹ One wonders, however, why some of the large three-story buildings, containing many apartments with very unsatisfactory means of egress, do not need fire escapes quite as much as the four-story tenements. The following note, taken from one of the schedule cards, tells the story of many of the larger houses:

This building [three stories high] is a conspicuous fire trap. All the apartments on the second and third floors [24 in all] are included in one building, and there are but three narrow, winding, old, wooden staircases at the rear for an exit to the ground in case of fire. If the doors of the livery barn in back should be locked, any who escaped from the building by those rear stairs would be entrapped between the building and the stable with no means of reaching the street. There are no fire escapes on the building.

This is, in brief, a picture of the housing in these sixteen blocks: a dreary chronicle of neglected dwellings, overcrowded rooms, inadequate light and ventilation, indifferent sanitary arrangements, a distinct fire hazard. The question that naturally arises is: How much do people pay for such accommodations?

Table XIII shows the number of apartments for which rent is paid, together with the number of rooms in the apartment. There is comparatively little connection between the size of the apartment and the rent; three-room apartments, for example, can be secured at almost any price between \$4.00 and \$30.00, and the range of prices for four-room apartments is even greater. The variation in price for apartments of the same size is perhaps partly accounted for by the position and general character of the apartments: a "through" tenement commands more rent than one in the rear; a bright apartment brings in more money than a gloomy one; an apartment on the first floor is worth more than one on the third. Taken as a whole, the rents are high; only 12 apartments can be had for less than \$5.00, and, even excluding from the totals 92 cases in which the rent quoted was for a large rooming-house, or more than one apartment, or included the rent of a barn, saloon, or store, there remain 234 apartments costing between \$15.00 and \$20.00, 124

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. 1X, sec. 466.

costing between \$20.00 and \$30.00, and 14 which cost over \$30.00. The median rental for all apartments is between \$11.00 and \$11.50, and for four-room apartments, which, here as elsewhere, are predominant, it is between \$12.00 and \$12.50. These

TABLE XIII

NUMBER OF APARTMENTS FOR WHICH SPECIFIED MONTHLY RENTALS ARE PAID AND
NUMBER OF ROOMS IN APARTMENTS*

RENT PER MONTH	NUMBER OF ROOMS									TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 or More	No Report	
Less than \$4.00.....	1	1	2
\$ 4.00 and less than \$ 5.00.....	4	4	1	1	10
\$ 5.00 and less than \$ 6.00.....	1	26	17	2	46
\$ 6.00 and less than \$ 7.00.....	1	77	19	4	1	102
\$ 7.00 and less than \$ 8.00.....	68	61	9	5	1	144
\$ 8.00 and less than \$ 9.00.....	18	93	30	4	1	146
\$ 9.00 and less than \$10.00.....	3	107	41	10	10	171
\$10.00 and less than \$11.00.....	4	77	94	35	7	19	1	237
\$11.00 and less than \$12.00.....	46	62	33	1	142
\$12.00 and less than \$13.00.....	1	33	120	21	3	205
\$13.00 and less than \$14.00.....	13	61	14	6	94
\$14.00 and less than \$15.00.....	6	66	18	5	2	97
\$15.00 and less than \$20.00.....	1	1	4	95	84	31	13	5	234
\$20.00 and less than \$30.00.....	1	39	41	27	12	4	124
\$30.00 and over.....	3	1	3	5	2	14
No report.....	10	22	26	14	3	1	6	2	84
Free rent.....	1	4	6	3	1	15
Number of apartments rented..	5	213	507	659	285	123	55	18	2	1,867
Number of apartments owned..	6	22	55	42	43	27	15	210
Total.....	5	219	529	714	327	166	82	33	2	2,077

* This table does not include 92 apartments whose rental included that of a store, saloon, barn, or of more than one apartment, or of a large rooming-house. All but 10 of the apartments in this classification rent for more than \$20.00 per month.

figures do not vary even when the 92 cases previously mentioned are excluded from the totals. A comparison of the median rental for four-room apartments here with those for apartments of the same size in other districts studied brings out the fact that the figure is higher here than in any other neighborhood except the colored, where racial discrimination tends to raise rents. The high cost of apartments cannot be accounted for by an undue proportion of lodgers in the population, for the percentage is lower here

than in several of the other foreign districts; nor can it be attributed to the large number of lodging-houses and stores, for the figures do not change when these are excluded. At least two-thirds of these apartments, to speak conservatively, are not worth the price that is paid for them. We cannot but conclude that the people here pay, not for good living conditions, but for the privilege of residing in a district in which many evils are made less apparent by the few high-class apartments, and by the large brick houses and busy stores of Halsted Street and Blue Island Avenue, which serve to fix upon the whole section a false front of prosperity.

MEDIAN RENTALS FOR FOUR-ROOM APARTMENTS IN TEN DISTRICTS

District	Median
Jewish	\$10.00—\$10.50
Bohemian	8.00— 8.50
Polish	8.00— 8.50
Stockyards	8.00— 8.50
South Chicago	9.00— 9.50
Colored	12.00— 12.50
Italian	8.50— 9.00
Slovak	9.00— 9.50
Lithuanian	10.00— 10.50
Greek and Italian (19th ward)	12.00— 12.50

It has already been said that in this neighborhood there are many evidences of general neglect. Anyone who doubts this needs only to look at the condition of the backyards and vacant lots. Many of the lots are used as dumps. In one place the surface of the lot has been raised about three feet above the street level by the refuse which has been emptied upon it. The yards are in quite as bad condition. Every kind of filth is to be found there—ashes, garbage, broken boxes, dead animals. Prowling round in such rubbish are hens without number, many of them having right of way within the house as well as without, for they were found in several kitchens, and in one third floor bedroom. Several pigs were seen, one of which, at the time of the investigation's visit, was disappearing into the back room or a saloon. There were also four goats—one kept in a kitchen—two cows, a lamb, rabbits, ducks.

pigeons, dogs of varying ferocity, and cats by the hundred. To the filth created by such animals must be added that from the stables which are to be found in the rear of many of the lots and under some of the houses. The present law prohibits the keeping of horses, cows, sheep, or goats in tenements;² the interests of health and cleanliness, however, demand stricter regulation of the keeping of all domestic animals in such confined quarters in a crowded neighborhood.

The streets, in decided contrast to what they were a few years ago, are all fairly well paved. In the matter of cleanliness, however, they still leave much to be desired. Several of the alleys have been paved, but this has had little effect upon their general condition for, whether paved or unpaved, they are all littered with trash and foul with garbage and manure. However, comparing them as they are now with descriptions of what they were twenty or even ten years ago, we cannot but feel encouraged at the progress that has been made.

The effort that is constantly put forth by the people themselves to have attractive, well-kept homes is exemplified by the case of the Greek painter who, during a period of unemployment, cal-cimined the walls of his apartment, and decorated them with elaborate stencilings, because he "liked to see things look nice." It is not easy to keep a house spotless and orderly within, when without there is little but dirt and utter ugliness. In the summer the dreariness of the streets is relieved by an occasional window-box full of geraniums, by tiny strips of yard planted with flaunting sunflowers or climbing morning-glories. Once in a while a little vegetable garden, with some beans, and perhaps a few stalks of corn, is to be found. Except for the few saplings on Gilpin Place, however, and the shrubbery in Hull House Court, there are no trees in the district. No one who is familiar with this neighborhood can feel that the people who live here have any inherent preference for crowding and squalor. Better quarters are beyond the means of the majority; but, severe though the economic pressure is, the worst tenements, which could be had at a very low price, are left unoccupied.

² *Sanitary Code*, Art. XXII, sec. 1386.

thrown there for want of any better place, rubbish of every description, filth from the stables and yard closets fill this so-called yard, which serves as well for the home of various animals, and as the playground for many little children. Where such conditions exist, lot overcrowding is inevitable. Table V shows that almost one-tenth of the lots are entirely covered, while one-fifth are more than 90 per cent covered. The law of 1910 provides that in no event shall any existing house be altered, or any new house

TABLE V
NUMBER OF LOTS COVERED A SPECIFIED
PERCENTAGE

Percentage of Lot Covered	Number of Lots	Percentage of Total
Less than 50.	13	3
50 and less than 60. .	84	17
60 and less than 70. .	58	12
70 and less than 80. .	114	23
80 and less than 90. .	125	25
90 and less than 100. .	55	11
100.	47	9
Total.	496	100

constructed, so as to cover more than 90 per cent of a corner lot or more than 75 per cent of any other lot.¹ And yet, even among the comparatively small number of houses erected since this law went into effect, there are several instances in which the lot is entirely covered. It is generally understood that the standard prescribed by law is the minimum acceptable to the community; but in this neighborhood 45 per cent of the lots are so covered as to fall below even this minimum legal standard. When this condition of lot overcrowding is considered in connection with the high density figure, it is apparent that the problem of congestion is indeed a serious one, for thousands of people, recruited from the elements of the population most susceptible to bad conditions, are so huddled together that cleanly, healthy living is made practically impossible.

Worse than apartment conditions are better found in tenements than in districts previously studied. Here there is no problem of

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 110.

the cellar or the attic apartment, and there are very few occupied basements. Of all the apartments 97 per cent are above street level. Furthermore, 828 of the apartments—38 per cent—extend through the house. Only 4 per cent are middle apartments, while 28 per cent are front and 30 per cent rear apartments. The large number of through apartments makes for good light and ventilation, as well as for increased privacy.

Table VI shows the distribution of families of specified sizes among the different apartments. Here, as elsewhere in Chicago,

TABLE VI
NUMBER OF PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN APARTMENTS HAVING A
SPECIFIED NUMBER OF ROOMS

NUMBER OF ROOMS	NUMBER OF PERSONS												VA- CANT OR NO RE- PORT	TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12 or More		
1.....	1	3	2	2	1	...	1	10	10
2.....	18	70	56	32	16	10	2	3	1	19	227
3.....	14	82	92	78	95	69	39	14	6	2	1	...	56	548
4.....	6	50	78	106	114	121	96	54	29	16	3	2	63	738
5.....	1	22	38	52	57	45	42	25	7	5	3	6	32	335
6.....	4	7	24	19	23	21	30	12	12	10	2	6	8	178
7.....	...	6	11	10	9	12	13	8	5	5	4	1	3	87
8 or more....	1	...	3	4	1	4	...	6	5	2	1	14	3	44
No report....	1	1	2
Total.....	45	240	304	303	316	282	223	122	65	40	14	30	185	2,169

the four-room apartment is most common. There seems to be no typical family, those having three, four, or five members being almost equally numerous.

In any neighborhood such as this, where there is more than one person for every room, it is inevitable that many sleeping-rooms should be overcrowded. The law attempts to eliminate this by definite regulations as to the amount of air space with which each person must be provided. The section reads as follows: "No room in any tenement house shall be occupied so that the allowance of air to each adult living or sleeping in each room shall be less than 400 cubic feet, or less than 200 cubic feet for each person under 12."¹

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 447.

When we consider that Professor Huxley, working among the East London tenement population, estimated that a minimum air space of 809 cubic feet was necessary for each adult, it is evident that this is at best a low standard. Yet, here in Chicago, even this slight requirement, unencumbered by any provision for thorough ventilation, is not enforced. Out of 4,564 occupied bedrooms in this district, 1,636, or 36 per cent, of the total, were in use in direct violation of the law (see Table VII). The mere statement of the figures, however, gives little idea of the bad conditions which actually exist. Some of these overcrowded rooms are without windows; many others, though provided with windows, get practically no fresh air, and are either gloomy or dark. A few examples, chosen at random, may serve to illustrate this. In one case four children were found sleeping in a room which had only 722 cubic feet of air space. The room was windowless and quite dark, the only light and air coming from a small transom opening into the living-room. The parents of these children slept in a room which, though light, had scarcely three-fourths as much air space as was necessary. In another instance, five lodgers and a child were crowded into a room which could legally have been occupied by only three adults. Again, in a room large enough for only two adults slept three small children, an older boy and a girl, and their grandmother. The older girl and the grandmother occupied the only bed, and the others contented themselves with "shake-downs," which completely covered the floor of the small room. Perhaps the worst case of all was that in which what was practically only a wide shelf over a basement stairway had been walled up until a tiny light-proof, air-proof room had been constructed. In this box, containing only 125 cubic feet of air space, slept three men.

It is, however, not only in rooms that are illegally overcrowded that poor conditions exist. Many other rooms were found which, though satisfactory in the eyes of the law, are undesirable sleeping-places. There is the room which is made by partitioning off the rear part of a store and then used as bedroom, living-room, and kitchen for the entire family. There is the room which is in use by day and by night, in which the bed is rarely empty, and the air is seldom quite fresh. There is the combination storeroom and

TABLE VII
NUMBER OF PERSONS SLEEPING IN ROOMS OF SPECIFIED CUBIC FEET CONTENTS
Numbers above the Heavy Rule Represent Cases of Illegal Overcrowding

CONTENTS OF ROOMS IN CUBIC FEET	NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED BY												TOTAL
	One Child	One Adult*	One Adult, One Child	Two Adults	Two Adults, One Child	Three Adults	Three Adults, One Child	Four Adults	Four Adults, One Child	Five Adults	Five Adults, One Child	Six, Seven, or Eight Adults	
Less than 400	1	29	4	16	5	2	57
400, less than 600	19	305	81	293	94	33	3	828
600, less than 800	19	319	99	459	182	95	7	7	1	1	1,189
800, less than 1,000	14	179	47	270	113	60	16	7	4	710
1,000, less than 1,200	10	134	20	162	75	53	7	14	2	2	479
1,200, less than 1,400	18	140	23	148	74	74	16	12	1	1	2	509
1,400, less than 1,600	23	91	28	129	51	45	10	6	0	1	384
1,600, less than 1,800	6	53	15	55	31	32	8	5	1	1	1	1	209
1,800, less than 2,000	3	22	8	21	6	15	3	6	2	2	1	89
Over 2,000	7	22	5	29	10	16	5	7	3	1	5	110
Total.....	120	1,294	330	1,582	641	425	75	64	14	9	3	7	4,564†

Number of rooms illegally occupied,
1,936—36 per cent†

Number of rooms illegally occupied,
1,636—36 per cent†

* The term "one adult" is used wherever 400 cubic feet of air are required; it may mean either one adult or two children under twelve.

† This does not include 372 bedrooms in vacant apartments, 191 unoccupied bedrooms in occupied apartments, and 3 rooms for which there was no report as to contents.

‡ The percentage of violations has been computed upon the number of occupied rooms.

bedroom, such as that described in the following note: "This room contains, besides two lodgers, two barrels of wine and hundreds of quart bottles. The place is gloomy, and the whole apartment reeks with the smell of wine." Finally, there is the room which is used by night as sleeping-room and by day as dining-room, living-room; or, most common of all, as kitchen. The grave menace to health



ROOM CONTAINING LESS THAN 600 CUBIC FEET OF AIR SPACE

Two adults, two children, and a baby sleep here

in such arrangements, the moral danger and breaking down of standards resulting from the total lack of privacy, especially where, as is too often the case here, there are lodgers in every available corner, need scarcely be pointed out.

Quite as important as the prevention of overcrowding, from the standpoint of healthful living conditions, is the provision of adequate light and ventilation. Here again the law prescribes a standard for all houses: in every tenement built since 1910, every room must have a window or windows equal to one-tenth of the floor

area, and none of such required windows shall have an area of less than 10 square feet.¹ Furthermore, no room in any tenement is to be occupied for living purposes unless it contains a window whose area is not less than one-twelfth of the floor area.²

Definite though these provisions are, they are disregarded. Of the 5,130 bedrooms—no other rooms were measured—189 had no windows. One of these windowless rooms, it is interesting to note, is in a building which has been erected since 1910. In 260 rooms the window area was less than 8 per cent of the floor area—a distinct violation of the provisions of the code; and in 328 rooms, the window area, though over 8 per cent, was under 10 per cent of the floor area. This makes a total of 588 rooms, 12 per cent of the entire number, which fall below the standard set by the law of 1910. Furthermore, of the rooms having windows, 1,763, over 35 per cent, are either gloomy or dark. This figure does not include the rooms with no windows, some of which receive light from transoms, skylights, or adjoining rooms. Table VIII shows

TABLE VIII
CONDITION OF ROOMS WITH LESS THAN TEN
SQUARE FEET OF WINDOW AREA

Condition of Rooms	Number	Percentage
Light.....	386	37
Gloomy.....	385	36
Dark.....	280	27
Total*.....	1,051	100

* This total includes 189 windowless rooms, of which 22 were light, 57 gloomy, and 110 dark. There were also 8 cases, not included in the total, in which there was no report as to the condition of the rooms.

the condition of rooms having less than 10 square feet of window area. It is interesting to note that these rooms, though only 20 per cent of the total number, furnish rather more than a quarter of the gloomy rooms and over half of the dark rooms. It is obvious from this that a room which is to receive adequate light must have a window of at least 10 square feet in area, and yet several rooms in houses built since 1910 fail to comply with this provision of the law for new tenements.

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 448.

² *Ibid.*, sec. 475.

Perhaps the determining factor in the question of whether a room shall be light, gloomy, or dark is the outlook of the windows. A room whose windows open directly upon the outer air, and face a street, a yard, or even an alley, will probably be light, and fairly well ventilated. However, less than a quarter of the bedroom windows here open on the street, and little more than 5 per cent on an alley. Adding to these rooms the 12 per cent that open on a yard, the comparatively small number which look upon a roof or a porch, and those with two or more windows facing in different directions, we find that about 56 per cent of all the rooms considered have a fair chance for adequate light and air. It is only a "fair" chance, however, for, even though these rooms do open directly upon the outer air, a surprisingly large number, as Table IX shows,

TABLE IX
OUTLOOK OF LIGHT, GLOOMY, AND DARK ROOMS

OUTLOOK OF ROOMS	CONDITION OF ROOMS			TOTAL	
	Light	Gloomy	Dark	Number	Percentage
No outlook (windowless).....	22	57	110	189	4
Interior windows (room or hall).....	10	53	112	175	3
Lot line.....	432	373	157	962	19
Passage.....	287	252	49	588	11
Shaft.....	26	113	64	203	4
Court.....	53	85	10	148	3
In two or more directions.....	239	68	47	354	7
Alley, street, etc.*.....	2,125	353	27	2,505	49
Total.....	3,194	1,354	576	5,124†	100
Percentage.....	62	27	11	100

* Includes rooms with outlook on porch, roof, or yard.

† Does not include 6 cases in which there was no report as to outlook of rooms.

are either gloomy or dark. This is usually due to the proximity of larger buildings, or to the crowding of two buildings upon one lot.


The close relation of lot overcrowding to the problem of light and ventilation is apparent when we consider the lot-line window. Formerly used to designate a window opening not more than one foot from the lot line, it is now defined as a window opening in a wall which is practically stolen from the next lot. So long as that lot is vacant, or has on it only a small building, placed, perhaps,

as should always be the case, several feet from the line, the house next door will receive abundant light and air. If, however, the next lot is covered by a house or a factory built to the boundary line, the side rooms in the buildings on both lots are effectually darkened. A striking example of this is to be found in one of the worst buildings in the district, a forty-apartment brick tenement, built somewhat on the dumb-bell plan. The house extends on both sides to the very limits of the lot. To the east is a vacant lot; consequently the rooms on that side of the house are pleasant and sunshiny. On the west, however, is a three-story brick house, the wall of which is within six inches of the wall of the larger dwelling. Not only is the smaller house darkened, but all the middle apartments on that side of the larger house, except the three on the top floor, are sunless and damp, though the window area of most of the rooms is theoretically adequate. Several of these middle apartments are so dark and damp that they cannot be occupied, and the front and rear apartments are made unnecessarily gloomy. It is only a question of time until the apartments on the bright side of the building will be reduced to the same wretched condition as those which have just been described.

This same building furnishes a good example of the failure of a court to supply light and air. In the center is a long, narrow space, 9 feet wide by 67 feet deep. Upon this open rooms from every apartment. Except on the fourth floor, almost all of these rooms are gloomy, for the sun seldom reaches the bottom of the court, and strikes the second story for only a short time each day. The investigator says of this building: "Practically no apartments in this house, except the very small ones in the rear, which open on a narrow yard, are sure of light in every room." In such a place live 30 families, made up of 114 people.

What has been said in the preceding paragraph as to the inadequacy of the court to furnish light and air is true of nearly every court in the district. It is a failure the more inexcusable because it could so easily have been avoided by proper planning of the house, and the adjustment of the width and depth of the court to the size of the building. Even now some of the gloom could be lightened by the simple expedient of whitewashing the walls of the court.

Of windows opening on passages there is little to be said that has not already been pointed out in the discussion of the lot-line window. The passage is, as a rule, a long, narrow opening between



COURT IN A LARGE TENEMENT HOUSE

Forty apartments have rooms opening on this damp, gloomy court

buildings, both of which are too close to the lot line. Often it is covered, and sometimes it is so filled with rubbish that the air it supplies is noxious in the extreme.

There remains, however, the window which opens on the shaft. Under the best of conditions this could not furnish much light, but,

if the shaft were open at top and bottom, it might furnish air. Just how well it does this is perhaps best told by the remarks upon some of the schedule cards.

"The shaft in this house is closed at the top all the time, and at the bottom during the winter, so that there is no ventilation. One toilet on each floor has a window opening on the shaft. The air is sickening."

"The light shaft is air tight above and below. One woman breaks out the panes in the skylight to secure adequate ventilation, and to be relieved from unbearable odors from toilet opening on the shaft."

"This building [one containing 23 apartments] has 4 light shafts, which are supposed to ventilate inner rooms and toilets. All of these are tightly closed at the top by skylights. Air passages are supposed to lead in at the bottom, but these are now closed, and will remain so all winter."

Perhaps no comments as to the kind of work done by the shaft are needed.

No less pressing than the problem of light and ventilation is that of sanitation. In this respect the law makes much less definite provision than in the matter of overcrowding and window space.

It has been enacted that in every tenement house built since 1910, every apartment shall have at least one kitchen sink with running water; and that in all other tenement houses there shall be a sink with running water easily accessible to every apartment which does not contain one.¹ This regulation has been very well obeyed. In only a few cases were hall sinks found; and there was but one instance of a sink without running water. Several times, however, tenants called the attention of the investigators to foul odors rising from the sinks. This was due, presumably, to defective plumbing.

Inasmuch as the law makes no provision for bathtubs, the fact that 324—15 per cent—of the 2,169 apartments are thus equipped is most encouraging. The number ranges from one in Block 13 to 54 in Block 10, which ranks second in number of population and third in density. Block 16, the most densely populated of all, has 44 tubs. It is interesting to remember that the United States Bureau of Labor, surveying somewhat the same district in 1894, found that less than 3 per cent of the families visited had bath-

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 471.

tubs.¹ The City Homes Association in its investigation in 1901 reports about the same proportion for approximately the same district. The last fourteen years have apparently witnessed very creditable progress.

In the matter of toilet accommodations, also, things seem to be undergoing a change for the better. The worst types of privies have almost disappeared, and while, as Table X shows, over one-

TABLE X
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS DEPENDENT ON SPECIFIED
TOILET ARRANGEMENTS

TYPE OF TOILET	NUMBER		PERCENTAGE	
	Families	Persons	Families	Persons
Yard.....	489	2,280	24	22
Hall.....	574	2,894	29	29
Apartment.....	865	4,535	43	45
Basement.....	39	227	2	2
Porch.....	24	117	1	1
Other.....	10	72	1	1
Total.....	2,001	10,125	100	100

fifth of the people in the district, and nearly a quarter of the families, are still dependent upon yard closets, and 29 per cent make use of hall closets, still over 45 per cent now have private toilets within the apartment. Furthermore, most of the yard closets are now so constructed that they will flush readily, and both yard and hall closets are frequently kept locked, so that none but the families to which they belong can make use of them. It is where yard and hall closets are used promiscuously by persons of more than one family, as is too often the case, that a thoroughly bad state of affairs results. The hall toilets are somewhat more objectionable in this respect than the yard toilets. There were only 12 cases in which one hall toilet was used by less than 6 persons, whereas there were 28 cases in which one yard closet was used by that number of people. At the other extreme there were two cases of 33 and 24 persons using 1 hall closet and one case of 35 people using 1 yard toilet, while in one instance one hall toilet was used by 31 people. A hall

¹ United States Bureau of Labor, *Survey of Great Cities*, p. 141.

toilets served 72 people, and there were several places in which from 30 to 80 people made use of from 2 to 4 hall toilets. Not only is there grave danger to health and morality in such a situation as this, but there is the difficulty—the practical impossibility—of keeping closets so used either clean or in good repair. Table XI

TABLE XI
NUMBER AND TYPE OF TOILETS OF SPECIFIED CLEANLINESS AND REPAIR

CLEANLINESS AND REPAIR OF TOILETS	TYPE OF TOILET									
	Yard		Hall		Apartment		Other†		Total	
	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage
Clean	87	26	130	33	465	53	13	26	695	42
Dirty	180	54	204	52	358	41	24	47	766	46
Filthy	69	20	58	15	50	6	14	27	191	12
Total . . .	336	100	392	100	873*	100	51	100	1,652	100
Good	70	21	184	47	493	56	18	35	765	46
Fair	166	49	140	36	296	34	14	27	616	37
Bad	100	30	68	17	84	10	19	38	271	17
Total . . .	336	100	392	100	873*	100	51	100	1,652	100

* This table does not include 11 toilets for which there was no report as to condition and repair.

† Includes 25 basement and 17 porch toilets.

shows the condition of cleanliness and repair of the different types of toilets. It will be observed at once that the percentage of dirty and filthy toilets, and of toilets in only fair, or in bad repair, is much higher among the hall and yard toilets, which are more or less public, than among the apartment toilets, which are used, as a rule, by only one family. The percentages for basement, porch, and other toilets, which are also semi-public, are based upon too small numbers to be of much value for purposes of comparison. It seems, on the whole, to be easier for people to keep toilets repaired than to keep them clean, a conclusion which is borne out by the fact that the number of toilets in good repair is considerably larger than the number of clean toilets. In a number of cases, however, foul odors seemed to indicate defective plumbing, though the toilet was apparently in fair repair. In the early winter, when the inves-

tigation was made, many toilets were already frozen, and the result was almost incredible filth, especially in the case of the yard closets. In several instances, manure from near-by stables was packed round pipes to keep them from freezing—a drastic remedy, which seemed likely to produce new conditions nearly as bad as those it was meant to alleviate.

One of the worst features of the sanitary arrangements of this neighborhood, which is not revealed by the tables, is the utter lack of any toilet provisions upon a number of premises. This forces tenants in these houses to make use of the toilet in the next house or the next yard, or, occasionally, that in a convenient store or saloon. This system, besides being undesirable from every point of view, works great hardship, especially in case of illness, upon women and children.

The chief point of interest about the apartment toilet, aside from the cleanliness and repair, is the place of entrance. Usually this is from one of the rooms of the apartment. In 76 cases, as Table XII shows, the toilet is entered from the bedroom. This is

TABLE XII
NUMBER OF APARTMENT TOILETS HAVING SPECIFIED ENTRANCE

Entrance from	Number of Toilets
Hall.....	327
Bedroom.....	76
Kitchen.....	411
Living-room, dining-room, or parlor.....	48
Storeroom, washroom, or pantry...	10
Factory, store, or saloon.....	12
Total.....	884

prohibited in tenements built since 1910,¹ and the law seems to be generally complied with. The large number of instances in which the entrance is from the kitchen is worthy of note, as this might easily bring about conditions as prejudicial to health as those which arise when the toilet is used as a storeroom for food. This was actually the fact in a few cases. The only safe entrance for the

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. 12, sec. 469.

apartment toilet is from the hall. Thus alone can the requisite privacy be maintained and the air of the living-rooms kept uncontaminated.

Another feature of the housing in this neighborhood which, while perhaps less important from the standpoint of health than the foregoing, nevertheless constitutes a grave problem, is the condition of the halls and stairs. Not only are they usually dirty, and often in a dangerous state of dilapidation, but in fully one-half the houses they are absolutely without adequate light. When a hall is so dark that at midday a person standing at the foot of the stairs can see neither the rear of the hall nor the top of the stairs; when, with bright sun shining outside, it is necessary for the investigator to use a pocket flashlight in order to ascend in safety a precipitous flight of stairs, then one may fairly say that conditions are unsafe for the people living in such houses. Time and again the schedule cards bear such notes as these:

"Hall and stairs entirely dark."

"Stairs dark and dirty."

"Hallways in this house very dark."

"Halls very dark. Landlord furnishes no means of lighting them."

"Halls very dark. Never lighted unless tenants place lamps there. Because of the darkness it is unsafe to go to hall toilets, even in the daytime."

The law provides that stair halls in houses built since 1910 shall be lighted either by windows or skylights of specified size;¹ and it also prescribes that in tenements over two stories in height proper lights shall be kept burning all night.² In many houses, however, no lighting fixtures were discernible in the halls; in others, they were so high up that no one could hope to reach them; and on still other places, where they were within reach, they were out of order.

The fact that the Great Fire of 1871 started only a few blocks south of this district, at the corner of Jefferson and DeKoven streets, naturally raises a question as to whether a fire hazard still exists. One cannot but feel that it does; that the majority of these buildings would vanish like straw before an onrush of flame. Every patch of yard is littered with combustible material; everywhere

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 444.

² *Sanitary Code*, Art. XXV, sec. 1422.

there are dilapidated wooden sheds. Only 3 per cent of the houses are provided with fire escapes, for the law does not require buildings of less than four stories in height to be thus equipped.¹ One wonders, however, why some of the large three-story buildings, containing many apartments with very unsatisfactory means of egress, do not need fire escapes quite as much as the four-story tenements. The following note, taken from one of the schedule cards, tells the story of many of the larger houses:

This building [three stories high] is a conspicuous fire trap. All the apartments on the second and third floors [24 in all] are included in one building, and there are but three narrow, winding, old, wooden staircases at the rear for an exit to the ground in case of fire. If the doors of the livery barn in back should be locked, any who escaped from the building by those rear stairs would be entrapped between the building and the stable with no means of reaching the street. There are no fire escapes on the building.

This is, in brief, a picture of the housing in these sixteen blocks: a dreary chronicle of neglected dwellings, overcrowded rooms, inadequate light and ventilation, indifferent sanitary arrangements, a distinct fire hazard. The question that naturally arises is: How much do people pay for such accommodations?

Table XIII shows the number of apartments for which rent is paid, together with the number of rooms in the apartment. There is comparatively little connection between the size of the apartment and the rent; three-room apartments, for example, can be secured at almost any price between \$4.00 and \$30.00, and the range of prices for four-room apartments is even greater. The variation in price for apartments of the same size is perhaps partly accounted for by the position and general character of the apartments: a "through" tenement commands more rent than one in the rear; a bright apartment brings in more money than a gloomy one; an apartment on the first floor is worth more than one on the third. Taken as a whole, the rents are high; only 12 apartments can be had for less than \$5.00, and, even excluding from the totals 92 cases in which the rent quoted was for a large rooming-house, or more than one apartment, or included the rent of a barn, saloon, or store, there remain 234 apartments costing between \$15.00 and \$20.00, 124

¹ *Revised Building Ordinances*, Art. IX, sec. 466.

costing between \$20.00 and \$30.00, and 14 which cost over \$30.00. The median rental for all apartments is between \$11.00 and \$11.50, and for four-room apartments, which, here as elsewhere, are predominant, it is between \$12.00 and \$12.50. These

TABLE XIII

NUMBER OF APARTMENTS FOR WHICH SPECIFIED MONTHLY RENTALS ARE PAID AND
NUMBER OF ROOMS IN APARTMENTS*

RENT PER MONTH	NUMBER OF ROOMS									TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 or More	No Re- port	
Less than \$4.00.....	1	1	2
\$ 4.00 and less than \$ 5.00....	4	4	1	1	10
\$ 5.00 and less than \$ 6.00....	1	26	17	2	46
\$ 6.00 and less than \$ 7.00....	1	77	19	4	1	102
\$ 7.00 and less than \$ 8.00....	68	61	9	5	1	144
\$ 8.00 and less than \$ 9.00....	18	93	30	4	1	146
\$ 9.00 and less than \$10.00....	3	107	41	10	10	171
\$10.00 and less than \$11.00....	4	77	94	35	7	19	1	237
\$11.00 and less than \$12.00....	46	62	33	1	142
\$12.00 and less than \$13.00....	1	33	120	21	27	3	205
\$13.00 and less than \$14.00....	13	61	14	6	94
\$14.00 and less than \$15.00....	6	66	18	5	2	97
\$15.00 and less than \$20.00....	1	1	4	95	84	31	13	5	234
\$20.00 and less than \$30.00....	1	39	41	27	12	4	124
\$30.00 and over.....	3	1	3	5	2	14
No report.....	10	22	26	14	3	1	6	2	84
Free rent.....	1	4	6	3	1	15
Number of apartments rented..	5	213	507	659	285	123	55	18	2	1,867
Number of apartments owned..	6	22	55	42	43	27	15	210
Total.....	5	219	529	714	327	166	82	33	2	2,077

* This table does not include 92 apartments whose rental included that of a store, saloon, barn, or of more than one apartment, or of a large rooming-house. All but 10 of the apartments in this classification rent for more than \$20.00 per month.

figures do not vary even when the 92 cases previously mentioned are excluded from the totals. A comparison of the median rental for four-room apartments here with those for apartments of the same size in other districts studied brings out the fact that the figure is higher here than in any other neighborhood except the colored, where racial discrimination tends to raise rents. The high cost of apartments cannot be accounted for by an undue proportion of lodgers in the population, for the percentage is lower here

than in several of the other foreign districts; nor can it be attributed to the large number of lodging-houses and stores, for the figures do not change when these are excluded. At least two-thirds of these apartments, to speak conservatively, are not worth the price that is paid for them. We cannot but conclude that the people here pay, not for good living conditions, but for the privilege of residing in a district in which many evils are made less apparent by the few high-class apartments, and by the large brick houses and busy stores of Halsted Street and Blue Island Avenue, which serve to fix upon the whole section a false front of prosperity.

MEDIAN RENTALS FOR FOUR-ROOM APARTMENTS IN TEN DISTRICTS

District	Median
Jewish	\$10.00—\$10.50
Bohemian	8.00— 8.50
Polish	8.00— 8.50
Stockyards	8.00— 8.50
South Chicago	9.00— 9.50
Colored	12.00— 12.50
Italian	8.50— 9.00
Slovak	9.00— 9.50
Lithuanian	10.00— 10.50
Greek and Italian (19th ward)	12.00— 12.50

It has already been said that in this neighborhood there are many evidences of general neglect. Anyone who doubts this needs only to look at the condition of the backyards and vacant lots. Many of the lots are used as dumps. In one place the surface of the lot has been raised about three feet above the street level by the refuse which has been emptied upon it. The yards are in quite as bad condition. Every kind of filth is to be found there—ashes, garbage, broken boxes, dead animals. Prowling round in such rubbish are hens without number, many of them having right of way within the house as well as without, for they were found in several kitchens, and in one third floor bedroom. Several pigs were seen, one of which had been killed and its carcass was being disposed of by a saloon. There were also four cats, one kept in a kitchen, two cows, a lamb, rabbits, ducks,

pigeons, dogs of varying ferocity, and cats by the hundred. To the filth created by such animals must be added that from the stables which are to be found in the rear of many of the lots and under some of the houses. The present law prohibits the keeping of horses, cows, sheep, or goats in tenements;¹ the interests of health and cleanliness, however, demand stricter regulation of the keeping of all domestic animals in such confined quarters in a crowded neighborhood.

The streets, in decided contrast to what they were a few years ago, are all fairly well paved. In the matter of cleanliness, however, they still leave much to be desired. Several of the alleys have been paved, but this has had little effect upon their general condition for, whether paved or unpaved, they are all littered with trash and foul with garbage and manure. However, comparing them as they are now with descriptions of what they were twenty or even ten years ago, we cannot but feel encouraged at the progress that has been made.

The effort that is constantly put forth by the people themselves to have attractive, well-kept homes is exemplified by the case of the Greek painter who, during a period of unemployment, cal-cimined the walls of his apartment, and decorated them with elaborate stenciling, because he "liked to see things look nice." It is not easy to keep a house spotless and orderly within, when without there is little but dirt and utter ugliness. In the summer the dreariness of the streets is relieved by an occasional window-box full of geraniums, by tiny strips of yard planted with flaunting sunflowers or climbing morning-glories. Once in a while a little vegetable garden, with some beans, and perhaps a few stalks of corn, is to be found. Except for the few saplings on Gilpin Place, however, and the shrubbery in Hull House Court, there are no trees in the district. No one who is familiar with this neighborhood can feel that the people who live here have any inherent preference for crowding and squalor. Better quarters are beyond the means of the majority; but, severe though the economic pressure is, the worst tenements, which could be had at a very low price, are left unoccupied.

¹ *Sanitary Code*, Art. XXII, sec. 1386.

The point at issue is, however, not so much the extent of progress in the past as the possibility of assuring it for the future. The first step in this direction is the adequate enforcement of the existing law. As matters stand at present, jurisdiction is divided between the Building and the Health departments. The latter, though efficiently organized and administered, has never received an appropriation large enough to support an adequate corps of inspectors. This means that systematic, house-to-house canvassing, by which alone the law could be enforced, is out of the question. Apparently the Building Department is likewise hampered; for the number of violations of the law in tenements built since 1910 alone indicates a very hasty examination of plans and an inspection of finished buildings which is merely nominal.

The existing law might well be amended on several points. There should be stricter regulation of the minimum distance permissible between the house and the lot line. More definite provisions as to the amount and character of toilet accommodations in buildings without apartment toilets are desirable, as is an absolute prohibition against the keeping of fowls and domestic animals. Finally, all three-story buildings containing more than 6 apartments should be required to have fire escapes.

Better service on the part of other city departments than those mentioned would also relieve conditions. Many complaints were made that garbage collections were infrequent; and the piles of garbage that are to be found everywhere seem to justify this charge. Furthermore, a higher standard of cleanliness on the part of the street-cleaning department would greatly simplify the problem of keeping houses clean and healthful.

In these sixteen blocks, where almost half of the lots are more than 80 per cent covered, where only a fifth of the houses are in good repair, where 1,636 out of 4,564 occupied bedrooms are overcrowded, where there are 189 bedrooms that are windowless, and 1,930 that are either gloomy or dark, live 10,125 people. Over 3,000 of these are little children, growing up in an environment which is full of menace to their health and to their future civic usefulness. The problems connected with the assimilation of the immigrant, of which we hear so much, might be more advanta-

geously dealt with by the improvement of living conditions here than by the passage of measures designed to restrict immigration.

No phase of community life is more closely connected with its welfare than housing. Low educational standards, high mortality and morbidity, industrial inefficiency, crime—all are rooted in poor living conditions. Those described in this article are not peculiar to any district, nor are they exceptionally bad. The same picture could be painted for many wards in the city; but often far more vivid colors would be needed. "Every society is judged and survives," a prominent English statesman remarked, "by the material and moral minimum it prescribes to its members." A city owes its people a chance to live in clean and healthful surroundings. Chicago has a good law, which, if complied with, would do much to insure this. In justice to everyone, it should be enforced.

INCOME AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SERVICE

VICTOR S. YARROS

Chicago, Illinois

A firm belief in progress is implied in the familiar quotation, "No question is settled until it is settled right." That so many men—that, indeed, the average man—should unhesitatingly subscribe to that assertion or generalization is indisputably a significant fact, one that attests the ingrained belief in the idea of progress. Taking a concrete case, if we should say that the interest question will never be settled until it is settled right, would any thoughtful man venture to challenge the affirmation? Nothing is more striking in the features of our age than the universal acceptance of the principle of service—that is, of service as the only basis of reward or title thereto. The complexities of our industrial and social order are such that our definitions of "work" or of "service" must necessarily be broader and subtler than those of a primitive and simple community; but the principle is not affected by the superficial complexities. More and more generally is the doctrine accepted as a matter of course that he who does not work or usefully serve has no right to support, to income. If this be not proof of moral advance, no such proof is in truth conceivable.

Professor Scott Nearing has in a manner wholly modern reopened the whole question of title to income. In his book on *Income*, as well as in his recent contribution to this *Journal*, he has issued a challenge to the economic and ethical champions of "property income," and particularly of interest. He would be the last man on earth to claim that he has given this subject exhaustive or searching treatment. But he has boldly and vigorously raised a question that too many writers and thinkers had forgotten. To some of his incidental views exception may be taken; but his facts and his figures are so impressive that the most complacent and Panglossian of publicists will find it impossible to ignore them or dismiss them with the stereotyped platitudes.

Billions, Mr. Nearing shows, are claimed and collected annually by holders of titles to property in various shapes or forms. These proprietors, in the great majority of cases, render no palpable service to society; or, if they do render such service, they receive compensation for it apart from the income they derive from their "investments." What are these billions of "property income" paid *for*? What is society getting for them? If society gets nothing in return, then property income is sheer robbery, as Proudhon maintained. If society gets something, then, of course, the principle of service is not violated. But what is that something?

Professor Nearing has briefly examined and disposed of certain conventional theories of property income. The present writer wishes in this paper to pursue a somewhat different line of argument and to analyze other theories that have been advanced to justify interest. Some conclusions may be ventured upon at the close.

There are three main sources of property income. Two of them, profit and rent, will not detain us. Profit is defined as the wage of the enterprising capitalist, the employer of labor. The normal rate of profit in business is not excessive, and where the employer is an active worker, his profit may indeed be his wages—and he is worthy of his hire. Where the profit is extraordinarily large we find either the element of privilege, of monopoly—legal or illegal—or the element of rare ability, of genius, or a combination of both elements. No one complains of the "profits" of the average farmer, or of the small shopkeeper, or of the small manufacturer. "Differential" profits, commanded by superior business ability or the gift for organization and administration, seldom constitute an evil or menace, since they tend to disappear where competition is really free and the laws against unfair practices or monopolistic oppression are enforced with reasonable vigor and effectiveness. Whether or not society is wise in its patent and copyright policies is a question that may be passed over on this occasion. Even if we assume that some injustice is traceable to these policies, that injustice is not serious enough to threaten social stability and social progress. An intelligent assault on profit is at bottom an assault on privilege and monopoly.

Rent is defined by economists as the price paid for the use of a monopolized natural agent. Now, where land monopoly or the monopolization of other natural resources begets rent, our quarrel is with the monopoly, not with any theory of rent, classical or modern. Rent will arise under certain conditions, and what society has been asking more and more persistently is whether these conditions are "natural"—that is, morally defensible and right. Where the conditions represent feudal survivals, expropriation of the tillers of the soil, inclosures of commons contrary to law or with the sanction of class-controlled parliaments; where the monopoly of land and mines and other natural resources may be traced to royal grants or perfectly arbitrary and profligate surrender of the common heritage, the case is morally simple enough, even if practically any attempted rectification may be full of difficulties and dangers. In France, a great revolution transferred the land to the peasant masses and in a terrible, sanguinary manner solved a problem that would have plagued generations. In Ireland, land purchase on an extraordinary scale is effecting a peaceable revolution and solving the "rack rent" problem and the problem of absentee and parasitic landlordism. The wisdom and beneficence of the Irish land-purchase legislation—so fiercely attacked when initiated by a liberal cabinet and popular premier—no one now seriously questions. Wherever the land question is "up for solution," the solution is certain to be found in the abolition of monopoly and the transfer of land to occupying owners and cultivators. Nationalization, the single tax, and other schemes severally contain the essential and saving idea of equalization of natural opportunity. None of the familiar schemes may get itself accepted in the precise form favored by its advocates, but the general direction and the true nature of the reforms that are surely "coming" are unmistakably indicated to the impartial students of the land and rent questions.

Nor is this at all surprising. The average man, who applies "common-sense" to everything, agrees with the most anxious and carefully investigated of "critics" and declares that land monopoly is immoral, anti-social, and in the long run "impossible." The wonderful success of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*

is due to this fact. Scientific economists found much in the book to deride and condemn; but its appeal to common morality and to the rule of reason was, as to the fundamental issue, irresistible. The land is not the product of man's labor; the right of one man to a place in the sun, or on the earth, is neither greater nor less than that of another; no generation may crowd another off the earth; therefore all land arrangements are subject to modification at the dictates of social need and social expediency. Arguments like these are simply unanswerable, and whoever has attempted to answer them has had to fall back on the plea that, whatever may be the case with the Ricardian "properties of the soil," native and indestructible, land today is generally the product of man's capital and labor. Land has for generations been bought and sold like other commodities; capital has been invested therein; improvements, the maintenance or even the increase of fertility are the work of man, not of nature. How, then, can we reopen the ancient question of title to the original form and quality of the property? If we wish to be honest and contemplate compensation to the present owners (as in the case of the above-mentioned Irish example), it is supposed to be demonstrable that the operation would cost more than it is worth to society.

Without analyzing these and similar arguments (in truth, they are hardly worth analysis), it is important to note here that what, after all, emerges from them is the claim that rent today is largely or mostly interest on capital invested in land rather than payment for the use of a natural agent or factor that has somehow been appropriated by this or that person.

It may be added that, as a matter of fact, a great deal of what is conventionally described and classified as profit or rent is in reality nothing but interest on capital. Professor Nearing is right in objecting to the old classification and in urging that the subject of income be considered in a new light and with reference to the notorious facts of the present economic and social order.

The knotty, the crucial, the basic question is the question of interest. If interest is wrong, the other forms of property income will fall with it; but if interest is right and defensible, then the

assaults on rent and profit are generally vain and futile, except in so far as they are assaults on naked monopoly.

Now, interest has staunch and convinced defenders, not only among the scientific economists, but also among the plain, hard-headed men of affairs, and even among the working classes. Professor Nearing candidly recognizes this fact. Is it not a significant fact? May there not be a soul of good in a thing seemingly evil that is yet widely accepted as natural and right?

Perhaps the best way to analyze interest is to take first the common-sense view of the average man—the average toiler, even, who keeps his hard-earned savings in a bank, and draws interest on them at the “low” rate of 3 or $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Now, let us approach a thrifty mechanic and tell him that interest is immoral and unjust—a modern form of exploitation and robbery. What will he be likely to think aloud? Something like this, it is safe to say: “I have worked hard and still work hard. I have to deprive myself of all sorts of little comforts and pleasures to which I think I am fairly entitled—amusements, little trips, vacations, an extra hat for my wife or daughter, a nice little birthday dinner at a good restaurant. I have friends and acquaintances who earn no more, or even perhaps less, than I do, and who allow themselves such occasional luxuries. They have saved little, if any, of their earnings. This has been imprudent and wrong on their part, as every moralist and economist tells us. If I, on the other hand, have put my honest savings in a bank, is it not perfectly fair that I should get some interest on my money?”

This, of course, is a simple, unadorned version of the abstinence theory of interest. The mechanic demands a reward for his self-denial, his thrift, his economy. Suppose we answer him by pointing out that what, in effect, he is asking is that he be permitted to eat his cake and have it too—have it whole and unimpaired; suppose we point out to him that his savings *are* his reward, the sole and sufficient reward of his abstinence and thrift; that his less prudent friends may live to regret their self-indulgence, since they may be obliged to fall back on in the event of accident or misfortune, and since old age may find them destitute and condemned to dependence on charity, while he, because of his virtue and foresight,

enjoys freedom from worry and dread, is able to sleep peacefully, and to face the future serenely. Suppose we say all this to him and ask him whether he still thinks society owes him interest; what is likely to be his rejoinder?

This, probably: that while the foregoing reasoning might be valid in a case where a man kept his little hoard at home, in a secret place, idle and useless to the body social and economic, it is not valid in a case like his, for *he* puts his savings in a bank and through the bank into circulation, and, as everybody knows, banks lend money to their customers and charge them interest on it. Why should the bank get the interest earned by the money of the depositors? It may be entitled to part of the interest, since it takes care of the money, provides safety vaults for it, and incurs expenses of administration. But under modern conditions the compensation for the bank's service to the depositor need not be large, need not absorb the entire interest earned by his money. Indeed, many commercial banks pay interest to depositors on their average daily balances. Hence, the man who puts his savings into a savings bank expects and gets interest on his money.

Again, this common-sense answer is wholly satisfactory as far as it goes. But it merely pushes the real question one step back—from the individual depositor to the bank. How does the bank earn the interest? Why is it able to charge interest?

Here the average person will perhaps pause for a moment and then advance a more complicated theory, a compound of the two distinct theories of abstinence and productivity. He will explain that the bank is able to charge interest because its borrowers use the money productively and profitably. The manufacturer and the merchant, the exporter and the jobber, the speculator and the exchange operator—all these borrow money of the bank in order to "make" money, to make more money than they could make without the additional capital thus obtained. Our common-sense defender of interest will therefore proceed to argue thus: "He who borrows my savings of the bank hands me over, as interest, part of his increased income. He makes more because of my money, and he is perfectly willing to divide the increase with me. My abstinence and self-denial are advantageous to him; and my interest is

not a reward of virtue in the abstract, but a reward of virtue that is directly and immediately useful to him and therefore to industrial society. Why, then, is this interest unjust?"

This little argument amounts to this—that interest *is* payment for service. Abstinence on the part of some enables others to do business on a larger scale than they could otherwise undertake; they realize larger gains or profits, and in paying interest they pay for a distinct service rendered them by the abstainers.

The learned political economists make the same argument in more technical and scientific language. They do not, gifts and legacies aside, quarrel with the principle of service, or with the formula, "No work, no food"; but they contend that the man of property who lends his money to another for use in industry or commerce performs a valuable service—"works," in other words, by letting his capital work in the hands of another man.

But how do the learned economists meet the two objections that the average man, armed with his common-sense and little business experience, can hardly be expected to know how to meet?

The first of these objections is that abstinence has its reward in the before-mentioned security and peace which it brings, and is really not entitled to any further reward. To repeat the homely simile used already in the discussion with the average practical person, the man who saves his cake has it, and if he lends it to another and gets back another cake of the same quality and size, he has all the reward he would seem to be entitled to. Suppose we sit down to a rich meal and conclude that it would be improvident to consume all that is spread before us. We leave something for the next meal, this act possibly involving a little resistance to the immediate appetite. Is not the next meal our sufficient reward? Do we need an additional incentive?

The economist thinks that we do, and that, in a sense, it is quite reasonable to demand that we eat our cake and have it too. Perhaps the ablest and keenest defense of this position was that made by Böhm-Bawerk, the Austrian statesman and financier. His theory of interest is a clear and unadorned and unadorned version of the abstinence theory. It may be summarized thus: It is natural to men to prefer present goods present

pleasures and satisfactions, to future goods, pleasures, or satisfactions. The thing we want today has a higher value for us, psychologically speaking, than the promise of the same thing for next week or next month. We do not like to postpone agreeable things, and sometimes postponement is positively painful. Besides, the future is uncertain; we may not live to enjoy the promised pleasure; or we may not be well enough or contented enough to care for it. To defer the consumption of goods is, therefore, to make a real sacrifice, even though we eventually consume the goods. This sacrifice, moreover, we would not always make for our own sake, for the sake of future security or enjoyment. To induce us to make it, those who use our savings must pay us some compensation. Interest is this compensation; it represents the difference in value between present goods and future goods.

In this explanation, manifestly, the economist appeals to psychology, to human experience at large. It must be admitted at once that the alleged difference is not fanciful. It exists. We all feel it, whether we have to defer a visit to the theater or a trip to Europe. And it must also be admitted that the sacrifice involved in deferring pleasure or enjoyment must as a rule be paid for. But all this is hardly sufficient to justify interest as we know it. That interest, as now paid, is nothing *but* compensation for sacrifice in the sense indicated is pure assumption. May it not be altogether excessive from that point of view? May not other and less legitimate elements enter into it? As a matter of fact, we shall see that other elements do enter into interest.

Here, however, the second objection to interest above alluded to should be considered. If interest is compensation for abstinence, or for the sacrifice involved in deferred satisfactions, in giving up goods today for goods to be consumed in the future, why is interest paid to those who do not abstain and do not consciously or unconsciously defer any pleasure?

Professor Nearing in his *Income* mentions this objection among others in the following trenchant paragraph:

This income [meaning property income] is not paid in return for meritorious social service; some of those who receive it are notoriously anti-social in all their dealings. It is not paid for abstinence; many of the recipients of

property income never knew what it was to abstain. It is not paid for saving; there are many people with vast incomes who during their entire lives have never done anything except spend. It is not paid for productive effort; children, disabled persons, idlers, and wastrels are among its recipients.

Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lasalle, in their day, directed withering sarcasm at this same theory of abstinence, self-denial, and sacrifice. They used to point to the idle millionaires, or the sons and daughters of such, and ask whether any economist of the classical school would have the audacity to assert that they have practiced abstinence or denied themselves anything in a spirit of virtue and thrift.

But the economists find this line of reasoning inconclusive. They remind us of the fact that it is the mass of "marginal investors" that count, and that the multimillionaire who draws interest without undergoing hardship and sacrifice no more disproves the theory in question than does the poor washerwoman or seamstress at the other end of the social scale, whose sacrifices are so great that the rate of interest she can command at any time on her slight savings may well seem a pitifully poor compensation for her truly heroic degree of thrift and self-denial. The economists tell us elaborately that the modern theory of interest does not imply that where there is no abstinence, no deferring of pleasures, there can be no interest, any more than that it implies that in every case the interest obtained corresponds strictly to the amount and quality of sacrifice undergone in saving the money that draws the interest. All that the theory implies is that, *as a general proposition*, interest is reward of abstinence and self-denial, and that if no interest were paid, few, if any, would defer satisfactions and save any part of their income. If nine-tenths of those who draw interest, directly or indirectly, do practice abstinence, the remaining tenth, even if they did not do so, would be able to command interest all the same, the rate being determined by the marginal investors. Once the level is fixed, we may find thereon cases that either do not deserve to be there or that deserve to be on a higher level.

It must be owned that this is sound and valid reasoning. If interest can be justified in the great majority of cases, the idle

millionaire with his income from property that represents no sacrifice will cause no trouble to the adherents of the abstinence theory. But the justification intended for the majority of cases leaves much to be desired. To repeat, we may grant that the marginal investors practice self-denial and deserve compensation therefor without being under the smallest compulsion to grant also that the interest now generally paid for capital is nothing *but* compensation for thrift and self-denial. If we accuse a man of having stolen a dollar, and he proves that he has earned and saved a dime, we do not regard the defense as adequate.

Let us now make the strongest possible case for interest under modern industrial and commercial conditions. Let us advance several illustrations that seemingly go to the very root of the matter, illustrations that the man of common-sense and the scholarly economist alike will concede to be not only typical but highly favorable to their view—illustrations, indeed, that are half arguments.

1. A man has saved money, or inherited it from a thrifty and honest father, and has bought a small farm with it. He has a chance to acquire his neighbor's small farm, and he is desirous of doing so. It would be to his distinct advantage to enlarge his holdings. But he has no money in the bank or elsewhere. He decides to borrow. He borrows of another neighbor, or of the local bank in which many of his neighbors keep their savings. He pays interest on the loan—pays it gladly. He expects to profit by the operation. The profit will enable him to pay off the debt.

2. A man of exceptional ability and initiative starts a small business with his own capital. He succeeds; his business grows; he wishes to enlarge his plant. He is accommodated by a bank, or by a private person. He pays the interest and nets a profit in addition. The business continues to expand, and he needs more and more capital. The banks are glad to extend him credit. He becomes rich and powerful—a captain of industry. He makes millions, in spite of the interest burden he has had to carry for years. He has enough to provide for his children and relatives, and to endow charitable and educational institutions. He has had ample reward for his skill and industry, his brains and enterprise. But

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he has all along handed over certain parts of his income to those whose capital he has used and by means of which he has accumulated his millions.

3. Several men of business ability and sound morals discern an opportunity or industrial "opening" of which they cannot take advantage, having little or no capital of their own. They organize a corporation. They sell the bonds and stocks of this corporation. The investors who buy the bonds or stocks furnish capital and nothing more. The organizers and entrepreneurs take charge and manage the affairs of the corporation. They employ assistants and superintendents. They prosper; they pay the interest on the bonds and the dividends on the preferred stock; there is a balance left. The balance they claim as their due. It represents their wages, but it may be large enough to include a bonus, a profit.

Now, these and similar instances, indefinitely multiplied and more or less varied, exemplify our present industrial and financial system. Indirect co-operation, joint stock companies, high organization of credit and banking, the "mobilization" and use of other people's savings by captains of industry are among the salient features of this system. Railroads, we know, are owned by thousands of small stockholders. The presidents, managers, and directors are really the paid employees of the true owners, and if the latter have but little power and few of the prerogatives of ownership, that fact is due to their lack of organization, training, and knowledge. But the "true owners" do no work and perform no service apart from the possible service under investigation—the furnishing of the capital.

What is true of railroads is true of banks, shipping companies, mines, mills, and factories. The owners of a concern may be "little fellows" scattered all over the land. The average holding may be exceedingly small. And the progress of what has been called the "peopleization" of industry tends to reduce instead of raise that average.

The picture in the mind's eye is not, therefore one in which the individual is exploiting or being exploited by numbers. It is a picture of organized mechanics, laborers, and stockholders, of houses, of factories and of agencies tens or thousands of workers.

Not few, but many, get the property income that is on trial, and these many would be startled and grieved to hear themselves described as Proudhon described them—to be told that interest is sheer robbery.

Still, be the recipients of interest few or many, the principle is not affected. The question remains open: Is interest paid for any real service to industry and society?

Of course, the farmer, the manufacturer, the managers of the corporation in the illustrations above given would maintain strenuously that they pay interest for real and important services. The recipients of the interest would even more strenuously maintain that it represents compensation for genuine service. With all the facts before one, what can he say at this stage of the discussion? Are the objections to interest as irrational, ignorant, and demagogical as the average capitalist thinks they are? Are they as superficial and unscientific as the conservative economist holds them to be? Is interest, in spite of the sentiments of religious and ethical teachers to the contrary, morally justifiable and economically indispensable?

It seems to the writer that the true answer is that "something" is wrong with interest as we know it, although it is not wrong *per se* and under all circumstances. To the extent to which interest is payment for risk incurred in surrendering one's capital or savings into the possession and control of another, it is just. To the extent to which it is reward for the sacrifice involved in deferring satisfactions and exchanging present goods for future goods, it is also just. But what would the *rate* of interest normally be in an industrial and civilized society if these two items, and they alone, went into the charge called interest? It must be borne in mind that, if there be a proper charge for risk incurred, there is also a charge to offset it, in part at least, the charge properly made for taking care of another's capital. It must further be remembered that there is risk in keeping one's savings as well as in letting another keep them. As to the self-denial involved in deferring pleasure and giving up present goods in the hope of enjoying future goods, it should not be forgotten that it is not purely altruistic. Ordinary prudence and foresight will, in the majority of cases, impel men to

save and provide for old age or disability. They need not, on the theory under consideration, be paid for serving themselves, but only for serving others. Now, the trouble is that they are paid more than their service to others is worth. Interest, in short, is a sum in which some of the constituent items represent something other than risk or compensation for social service. That something is monopoly.

Interest would be just if it were absolutely normal. It could only be normal in an ideally—or really—free market, in an economic and social order characterized by equality of opportunity, by equality of freedom, by the total absence of special privilege, of artificial and unjust monopoly. In such circumstances as these capital would be abundant, for more men would be able to save than is the case now. Capital would compete more actively for investment opportunities, and the rate of interest would tend to fall. And not only would more men be able to save, but the saving would involve no great sacrifice. There would be a wider diffusion of well-being, of comfort. Saving would not mean the giving up of necessities or of the things we regard as all but necessary to decent human existence. It would mean the deferring of pleasures and gratifications that fall into the category of luxuries. Naturally, self-denial in this sense would require and receive less compensation than the abstinence that means pain, hardship, and misery.

Our present order is not "free" in the sense intended by the classical champions of healthy and vigorous competition "in a fair field." The field is not and never has been fair. Land and other natural opportunities have not been equally accessible to all. It is hardly necessary to speak of the mediaeval land tenures, of the royal gifts of vast estates to favorites, of violent or fraudulent inclosures of common lands, of the appropriation of mines and other natural or national assets by small groups. It is sufficient to allude to the fact that even in the United States, the land "whose other name is opportunity," national assets have been handed over to the few. Conservation and the fair utilization of natural assets in the interest of the whole nation are new and recent "reforms" in the sphere of American politics. It is justly

felt that the profligate policy that has been thoughtlessly followed in the past has contributed to the great evils of unmerited poverty and involuntary idleness.

Similarly, every unfair privilege, every anti-social monopoly, every serious social abuse permitted or tolerated by law and society, may be said to inure directly or indirectly to the advantage of men of property and capital. They command higher rates of compensation for their capital because of the inability of so many thrifty and industrious persons to support themselves in relative comfort and, in addition, save part of their incomes for future use and enjoyment. The first and principal remedy for poverty, according to Bastiat, the great French free-trade economist, and his school, is "abundance." The modern world does not produce enough, in spite of all our inventions. It does not produce enough because of mediaeval survivals, of antiquated land tenures and laws, of indefensible systems of taxation and revenue. And a society that does not produce enough cannot save enough to devote to further production; capital, therefore, is dear in such a society and interest rates are higher than they would "normally" be.

Nor is this all. Other causes contribute to the element of iniquity and injustice that is vaguely felt to reside in interest. The interest question is, and has always been, largely a "money question." That is to say, bad and unjust banking and currency arrangements have made capital dear and interest rates high. This has become a truism in our own day, and we have been reforming our currency and financial systems for the recognized and avowed purpose of preventing the exploitation of industry by the monopolists of credit and of the banking power. President Wilson has used very vigorous language in describing the effect of monopolized credit and the need of "democratizing" credit and enabling men of affairs in country and city to obtain capital at reasonable rates. What has been done by national legislation (notably by the law establishing the regional reserve banks and authorizing a form of asset banking) is, however, merely a beginning. Even conservative economists are now advocating legislation providing for the organization of rural credit facilities on a co-operative or mutual basis. For the bulk of ordinary commercial transactions

in the centers of industry and trade, additional legislation is proposed in the direction of "asset banking," or the monetization of goods of certain kinds that are intended for early consumption.

The relation between capital and money—real or representative, hard or "soft"—is a difficult subject that has engaged the attention of economists for many years. This is not the place to deal with it, but it may be pointed out that the drift of liberal opinion among economists has favored the view that the old rigid notion regarding the comparative unimportance or irrelevance of the currency question in a discussion of interest was utterly unsound. It is true that the man who wants capital for productive purposes pays interest for capital, not for money, which is nothing but a means to his end, a medium of exchange. It is true that the manufacturer who borrows at a bank really, if indirectly, borrows machinery, tools, iron and steel, wood and brick. The money he borrows is at once paid out by him in the process of acquiring commodities and enlarging his plant or his markets. Still, as society is organized, the manufacturer cannot borrow capital. He *must* apply to the go-between, the banker or the money-lender, and what the latter can or will do to accommodate him is determined, not merely by the state of things in the goods or capital market, but also—and sometimes exclusively—by the state of things in the money market. A money panic or a money flurry is not necessarily a capital panic or flurry. A money famine does not imply a goods famine by any manner of means.

The dangers to industry and commerce that result from the inflation of the currency, or from cheap or fiat money, have been dwelt on sufficiently. The danger of contraction of the currency through causes that have nothing to do with the production and movement of goods, of capital available for further production, has not received nearly the attention it deserves. For decades practically all the measures taken to safeguard the currency were anti-inflation measures. At last it is beginning to be realized that contraction of the currency, which is not necessarily due to any cause of abnormal deflation, is a serious source of danger and of money laws, that begets periodical money panics and flurries, that fixes interest rates absolutely without reference to the condi-

tions in the capital market, is bad for industry, bad for all legitimate borrowers of capital, and bad for labor.

It is no longer denied by really scientific economists that the interest question in our day is largely a currency and banking question, and even to some extent a question of standards of value and deferred payments. The advocates of a multiple standard of value—from Jevons down—have laid proper stress on the injustice inherent in any metallic standard. The victims of the injustice are usually the borrowers and the toilers, not the recipients of property income in the shape of interest.

If, then, crude, unfair, and unscientific banking and currency systems have favored the lenders and oppressed the borrowers and the entrepreneurs, it follows that they have at the same time, and in the same manner, hampered the farmer, the mechanic, and the wage-worker. This is another way of saying that interest has been higher than it would have been under proper conditions and enlightened financial legislation.

But to say that there is much injustice in interest, and that true progress will result in the steady lowering of the rate of interest, is not to say that interest will ever, in a competitive order, reach the vanishing-point. Capital will never be had "for the asking"; risk and self-denial will always have to be paid for. But abundance, true freedom, and equality of opportunity, with a rational system of revenue and high taxation of private land held out of use for speculative purposes, will combine to make the rate of payment small. Again, the substitution of co-operation for competition in productive and distributive industries—a process that, as the present writer has shown in an earlier paper in this *Journal*, is certain to gain steadily in momentum as well as in scope and breadth—must also contribute more and more powerfully to the reduction of the charge called interest. Today labor has to intrust its savings to corporations and institutions that are used almost exclusively by capitalists. Co-operation will enable labor to make productive use of a growing part of its own saved capital.

One sometimes hears from the most unterrified social radicals the admission that "under existing economic and social arrangements interest is not unjust." When analyzed, this admission

amounts to no more than the recognition of the fact that he who lends capital performs a service to the borrower of it and is entitled to compensation for that service, as well as for the risk incurred by him. It also implies, however, that, as evolutionists, we cannot throw the blame for the element of injustice in interest on the possessors of capital or the recipients of property income. There are no "conspiracies" to maintain interest or to prevent its decline. Even the bad laws that have hampered industry and restricted opportunity by creating an artificial scarcity of money and credit have never been the result of deliberate conspiracies. There is such a thing as class or group legislation without real consciousness of class or group interest. There is considerable "robbery" in interest, but the recipients of interest are not deliberate "robbers." They are the beneficiaries of a system that is supported by most of us, that has been sincerely defended by good and able men, and that is even now so defended by earnest and high-minded thinkers. The system, however, as Proudhon said long ago, and as Professor Nearing shows again, is becoming economically "impossible." Labor and enterprise cannot carry the interest burden much longer. It will have to be lightened and lifted. It is, war and calamity apart, being lightened and lifted. Only so much of it will continue to be carried as is justified and sanctioned by the principle of service.

AN APPLICATION OF STATISTICAL METHOD

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Statistics, from the standpoint of the social sciences, has remained largely a field for hope and for study. Articles appear from time to time explaining some of the elementary processes. Articles also mention that the development of statistical method carries with it hope for many of the less exact sciences. One cannot escape a feeling that some great statistical formula or method is eventually to be found which will do away with all the uncertainties or doubts that beset the path of social science.

Whether or not such a formula or set of formulae is ever to appear must for various reasons remain doubtful. One obstacle is the difficulty of dealing with mathematics that involves more than a few unknowns of any complexity. Another is the difficulty of putting human phenomena and the common experiences of life into mathematical form. Neither difficulty, however, need stand in the way of the worker who is eager to see a more exact representation of fact in the field which is covered by the social sciences, whether it be sociology, economics, social technology or economy, or any other. Not only can observed facts be summed up precisely through the use of existing statistical methods, but the use of these will in itself lead to a more careful gathering of data, and to a much more careful presentation of the data after the facts are gathered.

To illustrate, it is possible to turn to a field where the data are unquestioned and where the use of a statistical summary would have made the methods of presenting the data scientifically unimpeachable and precise. In November, 1914, for example, there appeared¹ a tabulation relating the rent which Lithuanians in Chi-

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1914, p. 297.

matical coefficient showing the relations between rooms and rent, could not have appeared with foreshortened classes. Of the 790 apartments rented 12 per cent are in one of the last three classes (rent unknown, free, or including a store) or else in undefined classes ("less than \$4.00" rent; "\$15.00 and less than \$30.00," "\$30.00 and over," rent; "7 or more" rooms). The uncertainties introduced by the foreshortening account for 74 of the 130 apartments which cannot be classified.

As the data are presented, it is only possible for the person to whom the original data are inaccessible to calculate the coefficient of correlation for that part of the table which is complete; that is, to obtain it for the 660 apartments which paid at least \$4.00 rent and less than \$15.00 rent. The inclusion of the five apartments in this part of table which have "7 or more" rooms as 7 rooms does not greatly affect the coefficient of correlation. As the inclusion decreases the coefficient, they are included.

Rent per Month	fd_x	fd_x^2	Product-Moment fd_xfd_y
\$ 4.00 and less than \$ 5.00	- 60	360	120
5.00 and less than 6.00	-115	575	130
6.00 and less than 7.00	-140	560	84
7.00 and less than 8.00	-123	369	57
8.00 and less than 9.00	-156	312	6
9.00 and less than 10.00	- 74	74	9
10.00 and less than 11.00	-668
11.00 and less than 12.00	69	69	14
12.00 and less than 13.00	208	416	100
13.00 and less than 14.00	207	621	174
14.00 and less than 15.00	120	480	120
	604	3,836	814
	-668		
	- 64		

The summary of the work according to the product-moment (Pearson's)¹ method is as shown in the table above. The product-moments are positive, as given, and are summed for each rent

¹ Cf. Yule, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*.

row, the negative products being subtracted in each row before the total is set down.

Number of Rooms	fd_y	fd_y^2
1.....	— 3	9
2.....	— 52	104
3.....	— 156	56
4.....	— 111
5.....	104	104
6.....	66	132
7 and over.....	15	45
	185	450
	— 111	
	74	

The coefficient of correlation is then

$$\frac{814 + \left(660 \frac{74}{660} \times \frac{64}{660}\right)}{\sqrt{\left(450 - \frac{(74)^2}{660}\right) \left(3836 - \frac{(64)^2}{660}\right)}}$$

or

$$\frac{821.2}{\sqrt{441.7 \times 3830}} = +0.632.$$

And the probable error of the coefficient is

$$\frac{0.67(1-0.63^2)}{\sqrt{660}} = \frac{0.67(0.3969)}{25.7} = 0.0157,$$

which makes the correct expression of the relation between the number of rooms obtained for a given rent the following:

$$r = +0.632 \pm 0.016.$$

Since the coefficient is applicable to a part only of the table, it is obvious that for a part of the flats there is some connection between the number of rooms and the rent; location, repairs, position, etc., in other words, are not the predominating factors in rent for a part of the table.

The coefficient of correlation, which is the measure of the relation relating rent and the number of rooms in apartments is from

Journal of Sociology, p. 524 for data given.

the scientific standpoint a greater offender than the one just quoted. Rooms are classified only as far as "6 and over," and rent to "\$15.00 and over." Sixteen and eight-tenths of the rented apartments are indefinitely classified because of this fact. Here, using the available part of the table, but counting 6 rooms and over as 6 rooms, the coefficient of correlation by the product-moment method is 0.786 ± 0.008 (1,082 apartments included).

On p. 538 of the latter article another tabulation of the same character appears. In this a complete tabulation of rooms is given, though rent stops at "\$12.00 and over." Only 11.8 per cent of all the apartments (123) are incapable of definite classification. The coefficient of correlation for those which can be definitely classified (104) is 0.463 ± 0.050 .

In the text the median rental for 6-room apartments was found to be much higher than that for the district in which the coefficient of correlation was 0.786. The author states that "it is perhaps hardly fair to make use of the median rental for 4-room apartments, since we have the facts for only 20 such apartments" (p. 536). The relation of any apartment of a given size to its rent can be expressively stated by the proper coefficient of correlation, i.e., 0.463 ± 0.050 . Inasmuch as the true coefficient probably lies somewhere between 0.413 and 0.513, comparisons with other data are obviously not such as would inspire confidence.

This is a brief illustration of one way of many in which common statistical method can be put to good use in the field of social technology or economy. The service rendered is not alone on the side of accuracy. The use of the method reacts back into the data gathered, the method of gathering it, and its presentation. The application of the coefficient enables anyone to test the value of work being done long before it is necessary to make a final summary and draw conclusions.

There is a further, though perhaps minor, consequence of the use of precise expressions. The expressions themselves gain currency and gradually acquire meaning in a world outside, which might well become aware of the possibility of accurate statement.

THE PLIGHT OF THE RICH MAN IN A DEMOCRACY

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Centuries ago it was written that a camel could pass through the eye of a needle with greater ease than a rich man could enter the kingdom of heaven. A misinterpretation of the idea contained in this statement has developed through the ages into what appears to be a popular belief that the rich man is destined to eternal perdition. As a result of this seemingly popular belief it has become a much-lauded pastime to torment the rich man through his life with a recital of his alleged vices, in order that he may be prepared, in a measure at least, for the damnation which will be his eventually.

This attitude is psychologically interesting, and it may be profitable, or at least entertaining, to discuss for a little the causes and possible effect of such a widespread feeling of antagonism toward any one man, taken as typifying a class.

That the feeling is widespread cannot be denied by those who are in touch with the times. Prejudice against the millionaire is evident on all sides, except perhaps in social circles, where he is sought by those who would climb by his aid. Does he aspire to serve his country, his state, or his city, there are those who quickly intimate that his place, like woman's, is at home, or at least remote from the councils of men. Does he essay to be a teacher of morals or religion, scoffers are at hand to question his motives. Thus does the rich man find himself handicapped by prejudice, if not by actual ill-feeling. Some accept the limitations placed upon them by their fellows, and with a shrug plunge into the pleasures that money can buy, and thus bring added odium upon themselves.

"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is a maxim evidently ill-adapted to present-day conditions, and can easily be relegated

to the mistiness of the past; while in its place may be substituted an injunction to curse thy neighbor, especially if he have riches.

Probably the dominant ambition of every wide-awake man in the United States today is to control money. The amount desired in each case may vary, the difference being one of degree only. The little boy runs a paper route, or sells lemonade, in order that he may have money of his own, and his curly head is often patted by his elders in a most approving manner. Particularly is this true of the little velvet-frocked cherub who hawks a weekly paper perhaps, up and down his own more or less exclusive block. He has early caught the spirit of the land of his birth, and is deserving of commendation.

The boy fresh from high school is filled with the ambition of his little brother, and looks at once for a job which will bring him in money; while the young man in college seems to be given over largely to acquiring knowledge, or the hallmark of knowledge, for the sole purpose of turning it to financial uses; for with the democratization of learning has come its commercialization. The young student everywhere is fitting himself for a business or profession that will give him the opportunity for commercial gain, while those occupations which yield the smallest financial return are eschewed by the more alert scholars. Evidence of this is to be found in the lamentations of some religious people over the dearth of young men entering the ministry, and in the terror in certain quarters that the public schools are jeopardized by their imminent feminization. The opportunity for usefulness in the work of teacher or preacher, which was formerly a reason of much importance in choosing a career, appears now to be a justly negligible factor when weighed against chances to make money.

A young man's success is judged largely by the standard of dollars and cents. Idealism thus slips out of his life, while he plunges with others into the wild scramble for gold. As a man grows older he is deemed successful in proportion to his ability to control material things, and this popular estimate of success has given us an aristocracy based on wealth; an upper class dominant mainly by the legerdemain of chance, and constantly undergoing

change through the same sleight of hand, for not all of those who trail success will find her.

Now admitting for the sake of argument that the foregoing presentation of the situation is a true one, it becomes germane to seek the basis of the apparent antagonism against wealth. For some time past the most popular writing has taken the form of vituperative protest against existing conditions, particularly the hard conditions that result from the modern system of industry. In the effort to get at the root of these difficulties the employer has been singled out and marked, to indicate that he is the guilty person. Since the employer is usually better off than the people complaining, his greater wealth becomes added contumely, until eventually the rich man has come to be held responsible for most social maladjustments, and consequently a fit butt for social chastisement—in short, a man to be scorned; that is, the very man who has succeeded in getting what practically all the other men are endeavoring to acquire has become at the same time a thing to be despised. This is a unique situation.

Is the goal of ambition, after all, only a seething cauldron of popular hatred? Is the possession of the thing in life apparently most to be desired to brand one as more iniquitous than his fellows? Does reaching the goal really only mean that the swiftest runner is to be a target for the arrows of the following multitude? If this be the case, he must be regarded as the victim of a practical joke played by society. But society is playing the same joke on all the individuals in the race; that is, society is playing the joke on itself, which argues a state of social dementia not readily conceded by any of us. It would seem, therefore, that we must look for some other and more reasonable cause.

In the group of persons striving for wealth are usually found four classes: (1) those who are not successful, but who take things philosophically and really get considerable satisfaction out of life; (2) those who succeed in amassing fortunes; (3) those who are only partially successful and readily become disillusioned; (4) those who are unsuccessful and who are in a state of mental and physical distress. The first two classes are in a position to enjoy the fruits of the modern industrial existence which accompanies a wage system having no

settled minimum, an existence which quickly breeds discontent, envy, and even malice toward those who are more fortunate.

Manifestly it is in the third and fourth classes that the strong feeling against the rich man is generated, and the volume that this feeling has assumed goes to show that these classes are numerically very strong. They have a grievance against society, and they proceed to vent their wrath on him who is successful. They accuse him of injuring them, as the child whose finger is bruised in the door kicks the door, as the cause of his trouble. He, being a child, could not be expected to know that the door was moved by some outside force; perhaps a naughty brother, perhaps an unobservant parent, perhaps an unhindered breeze from heaven.

The rich man who, out of the power conferred upon him by his riches, has inaugurated an industrial system inimical to the best interests of the many, rightly deserves the animadversions cast upon him. But the fair-minded person must admit that the man of great wealth is as often a result as a primal cause of industrial iniquities. He is frequently an object to be pitied rather than to be blamed. The fortune is his apparently, and what is he to do about it? That it is impossible to give it away satisfactorily is evidenced by pitiable attempts in this direction.

That there are many critics of present-day conditions ready with more or less practical suggestions is true; but it is not yet possible for them to govern the situation, so the rich man is borne on his way, until he finds himself in the maelstrom of popular envy and indignation, at once a personage to be praised and a creature to be censured—praised, because of possible favors he may bestow, and censured, why? Because he succeeded in getting what all the others tried to get, and failed? At all events, he presents this dual personality, with the result that being conscious of society's estimate of him he becomes more or less what people insist that he is. He becomes arrogant, embittered, revolutionary even, and his control of wealth makes him a tyrant in spite of himself. He is often forced to strike in self-protection, and his acts are misinterpreted. Then the rich man gets threatening letters, and knows no peace at any time. And what is it all about? Always the answer that he got what the others wanted keeps sug-

gesting itself. There follows a time when he is held guilty, without the lawful judgment of his peers. The arrogant reformer sees no good in him, and goes about blackening a reputation he has already adjudged black, until some frenzied fool fancies he has a divinely appointed mission to shoot him.

That rich men sometimes squander their money in an offensive way is true; so also do poor men. The purchase of costly jewels may be no more reprehensible than the purchase of glass beads; assuming that in both cases the articles are regarded as luxuries. So far as serious expenditures are concerned, the rich may be on quite as high a plane ethically as the poor. The possession of glass beads is fully as immoral as the possession of diamond necklaces when neither are honestly earned.

Rich men may, and of course do, violate the principles of the Golden Rule, as in fact does every other member of society. The rich men may be responsible for certain industrial hardships, they may at times be unjust to their employees; but so are those of smaller means; which is only another way of saying that human nature is much the same, wherever it is found.

Probably the best example of industrial tyranny and unethical treatment of employees that modern society has to show is to be found in the case of domestic servants, particularly in the houses of middle-class housewives who keep but one general drudge. The possession of wealth does not necessarily predispose one to brutality in his relations with his fellow-men.

In view of the foregoing, it does not seem quite fair to single out one man who is very much like the rest of us, except perhaps in his acquisitive ability, and hurl at him deadly invective just because he happens to be conspicuous. Let us seek the cause of social and industrial wrongdoing; let us strive without ceasing to eradicate the evil; but let us first remove the mote from our own eyes, in order that we may see more clearly the location of the beam.

Just so long as society encourages the perpetuation of a system which makes possible the amassing of vast fortunes by individuals, it must, of necessity, be considered applaud the man who has acquired the fortune. The winner of any prize, to be sure, makes some enemies by his prowess. He wins what the other contestants

strove to win. It is not fair of course to give people an opportunity to compete and then to adjudge the successful ones enemies of the social order. If, however, we feel that the possession of great wealth is inimical to the republic, and to democracy, then let us make it impossible for men to acquire fortunes, and let us reconstruct our notions of success, so that the possession of much money will no longer be regarded as the supreme aim for the ambitious.

It is true that a class—growing constantly in importance—is registering its disapproval of the present system, and working hard to bring about a change in social and industrial conditions. These people are drawn from the poor, the middle class, and the wealthy, and they are making themselves felt in political life. Their criticism of present conditions is not by any means all destructive. They bid us return at once to a higher and simpler plane of living, where the almighty dollar will not be so abjectly worshiped, and where better human relationships will be the prime consideration. This is well, but while indorsing the plan, let us first, last, and always, in the name of consistency and honesty, leave the poor rich man alone.

Blatant agitators may defeat their own ends by too bitter vilifying of Croesus; and the man whom they hold up to public scorn is likely at any time to be rated a martyr. In the event of a revulsion of popular feeling he may eventually loom on the horizon as a hero.

THE RISE OF MODERN HUMANITARIANISM

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The coexistence in human nature of the traits which are ordinarily called humanity and cruelty appears to be a strange anomaly. This anomaly manifests itself in many different forms in individual cases and at different times and places. The savage may display the most inexorable cruelty toward all human beings not belonging to his own small social group and yet show the tenderest regard for his offspring. The criminal may murder his victim in cold blood and yet devote a loving care to an animal pet. The peoples of modern civilized nations are displaying much concern over the welfare of the poor and yet with the utmost readiness rush into wars with each other which cause untold suffering and loss of life.

This apparent anomaly can be explained only on the basis of the evolution of human nature in general. In the course of this evolution there have developed certain characteristics which seem incompatible with each other. Thus there are, on the one hand, certain traits which promote the preservation of the individual. These include the aggressive tendencies which aid the individual in defending himself and impel him to prey upon others. By some psychologists these aggressive tendencies are grouped under the head of the instinct of pugnacity or the combative instinct, and the affective state which ordinarily accompanies it is the emotion of anger. Furthermore, the sexual and the parental instincts may impel the individual to commit aggressive acts toward those who attempt to thwart his desires.

On the other hand, certain other traits impel the individual to perform acts which promote the welfare of the species. Thus the sexual and parental instincts and their accompanying states being in part the foundation for the parental instinct, in which these instincts are directed and in these acts we find the genesis of altruism. It is believed by many that these gen-

social instincts which impel individuals to do things for their fellows apart from the sexual and parental relationships. It is doubtful if there is any distinct social instinct, but a number of traits make man social.

We have not the space here to describe and analyze in detail the numerous instincts and feelings which play a part in giving rise to humanity and to cruelty, or to analyze the complex forms in which these traits become combined with each other.¹ Nor can we discuss the indirect and therefore unexpected and sometimes abnormal ways in which these traits lead sometimes to humanity and sometimes to cruelty.² But it is evident that these traits are fundamental in human nature and will therefore always remain as permanent forces for humanity and for cruelty. We must now turn to another aspect of human nature which plays an important part in the determination of humanity and cruelty.

The intellect serves sometimes as a factor for humanity and sometimes as a factor for cruelty. The foresight which intelligence makes possible may lead the individual to do injury to others in anticipation of thereby gaining something for himself. Or it may lead him under other circumstances to perform services for others where such benevolence will probably redound to his own benefit. Furthermore, the intelligence makes possible the sympathetic imagination which enables the individual to recognize the suffering of others as a kin to the pain which he himself at times experiences. This recognition usually gives rise to a feeling of discomfort which may inhibit him from inflicting pain upon others or may destroy the callous indifference with which he would otherwise regard suffering in others and may lead him to take active measures for the relief of those in pain.³

¹ The literature of modern psychology contains an enormous amount of data with regard to the instincts and feelings. The present writer has discussed these traits at some length in his book entitled *The Science of Human Behavior, Biological and Psychological Foundations*, New York, 1913.

² For example, the sexual instinct rouses in some individuals the sadistic impulse to inflict pain upon others, while in other individuals it arouses the desire to have pain inflicted upon one's self.

³ According to some students of the subject, all humanitarianism, and indeed all morality as well, has grown out of sympathy. For an extreme form of this theory see Alexander Sutherland, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, London, 1898.

These instincts and feelings and intelligence have existed in man since the origin of the human species so that men have always displayed these tendencies toward cruelty on the one hand and toward humanity on the other hand. The historical data which we possess show that the degree and kind of humanitarianism at any time and place have depended upon many circumstances such as the physical environment, the amount and kind of knowledge possessed by the community, the prevailing moral ideas and religious beliefs, the relation of the community to other communities, and many other circumstances.

Furthermore, history seems to indicate that, as a general rule, humanitarianism has broadened its scope and has extended over a wider range as the social group has increased in size in the course of social evolution. Thus the humanity of the primitive savage was restricted entirely or almost entirely to the members of the horde or clan or small tribal group to which he belonged while all the rest of mankind were his enemies to be treated as such. But as the social group expanded in size so as to become in course of time national and to a certain extent international in its scope, the humanitarian interests of mankind extended their range in similar fashion. This is, of course, to be explained on the basis of the part played by the intelligence described above. As the group increased in size the interests of the individual coincided with an ever-increasing number of individuals, thus leading the individual to regard the interests of these individuals as his own. Furthermore, this increase in the size of the social group increased the number of individuals of whom the individual had knowledge and whom he recognized as being of the same kind as himself, thus extending greatly the range of his sympathetic imagination.

On the basis of the forces and circumstances which have been suggested can doubtless be explained all the changes which have taken place in the past in the character and extent of humanitarianism. If we had the space it would be interesting and profitable to discuss the causes of the manifestations of humanitarianism in ancient Greece and Rome, in India, in China, and at many other times and places. But it is essential that we devote some attention to the causes of the great modern humanitarian movement, for

otherwise it is impossible to understand the efforts being made to relieve and abolish poverty and its attendant evils.

We have an abundance of evidence that humanitarianism has increased greatly in its range during very recent times. We need not go back more than a century in the occidental world to find that the criminal was being treated with much greater severity than at present, that there was little general interest in the welfare of the poor aside from personal almsgiving, that human slavery still existed extensively, that the position of woman was much lower than it is at present, that there was little general interest in the welfare of animals. During the last few decades has taken place a vast amount of social legislation to improve the condition of the working class, to lessen poverty, to ameliorate the condition of the criminal, to give better care to the sick and the insane. During the same period there have been extensive private philanthropic movements directed toward the same ends. Much has been accomplished toward placing woman upon an equality with man. There has been much effort devoted to the prevention of cruelty to animals. Much has been done to regulate warfare in order to make it more humane and to lessen the suffering caused by it by means of the Red Cross. There has been an extensive movement to prevent and to abolish war altogether.

This sudden rise of humanitarianism in recent times has indeed been a remarkable phenomenon. At first sight it may be difficult to discern why it should have taken place, and various explanations for it have been offered, the principal ones of which we must consider.

It may appear as if this phenomenon was due to a sudden change in human nature which made man much more humane than he had been. This explanation has been offered by a few writers who have discussed the matter. Perhaps the ablest presentation of this view has been made by Sutherland. This writer has argued that a process of selection has taken place which since the Middle Ages has eliminated the unsympathetic types and has increased greatly the amount of sympathy in human beings. Stated in his own words his theory is as follows:

It is, I am convinced, an actual systemic change which has been the cause of the great development of sympathy in the past. A man fairly typical of

the modern standard of sympathy would rather have a hand cut off than that any person should be killed by his fault. One of our ancestors of 1,000 years [ago] would without compunction have slaughtered thirty persons to have saved his own hand. If we analyze the motives, we find that they are in no way concerned with justice or righteousness, what we have been told by others or what we have reasoned out for ourselves. Our reluctance to cause the death of another is based on certain instinctive aversions, which were much less developed among our ancestors.¹

His explanation of the causes of this change in the constitution of man is as follows:

The clever, but heartless, fellow has a less chance of ultimate success and eventual representation in posterity than one less clever but better equipped with those qualities which win friends, gain a wife's devotion, and foster a family's happy affection. So, too, with nations. If the prevailing type be crafty but selfish, the strength of a people will dissolve in distrust and disunion, simpler folks, welded by ardent patriotism, secured within by the prevalence of a sincere and unaffected friendliness, and pursuing their honest paths in multitude of homes that are full of family devotion, will have better prospect of ultimately prevailing. It may seem fantastic to assert that within historic times actual physiological differences of nerve structure can have developed in the race. Yet it is a sober fact, though demonstrable as yet by only indirect proofs.²

But this explanation is far from convincing. In the first place, adequate reasons are not given to explain why this selective process did not take place many hundreds if not thousands of years before the time when Sutherland alleges it took place. In the second place, even if we grant that it did take place at the time named, the growth of sympathy alone would hardly account for the great rise of humanitarianism for, as we have seen, various factors in addition to sympathy play a part in causing humanitarianism.

We have not the space to review all the data which are of significance with respect to this question. But they indicate that the changes in the instinctive, affective, and intellectual traits of man have been too slight during the last few centuries, and, for that matter, thousands of years, to account for so great a movement. For a more complete explanation of the rise of humanitarianism, we must look elsewhere for an explanation of this movement.

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 4.

² *Op. cit.*, II, 4-5.

Another explanation of the modern humanitarian movement which is perhaps the most widespread is that it is due to religion and to the Christian religion in particular. The first thought that this theory naturally suggests is that religion has been in existence for several thousands of years at least and the Christian religion for nearly two thousand years, while the modern humanitarian movement dates back only a couple of centuries or so. The supporters of this theory are in the habit of at once replying to this thought that the circumstances were not suitable for Christianity to manifest its humanitarian influence until recently. But it is obvious that by saying so they are at once relinquishing most of their theory, for they are admitting that other factors were involved in the causation of the modern humanitarian movement and these factors may have been much more potent than Christianity.

When we review the historical data with respect to this question we can readily discern that Christianity has been a force both for and against humanitarianism. In this respect it has been like most if not all other religions. In the first place, it must be noted that the attitude of mind required by every religious faith is such as to make impossible the most thoroughgoing type of humanitarianism and therefore religion will always be to a certain extent a force against humanitarianism. This is because a religious faith requires an unquestioning belief in its doctrines and demands that they be set above other truths as being of a sacred character. Partly for this reason religious ideas are usually held by believers with a high degree of emotional intensity and differences of religious belief frequently serve as a serious barrier between individuals and groups because of the emotional conflict which they bring about. Now it goes without saying that other ideas as well are held with much emotional intensity by individuals and by groups, but this is peculiarly true of religious ideas because these are regarded as most important by those who believe in them. We may illustrate this point best by comparing religion with science. It is true that a scientist may hold a scientific idea with a degree of emotional intensity which equals the fervor of the religious believer. But that is an individual peculiarity and the spirit and method of science is such that no idea is held as sacred. On the contrary,

every idea however firmly established may be attacked and overthrown. Consequently the mental attitude encouraged by science is such as to permit of free intercourse without restriction between all parts of mankind, while the mental attitude not only encouraged but positively required by religion will always serve as a barrier to the highest and most extensive form of humanitarianism.

But on the other hand, most if not all religions have taught certain doctrines which have had a humanitarian influence, and this has been true of Christianity. And it goes without saying that by Christianity we mean the set of religious beliefs and practices which from time to time and from place to place have been called Christian. This historical Christianity is the only one which is of importance for the interpretation of social evolution, so that the beliefs of the person after whom this religion was named or of any other individual are of no importance for our purposes.

Christianity has probably exerted an influence for humanitarianism principally through two of its doctrines, namely, the doctrine of the sanctity of human life and the doctrine of universal brotherhood.¹ Now I hardly need to say that neither of these doctrines was original with Christianity. The doctrine of the sanctity of human life is based upon the idea that there is an immortal soul in every human being, and this idea has been held not only by many of the more advanced religions but is to be found among the religious beliefs of many primitive savages. It is indeed one of the elementary animistic beliefs. The doctrine of universal brotherhood had also been held by various individuals and religions before Christianity. But coming as a new religion into the pagan world at an opportune time, it emphasized these ideas in a fresh manner and probably was a force for humanitarianism for a time.

Unfortunately the religion had not been in existence more than two or three centuries before asceticism began to play an important part in it and has ever since remained a malignant force against humanitarianism. It has been said a good deal because it overemphasized the sacredness of human life and the sacredness of the body and the place of sex in human life; it consequently

¹ Cf. W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Ideas from Augustus to Charles Magne*, New York, 1877, chap. IV.

lowered the position of woman,² and it has done much to destroy the joy of living for many human beings by encouraging puritanical ideas and practices.

Then the religion became highly organized in the form of a church, and for more than a thousand years the pages of its history were blackened by the incredible inhumanity of its wars, crusades, and persecutions, and by its stupid and brutal opposition to the higher forms of culture. Not even the partisans and apologists of the Christian church have been able to deny, where they have been at all fairminded, that during this dark and bloody period it was a powerful force against humanitarianism. Christianity then presented itself as a strong and militant religion at its worst, carrying its doctrines at the point of a sword. During this period it applied its doctrines of the sanctity of human life and of universal brotherhood only to Christians and not always even to them.

With the coming of the Renaissance, which was itself a reaction against Christianity, and the beginning of the modern period, the church and religion fortunately lost their dominant position in the occidental world. Since that time the humane forces in religion

² It goes without saying that the position of woman was none too high previous to Christianity. But there is a great deal of historical evidence to indicate that the effect of the new religion (owing largely to the teachings of St. Paul), during the first few centuries of the Christian era at any rate, was to make woman's position somewhat lower than it then was in Rome and in other parts of the ancient civilized world. This opinion is expressed by an English clergyman in the following words:

"It is a prevalent opinion that woman owes her present high position to Christianity, and the influence of the Teutonic mind. I used to believe this opinion, but in the first three centuries I have not been able to see that Christianity had any favorable effect on the position of woman, but, on the contrary, that it tended to lower her character and contract the range of her activity" (Principal J. Donaldson, "The Position of Woman among the Early Christians," *Contemporary Review*, September, 1889, p. 433).

An eminent sociologist explains the outburst of asceticism which led to this lowering of woman's position in the following words:

"During the first four centuries Christians believed that the world was about to perish. Evidently this belief affected the whole philosophy of life. Marriage lost sense and the procreation of children lost interest. This may be seen in I Cor., chap. 7. It also helps to explain the outburst of asceticism and extravagant behavior, such as the renunciation of conjugal intimacy by married people" (W. G. Sumner, "The Family and Social Change," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1909, p. 585).

If Christianity has helped woman at all during the last few centuries it has been only through the general influence of the religion upon the humanitarian movement and not through any partiality of this religion for woman.

have had more of a chance to exert some influence, though the Christian opposition to humanitarianism still retains more or less strength. But these humane forces within the religion were quite incompetent to cause the great modern humanitarian movement.

Still another theory as to the causes of the modern humanitarian movement which has been held by a few has been that certain moral ideas came into existence and attained currency and this movement followed as a consequence. It is obvious that this theory is similar to the religious theory we have just discussed and that much the same objections may be made to it. In the first place, it is evident that these moral ideas are not at all new. It is only necessary to mention such names as those of Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch, and Epictetus to indicate that these ideas were known to the ancient world. And yet they did not give rise to a humanitarian movement at that time. In modern times, notably in the eighteenth century, these ideas reappeared in the form of a system of humanitarian ethics and had a great deal of influence. But apparently the circumstances had changed, and other forces were at work for humanitarianism, so that it is hardly accurate to attribute this movement to these ideas.

Let us now turn to the true causes of this movement. These causes may be readily discerned if we consider the salient features of modern history which are familiar to all. The modern period began with the Renaissance with its revival of the classic culture of ancient Greece and Rome and its renascence of art and learning. This renascence of learning marked the beginning of the development of modern science which made possible the great economic changes of modern times. At the same time were being carried on extended explorations to all parts of the world which resulted in the discovery of the Western Hemisphere and in a great extension of commercial relations. These explorations also resulted in the colonizing of many parts of the world by Europeans.

In the eighteenth century began the great industrial revolution which substituted machine and factory methods of production on a large scale for the hand and domestic methods of production on a small scale of the past. This great change meant a vast extension of the principle of the division of labor within the process of production. Furthermore, with the aid of international commerce

it meant a world-wide extension of the division of labor which increased greatly the interdependence of all parts of the world.

Along with this extension of the division of labor took place a great increase in the range, facility, and rapidity of the means of communication through the steamship, railroad, telegraph, telephone, post-office, press, etc. By these means the different parts of the world have been put in touch with each other and have come to know each other to an extent which was utterly impossible in ancient times.

Last but not least, there was taking place at the same time the development of modern science to which I have already referred and which was to a great extent the cause of the great changes above mentioned. In the nineteenth century came the theory of evolution which showed the common origin of the whole organic world, including man. When this theory was applied in anthropology it showed that just as there is no absolute distinction between man and other animals so there is no absolute distinction between the different races of men. When this theory was applied in sociology it showed the fundamental unity in the culture which has been developing in the course of social evolution.

The significance of these great changes for humanitarianism is evident when we consider them in the light of the discussion in the first part of this chapter. The increasing interdependence of the different parts of the world made it more and more evident to individuals and to social groups that it was to their interest to concern themselves with the welfare of others. Furthermore, the knowledge acquired with regard to other individuals and social groups through the means of communication described above and through science has shown the fundamental similarity of human beings and has stimulated the sympathetic imagination to a high degree. These ideas and this knowledge have naturally tended in the main to stimulate the humane feelings and impulses in the relations of men and of social groups and to inhibit the cruel feelings and impulses. Thus these fundamental human traits which have been in existence a very long time are being influenced by the intelligence, under the social conditions which have evolved during the past few centuries, in the direction of humanitarianism.

This is an example of the familiar psychological phenomenon of feelings and instinctive impulses being directed and to a certain extent controlled by ideas. It is through such combining of the different parts of the mental makeup that are formed the sentimental complexes which play so important a part in the life of man. Owing in the main to the events and conditions which have been described the prevailing sentiments of the day are humanitarian. But the same psychological process is also displayed in the opposite direction. Where individuals or groups are led to believe that their interests conflict and that they are not alike, neither self-interest nor sympathetic imagination will establish humane relations between them but their attitude toward each other will be either that of callous indifference or of hostility and hatred. It goes without saying that this situation frequently arises and will always exist to a certain extent, since the instincts and feelings out of which it arises will always persist in human nature. Thus when two classes regard their interest as conflicting and are not well acquainted with each other they will regard each other with dislike if not with hatred and are very likely to arrive at open hostility. If they are economic classes the upper class will regard the lower class as stupid and indolent, while the lower will believe that the upper is consciously exploiting it.

The same situation frequently arises between nations. Owing to ignorance of ethnological data the tendency is to exaggerate the racial differences between nations. This is well illustrated in Europe today. All the nations of Europe are very heterogeneous ethnically, and certain ethnic elements are represented in many of these countries. And yet it is the prevailing belief in each of these countries that the nation is ethnically pure or almost pure and is quite distinct from every other nation. This mistaken belief does not encourage the sympathetic imagination. Furthermore, these nations are very prone to regard their interests as conflicting, so that it is still deplorably easy for them to go to war with each other. Then when war breaks out the inhibitions upon the mind are relaxed in many cases to a large extent and what was once the enemy becomes more or less regarded as a sub-human. While these actually engaged in warfare may be guilty of atrocities which are utterly

incompatible with the humanitarian standards in accordance with which they themselves would ordinarily act.

The foregoing discussion has been a very brief analysis of the principal causes of the modern humanitarian movement. There has not been the space to mention many minor causes. But it must now be evident how important it is to understand the causes of this movement if practical measures are to be taken to further the movement. If the religious theory mentioned above is correct, the principal and perhaps the only measure to be taken is to preach religion. If the moral theory mentioned above is correct, the principal and perhaps the only measure to take is to deliver lectures on ethics. But if our theory is correct entirely or in the main, then to talk about peace will not prevent war and to tell the economic classes to love one another will not abolish industrial warfare. According to our theory the only effective measures in the long run will be those which direct the forces of industry, commerce, and science in such a fashion as to make the interests of individuals and of social groups as nearly alike as possible and the educational measures which will disseminate the kind of knowledge described above. And in this connection it is well to remember that many ideas which circulate as religious or as moral ideas or sometimes in both forms did not originate as such but came from science or arose out of the conditions which have been brought into being by economic and other changes. If the ideas are correct and will aid the progress of humanitarianism they may gain currency more easily under a religious or an ethical form. But the fundamental causes of humanitarianism must never be forgotten.

The modern humanitarian movement, we can now see, has arisen out of certain human traits influenced and directed by the conditions and ideas which have become prevalent during the last few centuries. Like every great movement it is a product of social evolution in general and can be understood only in the light of an analysis of social evolution. It is one phase of and an inevitable result from the universal world culture which is now rapidly coming into being. No unilateral theory can account for it.¹

¹ Many writers have presented unilateral theories to explain the modern humanitarian movement. As a very pronounced example of such a writer I might mention

The most spontaneous form of humanitarianism is that which grows directly out of the emotions. This is pure altruism and is perhaps not broad enough to be worthy of the name of humanitarianism. It arises in personal relations where the individual is moved by direct observation of the needs or the suffering of another to perform services for that other. It is pure "goodness of heart" untouched by any reflection as to the causes of the suffering or as to the consequences from the services rendered. It is evident that this form of humanitarianism is very limited in its range and is directed merely at the superficial appearance of the needs or suffering.

A less spontaneous form of humanitarianism is the sentimental type in which the altruistic tendencies become associated with ideas in such a fashion as to inhibit them in certain directions and to reinforce them in other directions so that they display a lack of proportion which sometimes becomes grotesque. This sentimental type may arise out of temperamental traits, ignorance, early training, circumstances of life, etc. Thus religious or moral ideas may

Benjamin Kidd. (See his *Social Evolution*, London, 1894.) This writer was at one time very much in vogue, probably in the main because he catered so exclusively to the prejudices of the upper class and to religious sentiments. Kidd's central thesis is that altruism, self-sacrifice, humanitarianism, etc., are attributable to the "ultra-rational" sanction of religion. Indeed he carries his theory so far as to imply that society itself could not exist without this sanction. Religion, thus conceived as a social, integrating force, he contrasts with reason which he represents as an individualistic, disintegrating force. Throughout his discussion he displays a profound ignorance of modern psychology. His conception of the mental makeup of man seems to be that of certain of the older psychologists who conceived of man as a purely rational being who was always impelled to act from within by purely egoistic motives and must therefore be coerced from without to be altruistic. According to Kidd this coercion comes through religion.

Now it goes without saying that man is governed largely by egoistic considerations, and none but the anarchists believe that it will ever be possible to have a society without a certain amount of social control of the individual. But we have already noted what is well known to all who are familiar to modern psychology, namely, that man possesses certain instincts and feelings which impel him to do things for others and that altruism originates from within the man himself and not from without. Furthermore, this altruism is not to be distinguished from egoism as sharply as Kidd and similar writers are prone to do. As a general rule a mother is happier in caring for her child than in devoting herself exclusively to other things; a man is happier to relieve the suffering of his fellows than in devoting himself exclusively to enriching himself.

lead the individual to inhibit altruistic tendencies toward those who are alleged to be immoral. An individual will be led, frequently quite unconsciously, by considerations of self-interest to exaggerated efforts in behalf of those with whom his interests are identified or are supposed to be identified, but will be blind to the needs of those whose interests are opposed or are supposed to be opposed to his interests. Various fortuitous circumstances may lead an individual to develop his altruistic tendencies in an extreme form along narrow lines to the exclusion of other forms of altruism.

Many examples of this sentimental type may be cited with all the inconsistencies and excesses which it includes. A manufacturer may contribute heavily to foreign missions, being moved to do so in part by altruistic motives, and yet overwork the men, women, and children in his factory. A clergyman may preach the duty of philanthropy to the poor and yet underpay the servant in his own household. An anarchist may agitate against capital punishment for murderers and yet kill innocent people with a bomb. A woman may make life miserable for the members of her family and yet work actively for the prevention of cruelty to animals. Various extreme forms of this sentimental type make their appearance, as, for example, when philozoism takes the form of vegetarianism or the still more extreme form of anti-vivisectionism.

The most highly evolved and the broadest form of humanitarianism is the intellectual type in which the altruistic impulses are directed and controlled by ideas. In this type an extended knowledge of mankind stimulates the sympathetic imagination to the highest degree, and every humanitarian measure is undertaken on the basis of a careful study of its ultimate effect upon the welfare of mankind. This is the least spontaneous type in the sense that the response to the altruistic impulses is not immediate, but these impulses may nevertheless be quite as strong in this type as in the others.

It goes without saying that no individual represents any one of these types perfectly. But humanity may be divided roughly into these three groups with respect to humanitarian traits. We all are acquainted with simple-minded, good-hearted persons who are helpful and kind to those within their own circle, but who know

little of and have no interest in the vast majority of mankind who do not come within their own personal experience. Their philanthropy is likely to take the form of personal almsgiving, and while they may succeed in aiding in the minor matters of life they are not likely to accomplish much with respect to the more important matters. It is obvious that these individuals represent the emotional humanitarian type. The sentimental type is abundantly represented in organized philanthropic movements, in religious circles, and in certain kinds of reform movements. The intellectual type is by far the rarest and is frequently hard to distinguish. He is found perhaps most frequently in social movements of the most fundamental sort. But he is also to be found in scientific, literary, artistic, educational, and other kinds of work where the relation of his work to the humanitarian movement and its influence upon that movement are not obvious at first sight. For example, it is interesting to note to what extent the humanitarian spirit of this highest type is now represented in science. In biology this is perhaps best illustrated by the development of eugenics. In the social sciences it is indicated by the great extent to which economics, which Carlyle, who was a sentimental humanitarian of his day, called the "dismal science," is concerning itself with problems of human welfare.

These types of humanitarianism may also be traced roughly through the many kinds of humanitarian activities. The emotional type is perhaps best represented by almsgiving. The sentimental type is represented in organized charitable work and in much of the reform work. The intellectual type is represented in certain far-reaching social movements and in many other kinds of activity where it is difficult to distinguish it. It is noticeable that the spirit of the first two types is what is ordinarily called philanthropic. In passing to the third type the spirit changes somewhat, and while it is still philanthropic in the sense that it is interested in human welfare it becomes rather what is ordinarily called a spirit of social justice. In this spirit the endeavor is made to benefit all of mankind and not to benefit one group in any manner as to do injury to any other group.

CERTAIN SOCIAL EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUALISTIC INDUSTRY

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The pronouncement of the Communist Manifesto that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" is still singularly applicable to conditions of industry. Notwithstanding the many strivings after equity and peace in the relations of labor and capital, it is not at all clear that the reform movement has yet emerged from the stage of experimentation. It may be of advantage, in this connection, to recognize the striking parallel between the social conditions marking the modern industrial situation and those which have developed in England as a result of the great changes effected in agriculture during the past two centuries.

Curiously enough, little if any reference has been made to the analogy between the status of the British yeoman, gradually dispossessed of his landholdings and reduced to the lot of a wage-earner, and that of the modern factory operative who likewise is dependent, as a class, on his wages alone. In England, about 1800, after the system of inclosure had begun to bear fruit, the aristocracy regarded the poor, essentially a rural element, "as a problem of discipline and order, to be passed on to posterity with a vague suggestion of squalor and turbulence."¹ Slightly altered in detail to fit modern conditions, this would serve equally as a characterization of the industrial society of today. Applicable alike to the two periods in question, the words of Carlyle serve as an indictment of the tottering policy of *laissez faire*.² "It is not to die, or even to die of hunger," declared Carlyle, "that makes a man wretched. . . . But it is to live miserable we know not why; to work sore and yet gain nothing; to be heart-worn, weary, yet

¹ Hammond, *The Village Laborer*, p. 331.

² Carlyle, *Past and Present*, p. 203.

isolated, unrelated, girt in with a cold, universal *laissez faire*." The ideal of national greatness is no longer that nation wherein "wealth accumulates and men decay."

Disclaiming any intention of discussing the merits of the system of inclosure as a public policy or as a means to agricultural progress, I shall attempt, for purposes of comparison, briefly to outline the changes that the practice of inclosure caused in the social structure of England; and to point out the process by which, through the vanishing of the old village, rural society gradually assumed its modern character.

Of the various classes who lived in the early English village the cottagers, squatters, and farm servants were more essentially laborers than the freeholders, copy-holders, and tenant farmers. Notwithstanding the general similarity in status and property rights, the best dividing-line between the classes was to be drawn between "those who made their living mainly as farmers, and those who made their living mainly as laborers."¹ The modern connotation of the term laborer, however, must be discarded in this connection inasmuch as the farm servant never had before him the opportunity of himself becoming in time a farmer—an end which was attained as a general rule. Indeed, to heighten the contrast with present-day conditions one should note the assertion of Dr. Slater that "in the open field village the entirely landless laborer was scarcely to be found."² The most significant social fact about the system was the abundant opportunity it afforded to the humblest and poorest laborer in the village to improve his lot. The normal worker did not depend on his wages alone. His livelihood was drawn from several sources, for he secured his fuel from the waste lands, his cow or pig roamed over the common pasture, and he frequently raised a small crop on a strip in the common fields. His income accordingly consisted in part of wages and in part of produce derived from his landed privileges. Moreover, his earnings were augmented through the labor of his wife and children who found employment in the handicraft industries that flourished in the village.

¹ Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

² Slater, *The English Peasantry and the Enclosure of Common Fields*, p. 130.

Although the danger of idealizing the societal features of the community thus described is recognized, the testimony of Adam Smith may safely be introduced. Writing during the latter half of the eighteenth century he declared that the large number of yeomen was at once the strength and the distinction of English agriculture.

Even at the time of Adam Smith, however, forces were at work which within a few decades were destined rudely to alter this condition of affairs. Whereas England, at the time of the Whig revolution, was in the main a country of common fields with a relatively independent class of yeomen, by the time of the Reform Bill it had become a country of individualistic agriculture and of large inclosed farms. A corresponding change was apparent in the status of the agricultural laborer. All his auxiliary resources had been taken from him, and he was now a wage-earner and nothing more. Inclosure had robbed him of the strip that he had cultivated, of the animals he had maintained on the village pasture, and of the right he had enjoyed of gathering fuel on the waste and of gleaning in the fields after the harvest. In short, his economic independence had been destroyed.

Under the rule of the oligarchy, in the form of the landed aristocracy, the old village community disappeared. Notwithstanding the fact that many an inclosing landlord thought only of the satisfaction of doubling or trebling his rents, the early agricultural community "was not killed by avarice alone."¹ At any rate, greed, in this case, was heavily veiled in public spirit. Believing themselves to be the pillars of society, the members of the English aristocracy quite logically concluded that the old peasant community was a public incumbrance. This view was given a special impetus by various circumstances. The possibilities of scientific farming, when once appreciated, led to the belief that the wider the area brought into the possession of the enlightened classes the greater would be the public gain. "The idea of having lands in common," it was declared, "is derived from that barbarous state of society, when men were strangers to any higher occupations than those of hunters or shepherds, or had only just tasted the advantages to be reaped

¹ Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

from the cultivation of the earth."¹ Bentham thought the practice of inclosure a most reassuring evidence of progress.

Under the influence of such reasoning it is perhaps only natural that in the enthusiasm of newly found knowledge the conclusion should have been reached that the early system was the root cause of the ills of society. It was said to be not only of no economic benefit to the masses but to be positively harmful to their morals on the ground that it bred in them instincts of idleness. In an official report published in 1794 the declaration appears that "the use of common land by laborers operates upon the mind as a sort of independence." Continuing, it predicts that with the commons inclosed "the laborers will work every day in the year, their children will be put to work early," and "that subordination of the lower ranks of society which in the present times is so much wanted, would be thereby considerably secured."²

The extent to which the system of inclosure was practiced may be briefly summarized. The estimate given before the Select Committee on Enclosures in 1844 covered nearly four thousand parliamentary acts by which almost six million acres of "common" land were made private property.³ There were probably also many inclosures, especially in the more distant counties, that did not possess the authority of legislative enactment. The conclusion is reached by A. H. Johnson in *The Disappearance of the Small Landowner* that approximately 20 per cent of the total acreage of England was inclosed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Sweeping changes followed in the form and character of the rural society of England. As already mentioned, the agricultural laborer, through the loss of his property rights, was reduced to the status of a wage-earner, pure and simple. Contemporaneous with this societal transformation the industrial revolution, by destroying the old household industries, swept away the earnings of his family. Each of these losses was a serious blow to his economic welfare. As if to accentuate his predicament the old Settlement Laws denied to the laborer the freedom to move about the country in search of better conditions if circumstances became desperate in his home.

¹ *Report of the Select Committee on Waste Lands*, 1795, p. 15.

² Quoted in Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

community. Whereas the system of inclosures deprived him of a career within his own village, his escape was barred by the Settlement Laws. Theoretically every person had one parish, and one only, in which he or she had a settlement or residence right; and the liberty of the individual was entirely controlled by the parish officers. "There is scarce a poor man in England," Adam Smith wrote, "of forty years of age, I will venture to say, who has not, in some part of his life, felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlements."¹

The economic basis of his independence having been taken from him, the English laborer was reduced to a pitiable plight.² The wages he received, without land privileges, had a lower purchasing power than the income he had earlier enjoyed when his wages were supplemented by "common" rights. His declining standard of living was not a part, however, of a general decline. The lives of the governing class in England were becoming more spacious and not more meager during this period. Food riots occurred which represented a revolt of the poor against an increasing pressure of want. An accompaniment of the laborer's dire poverty was the entire loss of his old-time sense of ownership. No longer did he feel an interest in the public affairs of the village. For the landless laborer the situation offered little to kindle ambition or awaken a sense of civic responsibility, and his narrowed horizon was now bounded by the ever-present prospect of the workhouse. The seventeenth-century peasant, notwithstanding the crudity of his agricultural processes, and his oftentimes doubtful prosperity, was subject to the stimulus of ambition and self-respect. With his unfortunate successor, however, the springs of self-esteem and ambitious endeavor gradually dried up *pari passu* with the process of impoverishment.

For a sharp contrast to this somber picture we have but to look at the condition of the upper classes during the same period. The aristocracy of England has left brilliant records of its art, political traditions, parliamentary debates, and notable achievements in many other fields of activity. An age which produced Pitt, Burke, and Fox cannot be called an age of mere avarice. Amid the

¹ Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, I, 194.

² Hammond, *op. cit.*, pp. 240, 324.

wretchedness that followed Waterloo and peace, it was a commonplace of statesmen that England was the only happy country in Europe, and that so long as their power and authority were left untouched, her happiness would survive.

Without detracting in the slightest from the record of this class, it would still seem legitimate to question the practice of justifying even by implication, any civilization in which national prestige and an illustrious career for a limited class are secured, if not at the expense of the masses, at least in conjunction with widespread popular poverty.

It is asserted by B. S. Rowntree that at present 70 per cent of the agricultural laborers of England and Wales are paid laborers, having no direct financial interest in the success of the work in which they are engaged. "The fact that in England very few laborers expect to become independent," says Mr. Rowntree, "and that abroad almost all of them expect to do so, is of supreme importance."¹ It is asserted further that, at present, a large proportion of the agricultural laborers are living below the poverty line and "that they could not make ends meet at all if it were not for charitable gifts."² Naturally this is deemed an undesirable and intolerable condition of things.

For the immediate purpose of the present study, perhaps sufficient reference has been made to the societal transformation which followed the changes introduced into the system of English agriculture. Its analogy to the social effects of modern industrial organization may briefly be pointed out.

During the past three-quarters of a century the character and status of the factory workman have undergone a significant change. The typical industrial community in the United States, in 1840, contained a body of laborers who were not unfamiliar with the stirrings of ambition and the hope of eventual economic independence. Their wages were quite frequently supplemented by auxiliary earnings derived from a modest plot of land. Because of such an attachment to the soil they felt a natural interest in civic affairs. The early system, strikingly paternalistic in many of its features, tended to develop a spirit of contentment and a

¹ Rowntree, *How the Laborer Lives*, p. 19.

² Rowntree, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

general morale on the part of the employees which unfortunately disappeared with the development of modern industry.

With the evolution of the modern factory system a distinct and permanent working class has been created. This class, heterogeneous in racial make-up, is now essentially dependent on wages alone. In the main, the industrial worker is no longer a possessor of property, and his loyalty to or pride in his town has disappeared. He is unstable in residence and lacks a sense of civic responsibility. Instead, he forms a discordant element in society, maintaining an impersonal and irresponsible attitude toward even the fundamental affairs of the community's welfare. This change, regrettable as it is, cannot fairly be attributed to the fault of the workman. Rather is he the product of circumstances which too long were permitted to develop without restraint.

The unhappy lot of the English agricultural laborer of 1830 and of the present-day industrial worker sharply raises the question as to what constitutes the proper standard of judgment in appraising the net results of economic development. The two views commonly held may be designated as the capitalistic and the societal. Their divergence is immediately obvious.

The former is based on the individualistic premise that the maximum of efficiency in the industrial unit is the end to be sought; and that the continued evolution of the factory system must be accompanied, as in the past, by certain hardships to the workmen. The necessity for progress and the exigencies of competition are put forth as a justification of the ills which accompany such an evolution. Industrial prosperity and national achievement must be attained even though attended by a species of exploitation of the wage-earners. An alleviation of the ills of the industrial worker would be favored in so far as such improvement could be effected without sacrificing efficiency. The protagonist of the capitalistic view would further urge that the laborer's lot has been steadily improving.

No less insistent, however, on genuine industrial progress, the believer in the societal ideal of advance would reply that the highest public welfare can be attained in the long run only by having due regard for all the legitimate interests involved. It is declared

that in the past the interests of the employer class have received undue consideration, with the result that the bulk of the population has lost its basis of economic independence; and that industrial efficiency would be enhanced rather than diminished by more widely distributing the benefits of progress. The underlying ideal may be termed industrial socialization.

The essentially individualistic spirit of America is largely the product of environment. "The westward march of the pioneer," declares Dr. Weyl, "gave to Americans a psychological twist which was to hinder the development of a socialized democracy."¹ The open continent with its vast resources tended to fasten more strongly upon the people an individualism which acknowledged few obligations. Whereas in the early thirties when De Tocqueville described the United States as "the most democratic country on the face of the earth," the nations of Europe were still in the grasp of absolutism, the tables have since been turned. Today America studies democratic institutions in Europe and Australia.

For an understanding of this relative backwardness, attention should be called to the prevailing attitude of Americans toward the fundamental choice which, early in its career, the United States was called upon to make as between the attainment of the social rights of men, and the material conquest of the continent. That we chose the latter was in large part due, as already suggested, to our unusual conditions of environment. The charge that the industrial leaders of the country have been guilty of personal dishonesty or avarice must be qualified. Rather is the explanation to be found in the mores of the country, in the laws, institutions, and general spirit of the society of which they have formed a part. From the conquest of its richly endowed territory the United States has emerged laden with prosperity and possessed of a strong national consciousness. Such progress, however, has been attended by certain unhappy conditions. Not the least disturbing of these unwelcome accompaniments have been the anarchic character of industry and the city slum. Too apparent to be mistaken are the many evidences of our characteristic policy of exploitation, heedless of the future and lacking in a sense of obligation to the larger interests of

¹ Weyl, *The New Democracy*, p. 36.

society as a whole. The modern conservation propaganda which would call a halt on the mad rush for prosperity has among other aims the protection of the life of the individual and of the society. The highest welfare of society is unattainable so long as a large part, if not the majority, of its members are subject to stultifying conditions of life.

That the ideal basis of industrial society has not been generally attained is obvious when we recall that the factory operatives form, in the main, a floating population, devoid of anchorage in any community and relatively lacking in morale.

Practically every industrial center of today constitutes an indictment against the prevailing system of industry. This is apparent upon an investigation of the dwelling-places of the factory population and after noting that the workmen in a sense are like migratory birds flitting about with few if any belongings and with even less of a sense of social responsibility. It is proposed to call attention to certain well-known symptoms of the disordered industrial situation and to venture suggestions looking toward an improvement in conditions.

An outstanding characteristic of the factory population is its prevailing occupancy of rented houses. Aside from the intolerable living conditions which prevail in the cramped, poorly lighted, and squalid rooms of the typical city tenement, there is a distinct social problem in the very fact that relatively so small a number of the industrial workers own their own homes. It was shown by the national census of 1900 for the city of Lowell, Massachusetts, that 22.9 per cent of the total number of houses were owned by their occupants.¹ Of these owners the large proportion were not of the wage-earning class.² That is, in a city containing in 1900 a population of 94,969, overwhelmingly wage-earning in character, less than 10 per cent of the homes owned by their occupants were owned by the workmen.

For private families classified by tenure of home in the 160 cities of continental United States having 25,000 or more inhabitants, the census returns of 1900 reveal the following average percentage

¹ Abstract of Twelfth Census, 1900, Table 90, p. 135.

² Kennigott, *A Record of a City*, p. 62.

figures. Of the 4,137,279 families resident in the cities under consideration 25.7 per cent owned their homes whereas the remaining 74.3 per cent occupied rented homes.¹ We are reminded, however, that the proportion of rented homes in the southern states is unusually high because of the presence of the negro population. In 1900, for example, among the negro families of the South 21.7 per cent owned their homes and 78.3 per cent occupied rented homes, whereas among the white families of the South the corresponding figures were 52.1 per cent and 47.9 per cent, respectively.² Accordingly, if the negro population of the South be omitted from consideration, the proportion of homes owned among the families in the 160 cities referred to above would be substantially higher than the figure, 25.7 per cent, quoted above. Therefore the percentage of owned homes, 22.9 per cent, in Lowell, Massachusetts, becomes the more significant. During the decade ending in 1910 there was a slight decrease in the percentage of owned homes in Lowell, the proportion revealed in the Thirteenth Census being 22.4 per cent.³

Although urban communities are marked in general by a relatively smaller proportion of owned homes than is the case in rural districts, this characteristic appears in an aggravated form in the more essentially manufacturing cities of the country. Those cities, in 1910, in which owned homes constituted less than one-fifth of the total homes, were:⁴ New York City; the following four cities of Massachusetts, Boston, Fall River, Cambridge, and Holyoke; Newark and Hoboken of New Jersey; McKees Rocks Borough and Braddock Borough of Pennsylvania; Central Falls City of Rhode Island; and Savannah and Augusta, Georgia. In addition to these, Providence and Woonsocket, Rhode Island; Jersey City and Passaic, New Jersey; Lawrence and Chelsea, Massachusetts; and Cohoes, New York revealed a percentage figure only slightly in excess of 20 per cent.

By the Pittsburgh Survey a similar state of affairs was shown to be existent in 1907-8. in the steel-manufacturing city of Home-

¹ Thirteenth Census, 1910, Vol. I, Table 12, p. 1310. ² *Ibid.*, Table 12, p. 1312.

³ *Ibid.*, Table 12, p. 1313; Table 15, p. 135.

stead, Pennsylvania. Of the ninety selected families whose budget accounts were investigated, thirty-two represented those of unskilled laborers whose weekly earnings were less than \$12.00, sixteen families were in receipt of \$12.00 to \$14.99; twenty-three were of a more skilled variety, having earnings of \$15.00 to \$19.99, and the remaining nineteen enjoyed an income of \$20.00 or over per week. It was discovered that thirteen of the ninety families owned their homes, while five others were in the process of purchasing on the instalment plan.¹ It was noted further that, whereas none of these eighteen families earned normally less than \$12.00 per week, not all belonged to the highest wage group. In eleven of these households the man earned \$20.00 and over. For the five families in which the principal wage-earner's income was \$12.00 to \$14.99 per week the purchasing of the home entailed severe economy and self-denial.² To guard against the unduly optimistic conclusion that the foregoing would seem to justify, it should be added that of the total number of 6,772 men employed in the Homestead plant in March, 1907, 58.3 per cent were classified as unskilled laborers; and that this group of workmen received an income of \$9.90 to \$11.88 per week.³ Inasmuch as at least one-half of the mill-operatives belonged to the class of unskilled laborers, and since Miss Byington's investigations showed that not one family of an unskilled laborer, among the ninety families under consideration, had even made an appreciable effort to buy a house, the conclusion seems justified that one-half of the married employees were practically debarred by insufficient wages from purchasing a home.

Such is the situation in the larger cities. "And yet the problem of the better housing of the working people exists," declares Dr. Streightoff, "in the small towns and villages just as certainly as in the larger cities."⁴ In the words of a labor inspector of the federal government, "almost every small manufacturing town is in great peril from unnecessary and preventable overcrowding."⁵

Closely related to this phase of the wage-earner's lot is the allied problem incident to his limited ownership of real estate. In view

¹ Byington, *Homestead: Households of a Mill Town*, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴ Streightoff, *Standard of Living*, p. 76.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

of the relative absence of complete data bearing on this question it is necessary, in estimating the amount of real estate owned by the industrial workers of the country, to pursue the indirect or symptomatic method. By this process conclusions must be drawn from such general indications as may be derived from statistics of wages and of property holdings and from general observation. Dr. Spahr's investigations led him to the conclusion that in the United States in 1890 somewhat less than one-half the families were without property, owning neither house nor land; that seven-eighths of the families held but one-eighth of the national wealth, and that 1 per cent of the families owned more than the other 99.¹ Although nearly one-half of the families in the country in 1895 owned the real estate which they occupied, the proportion of owners was more than twice as great upon the farms, as in the cities, although the average wealth of the urban property-holder is much greater than in the case of the rural inhabitant.² The wide distribution of property which is a distinguishing mark of the United States, as contrasted with England, is, after all, only characteristic of the small towns and farming communities. And needless to say, the great bulk of the factory employees are urban dwellers.

Even assuming a certain divergence between these conclusions and the true state of affairs, it is still incontrovertible probably that in regard to the urban population of the country in general and the factory operatives in particular the ownership of land is lodged in relatively few hands.

The testimony of Robert Hunter in this connection is significant. "Probably no wage-earners in Manhattan own their homes," declared Mr. Hunter in 1904, "and in several other large cities probably 99 per cent of the wage-earners are propertyless."³

Nevertheless the "back-to-the-soil" propaganda if attained universally would undoubtedly spell economic retrogression. In the first place, its application on a universal scale would seem physically impossible, whereas its operation, if possible, would probably involve a sacrifice in efficiency in the economic mechanism. However, the agitation for "four acres and a cow" must be deemed

¹ Spahr, *The Present Distribution of Wealth*, p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³ Hunter, *Poverty*, p. 42.

wholesome in its effects, notwithstanding the impossibility of its attainment. Through such agitation public attention is focused upon the fundamental problem of more equitably distributing among the several classes of society the fruits of production. Whereas a widespread ownership of real estate by the industrial workers is not an end to be unreservedly approved, it is undoubtedly true, on the other hand, that the ownership of their homes will represent a step forward in industrial evolution.

Concomitant to this problem of the non-ownership of homes is the wholesale crowding together of factory employees into totally inadequate living-quarters. That such congestion is attended with calamitous results, of a moral as well as physical nature, is well known.

Population congestion is a mark of the industrial center, whether small or large. So long ago as 1880 and containing less than 60,000 inhabitants, Lowell faced the slum problem, typified in particular in the district known as "Little Canada." "Its area is less than two acres," declared the State Board of Health report for 1880: "its population, according to the census just taken, is 1,076 souls, who live in twenty-four tenement houses. In addition to this are one unfinished tenement house, five stables, eight carriage and wood-sheds, one base-house, and sixteen privies or slop-hoppers."¹ In his report for 1880 the city physician stated in regard to this locality of the city that "unless special complaint were made, the poor man's landlord continued to use his galvanized iron soil pipe without traps, and allowed his vaults to overflow or leak. . . . Measles, croup, and typhoid fever were not reported to the Board of Health. No houses were placarded, nor was routine disinfection done after contagious diseases." Continuing, he declared that "were it not for the fearful mortality from this locality, our death-rate would be quite satisfactory."²

From the study of conditions in Homestead, the conclusion was drawn that overcrowding decreases with higher wages. The accompanying tables will indicate that among the ninety budget

¹ Kenngott *op. cit.*, p. 70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

families, housing accommodations varied roughly in accordance with the family income.¹

TABLE I

Expenditure Group	Total Number of Families	Water in House	Two or More Persons per Room
Under \$12.00.....	32	12	16
\$12.00 to \$14.99.....	16	5	10
\$15.00 to \$19.99.....	23	14	9
\$20.00 and over.....	19	16	5
Total.....	90	47	40

Statistics concerning the ninety budget families occupying specified number of rooms² are given in Table II.

TABLE II

Expenditure Group	Total Families	One Room	Two Rooms	Three Rooms	Four Rooms	Five Rooms	Six or More Rooms
Under \$12.00.....	32	5	10	3	11	1	2
\$12.00 to \$14.99.....	16	3	4	6	1	2
\$15.00 to \$19.99.....	23	6	7	3	5	2
\$20.00 and over.....	19	2	3	2	4	8
Total.....	90	5	21	17	22	11	14

To the often-repeated declaration that these people would not live differently if they could, these figures do not lend support. Results obtained by the Pittsburgh Survey indicate that whereas rent is the item which generally is cut down first when economy becomes necessary, most families when incomes permit will secure room enough to make possible genuine home life.

The investigations of Dr. Chapin in New York City support the view that the condition prevailing in Homestead is fairly typical of the essentially industrial centers of the country. He discovered that the average number of rooms per family increases regularly with income, as may be noted from Table III, in which the percentage of families having not more than three rooms is given.³

³ Chapin, *Standard of Living among Workingmen's Families in New York City*.

From a slightly different angle this problem of overcrowding may also be approached. Figures were compiled in the 1910 census report of the average number of persons per dwelling in cities

TABLE III

INCOME	NUMBER OF FAMILIES SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION		PERCENTAGE LIVING IN THREE ROOMS	
	Manhattan	Other Boroughs	Manhattan	Other Boroughs
\$600.00 to \$799.00.....	115	36	71	31
\$800.00 to \$899.00.....	58	15	48	27
\$900.00 to \$1,099.00.....	70	24	39	17

having 25,000 inhabitants or more. The ten cities showing the highest average number of occupants per dwelling were:¹

	Persons		Persons
Hoboken, New Jersey.....	15.9	New York City.....	15.6
Holyoke, Massachusetts.....	11.9	Fall River, Massachusetts....	10.9
Passaic, New Jersey.....	10.7	Yonkers, New York.....	10.2
Worcester, Massachusetts.....	9.7	Jersey City, New Jersey.....	9.6
Waterbury, Connecticut.....	9.5	West Hoboken, New Jersey....	9.5

Closely following these were New Britain, Connecticut; Boston, Massachusetts; Chelsea, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; and Bayonne, New Jersey. It would seem, therefore, that overcrowding is most pronounced in the more essentially manufacturing centers.

Even in the city of Lawrence, Massachusetts, in which the average number of persons per dwelling in 1910 was 8.2,² practically all the textile-mill employees live in wooden tenement houses. The most usual types of these are either three- or four-story buildings and, in the more thickly settled portions of the city, tenements occupy both the front and rear of the lots. During 1911 only 11 of the 135 permits issued for dwellings provided for the erection of one-family cottages, and during the five years from 1907 to 1911 only slightly more than one dwelling-permit out of seven provided for the building of one-family houses.³

¹ Abstract, Thirteenth Census, 1910, pp. 261, 262.

² *Ibid.*, 1910, p. 262.

³ Senate Doc. No. 870, 62d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 23, 24.

In the indictment against overcrowding, the first count is physiological. Among the results of overcrowding, as revealed in the investigations of the British Royal Commission of 1884 on the Housing of the Working Classes, were high death-rates, scrofula and congenital weaknesses, encouragement of infectious diseases, and reduced physical stamina.¹ An investigation in Berlin, Germany, in 1885, disclosed the fact that the death-rate for families living in one room was 163.5 per thousand, while families occupying two rooms sustained a death-rate of only 22.5 per thousand. The three-room dwellers escaped with the low rate of 7.5, and the well-to-do people, having four rooms or more at their disposal, suffered by death only at the rate of 5.4 per thousand.² "The case against crowding in houses on sanitary grounds," declares Dr. Streightoff, "is fully established."³

But, as commonly acknowledged, there are other counts. Both morally and psychologically the results of overcrowding are unhappy. Life in a crowded district, with its general accompaniment of wretchedness, checks the growth of individuality and strength of character, as pointed out by Professor Ross;⁴ it increases the tendency of men to frequent saloons.⁵ Habits of negligence are engendered and the moral sense is dulled in the life of the crowded tenement. In the words of Mr. Gould, in the eighth special report of the Commissioner of Labor, "there need be no caviling as to the relative merits of the block dwellings and small individual homes. No matter how excellent the accommodation, no matter what precautions are taken to secure self-containment and isolation, home in a tenement building can never be what it is where a single roof covers a single family."⁶

That the propertylessness of the wage-earner has also unfortunate political results is probably an accepted fact. The absence of any real interest in the town in which he resides, aside from his interest in the source of his wages, renders the factory operative

¹ *Report of Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes*, I, 13, 14.

² Riis, *Charities and Commons*, XVIII, 77.

⁴ Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 88.

³ Streightoff, *Standard of Living*, p. 82.

⁵ Streightoff, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁶ Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor, p. 176.

relatively an easier prey for the ward politician. The sense of civic loyalty and political responsibility is lacking.

The prime requisite to a general acquisition of property by the industrial wage-earners is an adequate income. When their wage scales are considered the wonder is that any homes at all are owned by any but the most skilled. The average wage, for example, actually received by the 21,922 textile-mill employees in Lawrence, Massachusetts, during a week late in 1911, in which the mills were running full time, was \$8.76. Practically one-third (33.2 per cent) of the total number received less than \$7.00 during the week. Only 17.5 per cent of the working force received \$12.00 and over during the week.¹ Data gathered by the 1907 Immigration Commission concerning 26,116 adult male industrial workers employed in thirty-eight of the leading branches of mining and manufacturing showed average annual earnings of \$475.00. The investigations of the United States Bureau of Labor in 1901 of the budget accounts of 25,440 families, found in the more essentially manufacturing states, disclosed the fact that the average income of all was \$749.50; while that of *normal* families, comprising a husband at work, a wife, not more than five children (none over fourteen years of age), and no dependents, was \$650.98.² The study was confined to families of wage-earners whose incomes did not exceed \$1,200.00 per year. Of the 25,440 families, 16 per cent had deficits for the year averaging \$65.58, while 33.44 per cent succeeded in just finishing the year without contracting debt. That is, 49 per cent of the families were unable, during a year of prosperity, to save for an emergency.³ For the city of New York, as the investigations of Dr. Chapin showed, "an income under \$800 is not enough to permit the maintenance of a normal standard."⁴ To state that the existing régime, under which the average industrial worker cannot save, is intolerable is but to voice a truism.

A hopeful note is struck by Professor Hollander in his assertion that "the consensus of present-day opinion among political econo-

¹ "Report on Lawrence Strike," Sen. Doc. No. 870, 62d Cong., 2d sess., p. 19.

² *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, p. 17.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 69 ff.

⁴ Chapin, *Standard of Living among Workingmen's Families in New York City*, p. 245.

mists that poverty is not a necessary consequence of the wage system is unaffected by the striking lack of agreement as to the principle determining the rate of industrial remuneration."¹ Admitting the failure of economic science to provide practical standards of reference for wage determination, Mr. Hollander points to the fact that it is "the misdirections, not the normal working, of twentieth-century industrialism which leave large elements of the community in receipt of incomes less than enough to maintain, in the long run, decent, self-supporting existence for themselves, and those necessarily dependent on them."² There is nothing inherent in competitive industry whereby the national dividend, from our economic organization, must needs be so apportioned as to give rise to widespread poverty. We are reminded of Sir Henry Maine's aphorism that social necessities are always more or less in advance of law, and that the greater or less happiness of a people depends upon the promptitude with which the gulf between them is narrowed. This being so and recalling that "the principles of *laissez faire*, having been read into the Constitution, can be read out again,"³ it is possible to view the fundamental issue more reassuringly.

The socialization of industry must involve a viewing of industry from the standpoint of society and not solely from that of the present beneficiaries. It would seek to extend the advantages of leisure from one class to all classes without sacrificing industrial efficiency. Progress has already been achieved. "Altruism has widened its scope," says Professor Taussig, "and wretchedness that was accepted as a matter of course a few centuries ago is now not to be endured."⁴

Included in the program of economic betterment is the great body of modern industrial legislation pertaining to factory conditions, length of working-day, the minimum wage, state insurance against industrial accident, sickness, and old age. In varying degree in different countries the state is imposing conditions of

¹ "The Social Basis of the Industrial System," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 1, p. 1.
² "The Social Basis of the Industrial System," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 1, p. 1.
³ "The Social Basis of the Industrial System," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 1, p. 1.
⁴ *Economic Review*, March, 1912, p. 29.

⁵ Taussig, *Principles of Economics*, II, 200.

employment expressly designed to benefit the workers. And as a first important step in the campaign against unemployment, Professor Hollander urges the establishment of public employment bureaus or labor exchanges to serve to bring the two parties to the contract into direct contact.¹ This would tend to remove, declares Mr. Wilson, the secretary of labor, in his 1914 Annual Report, "what is perhaps the most potent cause of labor disputes—involuntary unemployment."

To supplement the foregoing progressive measures a modified form of the protective policy may advantageously be adopted. Although there is lacking in the traditional policy of protection any compulsion on the manufacturer to share with his employees the fruits of protection, the tariff nevertheless can be made to pass over a share of its benefits to the wage-earners. A feasible method is presented in the short-lived tariff enactment of 1906 in the Commonwealth of Australia. The underlying purpose of this policy, aptly called the "New Protection," was summarized in a memorandum accompanying the cabinet bill. "The 'Old' protection contented itself with making good wages possible," it was declared. "The 'New' protection seeks to make them actual. . . . Having put the manufacturer in a position to pay good wages, it goes on to assure the public that he does pay them. . . . Excise duties will be imposed on certain classes of goods, which enjoy the benefit of sufficient protection, and an exemption from the duties so imposed will then be made in favor of those in the manufacture of which fair and reasonable wages are paid."² In brief, this policy, reversing that of the United States, treats the protection of industries as only incidental to the primary object of wage protection.

By the Customs and Tariff act of 1906 the duty on agricultural implements was raised, and as a safeguard to the consumer the maximum prices of the more important protected articles were fixed. While the Customs act was designed to protect the manufacturers and the consumer, the Excise Tariff act, supplementary to the former measure, was intended to achieve the same end in

¹ Hollander, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

² Quoted by Victor S. Clark in *Journal of Political Economy*, XIX, 486.

behalf of the employees.¹ The excise or internal revenue tax was imposed on the home production of the classes of farm machinery subject to tariff protection. The element of protection therefore was substantially offset by the excise tax when the latter was in operation. It was provided, however, that by establishing "fair and reasonable" conditions of employment manufacturers might be exempt from payment of the excise tax. To determine what producers were eligible for such exemption, an Excise Tariff Court was formed equipped with adequate powers to investigate wages and other conditions of work prevailing in any factory or industry.

This principle, incorporated into the Commonwealth legislation in 1906, was expected by the Labor party to be widely extended. It was urged that an internal revenue tax be imposed on all goods manufactured in Australia which enjoyed tariff protection, such tax to be half as large as the customs duty imposed on imported goods of the same class. The exemption feature also was to be extended.²

However, in June, 1908, the High Court of the Commonwealth declared that, in passing an act regulating wages by means of excise duties, the federal parliament exceeded its constitutional powers, and that, in effect, it was taking from the constituent states their right to regulate labor conditions within their own borders.³ Notwithstanding the Australian decision, it is held by Professor Commons that the fundamental principle involved has been "sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States as being not in contravention of the Constitution" and that a permanent tariff commission would be the only additional machinery required in this country to inaugurate the change.⁴ And this difficulty has recently been removed through the creation of the new Trade Commission. "This commission," declared President Wilson in his Indianapolis speech on January 8, 1915, 'is authorized and empowered to in-

¹ *Report to Secretary of State on the Wages Boards and Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of Australia and New Zealand* (Cd. 4167), p. 120.

² Clark, "Australian Tariff," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XXII, 580.

³ *Report to Secretary of State on the Wages Boards and Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts of Australia and New Zealand* (Cd. 4167), p. 216.

⁴ Commons, *Labor and Administration*, p. 357.

quire into and report to Congress not only upon all the conditions of trade in this country, but upon the conditions of trade, the cost of manufacture, the cost of transportation in foreign countries as well as in the United States. . . . It has the full powers which will guide Congress in the scientific treatment of questions of international trade."

Inasmuch as Congress "is supreme in its action" in the field of customs and internal revenue taxation, it may select the industries and articles to be taxed, it may determine the rate of import duty, and it may impose internal revenue taxes for regulation as well as revenue. That such control over taxing power is already exercised one will recognize if he but call to mind the prohibitive tax of 10 per cent on state bank notes which was coupled with the National Bank act. The adoption by the United States of the essential principles and machinery of the "New Protection" would therefore involve certain technical changes in the drafting of the law. Although requiring administrative machinery and scientific investigation, the plan would not call for any innovation on the principles of legislation. It would rest of necessity on the basis of the comparative costs of production in this country and abroad. Although there is, of course, no single cost of production of any article for a given country, there is nevertheless a tolerably definite difference in the money costs of a given specified article between two different countries. "So far as the difficulty of determining cost of production is concerned," declared Professor H. C. Emery in 1912, "I venture to say that, after our experience in trying to arrive at accurate conclusions in this regard, the present Tariff Board is not only aware of every difficulty which has been suggested by the critics of this idea, but could easily enumerate many other difficulties which have not been suggested. I am convinced, however, that it is possible, in the case of most staple articles of manufacture, to determine the *ratio* of the costs between two different countries with sufficient accuracy for practical legislation."¹

From the experience of the past it may be inferred that the people of the United States will willingly support a tariff high

¹ Emery, "Economic Investigation as a Basis for Tariff Legislation," *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1912.

enough to protect American labor, but they are desirous of seeing the tariff actually passed along to the wage-earner. A permanent commission should inquire whether wages and hours prevailing in this country are actually reasonable and adequate to the realization of a reasonable American standard of life. Despite the great difficulties, it could be determined, at least approximately, what such reasonable conditions should be. On the basis of such an investigation the customs and excise rates should be equitably adjusted. The excise tax should be sufficiently high to make exemption from the same appear highly desirable to the manufacturer, and the latter should possess the initiative in bringing to the notice of the commission conditions prevailing in his industry or plant. If the commission finds thereupon that a given manufacturer is granting to his employees these reasonable conditions a certificate to the effect would exempt the producer from the payment of the internal revenue tax. This policy, by judiciously adjusting the balance between the manufacturer's own self-interest and his workmens' best interests, makes it practically a certainty that with the "New Protection" the laborer would be guaranteed a real and appreciable share of the fruits of protection. Then no longer would the wage-earner, so long said to be "the chief beneficiary of our tariff system," be merely an alleged recipient of tariff benefits. A long step would have been taken toward a genuine socialization of industry. Although the constitutionality of such a plan would be, of course, a matter of personal opinion until the courts had passed upon the question, it appears to others in addition to Professor Commons, to whose opinion reference has been made above, to be quite in agreement with past judicial decisions.

Evidence is not lacking to indicate that with the growing realization of societal responsibility, the state, in its regulation of wages, must eventually exercise a greater control than heretofore in the distribution of the net product of industry. As the state consciously seeks more and more in the future to accomplish what in the past has been left to the unconscious operation of economic forces many of the existing industrial causes disappear.

THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN

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THE CONTROL OF SUGGESTION

The course of progress is determined by two fundamentals; innate tendencies and nurture. In nurture are included all the thought-materials which are brought to one's attention or which, imbedded in environment, press upon the individual and insensibly shape his outlook. If we could once get away from all that is undesirable in the thought-world and move over into a world affording only the best suggestions and ideals, civilization would spurt forward. Ideas govern action, even putting a clamp on the strongest inherited tendencies, as witness the vows of religious orders. If the modern world could be released from archaic ideas and false notions, and in their place installed the best thoughts and finest ideals, society would undergo a swift transformation. The trouble is that we never fully succeed in clearing the decks and giving the newer thought a full opportunity. We live in the shadows of shades. Bore into the mind of the man on the seat by your side, and you will perhaps discover a flinty prejudice which could be traced back through centuries of stolid ignorance—a possession drawn out of that large fund of atavistic consciousness which science in all its pride has as yet but slightly overcome.

This control by the past is through thought-materials which come down to us in unbroken succession. Early in life one becomes saturated with sentiments and opinions, much of which mental content is from former generations. Only the more intellectual ever shake off early impressions. By the age of legal emancipation—twenty-one—the average person is stocked for life with fundamental conceptions from which he may never escape thereafter. These adopted ideas govern conduct and establish types of citizenship; they determine attitude with reference to indus-

try, science, and the state; they create deference for ancient institutions, and sanctify imposition and caste. To secure a fresh civilization—radically to change conventional ways—would be to break with former systems of thought and sets of concepts.

The ideas to which one is subjected should be those that are satisfactorily progressive. The kind of ideas determines the kind of man. The reactionary is a reflex of a system of ideas dominant at an earlier period; he, for example, looks at woman suffrage in the dim light of former periods and applies obsolescent concepts to international differences; his concepts are stationary while society is dynamic; if the world could be turned back he would feel at home; terms like *labor*, *capital*, *patriotism*, *thrift*, *business*, and *woman* have each a different meaning to reactionary and progressive.

The basic method of changing conduct is to change ideas, and a shift to distinctively modern or futuristic ideas necessitates expunging contradictory traditional concepts. The dominating ideas must be those meeting current tests, and the best ideas are usually of recent origin, for the older thought was a reflex of an older social order; a new social order implies new thought.

It is not easy to shake off tradition. The new generation is being born every hour, and the passing generation does not let go all at once. Population has flowed down the ages, and there has been a laying on of hands upon the young in more senses than one. The old order is forever indoctrinating the young with old sets of ideas. But the dovetailing of heredities is not progress-proof, and it is possible to wedge in new ideas; oftentimes, too, and fortunately, a youthful perversity leads to differences of opinion; cloyed with imitation, the child does the opposite of his instructions just to see how it will seem. The armor of tradition is not invulnerable; even in the case of individuals not of dynamic tendency a certain development of new thought is inevitable.

A slow-moving transformation of ideas may take place, but how auspicious if undesirable tradition might be more effectually blocked and if progress-favoring ideas might be seen coursing through all the channels of intelligence—if none were soaked in thought-materials false, debasing, ungenerous, and unscientific.

The controlling of ideas and suggestions to action is the battle of progress the world over. Social reconstruction involves displacing certain ideas with others.

It would be idle to expect to secure always quietly and peacefully a substitution of the new for the old, for personal advantage is derived from the dominance of tradition. The man who is drawing dividends from the ignorance of others is not likely to be enthusiastic for enlightenment. Privilege and injustice on the part of the few require a corresponding education to servility on the part of the many. So in the case of various matters in dispute between the satisfied and the dissatisfied, agreement is hopeless; only force can prevail. But outside the lines of economic warfare there may be general agreement to oppose pernicious and encourage salutary suggestion.

In cases where what seems evil to some seems good to others social quarantine can hardly be attempted, and a multitude of differences of opinion appear in relation to values; but assuming a real concurrence among the majority of thinking people with reference to the admissibility of specific thought-materials, the protection of society against undesirable suggestions is as logical as the isolation of smallpox. It is well known, for example, that the cheap novel which exploits the crudeness and crimes of desperadoes is, in the hands of boys, a most pernicious influence. Not infrequently astonishing crimes are directly traceable to the reading of accounts of brigandage, and the glorification of lawless adventurers. Society is warranted in defending itself against ideas that can have no wholesome effects or are opposed to the hopes of mankind.

The very reservoir of ideas that must be considered inimical to an ideal civilization is literature. It is a most regrettable fact that splendid geniuses of former generations lend themselves unwittingly to the defeat of the visions of the hour, even though in many cases the great writer has been in advance of his own age. Poems are frequently a source of suggestions out of keeping with modern aims. "The Charge of the Light Brigade" is an example. War is irresistibly sanctified by a type of literature which, false and misleading through omissions of circumstances, tends to attach

the highest sentiments to a brutalizing folly. More consistent with the aims of peace are Walt Whitman's "A Night Battle" and the Matthew Brady photographs of the Civil War.

The influence of the monarch-revering and laborer-despising Elizabethan play is a real force making for the persistence of states of mind not conducive to modern welfare. Early literature and history are so impregnated with socially atavistic suggestion that a new literature must batter a way for the new democracy. The more impressive pre-modern literature is to one, the more unlikely is he to be found sympathetic with the hopes of the hour. It is usual to side with the "lord of the vineyard" against the workers who objected to paying out of scale. It is important that the reactions of the youthful reader be carefully observed when perusing material which consorts ill with fairness to the Jew or implies the unworthiness of those who do physical work.

In many cases the reader seems to react but slightly to such early thought-materials and would hardly admit that he was to any extent controlled in his conduct by the suggestions received. But if not affected by pre-scientific ideas of the universe, debased conceptions of womankind, the theory of human depravity, the sanction of slavery, and race prejudice, would one be affected by any other kind of suggestions? Bad suggestions rest upon the same psychological basis as good suggestions; in either case the idea that is centered in consciousness exerts its thrust in the direction of action and modifies the emotional life. At an earlier period vivid representations of future torment gave strength to the arm of persecution and resulted in peculiar horrors. If the body be thought of as, in the words of John Knox, a "wicked carcase," and if "every prospect pleases and only man is vile," why should there be any particular attention to sanitation? The immense and cherished literature of sacred song and story includes in its conglomerate a mass of materials strictly characteristic of the mental advancement of the peoples and times of their origin, and a process of sublimation and restatement like that represented in the novel *Anna Karenina*. The literary antiquarian might very properly consult accumulations of discarded ideas, but unto the extent to which entire

social concepts are supplanted in popular thought depends the rate of modern progress. Thus the shutting of the gates against the flood of undesirable tradition assumes large importance. English courts did not permit butchers to sit on juries in capital cases; but the slaughter house is not the only source of suggestions tending to indurate sympathies and degrade conceptions of human nature.

In this connection may be noted the activities of scholars who exploit the past or reconstruct former historical periods. That certain events have happened is not sufficient reason for calling universal attention to them. The world may very well forget a great deal that has occurred; in fact we do not progress except as we shift the focus of attention to forward-looking matters. Devotion to history, unless inspired by the desire to illuminate modern life, has but limited social value in a dynamic civilization. The historical student sees objections to reforms which less informed men accomplish through unscholarly optimism. The predominance of historical elements in one's thought is of the nature of a disqualification for the attainment of post-historical ideals. If one reads the memoirs of a general of the Civil War one's mind will be given a reactionary set. Mark Twain believed that the South was greatly harmed by its admiration of the works of Sir Walter Scott.

Very likely the conviction that free speech and a free press are invaluable has tended to an indifference as to the quality of thought-materials. But there is a problem of control not at all involved in what is commonly meant by free speech and free press. Freedom of speech with reference to the organization of society is absolutely vital to political welfare, and is opposed only by interests that fear the application of the collective judgment to privileges and usurpations in political or economic power. To limit freedom of utterance in this sphere would be the equivalent of tying the arms of a man in the act of self-defense. But there is a field where interference with the dissemination of ideas is permissible. It is thought no hardship to ask the babbler to keep still while truth is expounded, or to require the noisy child to maintain silence out of deference to his elders. There would be no question of political principle involved in discouraging the popu-

larizing of materials which not only have no educational value but distinctly lower the prevailing tone of thought and speech, in a sense interfering with the freedom of a better speech and a better press. Millions are regaled morning and evening with matter consisting largely of accounts of accidents, crimes, divorce-court proceedings, details of international matrimonial alliances, and mere personal allusion. The educational system provides a relatively small number for a limited time with contact with the best ideals, but how quantitatively insignificant the efforts of the teacher of literature or ethics when one considers the dissemination of dubious thought-materials on every side. The newspaper is essentially an educational medium, and its place in the social economy is beside that of the school; the editor and the teacher are engaged in logically like pursuits, and might properly meet in the same conventions for conference; but on the other hand flat opposition of the work of the teacher and of the publisher is often pronounced. How inappropriate if students were called upon to read on a fresh Monday morning the Sunday comic supplement or the front-page report of the electrocution of a murderer. If sensational publications were held up to the ideals of high-class magazines or to the brevity, readableness, and strict accuracy and balance of the best productions of the day, society would experience a transforming force.

The theater is as certainly a factor in the education of the young as is a course of study, and there would be much propriety in holding managers to strict accountability for the kind of instruction provided. The neutralization of the work of education by maverick agencies is a social blunder. It is not sufficient that there should be censorship whose aim is merely to prevent the appearance of absolutely indecent pictures while passing thousands that are degenerative and oversentimental; positive excellence is a reasonable requirement. Just why the judicious of a nation should stand by and let the operator of the penny arcade and of the lurid film exhibit shape the outlook of millions is by no means clear. The world, it is true, is a very large one, and it is not easy to control it; but the world should not be unduly commercialized, and, rather, given into the keeping of the best order of thinking which is possible.

Not only should there be effort to suppress unsuitable suggestions, coming down in history and literature or circulating through the press of the day, and to make use of good example for purposes of "rational imitation," but progressives should reckon with the penetrating persuasion of assumption. It almost seems as if no logic could prevail against the air of assurance which error so often has carried, and which truth and justice might do well to employ. It is doubtful if very many people are convinced by downright demonstration; they perhaps assent, but it is only when the contagion of others' confidence is experienced that the comfortableness of conviction is achieved. Even impressive institutions rest upon colossal bubbles of unwarranted assumption whose sustaining power is none other than a sort of hypnotization. The individual is won by the air of an enterprise. To assume rather than to debate is, accordingly, a strategy of conversion. When the individual dimly senses that something has got by him and that there is a simmering of consciousness somewhere in which he does not share, and when the peculiar fear of being left behind takes hold, his responses become highly inspirited. It would thus be more efficacious to assume that unearned increment is an outrage than to argue it. There is a surprising amount of assumption in the literature of the conservative interests. Time has shown the value of this type of persuasion, and proponents of advanced ideals cannot do better than assume finality for fundamental positions, thus making fuller use of a force which may disorganize obstructionistic attitudes and habits.

The social order, so far as not inevitable, is largely a product of suggestion, whose practical aspects form no small part of the peculiar knowledge which functions in social control. The child who distracts the attention of a playmate, in the meanwhile possessing itself of a desired toy, shows in little the importance of a method familiar to politicians. The wily advocate switches attention to the acceptable family life of the culprit. Ideas planted in the right spot grow into social determinism. Suggestion is the thing. Hence the fear of the critic, and the sweeping of the horizon for the first appearance of the disturber.

There is much of a positive character to be attempted in the utilizing of the force of suggestion. The best practices and the most significant steps taken for progress in any part of the world might well be systematically called to the attention of the public. This type of constructive suggestion is illustrated in the practice of the United States Bureau of Education of sending out almost daily reports of educational progress from all parts of the nation and from abroad. The best ideas in effect anywhere are thus directed to points of possible application, and an imitation instituted which may shorten the period required for a measure of advancement. Similar efforts in other fields would tend to do away with delays in the attainment of better conditions. The advertising of good examples and the diffusing of constructive ideas should be carried on effectively through system.

The diffusion of constructive civic ideas is fundamental to social betterment. Limited reasoning and lack of creative imagination, so far as they exist, make it necessary that means be provided to reach the intelligence which do not imply mental powers above the average. Social reform requires successful appeal to the millions in whose hands rest the ballot and the ratification of programs. Everywhere arises the problem of making people understand; at this point reforms stumble and confusion begins. Kropotkin declared that the Russian peasant was capable of understanding any social principle or natural law, provided he was addressed in words of his vocabulary and the person making the explanation really knew what he was talking about. This testimony of revolutionist and scholar is indeed significant. However, it is a common experience to meet with discouragement in attempts to promote measures or to popularize unfamiliar topics, and a real association of ideas is not easily brought about. Booker T. Washington tells of a negro who was convinced in conversation of the need of substituting other crops for cotton, but when finally asked what crop he would plant answered, "Cotton." Principles agreed upon by all who give them careful and disinterested thought are slow in being widely accepted. In fact, it is not a matter of principle on such ground. Either there are many who are unequal to taking

an intelligent part in social direction or means are yet to be devised by which latent intelligence may be generously set free for such purposes. The state of civilization reflects popular intelligence, but the full power of this rarely, if ever, is evoked.

To secure popular response with the least expenditure of energy is a desideratum. The most open avenues of influence are to be found and used, the lines of least resistance followed. The prominence of vision among the senses offers a suggestion for directness of persuasion. The clinching evidence is that one "saw it with his own eyes." Now it is evident that the voter may not see with his own eyes the elusive brigandage of monopoly or witness the progress of a ten-million-dollar battleship from the tax collector's office to the junk heap, but by a far greater resort to pictorial methods a convincing knowledge can be imparted. Literature with its roundabout symbolism is quite inferior for various purposes to the picture-writing which historically preceded it. Illustrations make a strong appeal.

Could a more extensive *picturature* be developed as a substitute for verbal symbolism the response of the average mind would be greater. Many intelligent people do not care for books, never having acquired the racially recent taste for looking at queer marks on a page and trying to make out what they are all about. Where such callousness is encountered the resort to the picture would be the most effective alternative in default of oral speech, to which likewise the picture is often superior. A picture of a case of "phossy jaw" arouses a larger response than any amount of verbal statement. The public will react to a suitable stimulus—it cannot help it—but the stimulus must be one which conforms to mental laws. It would be well to photograph every social maladjustment by way of argument. Unfortunately, from some points of view, there are more authors than artists, and cameras cost more than pens and ink. A rogues' gallery of modern evils, supplemented by constructive suggestions pictorially represented, would have possibilities. Indeed, extensive use is made of the pictorial, but a larger and more convenient presentation of this kind of material is feasible.

There are limits to the effectiveness of pictures for social education, but it would appear that their possibilities have been over-

shadowed by the use of print. The picture method is vastly more elemental and forceful, and might be adapted to evoke popular responses for which the symbolism of type is ineffectual. True, no elaboration of the pictorial could ever carry the subtle and the associational so successfully as words, but the distinction between the eye-minded and the thinker in abstractions and principles may well be taken into account. In fact a stage may be reached where the illustration becomes even a slight impertinence, the statement of a principle carrying the highest degree of conviction; but under the conditions of the day there is need of presenting truths in such telling form that efforts for social welfare be based as broadly as may be upon the consciousness of a public differing widely in mental content and capacity. The formal treatise and the philosophical exposition have their peculiar value but the limited market for books that are "dry" is evidence of a rather permanent division in the interests of the reading public, while to the non-reading public the specific case and the visual argument are the principal recourse. The instant response of millions to the moving picture creates a suspicion that the propaganda of reform has quite too fully relied upon a relatively unpopular method—that of printed or spoken arguments. The same forces of perception and emotion which now so often go to waste in attention given to distressingly weak subject-matter at the cheap-show place might, if applied to social ends, work in brief time advancement which otherwise would require centuries. A very extensive redirection of human forces, which so richly abound and which so often flow aimlessly to waste, is practicable. One is frequently surprised at the quickness with which a desirable thought will take effect. Control images, and civilization may be made to approximate any ideal.

After the actual picture is the word-picture. The economy of brief statement and striking phrase is recognized in advertising, and the joy of discovering a suitable slogan is known to campaign managers. Brevity and imagery characterize the statement on which reliance is placed to secure results in dividends and votes. The "famous paradox," which is "the only thing that is worth doing is to do nothing," like the "awesome paradox," no source of lasting enjoyment, is resorted to a flickering attention and to the mechanical and

discontinuous character of consciousness in modern life. Brevity is a legitimate consideration, and headline logic must play an important rôle in social reconstruction. For example, "Idle lands for idle hands" perhaps could hardly be improved upon as crystalizing the arguments against the present land tenure of England, and "Votes for women" has a telling effect.

To be sure, the slogan is not without its drawbacks; for every slogan there may be a counter-slogan, and the reasoning process is by no means obviated; however, the succinct presentation of issues conduces to their profitable consideration, and indeed when a position is not susceptible of direct and simple statement it is possibly untenable. A claim to privilege which might be made to seem reputable if glossed in two hours of oratory may be routed by a single "bomb shell" of rejoinder or a clarifying characterization. The art of divesting an issue of irrelevancies and of presenting truth naked and unashamed is one of real respectability.

There is economy in appealing in familiar terms. To bring about improvement by novel proposals is difficult, but when the new comes in familiar guise resistance is greatly lessened. The tendency is to adapt rather than invent, to modify rather than change abruptly. Merchants retain good-will by leaving up their predecessors' signboard or incorporating under a dead man's name. Labels must be satisfactory. New England was no doubt peopled the more readily because of its compromise designation. Political leaders know the advantage of adapting old names to new organizations. New journeys must be made by seeming to follow old routes where the familiar guide boards stand. It would be easier to arrive at federal banking through the postal savings bank than by a more direct route. To do away with private express companies by the gradual expansion of the parcel post would be more practicable than to seek this result at a step. The free feeding of school children could hardly come before the free supplying of mental pabulum in the form of community-owned textbooks, and before that the community-paid instructor. The advance toward the ideal social state is a matter of slow campaigns, with the band playing "Hail Columbia" instead of the Marseillaise. The thoroughgoing theorist cannot convince the public, for progress

is made by short, tentative steps which do not require a high degree of vision, and by seeming to follow familiar paths.

THE LEGAL MIND

The psychology of the bench and bar is especially important because of the large part played by the courts in shaping civilization. The United States is virtually under a commission form of government, the commission consisting of the federal Supreme Court. The power of the judiciary is immense and determinative. And when we group bar with bench the character of prevailing mental states becomes a matter of great importance. Attorneys are of a type with judges, and the legal mind has marked characteristics.

Law represents a continuity with the past like that of few other occupations. The lawyer's training harks back to early English and Roman law. Of much influence is the study of cases, of varying antiquity or recency, from which points of view are derived and bearings established, and by which the mind is shaped into conformity with legalistic ideals. The full force of legal tradition is brought to bear, both in schools of law and through association with the elders, upon the naked natures of young men and a distinct mentality results, characterized by logical structure, responsiveness to tradition, subtlety, and sociological finality.

Compare, for example, the training of the student of science with that of the law student. The former is led to believe that experimentation is the key to truth, and the older a textbook the less authoritative is it regarded. Ideas are discarded with actual fervor, and stiff orthodoxy is impossible. In scientific learning the spirit is that of progressive adjustment; in law this spirit is not dominant—quite the reverse. Indeed, the weight of tradition in the law gives the legal mind a quality which tends to freeze society into static conditions. Emphasis upon the application of rules to social problems does not accord with forward-looking tendencies. The rôle of remembering how things have been done and of striving to apply possibly inappropriate rules to current affairs limits outlook.

What is perfectly possible may be legally impossible, and what is legal may to the layman appear unreasonable. Rules of evi-

dence have wandered so far from rationality that young attorneys are advised not to try to see the reason for some of them but to remember them as they are. In a recent case in Chicago a witness was told that he could not qualify his answers but must answer yes or no, whereupon he refused to testify. Now in the real world to qualify an answer is often in the interest of truth, as witness the query "Have you left off beating your grandmother?" But in the other world—the legal—this is evidently not permitted. In the non-legal world the misspelling of a word is condoned, and the omission of an unimportant word attracts little attention, but the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the omission in an indictment of the word "the" from the phrase, "against the peace and dignity of the state," was a fatal one. A corporation is a person, without a body, so there is no body to imprison, and therefore let the state refrain from slapping non-existent wrists for corporate crimes. One must indeed renounce the world as he knows it in order to attain the legal cosmos. The real world and the judicial world conflict the moment one brings social and moral ideals into the atmosphere of the law; a professor of law once remarked to his students, "You are here not to learn what the law ought to be but to find out what the law is."

Possibly the root of such opposition of law to progress is in the attempt to reduce to settled concepts a social flux. The notion that law is a science—in the sense in which physics or chemistry is a science—is misleading, and to apply the word science to a subject-matter consisting, under progressive conditions in society, of transient expedients and adjustments and half-way places introduces error. Hydrogen, two parts, and oxygen, one part, form water; but rage and a butcher knife do not equate perfectly with fourteen years in a penitentiary. Seeming inconsistency is not incompatible with justice. Rules are properly subordinate to discrimination. But it is objected that with discretion enthroned no one would know the law; but who knows it now?

The fixedness of the law is its undoing. It is not from an earlier social order that we should seek guidance for present relationships; moreover various legal positions and doctrines have the dubious ancestry of privilege. Only such former decisions as are approved

by modern thought have any authority—and these merely through the accident of concurrence. Cases should be subjected to fresh thought and their disposition be made to square with present standards. The law is not more reputable than the circumstances of its origin, reflecting, it may be, the unjust power of lords of manors, holders of royal patents, owners of sailing vessels, masters of servants and apprentices, and husbands. The discord between ethics and “what the law allows” is notorious. Even the ideal of one law for the poor and the rich is open to criticism. What fairness, for example, in applying the same anti-trust law to grimy and poverty-stricken coal miners and to a billion-dollar monopoly? Worthy judges are not rare; but to the extent of their excellence they dare excursions into the world of today and tomorrow.

The type of learning most needed in the administration of justice is that represented by the social sciences, especially those applications of sociology which deal with actual conditions among laborers, wives, children, and other classes. The recent recommendation of the American Bar Association that law students be required to pursue the study of psychology indicates an awakening; for the examination of witnesses is rather a matter for a psychological clinic than for denunciation and oratory. In fact, oratory and tradition have conspired to render the legal profession, with its nearness to legislation, especially in the United States, an obstacle to public welfare. The striking progress in government in New Zealand has been explained as being due in part to the almost total absence of lawyers from the parliament of that country. A fresh view of human possibilities is a high qualification for service in a legislature. To serve at important points in the administration of justice, would it not be well to seek men and women who have followed the advice of former Judge Gaynor and thrown away law books for the reading of Browning? The presence of “lay judges”—to represent a saving ignorance of law—provided such were to consist of eminent publicists, sociologists, educators, journalists, and social workers, men and women, would prove

Moreover, conditions prevailing in courts do not lend themselves happily to actual justice. Litigants are aggressive and

attorneys are not engaged to report after the manner of the scientific investigator. When ingenious and hardened advocates are fabulously financed to circumvent justice when necessary for private advantage, and when successful subterfuge reacts to the fame of the advocate, there is real confusion. Not thus are scientific issues resolved. The attorney should be a real officer or agent of the court, paid by society. The pronounced forwardness on the part of retained attorneys is an impertinence. The German system of people's courts without lawyers represents a triumph of method, and the recently established lawyerless courts of Kansas afford profitable suggestions.

Prejudiced advocacy, characteristic of the bar, is not confined to the courts, but in part through legal example perverts behavior elsewhere. Thus the college debating team elects as its aim, not the impartial revealing of the merits of an issue, but rather the adroit presentation of "one side" of a question, and to beat the opposing group of advocates is the prime consideration. In the course of such partisan strife the truth may be forced out—but not for its own sake with the consent of either team. From the standpoint of veracity better than all debates be banished, and in their place even the feeblest soliloquy in which issues would not be treated speciously. To hold a brief is disreputable in scientific circles, for it does not conduce to the whole truth.

In various ways the courts and the legal profession are allied with reaction. Within their spheres of freedom the choices are usually in favor of things as they are. They oppose change. The preponderance of tradition, evidenced in legal ideals, practice, and reasoning, presents an acute problem in the psychology of habit, and to the effective rupture of such bonds to an earlier social order the spirit of the age in some way must address itself.

Courts may be dislodged, through the recall of judges or of decisions, from their position of ultimate influence upon legislation and social welfare, or on the other hand a system of training judges and attorneys might be installed which would modify the obstructionistic nature of the law, doing away with antiquated concepts, sacred rituals, and deteriorated wisdom. The socializing of the lawyer's functions as in the public law office of New Zealand, where

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the citizen may secure legal advice from a state-paid official, is desirable. Today, under the system of fee-taking, the average citizen is not quite sure whether the lawyer is a curse or a blessing. The bulwarks of privilege and social atavism represented by the legal mind should be razed in order that the modern spirit may find freer expression. The diversion and unworthy devotion of talents appearing in the retaining of a swarm of the keenest minds in the service of predatory wealth—essentially in a battle against the poor—represents an impressive miscarriage of a mentality which should be harnessed to social welfare, and creates a condition against which the more idealistic of the legal profession must ultimately rebel.

Lawyers need a thoroughly modern education, which means that they should not study much law. They need to get the biological or evolutionary point of view, to conceive of society as on the way to being different. The authoritative solemnity of the legalist needs to be mitigated; justice does not reside in the breasts of judges unless judges look upon life unfettered by tradition. There is a better intelligence than that represented by the law. There is a valid idealism which is everywhere blocked by legalism. It is unfair to measure the intelligence of a people by their institutions provided a tradition-revering type is in a position to apply a strangle-hold on new thought through power to interpret and to pass on the constitutionality of laws. With government thus subject to the legal mind, popular intelligence cannot function happily.

The legal point of view is seen in the citizen who opposed experimental legislation. To experiment in affairs of state is regarded as objectionable, and to style a measure an experiment is intended as an argument in opposition. From a scientific point of view this aversion is an anomaly. Why should there not be experimentation in social administration? There is a suspicion that objection is often from fear lest novelty should prove a success, to the abatement of privilege; but quite aside from selfish strategy there is no doubt a real opposition or indifference with reference to the methods of legislation, which is not rational.

To be sure, the subject-matter of society is less amenable to convenient experimental treatment than are acid soils or guinea

pigs; even so, the spirit of social invention should find a legitimate field for operation. The dissection of dead societies, like the dissection of dead bodies, presents fewer difficulties, but is also less illuminating than a study of living forms. No study of history could be so profitable as the observation of social reactions under experimental conditions. Whenever an opportunity presents itself gratuitously for a study in government, be it the recall of judges in Arizona or the single tax in cities of the Canadian northwest, let the most be made of it. Indeed, let it be urged as a reason for proposals that they are experiments. That the light of the past should be the only guide is a confession which in the field of science would discredit the proclaimer; the light of theory and trial is also a strong light.

A desire for repose and a settled order no doubt contributes to the feeling that there should be no tinkering with laws. New measures are adopted with hesitation, and a common attitude of mind is that a measure, once accepted, should remain unchanged. The proposal to limit legislative sessions to rare intervals seems quite opposed to the spirit of experiment; for would it not be best that legislatures remain in session and thus be enabled immediately to push the tiller?

A vast amount of futile talk would be displaced by the simple expedient of trying proposals for improvements in civic administration; there would be less occasion to "view with alarm" if it were commonly accepted that in case an experiment turned out poorly there should be a return to practice. Does the abolition of capital punishment in one state increase murder therein as against another state in like circumstances? Let an experiment be tried to find out. It is better that a homicide should live than that doubt should exist. Is the commission form of government applicable to states? We should rejoice if a given state has the seeming temerity to try it. An experiment could not be less undesirable than uncertainty. Would votes for women "ruin the home"? Observation should decide, not speculation. Is a two-cent rate on railroads confiscatory, or even a one-cent rate? The answer is, Try it. Would the country go to the dogs if life insurance were offered by a commonwealth? We should indeed

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be appreciative of the spirit of progress which gains for Oregon, Wisconsin, and New Zealand the reputation of being experiment stations in government. It would be better that Congress should guarantee against want the owners of the steel trust than that doubt should remain as to the necessity of a duty to protect its products. Let us gather the facts even as truth is sought in the laboratories of the chemist and the bacteriologist. It is to be expected that when benzoate of soda, under a pure-food law, becomes a political rather than a chemical term, self-interest will oppose and confuse; but there is no good reason why a few should be allowed to block attempts to find the best ways of doing things. Possibly the great advances in natural and physical science have come about so readily because of the negligibility of the cross-fire to which scientists have been subjected. In case of governmental experimentation, however, there is present the bad boy of big business to break the microscopes and spill the cultures of tentative reform. But the inductive method is a rock and refuge.

The device of permissive laws would be useful in introducing novelty. Let the people of a civil division be at liberty to experiment. The terms of a law may be made to apply at the discretion of those concerned.

The spirit of experimentation characterizes some occupations rather than others, and the advantage of having legislation, so far as it is conducted by chosen bodies, directed by men and women of known progressiveness occurs to one. The dead hand of tradition holds reins which should be held by individuals accustomed to methods of investigation and discovery and familiar with hypothesis. Indeed, a bureau of social engineers might well be established to make novel proposals, which, upon popular ratification, would promote welfare by demonstration. Experimentation should be utilized in the field of social developments, for it is one of the strongest aids of mind. The inductive method may well be applied to government, and the spirit of the scientist and the seeker after truth be made to supplant the widely diffused mild horror of social experimentation.

NEWS ITEMS

NEWS ITEMS FROM DEPARTMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY

Brown University

Mr. Harold Stephen Bucklin, who completed last June a two-year course in the New York School of Philanthropy, has been appointed instructor in social science, succeeding Professor L. M. Bristol, who has accepted a position at the University of West Virginia. Mr. Bucklin is a member of the class of 1910 of Brown University.

Dartmouth College

The Department of Sociology has recently received important accessions to the ethnological collections in its custody, which now comprise about 4,000 objects representative of the culture of a wide variety of regions, and which throw much valuable light upon the life of prehistoric, ancient, and contemporary societies. The most recent gift is a collection of Babylonian tablets dating from the third millennium B.C. to the fall of the Empire.

Harvard University

The only change in the courses of the Department of Sociology during the past year has been the addition of a new seminar by Professor Foerster entitled, Labor Legislation, Especially with Reference to Standards of Living and Standards of Earning. Two new half-courses, entitled Analytical Sociology, and Historical Sociology, are offered in the Department of Economics by Dr. B. M. Anderson, Jr.

Massachusetts Agricultural College

Professor John Phelan, formerly of Stevens Point, Wisconsin, has been elected as head of the Department of Rural Sociology.

Miami University

Thomas L. Harris, formerly assistant professor of sociology at Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota, has been elected successor to Professor Paul L. Vogt, who has gone to Ohio State University as professor of rural economics.

The Ohio State University

Dr. E. W. Burgess of the University of Kansas has been appointed assistant professor in economics and sociology to take the place of

Dr. F. A. McKenzie, who resigned to accept the presidency of Fisk University. Mr. D. R. McKenzie, a graduate student in the University of Chicago, has been appointed instructor in economics and sociology to take the place of Miss Emilie Renz, who resigned at the close of the last academic year. Both Dr. Burgess and Mr. McKenzie will teach sociology exclusively.

The State University of Iowa

Professor Morris A. Brisco has been made head of the Department of Political Economy and Sociology.

The University of Chicago

Mr. B. W. Brown, who was formerly Dr. Henderson's assistant, is in charge of the courses in practical sociology, pending the election of a permanent successor to Dr. Henderson.

University of Illinois

Dr. J. G. Stevens has recently joined the staff of the Department of Sociology. After graduating from college Mr. Stevens was for two years a resident of the South End House in Boston. Then for two years he was employed by the United Charities of Greenwich, Connecticut. The three following years he spent at Cornell, first as a Fellow and later as an assistant. At Cornell he had charge of the laboratory work in connection with Professor Willcox' courses in statistics, and assisted Professor Fetter in the preparation of a statistical report on the charities and corrections of the state of New York. One year he was a Fellow in the Department of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, where he received the Doctor's degree; and the year following he was a member of the faculty of the University of the South, from which he came to the University of Illinois.

When Professor Hayes took charge of the Department of Sociology at the University of Illinois he found an enrolment of twelve in the Principles of Sociology. That course now enrolls 230.

University of Kansas

Mr. W. B. Bodenhafer has been appointed temporarily as instructor in sociology, pending the election of a permanent successor to Dr. Burgess.

University of Minnesota

The Department of Sociology and Anthropology has been reorganized. The present staff includes: Professor D. C. Miller, Jr., professor of sociology; Dr. Paul I. Neergaard, instructor in sociology; Mr. Frank J. Brown, lecturer on poverty; Mr. Otto W. Oelke, lecturer on housing;

Mr. Charles C. Stillman, lecturer on poverty. Dr. Jenks has been professor of anthropology in the University of Minnesota for nine years. All the other members of the department are new men in the University. Dr. Todd comes from a professorship of sociology in the University of Pittsburgh; Dr. Neergaard was last year instructor in sociology at Western Reserve; Mr. Bruno is secretary of the Minneapolis Association of Charities; Mr. Davis is housing expert with the Minneapolis Civics and Commerce Association; and Mr. Stillman is secretary of the United Charities of St. Paul. The president of the University, Dr. George E. Vincent, will contribute a course of lectures on Aspects of Social Psychology; Dr. Joseph Peterson, another new member of the faculty and professor of psychology, offers a semester's course of lectures on Social Psychology for the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Another new course of lectures will be presented by experts in collaboration from the several detention institutions of the state.

It is the plan of the department to emphasize practical courses to equip the students for life in the extensive rural states which stretch westward from Minneapolis as their gateway.

University of Missouri

Professor Charles A. Ellwood, after his sabbatical year's leave spent mainly in Oxford and London, has returned to the University of Missouri to resume his active duties. While in Oxford he completed a volume on *The Social Problem*, recently published by the Macmillan Company. Dr. L. L. Bernard, formerly of the University of Florida, and last year acting professor of sociology at the University of Missouri during the absence of Professor C. A. Ellwood, has accepted a permanent position in the latter institution. He has also been appointed chairman of the Department of Sociology for the year 1915-16. Mr. Max S. Handman has been appointed extension lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Missouri. Mr. Handman also gives one course to students in residence.

University of Pennsylvania

Dr. Scott Nearing, recently dismissed from the economic group, gave one course under the title of Sociology. There have been no changes in the sociological staff.

University of Pittsburgh

Dr. Arthur J. Todd has resigned the headship of the Department of Sociology in the University of Pittsburgh to take a similar position in the University of Minnesota. Dr. Howard Woodhead, formerly of the

University of Chicago and of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology and acting head of the Department of Sociology in the University of Pittsburgh. The Department of Sociology of the University of Pittsburgh, in co-operation with other departments, is offering this year an evening course in Social Economy, which is of vital interest to all social workers, nurses, probation officers, and all wishing to secure a broader knowledge of the most pressing social problems of the hour.

University of Southern California

A separate Department of Sociology has been created, and Dr. E. S. Bogardus has been promoted to the headship with full professorial rank. Besides Dr. Bogardus' whole time, six hours of sociological courses are to be given by Dr. Hunt (Johns Hopkins) and the same number by Dr. Kenngott (Harvard).

ANNOUNCEMENT

The tenth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society will be held in Washington, D.C., December 28-31, 1915. In accordance with the decision of the Executive Committee at the Princeton meeting last December, the subject for consideration will be: "War and Militarism in Their Sociological Aspects." To this will be devoted four sessions, besides the presidential address, each session dealing with one important aspect of the matter. In view of the intense interest in the subject and the great contrast of opinion it evokes, discussion will be given a very prominent place in the program. Those on the program for discussion will have seen the paper in proof, so that there need be no firing in the air. The wide difference in the viewpoints of participants promises debate of the most vigorous kind.

The American Sociological Society, like the American Economic Association, the American Historical Association, the American Statistical Association, the American Political Science Association, and the American Association for Labor Legislation, will meet in Washington this year in order to profit by the sessions of the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, which is to be held in Washington, December 22 to January 8, and which will bring together the most distinguished savants of the two Americas. Not only will the Sociologists combine with Subsection C of Section VIII of this Congress in holding a joint session on "Sociological Medicine," but it is expected that after the adjournment of their own society many Sociologists will remain to attend the sessions of the Congress.

The American Sociological Society and the American Statistical Association will combine for their presidential addresses, at the first meeting, on Tuesday evening.

In view of the extraordinary richness of the opportunities in connection with the next meeting, it is hoped that the members of the Society will attend in unusual numbers. The hospitalities of Washington for the meeting will be very attractive and interesting. The headquarters of the Society will be at the Hotel Raleigh, and the meetings will be held in the same building. Reservations should be sent direct to the manager of the hotel.

So far as developed, the program will be as follows:

TUESDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 28, 8:00 O'CLOCK

Presidential Addresses

PROFESSOR E. DANA DURAND, of the American Statistical Association.

"War as Determiner," PROFESSOR EDWARD A. ROSS, of the American Sociological Society.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:30 A.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society.

10:30 A.M. Subject: "War and Militarism in Relation to Moral and Social Values."

"Social Values and National Existence," COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Discussion: DR. JOHN MEZ, of the American Peace Society; MISS MABEL BOARDMAN, of the American Red Cross Society, and others.

2:00 P.M. Subject: "War and Militarism in Relation to the Status of Women," PROFESSOR EMILY G. BALCH, of Wellesley College.

Discussion: PROFESSOR G. E. HOWARD, University of Nebraska; PROFESSOR J. P. LICHTENBERGER, University of Pennsylvania, and others.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 30

9:00 A.M. Annual Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society.

10:00 A.M. Subject: "War and Militarism in Relation to Government and Politics"; papers by HON. SIMEON E. BALDWIN and WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING.

Discussion: PROFESSOR A. W. SMALL, University of Chicago; PROFESSOR S. P. ORTH, Cornell University; PROFESSOR J. W. GARNER, University of Illinois, and others.

2:00 P.M. Subject: "Can War Be Done Away With?" BROOKS ADAMS.

Discussion: DR. ROGER W. BABSON, PROFESSOR A. B. WOLFE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. M. CHITTENDEN, REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES H. STOCKTON, and others.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 31

9:00 A.M. Joint Session with Subsection C (Sociological Medicine) of Section VIII of the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress.

Papers by HOMER FOLKS, DR. RAMON LOPEZ LOMBA, DR. WILLIAM G. WOODWARD, DR. EDOARDO LICEAGA, PROFESSOR IRVING FISHER, DR. HAYES E. DEARHOLT, and others.

REVIEWS

Population: A Study in Malthusianism. By WARREN S. THOMPSON, PH.D. Whole number 153 of the Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Columbia University Press, 1915. Pp. 216.

This important volume embodies a statistical test of the validity of Malthusianism, as the author construes that doctrine. Malthusianism is taken to mean, first, the tendency of population, and hence, later, to increase faster than the supply of subsistence, or improvement in productivity; and, secondly, the lowering of the class of labor by the pressure thus exerted in it, or the restriction of population by checks administered to it by means of either unconscious agencies or conscious fear of lessened subsistence (chap. i).

After noticing the views of several authors concerning the truth or falsity of Malthus' doctrine (chap. ii), Dr. Thompson considers the evidence relative to it. He examines the relation of wages and prices (chap. iii) to obtain a perspective of the economic condition of the laborers of the world. By a comparison of the indices of wages and prices for the United States and the United Kingdom from 1900 to 1912, for France from 1900 to 1910, and for Germany from 1895 to 1910, the conclusion is reached that prices have steadily risen since 1900 and that real wages have fallen since 1907 and probably since 1900, France being the only exception to the rule. In that country, however, most of the rise in prices has occurred since 1907, since which date wages have risen less rapidly than prices.

Chaps. iv-vii deal with the question of the amount of available foodstuffs produced by the chief nations. The statistics of production of the staple crops and of the more important of the minor ones, and of animals are surveyed. It is found that there have been substantial gains in production, but these have taken place in new countries and have been due to bringing into cultivation new, rich lands. Some of the older European countries show small gains in production, while others evince losses both in the amount produced and in the acreage. Production per acre increases slowly and the data indicate that "no epoch-making discoveries for increasing the yield" during the time considered (1880-1910) have been made.

The United States is selected as a type of the new countries with a view to observing the possibilities of agricultural development. Its total land area is 1,903,289,600 acres, but when all deductions for mountain, arid, swamp, and other waste lands are made we find that only 297,321,672 acres can be added to the present area in farms of 878,798,225 acres, an increase of 31.1 per cent. Since 46.2 per cent of land already in farms is unimproved, it is apparent that there is opportunity for large extension of agriculture. At the present rate of improvement there would be about 1,000,000,000 acres improved by 1960, but it must be remembered that the available new lands and the unimproved acreage will prove less productive than the land now cultivated. The author thinks there is an obvious limit to the quality and amount of agricultural lands.

The author is over-conservative, I think, in his estimate of new land to be made available in the United States. He excludes about 74,000,000 acres of swamp lands, because they are not immediately available, and about 141,000,000 of irrigable lands. The amount does not appear large in view of the total, but it is very important, for the swamp lands are among our richest soil.

The birth-rate, death-rate, and the consequent national increase of populations of the chief countries of the world from 1860 to 1910 are studied to discover whether or not there are signs of a slackening increase or a stationary stage. The data indicate that, save for France, there is no evidence of either. This, of course, results from the fact that the death-rate has fallen as rapidly as, or faster than the birth-rate has risen (chap. viii).

A survey of the growth of population and food supply (chap. ix) serves to substantiate Malthus' claim that the volume of population responds to variations in the available food. France is the only exception to the rule that increase of population follows prosperity, and vice versa. Immigration is an element in the situation, since in recent times populations may more easily seek the food in other nations than import it. The author has no explanation to offer for the unique peculiarities of France. Its population is practically stationary, yet it has actually increased the amount of available subsistence. He thinks a careful psychological study of the French people will be necessary to exhibit how the economic motives are mediated for the various "relative to production."

Following a thought from the preceding chapter, we are able to project the rate of growth of population during the half-century 1860-

1910 forward two hundred years. Since the rate of increase among people of European stock was 79.36 per cent during that period, were the rate to continue, by 2010 A.D. they would number 1,713,755,000 and by 2110, 5,513,365,000 people. This would be about three times as many people as now live. It appears that there need be no alarm over the "declining birth-rate," but that there should be much thought spent upon planning for the future.

At the rate colonization of new lands is taking place it will not be long before all the agricultural regions of the earth will be occupied. What of the increase of population then? The revolution in production which the invention of the steam engine brought by reason of facile transportation operated to expand agricultural production of the last century. No such revolution may be expected again, and the further increase of production through the improvement of agricultural implements is not probable.

In chap. x Dr. Thompson demonstrates that both in agricultural production and in manufacture the law of diminishing returns is actively operating. In agriculture, in the United States, he finds that, for 1900-1910, the labor time per acre increased slightly, the working capital increased 54.3 per cent, while the average increase of production was about 8.0 per cent. In the previous decade labor time per acre decreased, the value of means of production increased 1.5 per cent (live stock included in both decades), while the average acre production increased about 9.0 per cent. When the poorer quality of lands comes under cultivation, this process of diminishing returns will operate all the more severely.

Nor can we hope for great or continued release from the law through the employment of "scientific farming," for "it is doubtful whether, in the long run, the knowledge is more economical than the implements." Where intensive farming has been in use, as in the United Kingdom, the acreage of production of cereals and pulse has increased but 8.0 per cent during twenty-five years which shows it is cheaper to import foods than to seek to enlarge the area of production. Neither the acreage nor the yield of the chief crops in European countries evinces a decided tendency toward an increase. Hence, "intensive agriculture offers but little consolation to the great industrial nations of today."

But if we stake our hope of evading the law on manufacture, we are again doomed to disappointment. First, since the purchasing power of labor has decreased in recent years, it is obvious that any increment accruing to manufacturing has not gone to the laborers, who constitute

the bulk of the population. Secondly, the increment has not been absorbed as excess of exports over imports, for the per capita value of exports in 1912 was only \$5.44 while in 1900 it was \$6.85, and, quantitatively measured, there was a decrease of 36.5 per cent in goods exported. Thirdly, if there is a surplus, it does not appear in the per capita increase in the instruments of production, for, after deducting from the increase in national wealth all sums not involved in manufacturing processes, it is found that the increase in productive goods for the decade amounts to but about 7.0 per cent. Fourthly, if the well-to-do are absorbing the supposed increment, it cannot be large, for the income-tax-paying element is but about 2.0 per cent of the productive population, or 2.0 per cent of 20,000,000.

Should we include in the manufacturing process the legitimate social costs of the business, such as injuries to workers, old-age pensions, high cost of living, slums, and bonded indebtedness of political units due to the failure of industry to meet its legitimate obligations, it might appear that the present supposed increment is in reality a deficit.

The conclusion (chap. xi) is that Malthus, as interpreted, was correct, and that either we must simplify our standard of living to permit an increasing population or the rate of increase must be lowered. If the rate of increase is to be lowered, which class should be selected to practice the decrease and which to effect an increase? This question of selection the author hopes to make the subject of a future study.

The volume is supplemented by three appendixes containing detailed statistics relevant to textual considerations and is accompanied by several graphs. Dr. Thompson has performed a valuable service in giving the world this detailed and thoroughly executed investigation of a vital subject. The data are complete enough to make a world-exhibit, and the conclusions drawn inevitably arise from the facts. Many of us will be obliged to revise our ideas and our published works in view of his demonstrations, but his work will not be unwelcome for that.

JOHN M. GILLETTE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie. Von DR. PAUL BARTH.

Erster Teil: Grundlegung und kritische Uebersicht. Zweite, durchgesehene und sehr erweiterte Auflage. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1915. 112 S.

The first edition of this book appeared eighteen years ago. It was reviewed in this *Journal* (LII, 700). In the meantime sociologists have

become much more articulate, and the contents of this volume are correspondingly enriched. The introductory thirteen pages of the earlier work, containing the author's fundamental propositions about the province of history and the identity of the philosophy of history and sociology, are expanded into a methodological discussion of 145 pages. In view of the fact that the larger part of the author's case in support of these positions must be found in the second volume, which the author hopes to publish in three years, it still seems as premature to the reviewer as it did in 1898 to undertake an evaluation of that part of the author's system. Irrespective of one's suppositions about that element, however, the body of the present volume has distinct importance. Professor Barth has compressed into 336 pages the most luminous exposition in our literature of the most important sociological writers. Entirely apart from the main argument in which this interpretation is incidental, the digest and criticism of the most significant authors furnish a conspectus which will be indispensable for reference in all courses on the history of sociology. The value of this epitome is enhanced by the succeeding 327 pages which contain a similar analysis of the most notable conceptions of history. There is less doubt today than there was eighteen years ago that, whatever the provinces and methods of history and sociology eventually prove to be, historians and sociologists need to understand each other. The two *résumés* project a survey which neither historian nor sociologist can afford to neglect.

Referring now to the sociologists only, Barth has reconstructed his classifications in such a way that his groupings are suggestive theses in criticism. His main categories now are: (1) "The Intellectualistic Sociology," under which title he discusses Comte, Littré, Roberty, DeGreef, Lacombe, and Adolf Wagner, with incidental reference to others; (2) "The Biological Sociology," treated chiefly in connection with Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schäffle, Fouillée, Izoulet, and Worms; (3) "The Voluntaristic Sociology," including Tönnies, Ward, Giddings, Ratzenhofer, Small, Ross, Spann, Mackenzie, Houriou, etc.

In spite of some surprising omissions, Barth shows more comprehensive knowledge of the American writers than any previous European author. As he virtually assembles all of them in his third group, his final estimate of that group is interesting. He says (p. 468):

After all, the voluntarists scarcely more than the biologists have trodden the royal road of sociology, as Vanni rightly called it. Thus after they have done their best the problem still remains unsolved; viz., the problem of making out the innermost life-principle or life-principles of those societies which have

appeared, and disappeared or still remain, of showing it or them up in its or their workings, and thus of reconstructing history.

Some of the sociologists and some of the historians are in more complete accord than they were eighteen years ago upon the conclusion that the aim to explain history after the fashion which Professor Barth has in mind can be reached only in a purely formal way, and that such a formal interpretation would be at best not objective but in a very empty sense conceptual. These men regard it as a triumph in itself to have seen through the illusion that a real interpretation of that sort is possible. We have gone far enough to be pretty sure that, even if a plausible formula of the method of human experience could be constructed, it would be impossible to verify it inductively, because the evidences of the most subtle and decisive influences in history are mostly unrecorded; or if they are in part recorded, they are largely in such indirect and inferential form that they have only dubious value in comparison with all which we should need to know in order to arrive at the sort of interpretation which Professor Barth has in mind. The study of group psychology has gone far enough to make everyone who has pursued it contemptuous about generalizations which purport to account for large areas or long reaches of human experience. We cannot be sure that we know just why a particular municipal election in our own town went as it did. Anything which might offer itself as a complete explanation of the whole of a historic era, and much more of a series of eras, would simply serve to confirm our incredulity.

Sociology has made much progress in shedding even the accidental resemblances to the "philosophy of history" which clung to it a couple of decades ago. Professor Barth's second volume cannot appear too soon. It must certainly furnish occasion for vivid exhibition of the contrast between the aims and methods of the sociologists and conceptions of social interpretation which are more intimately related to eighteenth-century philosophy than to twentieth-century group psychology.

ALBION W. SMALL

The Foundations of Character. By ALEXANDER F. STRAND, M.A.
London: Macmillan, 1914. Pp. xxxi + 532. 12s. net.

It is over sixty years since J. S. Mill, in a famous chapter in his *Principles of Political Economy*, proposed a science to deal with the "character," which he named "ethology." The state of the sciences, however, at the time Mill wrote precluded his accomplishing more than a

mere sketch of the problems and methods of the new science as he conceived it. But the development of the sciences, especially of psychology, during the last sixty years would seem to make it reasonable to hope that the time has now arrived to constitute a science of "ethology." The problem is doubtless bigger than Mill supposed. But the desirability of such a science is even greater than in Mill's day; for as the social sciences have developed, their problems have been found to be inextricably interwoven with those of human character.

Sociologists accordingly have been waiting for the appearance of a comprehensive, scientific text in ethology. Is the book before us the one for which they have been waiting? It is to be feared that most sociologists will find but little in the book to interest them; for at first glance it seems to be wholly a study in individual psychology. And, in truth, the author has failed to make that wide, synthetic study of the sources of individual character which the sociologist desires. His book is a study of character rather from the inner side, of its sources in the tendencies of emotion, sentiment, and desire. The point of view in the discussion of these is, to be sure, often biological; and there are not wanting many illustrations of the influence of stimuli in the environment. But the book has almost nothing to say *specifically* concerning the forces of heredity and environment in their influence upon individual character. There is no attempt at synthesis of the results of biology, psychology, and sociology. The author's point of view remains throughout purely psychological, and he is content to base his science of character upon "the laws of mind." It must be said, in the first place, therefore, that he has succeeded in dealing, not with the whole science of ethology, but rather with only one of its sections.

Judged as a psychological study of character, however, the book is deserving of considerable praise. It is filled with sound psychologizing upon the basis of modern functional psychology, though it lays itself open to severe criticism even from the purely psychological point of view in two respects. In the first place, it makes the several emotions and sentiments which it discusses altogether too isolated and independent of one another. It almost personifies these "forces," and does so deliberately! In the second place, it is doubtful, to say the least, if the intellect is in any such complete subordination to the instincts, emotions, and sentiments as the author represents it, though in this position he has the support of a number of eminent psychologists.

Minor criticisms of the book are its loose use of the term "law" (it lays down no less than 144 "laws" of character) for what are con-

fessed to be only "approximate generalizations," and its scholastic and discursive style which makes it far from easy reading. The book could, with advantage to the ordinary reader, be condensed to one-half or even one-third of its present size.

The work is divided into three parts. The first discusses the general conception of character, the systems of the emotions and sentiments, the part played by will and intelligence as constituents of character, the influence of temperament upon character, and the methods of science of character. The second discusses the tendencies of the primary instincts and emotions, such as fear, anger, joy, sorrow, disgust, surprise, and curiosity. The third discusses the system of desires in their relations to impulse, appetite, and emotion. This last part will be found of especial interest by those students of the social sciences who regard the desires as "the true social forces."

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

History of Poor Relief Legislation in Iowa. By JOHN L. GILLIN.

Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1914. Pp. xiv+404.

This scholarly study is divided into four parts: (I) "A General Historical Narrative"; (II) "Special Phases of Poor Relief Legislation in Iowa"; (III) "Special Classes of Dependants and State Control"; (IV) "Summary and Suggestions."

The first two divisions of the book constitute a genealogy of Iowa poor relief legislation. They are of interest mainly as affording illustrations of the legislative methods of American frontier states. The author, in summarizing these legal pedigrees, points out (p. 166) the extent to which "laws were taken ready-made from the statute books of other jurisdictions" in a spirit of "wholesome optimism" but with "reprehensible carelessness" in failing even to attempt in some cases to adapt to pioneer communities the social machinery borrowed from populous states farther east. He is also "impressed with the fact that in the absence of high motives growing out of careful scientific study of poverty and its treatment, economic considerations have largely determined the legislative process" (p. 166). Thus the history has been a record of economic expediency, and the state has suffered for the last half-century with a very ineffective organization of its care of the insane and of the poor both in almshouses and in their own homes.

This has been due largely to unwillingness to take the control of these matters out of the hands of the counties and lodge them firmly in the hands of the state board of control. "The chief obstacle in the way of successful public relief work is that centralized supervision has not gone far enough" (p. 325). "... the situation in Iowa is much as it was in Indiana before 1897" (p. 326).

Part III discusses in order the following classes of dependents: normal children; defectives; soldiers, sailors, and marines; the sick; vagrants; etc. In general, normal children and the feeble-minded receive enlightened treatment which contrasts strangely with the obsolete methods still obtaining in the care and control of paupers and insane. In 1912, 1,313 defectives (nearly two-thirds of them insane) were still housed in the county poorhouses; moreover, if a poorhouse luckily contains no insane then "there is absolutely no provision for its inspection and regulation by the state" (p. 319). The proposals advanced by the author for remedying these and other defects are thoroughly sound and in line with the best effort in other commonwealths. The book is written in a clear and vigorous style and is accurate in detail and broad in conception. The very numerous notes and references are well managed at the end of the volume.

ERVILLE BARTLETT WOODS

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Report of the City Council Committee on Crime of the City of Chicago.
Chicago, 1915. Pp. 196.

In the space available it is impossible to give a review of the report of Alderman Merriam's committee that will bring out in detail the value of the exhibits.

A few selections from the findings follow:

"The amount of crime in Chicago is rapidly increasing."

	ARRESTS OR ARRAIGNMENTS FOR		
	Murder	Burglary	Robbery
Chicago, 1913.....	262	1,022	1,041
New York, 1913.....	131	928	1,755
London, 1913.....	36	78	1,129

"Of those arrested 64.7 per cent are native Americans, and 35.3 per cent foreign born, the relative percentage of population being 53.2 per cent and 46.8 per cent (population over fifteen years of age taken as basis)."

"Thousands of innocent persons are annually imprisoned in the county jail, many of them under disgraceful conditions, tending to create criminals."

"The present machinery catches poor, petty, and occasional criminals and punishes them severely but fails signally to suppress the professional criminal."

"Over 80 per cent of those committed to the Bridewell are sent for non-payment of fines. Thirty-five per cent are sent for the non-payment of fines of less than \$15, and 19 per cent for fines of \$15 to \$20—a total of 56 per cent for fines less than \$20."

"Professional criminals have built up a system which may be called a 'crime trust,' with roots running through the police force, the bar, the bondsmen, the prosecutor's office, and political officials."

Besides the findings and recommendations compactly stated there is a section of some 70 pages devoted to a very thoroughgoing exhibit of "Statistics Relating to Crime in Chicago by Miss Edith Abbott, Ph.D., Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy"; a second devoted to an elaborate analysis of the "Underlying Causes and Practical Methods for Preventing Crime by Professor Robert H. Gault, Northwestern University;" and a third giving a "Description and Analysis of Criminal Conditions by Morgan L. Davies, Attorney for Committee, and Fletcher Dobyms, Associate Counsel for Committee." There is a two-page bibliography.

The report makes a splendid beginning of an attack upon a fundamental social problem, but will be of very little value unless persistently and courageously followed up.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

The Juvenile Court and the Community. By THOMAS D. ELIOT, M.A., PH.D. New York: Macmillan, 1914. Pp. 234. \$1.25 net; postage extra.

The book under review is the first one of its kind. No other book has considered, as Mr. Eliot does in this book, the place of the juvenile court in a community welfare program; its relationship to other social and educational activities and the place which the court should hold in the future.

The author states his purpose in the following section:

The object of this book has been to point out the place of the juvenile court in its relation to other social institutions, as a problem in social science. By . . .

I believe that, in so far as the juvenile court has failed, its failures, if for other than purely personal reasons, have been due to the very nature of the institution. . . .

The present functions of the juvenile court and its probation office could and should be performed by the school and the domestic relations court. . . .

This is not, then, an attack on the juvenile court in any destructive sense. It is an effort to clear up a vagueness about its present status; to delimit its legitimate functions and point out those which should be given up; and to show how the juvenile court movement, like the settlement movement or the charity organization movement, leads to something more thorough-going.

In order to prove his thesis, Mr. Eliot makes a sharp division between the judicial and the administrative functions of the court, and then carefully considers the activities under each function, attempting to show in each instance that the work rightfully belongs to some other department of the educational or judicial branches of the government.

This book has two distinct values. The first is as a brief, clear, and very satisfactory statement of the facts concerning the methods of procedure in most of the juvenile courts of the United States. The author very wisely writes in the Foreword, "Most statements of fact will be found reliable through September, 1913." The reviewer thought he had found some inaccuracies concerning the Chicago court but later discovered that the changes had been made since September, 1913. As a statement of facts the book is of great value.

The second value of the book is as a study of tendencies in juvenile court work and a prophecy concerning their outcome.

In this day when there is so much negative criticism of social service; when there is admittedly in every community a great deal of unnecessary overlapping between social agencies, and when many of the agencies do not seem to understand themselves what they are supposed to do, it is very refreshing to read a constructive criticism. There is no disagreement with Mr. Eliot's feeling that the position of the juvenile court in the community needs to be more clearly defined. Especially true is this in regard to its dependency jurisdiction.

Mr. Eliot is right in his argument that all domestic difficulties should be under the jurisdiction of one court—call the court whatever may seem best.

The reviewer does not agree with some of Mr. Eliot's prophecies concerning the future of the juvenile court, but these points of difference cannot be set forth in a review. Very few will dispute his statement that there should be a closer articulation between the public school and the

home. One thing is certain—that every community should be so organized that cases of juvenile dependency and delinquency will be recognized at their beginning and steps immediately taken to better the condition and remove the causes.

The prophesies are thought-producing but of secondary value to the information which this excellent book contains.

JOEL D. HUNTER
Chief Probation Officer
Juvenile Court of Cook County

The Road toward Peace—A Contribution to the Study of the Causes of the European War and of the Means of Preventing War in the Future. By CHARLES W. ELIOT. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. Pp. xv+228. \$1.00.

Advocates for world-peace may find a worthy champion in Mr. Charles W. Eliot, whose patriotic utterances have found expression at various times in his letters and addresses both before the beginning of the present European conflict and since. Some of the most pertinent of his public expressions, covering a period of time from February, 1907, to March, 1915, have been collected into a little volume under the very suggestive title, *The Road toward Peace*. No one need be long in doubt as to the attitude of Mr. Eliot toward the war; it is indicated to a certain extent by the title, and further by such chapter headings as, "The Competitive Arming of the Nations—A Way of Escape" (chap. i), "The War an Unprecedented Calamity—Shall Its Outcome Be an Unprecedented Gain?" (chap. xi). The causes of the war are set forth in chap. ix as "Autocratic Institutions, National Desires for Empire, Disregard for Treaties and Conventions, and False Philosophies." Germany must be defeated because of her "desire for world-empire" (p. 116), and because "she has developed and accepted the religion of valor and the dogma that Might makes Right" (p. 122). "The government of Germany is the most autocratic in Europe" (p. 187), while free institutions and the "cause of righteous liberty is the cause of humanity" (p. 128). "What Gains for Mankind Can Come Out of It," (chap. v), and "Lessons of the War to March Ninth" (chap. xiv) are constructive in character, and show that national citizenship is best developed under a free government, and that future peace and happiness of the nations lie in that direction.

In addition to the lectures and addresses comprising the main part of the volume, an appendix is added which includes President Eliot's "Address at the Special Academic Session Called to Confer the Degree of Doctor of Laws on Prince Henry of Prussia, March 6, 1902" (p. 221), and his "Address at a Banquet Given March 6, 1902, by the City of Boston, to Prince Henry of Prussia" (p. 225).

Each chapter is an interesting and scholarly presentation of the views of one of America's foremost citizens, upon a subject that should receive the most serious consideration of every thoughtful person interested in the preservation of all that is highest and best in civilization.

LORIN STUCKEY

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Colored School Children in New York. By FRANCES BLACOER, Special Investigator for the Committee on School Hygiene of the Public Education Association of the City of New York, New York, 1915. Pp. 176.

This is a study of the "race problem" at first hand.

In the year 1911, one of the large public schools of New York City had occasion to report to the school authorities a number of cases who appeared to be in need of special attention outside as well as in the school. Their classroom difficulties, in the opinion of their teachers, resulted almost entirely from the unsanitary or wholly neglected condition in which they were living.

It was the attempt to follow up this clue and to trace to their sources the outside influences responsible for classroom difficulties that brought this report into existence. Other studies have been made of the mentality of colored school children. They have been based for the most part on mental measurements and a comparison of colored with white children of the same grade and age. The assumption of these studies has been, as a rule, that where marked differences existed they were to be attributed to differences of race. What distinguishes this study is that it lays special stress upon other factors, namely, family life, isolation, and early training.

The principal interest of this investigation to the student of race contacts will be the light which it throws upon the curious and subtle ways in which race prejudice acts at once to stimulate and to inhibit the activities of the colored child. Under the influence of these conditions his mental life is thrown all out of gear and he is compelled to make special adaptations to social situations of which the white child knows

nothing; situations, also, of which the ordinary public school cannot and does not take any account. The school cannot of course, take account of situations created by race prejudice, because the public school cannot recognize the existence of race prejudice. To do this would be to recognize a different status in the negro and the white man.

As a result of this condition more is expected of the negro, and less, than of the white child; the colored boy and girl have more liberties and less freedom than the children of other races.

This, in substance, is the conclusion to which a study of the facts presented in this report lead. Intimate studies of contemporary social life such as this commend themselves to the student of social life, not merely for the light which they throw upon local conditions, but for the insight which they offer into the working of the subtler social forces elsewhere.

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Wage Worth of School Training. By ANNA CHARLOTTE HEDGES.
New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1915.

The preface to this investigation informs the reader that "this inquiry involved seeing twenty thousand girls at work, conferring in detail with foremen, forewomen, and managers, questioning several hundred girls themselves, and making an exhaustive study of 617 questionnaires."

Statistical methods of enumeration, description, and interpretation are used more elaborately than is usual in such inquiries. The impression is left that the greater interest of the investigator is in the mathematical aspects of her problem, and that the standpoint of foreman and employer is more emphasized than the attitude of the women workers themselves. Some of the conclusions to which the writer comes are as follows:

1. Schools instruct girls without reference to discovering and training progressive wage-earning ability.
2. Training in specific process operations can be given best and most adequately by the management itself in the factory.
3. Work will be most remunerative to the girl who enters the industrial work from the school, able bodied, industrious, right minded, trained in dexterity and in the correct meaning and use of the English language.

4. A cooperation is necessary between the industrial factors in the community and all wage-earning, not the school and factory, but co-operation; the school can continue the training of the girl whose economic need is so great, and who has so often her school life and aid in the continued training of the

wage-earner should be afforded by releasing her from work during the day for part time at full pay.

5. Public interest is required to promote this co-operation between industry and the school. Interest can be aroused mainly through demonstrating the economic worth of school training by adopting school methods freed from scholastic symbolism and rich in experience of problems involving tools, materials, and processes.

6. The school system should include among its definite and expressed aims the training of every child without exception in ability to earn by producing.

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

The Collection of Social Survey Materials. By FLORENCE RISING CUTTING, Instructor in the University of Illinois Library School. Chicago: American Library Association Publishing Board, 1915. Pp. 12.

This little pamphlet will be useful to students and others who are collecting materials on civic and social life in cities. It offers in outline a systematic classification, based upon recent surveys, of reports, investigations, and other materials which constitute the sources of information in regard to the city.

One of the first and essential factors in social control is records. At the present time these are widely scattered and wholly unco-ordinated. In this paper the author offers a suggestion for bringing them together into one place, preferably the public library, where they will be accessible to the public and may at the same time be available for the use of special students. This will, it is to be hoped, become in time a sort of clearing-house for information about city life, a sort of permanent survey. At any rate, listing "civic materials" may be regarded as the first step in the education of the community in regard to its community affairs and a necessary step in the movement for the revival of self-government in cities.

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Z. T. E.

The Relation of the State to Unemployment.—Unemployment means an economic loss to the country. Every unit added to the percentage of employment during the year means the conservation of human resources and a resultant improved prosperity for the people. There are two classes of unemployed. The first includes the permanently or partially deficient, the sick, the injured, delinquents, and those unwilling to work. The second class includes the able-bodied and willing to work. This class includes: those who are not working, or working only part time due to depression in business; those subject to periodical unemployment through variation of seasonal industries; those who lose work through labor troubles, and those who suffer loss of employment through failure to co-operate with employers needing workmen. The state already cares for the first class of unemployed in hospitals and institutions for deficient and delinquents. It can reduce unemployment due to sickness and injury by the promulgation of reasonable safety standards and methods and by industrial compensation laws. To reduce unemployment among the able-bodied and willing the state should establish a method of binding workers and employers together. This can be done by a system of local labor unions organized under state control, the purpose of which would be to bind the worker to the employer by a contract, the terms of which would be determined by the state. Such a system would be a practical method of reducing unemployment, and the state would be able to control the labor market.

worker where unemployment exists into the ranks of the skilled and intelligent workman. To prevent unemployment, arising out of labor troubles, the state should establish an effective mediation and conciliation bureau. The various state activities must in every case safeguard the self-reliance and responsibility of the individual.—John Price Jackson, *American Labor Legislation Review*, June, 1915. R. H. R.

Health Measures Affecting Factory Employees.—The National Council for Industrial Safety gives the number of killed and injured in the industries of the United States each year as 2,035,000. An analysis of the statistics in Ohio has shown that over one-half the deaths among workers in factories, mines, and offices were due to preventable causes. The laws which aim to control the working and living conditions of factory employees have their medical aspect, and the field is one for preventive medicine and sanitation rather than for curative medicine. Such splendid results in eliminating disease as were obtained on the Isthmus of Panama can be achieved only when health and sanitary experts are given full power to carry through their measures. The difficulty in controlling health conditions in democratic communities lies in the fact that the public distrusts expert advice and considers itself a competent judge of necessary health measures. A campaign of education is necessary, therefore, to change the attitude of the public into one of faith in the judgment of experts. The employers' attitude must also be changed so that, instead of opposing health measures, they will provide healthful working conditions willingly. No idea of charity should enter into this policy, because it is now recognized that industrial insurance is a proper risk to be placed upon an industry.—J. E. Tuckerman, *Journal of Sociologic Medicine*, June, 1915. A. C. K.

The Psychology of the Neutrals.—The task of being neutral in a world's war such as we are living through at present is beset with difficulties: it is morally impossible. Legal neutrality is of course a simple matter. Every state can exercise it and enforce it to the letter of the law. But the difficulties begin with the neutrality of sentiment and opinion. The *causae belli* set forth in the official declaration of war putting all the blame on the enemy are meant more for the neutrals than for the belligerent governments. The neutrals, at the very outbreak of war, must pass judgment as to which government is in the right and which in the wrong. Not to pass judgment is almost a moral impossibility and to have passed judgment and still claim neutrality is nothing but sheer hypocrisy. Again during the war each warring nation tries to report all the atrocities committed by the enemy but keeps silent as to its own misdeeds. Here the neutrals again, if they are conscientious, are called upon to pass judgment and believe one or the other of those reports. Neutrality would mean not to believe any of these. But in reality one finds himself believing one or the other of these reports, according to his sympathies. But this is not neutrality. It is just as one-sided as taking part in the war. The greatest difficulty, however, is concerning the close of the war. Whatever judgments one may pass upon the cause of war and conduct during the war, the important thing is the outcome of the war. Only a thoroughly demoralized and dull person can boast that the results of the war leave him indifferent. Wherever mentality functions, wishes and prayers, hopes and fears about this gigantic struggle are bound to arise. No thinking person can remain indifferent to the changes in the map of Europe and the world that this war may bring about. To remain impartial to the most important events in history would be a degradation of manhood.—F. Curtius, "Zur Psychologie der Neutralen," *Deutsche Revue*, May, 1915.

A. M. B.

The Japanese in America.—The United States has not given the Japanese a square deal. There are some 71,000 Japanese in this country, of whom about 55,000 reside in California. The hatred toward these people is confined, for the most part, to the northern part of California, and the relations between the Japanese and whites in the southern part of the state are amicable. After careful study we must conclude that the Japanese "problem" is due largely to misunderstanding, and the presence of these people in our country does not constitute a "yellow peril," but may be transformed into a golden advantage for us. The veracity of the Japanese has been ques-

not to overlook the one great limitation of scientific data in their being written in so many different languages that a large proportion of information remains inaccessible or at least delayed for a time to the average investigator. It would be well for men of science to take note, when the war is over, of this great problem which is daily growing in importance with the rise of national consciousness and striving for independence of small cultural groups. How this great obstacle could be wholly or partially removed is difficult to see. To use Esperanto for scientific publications is out of the question. Would the smaller countries listen to the appeal to publish their scientific data in either one of the three languages—French, German, or English?—A. Jülicher, "Die Internationalität der Wissenschaft," *Protestantische Monatshefte*, May, 1915.
A. M. B.

Negro Ideals.—The destiny of a people is determined by their ideals. These ideals appear and disappear, and with them disappear the nations which embody the ideals. No nation has yet appeared whose ideals have proved sufficient for its cumulative needs. The position of the negro in America is complicated by the fact that he is not in a separate territory; he cannot work out his destiny free from the conflicting ideals, sentiments, and customs of a white environment. The white man does not like the negro and there is no place for him in the white man's world. Christianity, despite its teachings, does not induce the dominant race to admit the black man as a brother. The teachings and the practice of the white man's religion baffle him. He finds that the principles of democracy he has been taught do not, in practice, apply to him. In education he does not have an equal chance. The colleges exclude or at most tolerate him. If he acquires an education there is no plan for him among the whites. In skilled industry there is a growing tendency to exclude him. Now the program of the twentieth-century negro is to conquer all this feeling against him that exists in the dominant race. This new negro feels that there rests on him the responsibility of leading Christianity and democracy back to their ancient professions. His ideal is to refuse to accept the stamp of inferiority and to fight segregation and discrimination. The refusal of the white man to accept the negro and to give him full freedom and opportunity to develop is the greatest obstacle to be overcome. This attitude of the white man is unreasonable. It must yield to the negro's demand or it must be broken.—Leslie Pinckney, *Journal of Race Development*, July, 1915.

E. B. R.

The Meaning of "Unearned Income."—At the present time the word "unearned" is being used in economic, political, and general literature with at least three distinct meanings. The resulting confusion gives rise to the need for definiteness and uniformity in the use of the term. The first sense in which it is used may be called the revenue connotation. The select committee of 1906 sought to define more clearly the meaning of "unearned income." Regarding this it pointed out that the line of demarkation between "earned" and "unearned" might not be strictly logical or accurate, yet respecting investments and returns upon capital the profits of private traders should be regarded as earned and those of public companies and similar undertakings as arising from investment. This restriction to smaller incomes was based upon the view that in the larger businesses the capital element predominates. The line of distinction becomes then the passivity or activity on the part of the recipient of the income. A second use of the terms "unearned" and "earned" gives them certain moral and ethical implications. This use is familiar in propagandist literature from the time of Mill until the land campaign of 1910. This is the use of the term in Lord Hugh Cecil's exposition of political theory in his chapter on "Property and Taxation." A third meaning is that of Mr. J. H. Hobson in his exposition of his doctrine of surplus. In the revenue sense interest is unearned; in the Hobsonian sense only excess interest, beyond the minimum for use of capital plus compensation for risk, etc., is unearned. In the case of the revenue act all the profits from private enterprises or professional services are earned, whereas in the third sense parts of these profits may be surplus and therefore unearned. It seems better to use the term "unproductive surplus" for this Hobsonian viewpoint; to use various terms from "undeserved profits" to "ill-gotten gains" for Cecilian distinctions; and to reserve

the revenue adjective "unearned" for income from, or increment in, the value of invested capital unconnected with personal exertion or expenditure.—J. C. Stamp, *The Economic Journal*, June, 1915. R. H. R.

Biological Effects of Race Movements.—The force of a nation may be lowered by emigration, immigration, or war. Many regions of Europe and even the older sections of the United States have been weakened by the drafting off of the most hardy and adventurous. While this is a loss to one region there is no loss to the world. Immigration has replaced barbarous races by peoples more efficient and aggressive. Strong nations have sucked in weaker groups to supply the demands of industry or to fill the vacancy caused by war. Everywhere the blood of the slave, a forced immigrant, has diluted the blood of the conqueror to its detriment. But in closely allied races the crossings seem to be a distinct advantage. Even wide crosses do not necessarily work always for evil. The mulatto in America is superior to the negro. But the introduction of black blood has not been a gain to the nation, however much the mulatto is superior to the black. In a similar way our late immigration has been weakening. While among these later immigrants there are some individuals of splendid personal possibilities, the mass, while adding to our national wealth, constitute a burden to our democracy. The claim sometimes made that all men are biologically equal and that differences in capacity are due to opportunity and to education neglects to consider the fact that opportunity does not come to a race as a gift. Powerful strains make their own opportunity. To say that one race is inferior to another is only to repeat what is said daily in regard to individuals. It is not to say that a lower race cannot produce its own great men but that the number of these great men will be proportionately fewer. The average of one is below that of the other.—David Starr Jordan, *Popular Science Monthly*, September, 1915. E. B. R.

International Morality.—There are two antagonistic schools of thought regarding the application of moral principles to international affairs. The first, which may be called the *Realpolitiker*, accepts the dictum that might is right. The second, or *Idealpolitiker*, desires to place the international system upon the basis of strictly moral conceptions. At present all sovereign states accept the former. This naturally follows from the origin of the state, which finds its beginnings in conquest, oppression, and injustice. It further strengthens itself by imposing upon its members obedience and a type of morality useful to itself. The state must increase its power by all available means. There arises, to justify philosophically the absolutism of the state, a legal philosophy which is summed up in the concept "sovereignty." This furnishes the state with a charter of exemption from the moral law. There is no international law to restrain one state from declaring war upon another, and, in case of conquest, imposing its authority upon the weaker, since there is no central power which is able to enforce such a restraint if it were contained in international law. At present international morality is non-existent. War as understood in actual practice covers every crime that is conceivable to the human mind. To bring about international morality, we must repudiate traditional and current conceptions of the state, and discarding the idea of the state as an end in itself, give to it a new interpretation, that of a means of accomplishing the true end—the safety, the free development, and the elevation of mankind.—David Jayne Hill, *North American Review*, June, 1915. R. H. R.

Eugenics and the Poor Law.—The improvement of the human race depends on the elimination of the unfit, but the operation of the law of natural selection is obstructed in modern society by public charity. The alarming increase of pauperism in England during the earlier years of the nineteenth century was directly attributable to the lax administration of poor relief for many years previously. Men is weak and will follow the line of least resistance, if given the chance. The problem is, therefore,

to create a system of public charity which will not only relieve the poor, but will also be a means of improving the race. The problem is, therefore, to create a system of public charity which will not only relieve the poor, but will also be a means of improving the race.

But the environment of the children under the care of the Poor Law is of vital importance. The Poor Law statistics of 1905 show unmistakably that the dysgenic conditions of life implied by pauperism are being perpetuated and even augmented by the present administration of poor relief.—Sir Arthur Clay, *Eugenics Review*, July, 1915.
A. C. K.

Old Age and the Industrial Scrap-Heap.—The problem of the place of the old worker is one of the most delicate of social problems. There is a general impression that the older men are put on the industrial scrap-heap. The fact is that there are far too many men above the age of 50 that are dependents. Official statistics in England in 1839, 1848, 1850, and 1894 indicate that age debar men from industry. Professors Marshall, Hobson, and others hold like views. On all sides in the United States we hear that the speeding up of industry is placing the age limit from 40 to 50 years. There are, however, many facts that contradict such a notion. Rowntree and Lasker found that men of 60 in the building trades stood an equal chance with young men. Booth in his London studies showed that many lines of work are open to the older men. In the general skilled industries the average superannuation age in the United States is 55 to 65. Railroads as a rule set voluntary retirement at 65 and compulsory retirement at 70 years. Other industries run from 55 to 65. Policemen are retired from 50 to 65. In European cities pensions to officials begin at 60 to 65. One is not warranted in making new machines a great cause of the unemployment of the older workmen, for the machine that saves hard muscular exertion is often in favor of the old workers. Nor do the labor union rules prevent older men from being hired because they usually make exceptions in their standard wage for men 55 years of age and over. Workmen's Compensation Acts are found by the officials of the English Poor Law to be the cause of very few men coming to them for aid. Insurance companies do not find elderly workmen poorer risks than younger men. These facts show that the common impression is not at all proved. A truer inference from the facts is that it is rather the lack of vocational training, sickness, lack of enterprise, and inability to change from one occupation to another than the fact of age that causes the increase of the superannuated workers.—Arthur J. Todd, *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association*, July, 1915.
C. A. D.

The Adolescent Workman.—In the preoccupations of war times the training of boys too young to be in the army, yet out of school, is being more than ever neglected. Suitable moral and vocational training for young people, though long demanded, has, in France, never reached more than a few of the more fortunate classes, while, for insuring the future welfare of the country, it should extend to all. Several local and generally private attempts have already been made to put in operation tentative programs. One plan puts the youth into the ranks of adult labor, subjecting him to an undue stress and making of him a source of profit to his trainers. The independent vocational school where broad and thorough development alone is the end avoids this fault, and also the mistake of hasty specialization found in certain otherwise excellent schools established by business and industrial firms for training their future workmen. Hence, public initiative should rapidly extend the independent and free type of industrial school, not forgetting while doing this the moral, recreational, and hygienic needs of youth, and the aim of making a well-developed citizen.—Gustave Belot, "L'adolescence ouvrière," *La Revue de Paris*, August, 1915.
C. C. C.

The Bright Side of Superstition.—The superstitions of the Chinese are a powerful means of producing attitudes of devotion to, and belief in, the supernatural. Along with these are developed intense moral qualities, so that the total result well prepares one to appreciate the spiritual things of Christianity and to accept them. As a child in his Chinese home the writer was taught the many ghost stories by the maid-servants so that it seemed to him that this home was full of evil spirits. The death of an aunt brought to the home a large number of Taoist priests and Buddhist monks. The Buddhist ceremonies presented hell in all its horrors as the punishment for the wicked. These ceremonies made a lasting impression on the child's mind, preparing it for appreciating the nobler things of life. The sickness of mother was the next great

crisis. The best physicians were called in, but they could do nothing. Father and friends now appealed to the priests who invoked a goddess to lend her aid in mother's behalf against the evil spirits of sickness. Mother quickly recovered. The writer's young mind was greatly fascinated by the purity and goodness of the goddess. Home too was made most beautiful as a result of the effect of the same ideals on father and mother. At thirteen the writer participated in a village theatrical performance in which the gods and goddesses were represented. He was told that the gods had once been men but by a pure life had become gods. He set his mind to become a god. Near the writer's home lived a Presbyterian missionary who influenced him to go to a Christian college. Here he soon saw that his old beliefs were merely superstitions and gave them up. These superstitions had, however, created attitudes of obedience and devotion to purity of life which remained and became the soil in which Christianity took its root and grew. Here is the bright side of superstition.—T. C. Chao, *Methodist Review* (South), July, 1915. C. A. D.

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The "tricks of the trade," business "shrewdness," lying by advertisement, newspaper prevarication, the wiles of the bar, and the ruses of diplomacy are serious enough in their way, but they do not greatly hamper the honest functional people who are striving to render genuine service. What most hurts them is the tendency of the unworthy to simulate every type or trait which has won social approval in order to steal prestige from it. This taking on the popular hue is like that coloration and mimicry one finds among the lower forms of life, save that it is acquisitive rather than protective. The simulator usually aims to traffic on the prestige he filches from the simulated.

In the Middle Ages piety was the best cloak for self-seekers to assume. In his *Inferno*, wearing mantles of lead but gilded without, Dante places two "joyous Friars Catalano and Loderingo," founders of the Order of Knights of Saint Mary, who were called in by the Florentines in 1266 to act as mediators in private disputes but who proved to be corrupt and grasping. Satirizing the pretensions of the medieval church, he writes:

To work miracles is old and antiquated and not in fashion now; to interpret the people, troublesome; to interpret the Scripture, Pedantic; to pray, a

sign one has little to do; to shed tears, silly and womanish; to be poor, base; to be vanquish'd, dishonourable . . . and lastly to dye, uncouth; and to be stretch'd on a Cross, infamous.

With the rise of the centralized monarchy bloomed a new type, the courtier. Thanks to Richelieu's work, Louis XIV could have proud feudal nobles as pliant ornaments of his court. La Bruyère says:

Whoever considers that the king's countenance is the courtier's supreme felicity, that he passes his life looking on it and within sight of it, will comprehend to some extent how to see God constitutes the glory and happiness of the saints.

According to Taine:

The Duc de Fronsac, every morning at seven o'clock, in winter and in summer, stationed himself, at his father's command, at the door of the small stairway leading to the chapel, solely to shake hands with Mme. De. Maintenon on her leaving for St. Cyr. "Pardon me, Madame," writes the Duc de Richelieu to her, "the great liberty I take in presuming to send you the letter which I have written to the king, begging him on my knees that he will occasionally allow me to pay my court to him at Ruel, *for I would rather die than pass two months without seeing him.*"

How a monarch who had become "the fountain of honor" was able to trade upon the passion of his ambitious subjects to share in the prestige of the feudal nobility is indicated in one of Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes*:

The King of France is the most powerful prince in Europe. He has no gold mines, like his neighbour the King of Spain—but he has greater riches than he, because he draws them from the vanity of his subjects, more inexhaustible than any mine. He has undertaken and maintained great wars, having no other funds than titles of honour for sale, and by a prodigy of human vanity and pride, his troops are paid, his places filled, and his fleets equipped.

From the courtier example there spread quickly through society a deceptive glaze of manner. In one of his sermons Bossuet declares:

Never have people lived so much on caresses, on kisses, on words chosen to bear witness to a perfect cordiality, yet if we could pierce to the bottom of all hearts, if a divine light could disclose suddenly all that conventionality and good taste, interest and fear hold so well hidden, then what a strange spectacle!

There is no reason to suppose that modern society is so corroded with hypocrisy as was the seventeenth century in France. The brushing aside of glittering parasites by the rise of the rough-and-ready, plain-dealing, functional people has brought sham into bad odor. Polite society is probably as sincere as it ever has been, while religion is now but a thin cloak for worldliness. Commercial simulation, however, waxes apace. Layer after layer of people have come to buy other people's products instead of consuming their own, so that the total purchasing power exciting the cupidity of traders is nearly equal to the entire volume of production. The possible buyers of nostrums, gold bricks, beauty recipes, "salted" mines, and town lots under water are legion. The fraud orders of our Post-Office Department in a single year bar the mails to schemes which have robbed the public of \$239,000,000 within the last four years.

The rivalry to unearth new strata of customers and to sell new kinds of goods results in an ear-splitting overproduction of publicity and hence a resort to every trick of falsehood, sensationalism, suggestion, and association of ideas to impress fleeting attention. Adulterations, the misbranding of goods, the counterfeiting of trademarks, the forging of testimonials from celebrities, the manufacture of stock-exchange quotations for worthless securities, the sale of diplomas by bogus medical schools, advertisement masquerading as news dispatch or editorial—these illustrate how good repute is preyed upon. Owing to the association of the Quaker name and symbols in the public mind with integrity and just dealing, dealers are using them so unscrupulously for advertising purposes that the Quakers are now seeking legislation forbidding the use of their name as a trademark on commercial products.

A more serious, because more elusive, form of simulation is the professionalizing of something that ought not to be used for making money. There is the professional mendicant whose tone and tale far surpass in piteousness the appeal of the honest victim of misfortune. Sport is infested by the professional athlete posing as an enthusiast for physical development while greedy of prizes and purses and bent on secretly hiring himself to amateur teams and organizations whose eagerness to win has gotten the better of their

honesty. In college he passes for a student while he debases intercollegiate athletic contests with his low standards and unscrupulous methods. Nothing has so hurt real sport as the creeping in of these mercenaries among the true sportsmen.

Our courts are plagued by the presence of the professional expert witness on handwriting, poisons, or insanity. He simulates, of course, that disinterested love of truth which is rightly presumed of the bank cashier, alienist, or chemist who for a moment steps aside from his work to clear up a doubtful point in a law suit. The fact is, however, that the expert who makes a trade of furnishing testimony becomes a parasite on his own past and on the credit of his profession. To keep fees flowing in he must give testimony in favor of the side that has engaged him, at the same time guarding himself from damaging grilling by the experts and attorneys of the other side. Hence, when he has a hard case, he hides himself in a maze of technical minutiae or a cloud of big words, which can only mystify and befog the court. Experts who make a business of furnishing testimonials as to the merits of commercial wares follow the same downward path.

It is instructive to follow the recent rise and downfall of the professional muckraker. At first the exposure of the misdeeds of the high and powerful in the political, the financial, or the commercial world is dangerous, and only brave men undertake it. But in case, as sometimes happens, exposures excite interest, are eagerly read, and make money and fame for both writer and publisher, there arises the professional muckraker who aims to meet the market demand for exposure; who not only probes for a living, but who sensationalizes, spices, and misinterprets in order to dress a dish to the readers' taste. By showing only one side, twisting facts, hinting when he cannot prove, suggesting bad motives for innocent actions, and interpreting errors as crimes, he sells his wares but finally discredits the work of even the honest muckraker and brings all unauthorized exposure into doubt or contempt.

A religious body that has gained resources, credit, and power is likely to become infested by worldly clerics to whom the pulpit is an opportunity for easy living or a chance to rise. The ambitious wire-puller, without a spark of religion in his heart but adept

in its tones, phrases, and postures, schemes his way up to the miter, while the real saint works unnoticed in his parish. These shrewd self-seekers are of course strong for authority, profess orthodox beliefs, and commend themselves by their zeal in smelling out and hounding down clergymen honest enough to confess to a heresy. Until someone has devised a litmus paper for testing spirituality, wealthy and powerful churches will be liable to progressive dry rot while pure religion will be found where a learned and hard-worked clergy commands no temporal power, only a modest living, and not too much social consideration.

When charity and social work, having achieved a solid financial basis, begin to hold out the prospect of a reputable career, a change is likely to occur in the type of worker. The self-devoted still offer themselves as in the days of ill-paid and uncertain employment, but with them enter ambitious young people of greater ability and broader preparation, perhaps, but lacking the spirit of service. Conscientious and efficient they may be, but they feel little sympathy and liking for the distressed people they deal with. Try as they may to imitate the approach and manner of volunteer workers, the poor sense their coldness and are less confiding and less comforted than under the old system. While it is inevitable that social work should develop into a profession, the friends of the unfortunate who have relinquished their ministrations to paid workers may well supervise and study these workers, to the end that only the genuine may be kept and advanced. There is need of labor on unpaid boards and in voluntary associations to hold the organized services up to the mark.

Once a labor union is in smooth water with a loyal dues-paying membership willing to maintain salaried officials, the leader of its storm-and-stress period is often succeeded by the canny schemer who prefers a salary to a wage. Although willing to sell out his fellows to their political enemies—as from the Mulhall lobby investigation we know that thousands of union officials actually did—he is not without the talk and pose of class loyalty. His first concern is not the needs of his workers, but the preservation of his position. Methods, labor-bait contests are sometimes worse than the horrors of the lowest slum yards. While voicing roundly labor sentiment:

and getting what he can for his constituents, he is too shrewd to risk his job by attacking a formidable abuse or calling a hazardous strike unless he is driven to it. His counsels of narrow self-interest chill his people to the cause of labor; so that when his ilk control a labor organization "the fight is out of it." By the fiery crusaders who rouse and organize unskilled labor, such union officials are styled "labor grafters."

The hollowness of the patrician pretense that every popular unheaval threatening privilege is the work of "irresponsible agitators" should not obscure the fact that disturbance may be followed as a trade. The man possessed of assurance, a glib tongue, a platform manner, and a taste for excitement may make a career for himself by going about stirring up discontent without in the least knowing or caring whither it will lead. Until he has met the acid test it is easy to mistake him for the unselfish champion of the wronged and the prophet of the disinherited. The workingmen dread being fooled by the windbag and are likely to withhold their full confidence from the agitator until he has proved his mettle in a time of danger and persecution.

Most insincere agitation, however, is the work of another type, the vote-seeking politician. Once power has passed from classes to masses, there springs up the professional politician, a man unembarrassed by principles, loyalty, or public spirit, whose sole and abiding concern is the gaining and keeping of office. In a way he is the modern courtier. Says Mr. Lecky:

In the field of politics the spirit of servility and sycophancy no longer shows itself in the adulation of kings and nobles. The man who, in former ages, would have sought by Byzantine flattery to win power through the favour of an emperor or a prince, will now be found declaiming on platforms about the iniquity of privilege, extolling the matchless nobility of the masses, systematically trying to excite their passions or their jealousies, and to win them by bribes and flatteries to his side.

A thousand times the political conservatives have thus exposed him without persuading the people to return to class government. They remember that the governing class cost them quite as much as the politicians and insulted them into the bargain.

In order to maintain himself the politician must be able to drive off the field the real leaders, the men of positive character and

conviction, who have gained popular support for their ideas. This he does by impudently outbidding them at every point. His patriotism is loftier, his rhetoric more glowing, his promises more dazzling. Beside him the truth-teller who makes no mealy-mouthed professions, nor promises more than he can perform, seems halting and timid.

When a hitherto negligible class—the wage-earners, for example—gains the suffrage, or shows independence in voting, the politician professes suddenly a deep concern for its welfare. He takes to voicing its grievances and advocating measures in its program. Since the politician is able to bring to the workingmen prestige and a following, perhaps even a party, they are tempted to discard at this point the trusty working-class leaders, who have brought them thus far but can hold out to them no prospect of immediate gains, and swing to the support of the politician. It is needless to add that they either fail to get what was promised them, or, if they get it, it proves to be a sham.

When by years of labor and sacrifice a reform movement has been brought within sight of victory, some “practical” politician takes up with it, professedly as a convert, but really because he deems it a vote-getter. At this crisis its faithful friends, who nursed it through its initial unpopularity and have built it up to its present strength, are sent to the rear because they bear the taint of radicalism and the scars of defeat. Taken up by a “safe” political celebrity, the reform triumphs and goes down in history as the fruit of his statesmanship. Thus has it been with tariff reform, old-age pensions, direct democracy, and workmen’s compensation. Under the two-party system scarcely any great reform is credited to those who sacrificed most for it. The glory goes to some political strategist who opposed or ignored it when it stood most in need of friends and became an eleventh-hour convert only when it could do as much for his party as his party could do for it. Such is the way of the world.

In England the old party custom of encouraging only men of fortune to stand for Parliament was defended as a means of excluding the political adventurer. After the class struggle came into politics, however, the practice had to be given up, since it left the

wage-earners entirely without representation from their own class. Non-payment of legislators has been justified on the ground that if service in the legislature involves financial sacrifice the self-seeking politicians will shun it, thus leaving the way clear for men of means and public spirit. Here again labor is put at a serious disadvantage, so that everywhere democracies have come to compensate their legislators sufficiently to cover at least their actual expenses. It is probable that the public is least plagued by political job-hunters when it allows only expenses for part-time service—like that of the legislator, the university regent, and the member of an advisory board—while for full-time service it pays well enough to attract ability.

"It is the weaker sort of politicians," says Lord Bacon, "that are the great dissemblers." Resort to the arts of popularity is, however, no proof that a public man is a professional politician. They may be forced on him by competition with the professionals. They may be his means of withstanding money and organization. The candidate of the prosperous classes does not need the eyebeam, the handshake, or the platform way of the representative of the popular cause; he has behind him the "interests" and the "machine." It is the champion of the broader public welfare or of the poor man's cause who must expose himself to the sneers of the powerful by openly paying court to his constituents.

Everything that gathers prestige will be counterfeited if it is possible to do so. This is so true that the advertisements of trashy goods give the warning, "Beware of imitators," in order that the reader may think they have prestige. Quacks hang on to the skirts of the medical profession. Shysters and "ambulance-chasers" insinuate themselves among the men at the bar. *Science* being a name to conjure with, astrologers, clairvoyants, rain-makers, magnetic healers, and "Swamis," all profess some "science." Social climbers pretend to good birth and breeding, to social experience and intimacy with the exclusive, in order to break into the charmed circle. Once a religious order has attained credit and comfort, the lazy wriggle into it in spite of all that can be done to keep them out. Like a bright river losing itself in a swamp, the Yogi movement in India lost itself among fakirs leading a life

of ease by appearing more ascetic than they really are. A new departure in art or literature has scarcely won recognition ere its originators are trodden under by the rush of charlatans and notoriety-seekers who convert the thing into a caricature of itself. Dissect symbolism, cubism, or futurism in their heyday and how small the core of sincerity!

One reason why "the new broom sweeps clean," "what is new is always fine," is that the new, lacking prestige, suffers little from the presence of impostors. The young political party, the religious order in the flush of youth, the new religious movement, the developing branch of knowledge, the literary departure not yet recognized, the experiment in philanthropy, the new-born public service, such as sanitation or forestry, is likely to be in the hands of the sincere; so that it may do better and reach higher than later after its success has attracted to it sycophants and charlatans. This is why it has so often been remarked that the fervor of faith is strongest when a religion is persecuted, not after it has won official favor; that the noblest men are to be found in a service or an agitation before there is a good living in it; and that the early leaders of a cause or a party pitched the note higher and stirred hearts more than those who headed it at its moment of triumph.

Groups and interests wear masks as well as individuals. Freedom being dear to man, selfish interests use it as a stalking-horse—leagues for "medical freedom," "industrial freedom," "free Canal," "freedom of the seas," etc. "Personal liberty" is a fig leaf for the liquor traffic. Rich men unite to fight "socialistic" measures under the name of "Liberty and Property Defense League." But their concern for *liberty* is a tittle compared with their concern for *property*. A movement for the defense of the family turns out to be a mask for brewers fighting equal suffrage. Certain nationalist societies among our foreign-born are the screen from behind which liquor dealers attack "dry" measures. A "national water power conference" may be a scheme of power companies to gain the front page for the arguments of their attorneys. Under the cloak of a "pure food" association the concern producing soda-water company has sought legislation against rival baking powders. During the Great War a number of non-neutral movements moving

hyphenated Americans have worn the guise of a peace propaganda, or a "truth" movement.

From the foregoing we may deduce:

1. The better the reputation the more eager is the simulation. Counterfeits cast no discredit on the genuine. In the words of La Rochefoucauld, "Hypocrisy is a sort of homage that vice pays to virtue."

2. From the humbler classes proceed impostors in quest of gain; from the higher classes impostors in quest of respectability, dignity, reputation, honors, or public office.

3. Frauds known and tolerated discredit the genuine, and if they are allowed to multiply will ruin whatever they have attached themselves to.

4. The unmasking and casting out of hypocrites is a temporary embarrassment to the thing simulated, but an ultimate benefit.

5. Endowments attract parasites as honey attracts flies; so that only great precautions in the way of visitation, investigation, and publicity can prevent an endowment from becoming a nest of corruption.

6. The more honest labor is despised the more will men seek to live by means of simulation. Making productive effort respectable lessens the resort to acquisitive mimicry.

7. Services that, being *spiritual*, are not subject to test should be underpaid. Clergymen, missionaries, revivalists, writers of devotional literature, poets, prophets, agitators, leaders, inspirers, and public men should receive less than their ability might command in other lines in order that these precious ministrations be not adulterated.

The showing up of the fringe of simulators that attach themselves to every reputable thing is one of those necessary but distasteful and thankless services which remind us that it is not kindness so much as militant honesty that keeps the linchpins of society from falling out. Nearly everything which has a good name stands in need of protection; hence the providing of fraud-detectors is a means of accelerating social progress.

It is not enough that the state has tardily come to lay an arresting hand on the venders of impure foods, drugs, seeds, and ferti-

lizers; to scrutinize the securities offered to the public; to fix tests for admission to certain professions, and to disbar tricky lawyers. More, much more, is needed. In every worthy calling the sheep ought to find means of isolating and branding the goats. Every profession ought to be alert to keep itself free from tares. Even now associated physicians issue an annual exposure volume about quacks and nostrums. Bureaus are forming for the interchange of the information about impostors which accumulates in the hands of charity agents. Boards of conference study to weed out the professionals from intercollegiate athletics. Although the idea of a "people's lobby" to apprise the citizens as to the voting record of their representatives was never realized, such features as the "Roll Call" and "Comment on Congress" help us to compare performance with promises. Municipal voters' leagues and legislative voters' leagues hunt the hypocrite out of politics by printing a relentless analysis of his record. In one state a single fearless writer, publishing after every legislative session a faithful history of that session, has made himself a terror to the "whited sepulchers" of politics.

The campaign against the stealers of good repute ought to be far more general and vigorous. Since tainted news is destroying the confidence of the public in the press, the honest journals ought to band together to pillory the lying newspapers. Since fearless art critics and literary critics are needed to part the real from the spurious, such critics ought to stand together against advertisers' efforts to intimidate them. The scandal of the professional expert witness might be ended by having technical testimony sought by the court—not the litigants—from some member of a panel of reputable experts recommended by their profession.

The timely recognition of merit may be as serviceable to society as the prompt elimination of the fraud. A university or a scientific institution ought to function as a testing laboratory, its degrees and appointments as certificates of quality of scholarship. To allow our universities to give degrees and appointments for the sake of "science" is to overlook their value in protecting the public against charlatans possessing the phrases and trappings of learning.

but not its substance. A learned society with its honors and medals and programs may render a like service.

The public should be enabled to discriminate sharply between those who do and those who by lavish and skilful expenditure simulate achievement without having in fact achieved. By a shrewd outlay of money and attention a mere rich man may capture for himself the name of "philanthropist" which ought to be reserved for those who, like Vincent de Paul and John Howard, give themselves. By hiring able helpers and by drawing upon ample resources he may with little risk or hardship to himself gain the honors of the geographical explorer. By financing the good cause which is on the point of issuing from obscurity he may reap the reputation of reformer. By well-timed gifts and attentions to religion he may deodorize his past and acquire the aroma of sanctity.

Such stealing of plumes will not discourage those who love achievement for its own sake, but it damps the ardor of such as are fired to high emprise by the prospect of appreciation and recognition. If society allows Dives to capture the honors which ought scrupulously to be reserved for real achievers, *just because they can hope for no material reward*, it will be served less and exploited more. Consequently we ought to hail as deserving public servants the implacable critics and stern exposers who foil the schemes of the unmeriting to take the credit which belongs only to genuine achievement.

We Americans have been slow in waking up to the possibilities of formal recognition as a means of encouraging signal social service. In our eyes all honors and titles have been suspected because they are associated in our minds with privilege and hereditary transmission, neither of them essential to social recognition. But a democracy like Australia or Canada sees no harm in the knighting of citizens who have nobly served their fellows. Royalty has stimulated *its* servants by holding out decorations. Why should not the people inspire *their* servants with the prospect of recognition?

In the rational encouragement of the ambitious citizen to do his best for the common weal, Germany is a generation ahead of us.

Many a tradesman there keeps straight in the hope of some day seeing the crown over the door of his shop and calling himself *Hoflieferant*. After that he may strive for the dignity of *Kommerzienrath*, while beyond that is the high honor of *Geheimrath*; and so on. Besides this ladder of titles, any man who has done something very fine, be his station never so humble, may be honored with a signed photograph of the Kaiser, or even invited to lunch with His Majesty. In the hands of a hereditary monarch the method of graduated recognition may be perverted to dynastic and militarist designs; yet the principle is sound and it ought to be as feasible for the people to capture and keep the power of recognition as it has been feasible for them to capture and keep the power of the purse.

Our neglect of public ante-mortem recognition has obliged the man of high desert to vociferate his claims or else remain in obscurity with no other reward than the consciousness of duty performed. If in every walk of life notable achievement were promptly singled out and formally recognized, our eardrums would not ache as now with the self-recommendation of impostors. We need more responsible agencies with the right to seek out and set a hallmark on sterling merit. It is not too much for society through governor, mayor, state university, library trustees, school board, or other representative to give an early and a right direction to public esteem. Let a certificate, diploma, medal, label, portrait, or commemorative naming of street or park or public building set the man of extraordinary merit apart, *while he is still alive*, from the pursuing horde of impudent pretenders.

A BUSINESS MAN'S REFLECTIONS ON LABOR PROBLEMS

By ARBITRATOR^{*}

Every man who considers matters outside his own immediate sphere of activity must have become aware of the feeling of unrest which permeates society. The rich as well as the poor, the educated as well as the more ignorant, all are affected by it. It is universal, and its cause or causes cannot be confined by locality nor be due to the circumstances of any particular individual. It must be attributed, rather, to some influence which is general and not specific. Some of our deepest thinkers—men who are devoting their lives to the study of social problems—have endeavored to determine the fundamental causes of this unrest. It is not with any idea that a correct solution has been found, but rather with the hope that a hint may be dropped which may be of assistance to these scientists, that the following suggestions are made.

Twenty years ago a man who knew only the law of gravitation could infer correctly from that standpoint that the science of aeronautics was an idle dream. If he saw an aeroplane in flight today, he could not deny the evidence, but he might consider that the law of gravitation had been disproved. But there are other laws acting in conjunction with, but not in contradiction of, the law of gravitation, which explain fully the flight of the aeroplane. It is the resultant of all these forces acting in harmony. The error of the man was in his assumption that the law of gravitation only applied, and in his presumption that he was familiar with all laws which could apply. We have endeavored to forecast the result of

^{*} The writer is an official in a large manufacturing corporation. Until recently he has paid no attention to academic theories. He has taken existing business structure for granted, without entertaining suppositions about need or possibility of change. His own observations of industrial unrest have lately led him into the courses of thinking indicated in this paper. As an index of reactions among men of his type which are rarely reported to the public, the discussion is important.—THE EDITORS.

certain economic laws, and if the result is not what we have in advance determined it should be, it does not follow that the economic laws in question are wrong. It is quite possible, in fact quite probable, that our reasoning has been unsound, or rather incomplete, and that in arriving at our conclusions we have not given proper consideration to certain other laws which in reality have a bearing on the subject. Perhaps we have accepted the result, without endeavoring to determine wherein our previous conceptions were wrong. This last is the easiest but not the scientific way of treating the matter. Had it been followed by astronomers, the discovery of Neptune might have been delayed many years. This discovery is recognized as the greatest triumph of mathematical astronomy since the days of Newton. The planet Uranus did not conform to the calculated orbit, and in relating the circumstances which led to the discovery of Neptune the author of *Young's General Astronomy* states:

It was very soon found impossible to reconcile the old observations of Uranus by Lemonnier and others with any orbit that would fit the observations made in the early part of the nineteenth century, and what was worse, the planet almost immediately began to deviate from the orbit computed from the new observations, even after allowing for the disturbances due to Saturn and Jupiter. It was misguided by some unknown influence to an amount almost perceptible by the naked eye. The difference between the actual and the computed places of the planet amounted in 1845 to the "intolerable quantity" of nearly two minutes of an arc.

One might think that such a minute discrepancy between observation and theory was hardly worth minding and that to consider it "intolerable" was putting the case very strongly, but in science unexplained "residuals" are often the seeds from which new knowledge springs. Just these minute discrepancies supplied the data which sufficed to determine the position of a great world, before unknown.

As the result of a more skilful and laborious investigation Leverrier, a French astronomer, wrote in substance to Galle, then an assistant in the Observatory at Berlin:

"Direct your telescope to a point on the ecliptic in the constellation of Aquarius, in longitude 326° , and you will find within a degree of that place a new planet looking like a star of about the ninth magnitude and having a perceptible disk."

The planet was found at Berlin on the night of September 23, 1846, in exact accordance with this prediction, within half an hour after the astronomers

began looking for it and within 52 minutes of the precise point Leverrier had indicated.

In the foregoing illustrations the observer of the aeroplane and the astronomers who had calculated the orbit of Uranus, through insufficient knowledge, had been led to wrong conclusions. All man-made laws are supposed to be enacted for the benefit of those affected by them. The fact that outrageous laws, and laws to accomplish purely selfish ends, have been passed does not vitiate this assumption; it merely proves ignorance or selfishness or unfaithfulness on the part of the lawmakers. It must be borne in mind also that all laws are supposed to be based upon the observation of certain evils which they are designed to correct. If when honestly made they do not succeed in their purpose, it is because the observation has been imperfect, or because the conditions upon which they were based have been changed. If experience proves that they do not "fit the case," they either become a dead letter (as have some of the so-called "Blue Laws" of Connecticut and other states) or else they are modernized. The Sherman law affords an illustration of a law which requires amendment. The reasons for its failure are very clearly explained in that able paper entitled "The Sherman Law," written by Mr. George W. Perkins. Although enacted but thirty years ago, as it stands today its effect instead of being a benefit to the country, as it was honestly intended to be, has been detrimental, because its framers did not and obviously could not take into consideration the present conditions. It was framed before the day of the large corporation, before the day of the large accumulations of capital in the industrial world, and before the telephone and other scientific inventions had revolutionized business, and developed possibilities undreamed of at that time.

To get a little nearer the subject under discussion, are the so-called laws of business perfect and immutable? The unrest in society and the friction in business relations is becoming more and more marked. Rather than admit that this is due to the imperfections of these laws, it is easier to lay all the blame upon agitators, and accuse them of selfishly endeavoring to set aside or nullify the laws. Is this easier answer the correct one? Some

of these business laws have become so venerable that they have been given the authority of axioms. One of these proclaims that "any commodity is worth what it will fetch in the open market"—and a corollary to this law is, "labor is a commodity." Based upon this law and its corollary, another law states: "An employer is not legally or morally bound to pay more for the services of an employee than is necessary to secure those services." Considering this law and its corollary as the premises, and the last-named law as the conclusion to a syllogism, is it not possible that there is a fundamental error in the minor premise that "labor is a commodity"? Admitting for the sake of argument that the *services* of this laborer may be properly so classed, is that feature all that is to be considered when we buy or sell "labor"? When we say that we have bought a barrel of flour or a bushel of potatoes, we have described the whole transaction in so far as the flour or potatoes are concerned; but is this true when we say that we have hired a man for a dollar per day? It would seem that there is a difference in the two cases, because we cannot dissociate the services of the man from the man himself or from his other functions; yet in dealing with the problem we have applied only the same reasoning or law that we should to the flour or potatoes.

Celluloid is composed of cotton which has been treated with acids and combined with camphor. It is not cotton, however, although cotton is its principal ingredient. Its entire character has been changed by synthesis. It cannot be spun or woven, neither would it make a soft cushion. A laborer is more than a machine; he is also a synthetical compound. The commodity feature is part of the combination, but an inseparable part. We cannot use the labor without affecting the laborer. As in the case of the celluloid, we must deal with the combination as a whole and not with one ingredient alone.

Society is composed of individuals, and the welfare of society is made up of the aggregate welfare of its members. The laborer is a member of society, which demands from him obedience to the laws and customs of the community, and a contribution to the welfare of the community. The demand which the community makes of the laborer is the same irrespective of any amount received from the sale of the commodity, part of his activity.

He may or may not be a citizen of the country in which he resides, but it is his duty to contribute actively toward the general welfare, physical and mental; otherwise he would be a parasite. Except in rare instances, he has others more or less helpless, who are dependent upon him, and it is his duty to provide not only for their present and future physical necessities, so that they may not become a burden on society, but he also must provide for their mental needs, so that they in turn may do their part as members of society. Potatoes and flour partake of none of these characteristics, yet in considering the laborer as one who merely has his services to sell, we treat him as we do the flour and potatoes, and to the extent that we pay him no more than what is termed a "living wage" do we curtail his other functions, which to society at large are quite as important—indeed more so. The laborer himself may not be fully aware of his composite nature, but society is, and is beginning to demand recognition of its claims. For example, it is generally admitted today that the laws which have been passed for the benefit of women and minors are economically sound, and that the minimum-wage law is entirely justified; yet if the women and minors are to be considered the same as machines or only as producers of "commodities," these laws have no sound basis. In all the laws just referred to society demands that its interest be conserved.

May not further investigation show that the unrest in society is due in part to our failure because of ignorance, or mental inertia, or even unwillingness to consider carefully and fairly economic questions which deal with social conditions? Our ignorance is inexcusable; but our mental inertia is dangerous, as it may lead to mental degeneration; while our unwillingness can be regarded only as dishonest to ourselves and disregardful of our duty.

Welfare work is most commendable, and it is undoubtedly beneficial to a certain extent. The individuals who have come in contact with the workers have been given higher ideals, their ambitions have been aroused, instructions in household economics and hygiene and sanitary matters have increased the comfort and health of those for whose benefit the work has been undertaken, and trades have been taught—but here the work ends; a most

commendable and beneficial work, which does not and cannot, however, because of its nature, strike at the root of the trouble. This work has been undertaken by many corporations and associations, because of a sincere desire to ameliorate the conditions of the poor; but by many for whose benefit it is undertaken it is regarded as an admission that the amenities of life are unfairly distributed, and while the results of such unfairness are being softened, the fundamental causes still remain undisturbed. Where such feeling prevails, the dissatisfaction remains—in fact it is sometimes accentuated by these honest philanthropic efforts.

In our public schools the children of all classes of society have been brought into very close contact. These children are intimately associated in a most democratic way until they graduate, when their paths diverge, the divergence increasing as the years pass. Old intimacies are forgotten. The child of the rich or well-to-do continues his studies at college while the child of the poorer man goes to work. The latter cannot understand the justice of being debarred from these advantages which he himself would enjoy, and by which he would profit quite as much as does his more fortunate playmate. This discontent, which started in childhood, increases as the man matures until he becomes morbid or sometimes even resentful. Is not the public school partially responsible for this unrest? If we find that the public school is responsible in part for this unrest, no one on that account would suggest that the system of public education be discontinued. Whatever unrest it may be responsible for is an evidence as well as one of the causes of the evolution through which society is passing. The influence of the school as a whole is beneficial, and the fact that it creates unrest is not sufficient reason for its abolishment. As the evolution continues, the inequalities which have been called so forcibly to the attention of the child may in time be removed or reduced. This result might be hastened if, as has been done in a few cases, the state should provide a certain number of scholarships to be awarded under proper conditions only to those who are unable for financial reasons to enter any of the higher institutions of learning.

Inventions have brought the individual as well as the community into new and closer relations with other individuals and the world at large. Business is pursued on a scale and by methods undreamed of and impossible before the advent of telegraph and telephone. As the number of employees has increased, so also has the opportunity for interchange of ideas. The employer and employee have been brought into much closer relations, to the benefit of both. May not this unrest be still further intensified by our failure or unwillingness to acknowledge that, coincident with this evolution in business, society itself is undergoing a similar but none the less positive evolution? The results of this evolution are permanent and must be recognized; the unrest will continue until some readjustment is made.

The professional socialist does not stop to determine the cause, but is ready with a remedy irrespective of the cause. Such ill-considered action on his part is illogical, and the remedy which he offers may cause worse troubles than those he is seeking to escape. One of the foremost students of sociology in the country, in commenting on the propaganda of the professional socialists, calls it "quack medicine." In substance he declares that they do not endeavor to determine whether the trouble is in the head or the stomach or the heels of the body politic, but have a universal panacea for all ills—in fact, are veritable quack doctors. They deal with the results only and do not seek to remove or even determine the cause.

In their endeavor to find relief, wage-earners, such as mechanics and laborers, have organized labor unions and other similar bodies. All of these unions are purely selfish. They demand not only increased compensation but also shorter hours of labor, thus reducing the earning power or the efficiency of their labor, for which they demand a higher price. Are these unions (exclusive of the I.W.W.) acting on any principle fundamentally different from that which has prompted the policy of the employer? Can one side be accused of being more selfish than the other? Is not each party endeavoring to obtain all that he can for himself, irrespective of the welfare, outside of the actual necessities, of the other? The community, including both the employee and the employer, pays

for this reduced efficiency—the employee by reason of the inevitable increase in the price of the necessities (the higher cost of living) and the employer in the reduction of his net earnings. Undoubtedly the majority of the members of these unions do not realize the injustice done to the employer, but unfortunately a few of the more intelligent leaders have this very object in view. They not only seek to raise up the employee but endeavor to pull down the employer, thus reducing to the extent of their success the difference between the two. No plan is suggested by which the general welfare of society may be improved. They seek to benefit their members only. Demands are frequently made which are unreasonable, but which the employers in many instances have been obliged to grant in order to avoid a disturbance in their business. Concessions have been granted by the employers only after bitter controversies, or after a strike has been declared. But in the end, in almost every case, the employer has yielded to a greater or less extent, and the wage-earner's compensation has been gradually but persistently increased. These concessions have strengthened the power of the unions without increasing the good-will of the employees toward the employers, without which no enterprise, corporate or individual, can achieve the highest degree of success. Until recently such organization has been confined entirely to the classes named. The movement is spreading, however, and quite recently a similar union has been formed among salaried employees. This latest organization made demands which were promptly granted. Such action is fraught with danger, as it inevitably suggests to all employees that their only hope is to be found in organization, thus creating a spirit of antagonism against the employer which can end only in industrial warfare.

The Industrial Workers of the World is the most serious and unreasonable combination of wage-earners which has yet been organized, partly because it is largely composed of the most ignorant, and also because its membership is made up almost entirely of foreigners who are not familiar with our customs or laws and who are ignorant of the principles of our government. In all of these organizations there is the desire and demand for a larger share in the profits of the industry in which the employees are engaged.

While no intelligent person can agree in full with the conclusions which have been reached by many of the labor organizations, it is becoming more and more evident that there may be some truth (possibly not more than a grain) in their contentions. No individual has any choice as to his parentage, nor as to the environment by which he will be surrounded when he is ushered into the world. It is therefore claimed that no credit is due him because his parents are wealthy, or because opportunities come to him entirely by virtue of his environment. It would appear that both of these contentions were absolutely logical. It is admitted that there is credit accruing to the individual if he improves the opportunities which birth has given him, but it is also equally true that many men who have not had this privilege or good fortune, had they enjoyed this environment, would have improved it to a larger extent than do many who have been thus favored. Some extremists have even gone so far as to demand that the property or wealth which was owned by a person at his decease should not be transmitted to any other person, but that it should be turned over to the state, inasmuch as it was largely through the protection of the state, and owing to the organization of society in general, that he was enabled to accumulate the property. To a very limited extent the state has recognized the justice of this principle, by imposing an inheritance tax which must be paid by the executors before the estate of the deceased is distributed. This is the same idea that underlies all taxation, namely, that the taxpayer has received benefits from society and that he should assume his share of the burden necessary to sustain society. Irrespective of its merits or demerits, the present system of inheritance accomplishes for its beneficiary the same results in the financial race as does the handicapping system in athletics—it permits him to start, so to speak, from the 10- or 20-yard line against the scratch man. There is an important difference, however. The handicapping in the financial race is arbitrary, or rather accidental, as it is based upon the accident of birth, whereas in the athletic race it is based upon the merit or skill of the individual.

The government grants monopolies to inventors, who in the majority of cases assign their patents to corporations. It affords

protection by the tariff or other laws which it has passed. It is admitted that the corporation has a legal right to proper compensation for inventive genius or for successful management, but it is claimed that the government has passed such laws and afforded such protection with the expectation that society also shall share in the resulting benefits. So long as these corporations were not called upon to publish a report of their operations, the general public was kept in ignorance of the extent of their profits. The necessity of limiting the activity and power of these corporations was not apparent. Laws are not, or rather they should not be, passed for the benefit of the few. In the passage of these laws, the benefit to be derived by the individual or association of individuals in the corporate form was secondary; the primary object sought was the benefit of the community at large. The benefit to the few was the price paid to secure the larger benefit for the many, but the public in general and the employees in particular are becoming impatient and are insisting that they are entitled to a share in the large profits which are the result of these corporate undertakings. The state encourages the organization of corporations because it is realized that by combination more can be accomplished than by individual effort. To use an illustration from hydraulics, it encouraged the damming of the river so that the energy thus accumulated and stored might be utilized to better advantage than if the stream were allowed to continue its natural flow. Is it not possible that the unrest in the community is partially due to the protest of the abutters on the stream that their riparian rights are being violated? And if these protests are not heeded, may not the abutters compel the lowering of the crest of the dam, or at least the removal of the flashboards, even though such action may result in a curtailment of the power? Would it not be more prudent before taking the case to court to order a resurvey to determine whether or not, in the endeavor to store as much water as possible, inadvertently (presumably not intentionally) the level of the water has been raised so that the stream has overflowed beyond the limits shown on the original survey on which the charter was based?

Has not too much effort been misdirected in endeavoring to locate and define the causes of this "unrest," with the sole purpose

of removing them? Have we not assumed that it is entirely artificial and unreasonable and undesirable? While this may be true to a certain extent, is it not possible that a considerable portion is the result of evolution, and entirely natural and wholesome—and to that extent an evidence that the body politic is awake and active, and not sleeping or dead? In so far as this unrest is an evidence of evolution, it is unwise to attempt to correct it by endeavoring to remove the causes thereof. These causes are fundamental, and can no more be removed than can the growth of a healthy child be stopped. The evolution must continue. It is wiser to recognize and admit the evolutionary character of the movement, and to change our policies and plans so as to be in harmony therewith. The careful physician makes a thorough diagnosis of each case presented to him. If his patient complains of "headache," before making up his prescription he will first determine whether it results from a disordered stomach or an overworked brain; but if he finds that the headache is due to a strain on the eyes, he will refer the patient to an oculist. If the latter finds that the difficulty is not temporary but is occasioned by advancing years, which have changed the form of the eye, he will recommend that glasses be used. The physician endeavors to remove the cause of the headache; the oculist finds that it is due to a failure to recognize the physical evolution or growth of the individual, and he endeavors to work in harmony therewith. Society needs the services of both the physician and the oculist. If the unrest is due to artificial or selfish reasons, the physician should prescribe; but if the unrest is due to a natural evolution, the oculist should be consulted.

Furthermore, as education has become more general and broader in its nature, a larger number of individuals have been taught to think for themselves. So long as education was confined to comparatively few, it was natural that those who did the thinking should look at all problems from the viewpoint of their own environment, and should endeavor, unconsciously perhaps, to solve these problems to their own advantage. As the opportunity for acquiring education has been widened, new ideas have been advanced by reason of the different environment of the

thinkers, and an entirely new tone and virility have been injected into the controversy in which each party thereto is endeavoring to obtain an advantage for himself, even at the expense of his opponent. Can a permanent state of equilibrium be reached until each side recognizes the just claims of the other and both work together, instead of in opposition, to determine what is right and just to both?

The forces of nature are irresistible, and in so far as this disquiet is an evidence of the natural growth of society it is useless to attempt to oppose it. As well might the scientists of thirty or forty years ago have considered that the suggestions made by Bell, Brush, Edison, and Sprague were revolutionary, and that business would be disorganized if their propositions were considered. To the man who elected to stand in the way and oppose this scientific progress, it may have appeared of the most revolutionary character, but his opposition resulted only in disaster to himself; whereas the man who recognized the evolutionary character of the movement, and coincided therewith, received benefits almost commensurate with his coincidence.

Democracy would not triumph if "Unionism" as now interpreted should prevail. The latter would be an oligarchy of a most selfish and relentless type. The true democracy demands fair treatment for all and a division of opportunity and reward commensurate with each man's ability. This ideal may never be fully realized, but it cannot be even approximated until all feelings of antagonism are subdued and a spirit of co-operation and good-will predominates.

Early action is imperative, and the initiative should be taken by the employer. The present condition of affairs cannot continue without jeopardizing, not only the welfare, but also the very existence of our institutions. Concession must be made by both employer and employee, or else the prophecy of the failure of our democratic system made by Macaulay nearly sixty years ago will be fulfilled.²

² See Appendix to *Lord Macaulay* by Trevelyan, in letter dated May 23, 1857, addressed to H. H. Randall, of New York, on "American Institutions."

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE MODERN CHURCH

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The political history of the United States records a consistent democratization of government. In applying democracy to an ever-widening area of activity, the American people have carried the initial spirit of the nation quite beyond the range of primary national interests as incorporated in the Declaration of Independence. Progress has been made from the formal affairs of state toward the practical concerns of the people, from the birthday issue with Old World politics toward domestic concern for the common man.

In this modern development, as in the initial act creating the nation, will be found the simple faith that the people are able to govern themselves, and are more to be trusted than overlords, however benevolent, in attaining and guarding common rights. Upon fair presentation, the popular verdict tends ever toward a more adequate justice. The early leaders, however, both in the nation and in the constituent states as they multiplied, were insistent that this happy outcome of democracy depended upon the efficiency of educational and religious institutions. The one must guarantee sufficient intellectual training and the other reliable moral character. The reflective rather than the emotional will of the people was deemed essential to the great experiment.

No doubt the political function of the church was more obvious and simple in post-Colonial days than it is now when the vital problems are not those imposed upon a whole people from without, but rather those which arise from a stratified society within the nation. It may be of interest, therefore, to chart the location and significance of the church in contemporary democracy, and to indicate what the churches, conceived collectively, are doing toward the realization of a comprehensive and worthy form of self-government.

Quite apart from the important matter of the form of government under which a people may be organized, it will be generally conceded that the morality of those holding public office vitally affects common welfare. Moral failure in public trust not only blights the popular mind with the frost of cynicism but allows predatory interests to rob the whole people, who, for the time being, have no advocate or defender other than the publicly elected official. If, therefore, democracy is ever to discover and retain efficient servants after the fashion of private concerns, she will need the best judgment and the full moral support of church people. Of even greater importance is the necessity of maintaining high moral standards in the citizenship generally, so that almost any popular choice may be politically safe, and that malfeasance may be promptly and vigorously punished. To this end, the free debate of public questions in the light of the highest ethics becomes imperative.

Such being the case, it is in point to ask whether the church supplies such leadership to the state, whether she leavens the mass with such working ideals of integrity and service as will automatically right governmental wrongs and guarantee progressive righteousness, and whether she fosters the enlightened debate of public questions. The minority standing of the whole church group, however weakened by sectarianism, does not in itself absolve the church from rendering great service to the state. For the group supplying leadership always exerts an influence far above the ratio of its numerical strength. Hence the question remains whether the church fosters such a conception of civic duty as will impel her adherents both to serve in public capacity and to do their duty at the polls. Leaders in anti-saloon propaganda report 40 to 60 per cent of the church vote registered in the cities studied, so that the actual church vote probably falls below half of her voting strength.

It is probably true that both main divisions of the Christian church are chiefly concerned with saving souls for heaven. The conditions under which souls are achieved, and the fact that these conditions are increasingly determined by government only faintly affect the rescue policy. Possibly the arrest of the social sense

is due to an unscientific, metaphysical doctrine of "sin," as contrasted with sins which may be empirically observed as a social and largely unnecessary product, to a formal conception of the soul at variance with psychological knowledge, to a traditional despair which beclouded the early persecuted church and so fostered individualistic eschatology, and to a view of salvation as being something other than normality. The fact that misgovernment, whether deliberate or by neglect, blights innumerable souls with greed, poverty, crime, vice, and disease does not come home to the church in such a way as to make her vigorous for society's governmental or organic health. No doubt, also, the usual silence of the church when confronted with the ills of our collective life—which ills in turn spring largely from economic injustice—is due to the ever-present danger, that in practically every local church any positive espousal of social righteousness would surely disturb the peace.

The vent for moral passion which might be found in a hearty enlistment in democracy's struggle has as substitute an intermittent opening in high-pressure evangelism, which is a recrudescence of individualistic traditionalism professionally and profitably engineered, and also in a rather lower fissure whence issue condemnation of public officials and the odor of dead opportunity proclaiming that "politics is rotten." Instead of urging her strong men to enter the fray and to bear hardship for the common weal, instead of training her youth and inspiring them for civic duty, she lets men of inferior standards both make the rules and umpire the game while with the other "respectables" she keeps out of trouble or at most says some "nasty" things from the sideline.

The church's service to the state depends in no sense upon action as a political party, whether composed of the 14 per cent of the population adhering to Roman Catholicism or of the 24 per cent affiliated with Protestant denominations. The great majority outside the church would tolerate no such method and would suspect ulterior aims of power and privilege, however lofty the ideals announced. It certainly is not for lack of organic political effort that the church is to be censured, but rather for an underestimate of the state and for failure to inject into public service,

through strong, well-trained men, the greatest dynamic that democracy can have—the principles of Jesus of Nazareth. The state has needed timber, and the timber has not been provided; the gospel has needed socio-governmental expression, and the most virile of its professed adherents have been busy making private fortunes under un-Christian rules.

From these and other considerations it has come about that now, when democracy has educated the people to distrust philanthropy as covering more ills than it cures, and to regard it as a belated and unfair substitute for social justice, the church, having taken no arduous part in the struggle of the common people to gain their rights, stands embarrassed and bewildered before a seemingly ungrateful people. With her, for the most part, the old ideal of charity still prevails, whereas the democracy is not asking alms but fair play. It is difficult for church leaders to sense the change or rightly to estimate how sensitive is the soul of democracy to the whole affront of patronizing good-will. Humaneness as a doctrine of social relationship can be fully accepted only in a society where democracy has not been born or is utterly dead.

Ugly suspicions also permeate the popular estimate of the church. Can the minister as employee of the select group do his full manly duty by his employers? Is it in human nature to take issue with one's bread and butter? Do the prominent supporters of the church stand for the democratization of opportunity, the square deal, the Golden Rule? Does the church represent brotherhood or class-consciousness? Has it not in the very luxury of its appointments, in its segregation of Negroes, immigrants, and working people, stood for class rather than for brotherhood? Whether the common man thinks of the awesome building, the professional choir, the sermon without debate or reply, or the constant presentation of dead issues, he always suspects the lack of democracy.

No one who has knowledge of that greater half of society without the church can honestly doubt the existence of these suspicions, and the church has not found the way to meet them. The church has not found the way to meet them. The church has not found the way to meet them. For the outsider can now distinguish between Jesus and ecclesiasticism perhaps more clearly than in the case with the churchman.

It may be that the popular, unchurched mind is too suspicious, and has learned in the school of hard knocks to look for the revenue feature behind all movements as well as to resent superimposed benefits; but certainly the present organization and standard activities of the church do not impress the mass with any heroic proof of her unselfishness. More recent forms of propaganda for the Kingdom of God through the secular and organic life of the state are eliciting a vast amount of unpaid service for the public good; and until very recently the church has hardly recognized these heroic struggles for righteousness outside her walls.

Contributors to most of these reform organizations ask no return in comfortable pews, fine music, and aesthetic solace, but only that the cause of human justice be promoted. The socialist believes that his cause is greater than that of the church, the trade-unionist that his is more urgent, and both are prepared to make sacrifices which compare favorably with any similar exhibit in the modern church. Similarly, most of the societies working for reform and amelioration, even though they be often supplied with impulse and ideal through church religion, regard their propaganda as more urgent than ecclesiastical effort. The suspicion that sectarian leaders and local ministers are animated by something other than a passion for human welfare creeps into the public mind, and the man of the street discounts the paid enthusiast who often betrays the fact that he is working primarily for his church, and not disinterestedly for the common good. The church by virtue of her long history and substantial success in attracting the well-to-do has become professionalized, while the younger movements of the struggling classes possess more of the initial spirit of Christianity when apostles and prophets did not work for hire; and membership in these new organizations is usually more conscious and vital than it is in the older body.

Thus the degree in which the church is separated from the masses is not merely geographic as measured by its suburban trend, but somewhat organic also as measured by the difference between the volunteer unpaid apostle and the subsidized modern minister. It may be that this wide gulf will not be bridged but by a generation of preachers who, like Amos, Jesus, and Paul, give their life

and message to the people, living as the people live, working as they work, and refusing every monetary reward for this public service. In such a situation the motive of the propagandist could not be impugned or his message fettered. The supposition that a clear grasp of the central message of Jesus and ability to convey its dynamic to others necessitate extended professional training and detachment from productive toil may need to be revised; while the richer social implications of the gospel that might come to an intelligent person in the normal process of the world's work demand fair consideration. In the mind of the democrat the whole question of the inner and outer effects of making a livelihood out of religion is up for frank review, and, whether one thinks of foreign mission policies or of the needs at home, there must be a comparison of the respective virtues of the two methods: that of Christianizing people while working in the ranks with self-support and that of ministering religion to people by a professional class supported by others.

Again, the internal organization of the local church, even when ostensibly democratic, ever tends toward bureaucratic control. So far as the preacher is concerned, this is due to the assumption that he speaks *ex cathedra* and has some sort of authority other than that of demonstrated truth as so perceived by his hearers. But the common man who is working out his economic and social salvation in other bodies and who has qualified as a democrat abhors a muzzled meeting. For him the sanctity of the truth in the case stands above consecrated buildings, personages, and dictators. Furthermore, in many churches so little effort is made to refer matters of policy, program, election, and expenditure to the whole body for decision, that the people become supine in their goodness and almost grateful to those who, with presumably the best of intentions, nullify self-government.

With some notable exceptions the music of the church takes the same upper-class, patronizing trend. Money which might have been spent to educate the whole body in glorious and unifying praise and in the training of large numbers of children and youth to participate worthily in public worship is often spent on a few imported singers, who give a high-class and critical stamp to the service, but seldom draw out the congregation in the joyful abandon

of democratic praise. Again the psychology is that of a superimposed, although problematical, benefit, as contrasted with a social achievement of the whole body.

It is perhaps iconoclastic to suggest that the church needs to re-examine her meeting-house in the light of this crude and relentless spirit of democracy. Is it best to occupy a distinctive building or to use quarters in which other popular assemblies of the people gather and express themselves? Should the place in which religion is advocated possess a solemn grandeur, an awesome and aesthetic worth, a crystallized tradition of the might and sanctity of the historic church? Should it bow the soul in mute acceptance of a ministry which it and its officials mediate, and send men forth pardoned, purified, and serene to meet the unceasing struggle of the outer world? Perhaps so; but if this be all, democracy remains unsatisfied.

It is noteworthy that the forward movements of the church, in which it has found the people, have been marked by unconventionality and extramural effort. The open fields, marked places, streets corners, town-halls, schoolhouses, and rough "tabernacles" have characterized the popularization of religion from the time of Jesus to the present day. The address of man to man in forum fashion as is the practice in politics is standard democratic form. Aesthetic and sedative values reside in the ecclesiastical treatment, but the implications of the separateness of religion from common places and from common life, and its failure thus to come to grips with the people, as well as its shyness of intellectual struggle in the open without fear or favor, have made the religion of the sanctuary the religion of the few.

Some maintain that America's large European immigration demands the reproduction here of the great symbols and bulwarks of religion as set forth in the imposing cathedrals of the Old World. But those who so argue do not reckon with democracy, lack faith in the ability of America to work out a form consonant with her spirit, and forget that the immigrant himself, seeking liberty and larger life, is very tired of the old patriarchal system—which he regards as largely an imposition—and is passing through skepticism toward a religion that is popularly and intellectually based. The

church which seeks to serve him through the old architecture of monarchical religion will probably have a harder task than the group which seeks to meet him on the democratic level where he may be paid the compliment of working out his own salvation with as much honesty and independence as he exercises in his other groups, social and national.

Another matter calling for a review of church method in the light of democracy is the degree of social stratification which is condoned and sometimes indorsed. The church often accentuates the belief that an impassible gulf exists between the Negroes and the whites. Whatever the inter-racial method may be in the heavenly Jerusalem, the church is quite clear on the point that it is not best that blacks and whites should work together here on a basis of character values and a common aim. The social decrees which so handicap the Negro in securing industrial and political justice are confirmed by the church brotherhood which denies him the education and hope to be found through association with his white brethren in the membership and activities of the common church organization. It may be contended that he prefers to be separate, has a different psychology, would not be happy in the white group, etc., but efforts to disabuse him of this opinion and to mitigate his embittered race-consciousness by making him welcome on a common membership basis are usually lacking.

A similar stratification exists through several generations of immigrants and their children. Undoubtedly the church should so specialize her method as to be able to minister to new comers in their native tongues. But to erect and maintain separate buildings for these people retards assimilation and stratifies the democracy. In this way the church is often working at cross-purposes with the public school, and long after the children have been prepared to become part and parcel of the common American life the church will be found accentuating by its separate buildings, organizations, and language those clannish factors which impede a hearty and reliable democracy.

Little need here be said of the gradual alignment of the church and the well-to-do except that the congeniality of the two is attested by their present partnership. Conversely there must

have been some lack of congeniality to account for the absence of the struggling classes. For certainly both their social hunger and their need of help were greater than would be found with the "respectables," while at the same time they were less competent to command other outlets. Had the church been democratic and socially concerned, rather than ecclesiastic and self-centered, there is no reason to doubt that she would have succeeded more largely with the mass than with the class, or at least equally with both.

Another difficult element enters into the problem by virtue of the fact that the symbols and content of public worship are largely the product of an undemocratic age. Only in small degree, as yet, have the hopes of the masses risen into sacred song, great statements of faith, and adequate common prayer. The historic agencies used by the church are rich in ministries to the individual soul as contrasted with the same service for the collective life. Even in their best form, they are the voice of the unworthy suppliant in the presence of an absolute monarch. Without wholly denying the validity of this aspect of religion, one feels that for the democracy which has become conscious there remains an unsatisfied demand, an Immanuel passion as contrasted with the absentee potentate.

So also the theological conceptions of the church are not cast in terms which are known to the common man. The preacher may speak of sin as a great undifferentiated state, with explanations as to how man came under sin and how the hearer may himself be extricated from this state, but the public mind does not think in these terms. The intelligent democrat has analyzed sin more specifically than the appointed moral leader. To him definite sins have become clearly outlined. He believes that their prevention is more important than their forgiveness and that prevention is, in a very large measure, possible. The point of view of the churchman is theological, that of the democrat, social. The one thinks of a state of sin, the other, of a condition of society that defeats the real ends of life. The one seeks to change the spiritual status on a basis of belief, the other, to change living conditions by direct action. Both may be right, but they do not understand each other.

The church says children are unregenerate and need to be born anew, the democrat says many of them are victims of vicious living conditions imposed by greed and the industrial exploitation of human rights. The church would save them by the mystery of baptism or of faith, the democrat thinks that they would save themselves in a fair society where the hopes and possibilities of the soul might reach out through normal human experience to some sure sense of an Infinite Love.

Similar contrasts exist all along the conscious boundary between church and mass. Church membership is for those who believe thus and so, and who submit to a certain ritual. These are the measures of excellence. But in the democracy social conduct that is fair and therefore beneficial to all is the sole consideration for rating and good citizenship. The ecclesiastic will admit the unselfish person only on certain provisos of creed and ritual, and whoever qualifies in these respects is usually immune from censorship or dismissal, although his social conduct may be subversive of the public good, extortionate, and unjust. But the standard of the outside world has to do only with conduct, reckoning this or that profession as neither here nor there.

All of this wide difference has come about in a fairly traceable way. The church has undergone a progressive loss of public function, as for example the control of education and relief, and there has crept in a subtle error, to the effect that her responsibility ceased, with the passing over of these concerns to the state. She lacked the vision to see society whole, to work for the community in its totality, to shepherd all the people. Denominationalism favored irresponsibility. Philanthropy supplanted public spirit, ambulance service got more attention than generalship. Arrest was inevitable, and, by the law of compensation, she turned with greater diligence to her traditions while the democracy marched on to meet its trying problems.

The writer recalls a recent painful illustration of how the church sometimes ignores this state-consciousness. Picture a great audience on memorial Sunday, a service organized by local officials and rich in the best patriotic music, rumors that Germany's reply to President Wilson's first note was being received at Washington,

and a noted preacher who announces to this expectant congregation that he will preach on the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. To the perplexed democrat in this land which is striving to realize the brotherhood of all the peoples there was the unhappy suggestion that organized religion is wedded to tradition, lacks regard for the departed servants of the Republic and concern for her moral guidance in the grave issue of the hour. Fortunately this is no fair view of the church's response to the special days of celebration in the democracy, but it is indicative of an aloofness to state interests which is all too general.

A review of the courses of study which the church offers her children and youth also favors the inference that she is not an eager and efficient handmaid of the state. Almost without exception the material is traditional and individualistic and without inspiration or direction for civic duty. With all the social service parlance so much in vogue, the direct avenue to justice in the corporate life is seldom mentioned. The philanthropic mother nurtures a philanthropic child, in the presence of crying needs. This is the interpretation of the Christ spirit and is not without promise if it should carry through to the why of misery and the finer obligation of justice. The hope of connecting with democracy through this avenue consists in the rather common experience wherein the serious social worker gropes through the sorrows and superficialities of philanthropy to the comprehensive realities of civics.

It may be that a dim sense of the church's failure to meet society's collective need of moral leadership underlies the present demand that she confine herself to the "gospel," implying thereby that the gospel is concerned solely with man's relation to God. And since the attempt to regulate social conduct is so fraught with the danger of offending church people, it is thought that a restriction of the church's function as an agent of religion is desirable. But the internal advantage of such a course is bound to be attended with further loss of influence in the democracy. The ethics of society in general would then prove to be more aggressive, vital, and urgent than that of the church group.

Recent developments of the democratic spirit will test church organization in new ways. The progressive realization of woman's

suffrage, growing logically out of general education and the feminist movement, is rapidly centering the attention and effort of women about civic affairs. A competitive bid is being made for the time and energy which women have so generously given to the church. During the past decade women have educated themselves, principally in their clubs, to understand and attack governmental evils which threaten their own and the public's interests, especially in the humanitarian field; and perhaps the bulk of humanitarian legislation has been proposed and urged by them.

This means that the most intelligent women and those with capacity for leadership are turning from relief to reform measures, from philanthropy to civics; and unless the church provides scope and expression for this redirected energy she will suffer the loss of that active support which the women have so readily given. A further implication of this trend is the necessity of giving women a larger representation on the official boards of the church. Democracy demands that representation be substantially balanced or, at least, placed upon a basis of merit and efficiency quite apart from any consideration of sex.

As any given church becomes large and prosperous there develops a tendency to remove its government from the rank and file. The usurpation of the "ring" is not consciously banal, but springs mainly from the bother of maintaining an active, and therefore real democracy. In the election of officials and the adoption of policies and budgets there is often a cut-and-dried method which hardly preserves the form of democracy, much less its substance. Instances are known where members in good standing have been refused information as to the church's expenditures on its standard activities; which, of course, implies that the contributor—and therefore, by implication, any or all of the members—might be kept ignorant of what the rulers do. In so far as such practices obtain, the spirit of democracy is violated, for self-government permits no secrecy in the handling of the common funds. The church must meet the standards of a public which is debating and

From the foregoing no conclusion should be drawn as to the imminent decrease of the church. For, while no one can reliably

forecast how the newer altruism of justice will clothe or incorporate itself, only a poor historian would predict that the church will pass away because of its present maladjustment to democracy. The vitality of social institutions of long standing is almost unlimited, and in the case of the church there is the added conviction of being divinely ordained. Because of these two facts she can continue far beyond the day of her social utility and can, no doubt, last long enough to make or suffer the necessary adjustments.

It is often forgotten that the church is usually but a pacific grouping of people who have numerous other vital associations covering practically all the normal contacts in a community. These persons are in the stream of contemporary life and cannot in the long run, or in any given compartment, remain permanently unaffected by the time spirit. Already a distinct party of discontent is to be found in many churches. It represents something far more real than inherited denominational labels and probably exists in all sects. This more radical and socially conscious element does not make much disturbance as yet, but like every democratized minority it will finally speak and act.

If, however, conformity to the democratic demand proves to be very slow, the experience will be no different from that of the schools which have had more reason to respond because supported by the whole citizenship. Yet the aristocratic policy of the schools—dictated by the professional class through university standards—is only now reluctantly yielding to the pressure of democracy which demands a training suitable for the many as against a culture limited to the few. Surely the higher schools, which have shaped education, have excelled the church in avoiding live issues and in maintaining a decorous post-mortem interest in the life of the people; and yet the whole system from top to bottom is now changing and becoming socially dynamic. So may it be with the church as she faces the situation and becomes less occupied with tradition.

Another source of hope is to be found in the personnel of the modern ministry. Almost without exception the candidate for the ministry comes from the common people. Certainly he does not at the outset represent wealth or privilege in any form. By birth and early training he is from the economic middle class or

below. It is hardly to be supposed that in most cases he can be manipulated into any other attitude than that of the people from whom he springs. Of course there is a certain danger arising from the frequent practice of subsidizing ministerial students, and so compromising the manliness that inheres in self-support, and also the frequent liability to bias, through the fact that young men of promise are quickly detected and retained by the well-to-do class, but an intimate acquaintance with divinity students for more than a dozen years has convinced the writer that they are essentially and intelligently democratic in sympathy and aim.

Furthermore, during recent years radical changes have been made in ministerial training. Especially in divinity schools affiliated with universities the social sciences have come in for increasing consideration, and sociological courses are required which direct the attention of the prospective pastor to those very problems which agitate the body politic. The graduate of today is able not only to see a community whole but to survey its social needs and resources. He understands not only philanthropy but social politics. He is furnished with a community conception of the pastoral office and with a knowledge of how to co-operate with other churches and welfare agencies. The degree of co-operation for the sole aim of the community's good may be somewhat hindered by denominational overseers, but the divinity-school graduate of today is sufficiently catholic in his outlook and social in his method to at least keep pace with the democratic trend in government, education, and industry, and to help form public opinion if he has the personal qualities of leadership. The minister who has received such training will not be laughed out of court, for his method will be that of an accurate and conservative presentation of facts which he has learned where and how to secure. In place of hasty, emotional conclusions delivered from the protection of the pulpit, there will be the patient, restrained, and repeated revelation of conditions as they are, until the Christian conscience is moved and action is taken through the agencies already organized for specific amelioration and reform.

Into the forum movement which is now so rapidly developing within the church, many of these questions will come for

conscientious consideration, with the result that the facts as set forth in Sunday evening and week-night sessions will certainly stir the church to a more vigorous attitude on questions of social morality and will therefore re-enlist the interest of the public. The abnormal fear of creating any issue will give place to wholesome partisanship with the right. Not to avoid issues, but to be on the right side of issues and to clarify them for the popular mind, is the essential of moral leadership, and in the forum tendency of the present time the church is headed toward that goal.

It is at this point that the function of the church needs clear definition. Her's is a composite group which by its very nature is incapable of class propaganda. The other social groups whose component members are firmly knit together by a common economic interest must constitute the fighting units for their respective reforms. No one of these militant groups is altogether right or irreproachable in the methods used, and hence the church cannot be the agent of any one. Her great function consists in her impartial adherence to righteousness and in her provision of a composite group animated by the ethics of Jesus into which these contending efforts may come for frank and brotherly consideration. The hope of an honorable conciliation which compromises no single item of righteousness rests largely with the church if she can maintain this open and unfettered attitude—an eagerness for the truth, plainly spoken and reverently considered, in an atmosphere of brotherly love.

This being the case, it is probable that the advocates of radical reform will continue to be dissatisfied with the church. She will at best serve chiefly to conserve the gains made in social morality and to sanction certain reforms which she cannot directly undertake. The social creed of American Protestantism as formulated by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America is an index of this conserving and sanctioning function. Therein the major humanitarian reforms of our time are commended and a publicity bureau for the church conscience is created. Through the Anti-Saloon League the church is vigorously in the field for temperance reform. This must serve as good training and as introduction to the treatment of other problems which result from

the same commercialism. For, although the abolition of the saloon will undoubtedly diminish misery and vice, there will remain other social causes which the church cannot long overlook. Already special days are dedicated to the consideration of labor, child welfare, prison reform, and the prevention of disease, the method being identical with that of the temperance propaganda, viz., sanction within the church body, and function through other agencies. Furthermore, the Sunday schools are rapidly organizing classes in welfare courses, which must lead to civics, and which in themselves provide some training in self-government.

No doubt much of the criticism of the church is just. Many honestly question the wisdom of diverting so much social energy into this channel when direct action seems to promise more immediate benefit. Yet for society to despair of so great a dynamic as the religious sanction in the hearts of those who would conserve its welfare or cure its ills is deliberately to use less than the full and normal dynamic for human betterment. Church people are awakening slowly because they are comfortable. It takes some time to grasp what religious living means in this twentieth century. Their attention has long been diverted elsewhere. When they behold the cause of human justice in the present order as something more than the concern of mortals, as being, indeed, the cause of God, they will respond with that peculiar totality of self which inheres in religion.

THE GENERALIZATIONS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY

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Economic history is peculiarly dependent upon some division into periods. Schemes are, of course, incomplete, and their shortcomings are peculiarly evident in this field. They can hardly become the basis of sustained historical narrative, but they do serve to bring the larger conceptions of evolution into close touch with history and they vitalize research by emphasizing the problems which are most influential in our thought. A scheme helps us to think genetically and prevents us from losing sight of the deeper speculative problems involved in the study of a subject whose detail presents the bewildering diversity opened up by consideration of the homely affairs of daily life and work. The scheme should be the means of relating general notions to the concrete phenomena of history. It is essential, therefore, that special effort should be made to frame any scheme with reference both to the philosophical problems and to the course of events. Unfortunately the schemes thus far published have been narrowly pragmatic. Each phase of economic development has been made the basis of a division into periods.¹ With reference to each particular purpose these schemes are valid, and it is hardly possible that any single division into periods will be sufficiently comprehensive to be entirely adequate. Various schemes will always be necessary. It is none the less essential to recognize that some categories possess a broader and more general significance than others, and that it is wise to build up these broader generalizations into a comprehensive body of doctrine. The periods usually associated with Professor Schmoller's name are of this broader type. They must be regarded as a note-

¹ K. Bücher, *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft* (Tübingen, 1898); translation by Wickett, *Industrial Evolution* (New York, 1901); W. Sombart, *Moderne Kapitalismus* (Leipzig, 1902); R. Liefman, *Beteiligungs und Finanzierungsgesellschaften* (Jena, 1909).

worthy beginning despite the naïveté of some of the underlying conceptions and the infelicity of some of the phrases. Schmoller's conception of the evolutionary growth of society was developed with the evident intention of placing the mercantilistic policies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in a historical setting, and for that reason he did not endeavor to formulate a more complete scheme of social growth.¹ His chief concern was with the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times. The problems of the earlier stages of economic life are not fully treated. The scheme is fragmentary and incomplete. It is a suggestion of the lines of thought to be pursued rather than a completed body of doctrine on the subject of social evolution. Schmoller's famous essay is primarily occupied with the antithesis between the "town economy" of the Middle Ages and the "national economy" of modern times.

The thesis of the essay is comprehensively stated:

In every phase of economic development, a guiding or controlling part belongs to some one or other political organ of the life of the race or nation. At one time it is the association of the kindred or tribe; at another the village or mark; now it is the district, and then the state or even a federation of states, which plays this part. . . . Of course, it is not the only factor that enters into the explanation of economic evolution; but it appears to me the fullest in meaning and the one which exercises the most penetrating influence upon the various forms of economic organization that have made their appearance in history. In association with the tribe, the mark, the village, the town (or city), the territory, the state, and the confederation, certain definite economic organisms have been successively evolved of ever-wider scope: herein we have a continuous process of development, which, though it has never accounted for all the facts of economic life, has, at every period, determined and dominated it.²

The earlier stages may be found in the classic world and also in the early mediaeval world; it is thus a matter of some uncertainty just when Professor Schmoller intended to begin his account of this "continuous process of development."

¹ G. Schmoller, *Studien über die wirtschaftliche Politik Friedrichs des Grossen*, September 30, 1883. Part I has been translated by W. J. Ashley under the title, *The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance* (New York and London: Macmillan, 1896), and various reprints.

² Schmoller, *The Mercantile System*, p. 2 (New York, 1910).

The relation between the civilization of classical antiquity and the Middle Ages soon became, in Germany, the subject of a considerable polemic literature. Classical students endeavored to show that the fall of Rome had been followed by a real decadence in western civilization and an actual regression. The economic historians maintained that there was an essential continuity in the process of history and that the civilization even of the Middle Ages represented an advance over the civilization of Greece and Rome. The most significant statement of the case of the economists was Professor Bücher's *Industrial Evolution*.¹ For the first of Schmoller's major stages in development, the "village economy," Bücher substituted the conception of a "household economy." The characteristic feature of primitive society and the civilization of Greece and Rome was, in his view, the patriarchal family. He uses the word "household" in this sense: it includes a group of kindred and usually a considerable number of dependents and slaves. The city-states of classical antiquity were loose associations of such patriarchal households, and, though the political unit was indeed the town or city, the economic unit was this extended household.

There are many historical difficulties involved in all these stimulating phrases. Bücher's term "household economy" is not an inapt characterization of the town life of the early classical period, but it requires no small stretch of the imagination to apply the idea to Imperial Rome. In Schmoller's conception of a "town economy" there is a grave difficulty involved in his emphasis upon the desire to become self-sufficient, upon the "local economic selfishness," and "the struggle for self-sufficiency and independence." The description of the "national economy" is couched in identical language. There is no doubt an element of truth in all this characterization, but there is something omitted; something not easily defined, but none the less vital to the understanding of the whole. The detailed history of these periods cannot wisely be poured into Professor Schmoller's molds.

Metaphysical difficulties are closely related to these historical infelicities. It is not evident just how we get from one stage to

¹ K. Bücher, *op. cit.*

the next. The "town economy" gives way to the "territorial economy" simply because the territorial princes who used to be weak and insignificant have become strong. The only explanation of why the territorial prince became strong is "that the necessities of real life were relentlessly driving society toward territorial organization" (p. 15). It would seem that the vital thing to discover and describe would be these "necessities of real life." The state intervenes as a kind of *deus ex machina*. Whenever any change is to occur some newly constituted authority arises and carries out the social transformation. Such a series of successive changes is hardly the description of a spontaneous evolutionary process; it is a creation by fiat upon an instalment plan. It is not a rational development, but an accomplishment of brute force conceived as external to the events described.

The growth of economic organization can be most successfully measured in terms of commercial development. The history of commerce in its widest sense affords a broader basis for generalization than industry: the mechanism for the determination of values affords an accurate measure of the progress of social organization within each community or state; the sphere of influence embraced by organized trade keeps ever present to our minds the persistent interdependence of communities. The process of growth is a development from systems of distribution based wholly or in part upon power and arbitrary fiat to a system founded upon the exchange of values. There is development also from a narrowly circumscribed interdependence of small communities to a world-wide interdependence of large states. Both of these processes consist in a movement from unfreedom to freedom comparable in many respects to the changes so frequently described as the characteristic feature of political life and the history of thought. The increase in the economic freedom of the individual is of two kinds: (1) increase in the area of social contact, and hence greater freedom of physical movement in the world at large; (2) increase in freedom from arbitrary or unreasoned interference. The first is a development of freedom in a developed community; the second is a development of freedom in a less developed community: but the motive is evident and the necessity of such restriction is understood. Freedom is not the absolute, unconditioned

EPOCHS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

I. EXCHANGE WITHOUT MEASURED VALUE

(Primitive Society and Semi-historic Period)

The Value Judgment Implicit in Social Life

1. Gift-giving, barter, and primitive trading systems.
2. Growth of systems of measure; weight, length, volume, value.
3. Bazaars and developed barter: Egypt and Mesopotamia.

II. "ISOLATED" MARKETS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

(Fifth Century B.C. to Seventeenth Century A.D.)

Opposition between Form and Content

The Antithesis between Town and Country

1. Urban units with dependent rural suburbs.
2. Rise of distinct rural organization; latifundia, village communities, manors.
3. Rise of the mediaeval town: the country remains independent.
4. Formation of small market systems.

The Rise of Cosmopolitan Commerce

1. Northern and southern spheres of commerce.
2. Consolidation under Greco-Roman influence and power.
3. Rise of systematic trade between the semi-tropical East and the manufacturing North:
 - a) Fairs of Champagne and Flanders.
 - b) The second fair system: Lyons, Flanders, Spain, Genoa.

III. WHOLESALE MARKET SYSTEMS IN A WORLD OF OCEANIC COMMERCE

The State and Its World—the Inner and Outer Dualism Made Explicit

Systems of Markets between Capital and Provinces

1. Spheres of influence in the provinces.
2. Rise of wholesale markets in the producing regions.
3. Rise of organized speculation; consuming centers.

Metropolitan Markets as Units of a World-System

1. Protective policies as a means of national integration.
2. Rise of markets for domestic and foreign commercial paper.
3. The Bank of England becomes the center of a system.

freedom of a supposed "state of nature." It is freedom from caprice and custom, an activity subject only to the restrictions of reason. The former conception, which became closely identified with the ideas of economic freedom among the followers of Adam Smith, implies that a state of freedom exists naturally and spontaneously, that it must needs exist unless destroyed or qualified by governmental interference. The doctrine of *laissez faire* is the inevitable deduction from such a conception of freedom; and it would seem that the widespread distrust of governmental activity and regulation might safely be attributed to this source. The Hegelian philosophy is founded upon a conception of freedom that is apparently more closely in accord with the history of political rights and the evolution of thought. Freedom in this system of thought is represented as an achievement. Instead of declaring that "man is born free and is everywhere in chains," the Hegelian says, "primitive man is found enslaved by passion, by superstition, and by armed force: in the process of social evolution he achieves his freedom." Economic freedom, like political and intellectual freedom, is achieved in the course of a long historical struggle. The state is not an obstacle, an unwarranted interference with the "course of nature," but the means by which conscious society wins its freedom. There is a real place for effective government even in a free economic society, but government is not the whole of social life. Evolution is seeking neither a transcendental "superman," nor an equally transcendental state. The development toward freedom is a growth toward a better definition of the relations between the individual and the state. Both must be dominated by the principles of reason which are implicit in the most primitive societies, becoming fully manifest as explicit laws and institutions only in the course of historical development.

The nature of this change will perhaps be more readily understood if we consider two typical illustrations. The fundamental principle of social life is interdependence, both within the unit of social organization and between different units. Even among the most primitive peoples this fact of interdependence is apparent. In his study of *The Silent Trade*, Mr. Grierson speaks of certain tribes whose trade with other peoples is carried on through the

medicine men.² The goods to be exchanged are left in a particular spot protected from theft by divers taboos. The other tribes come and make the trade, leaving the goods given in return. To many of the tribes the unknown strangers with whom they trade are supernatural beings—foreign devils. There is thus the fact of interdependence, but no recognition of a common humanity. The equivalence of values in such exchanges was crudely determined. Within the tribe most exchange was reduced to the form of an exchange of presents, so that the fact of trade was not formally recognized. Presents were sometimes supposed to be of equivalent values, but frequently the value of the gift was more closely related to the social importance of the giver than to the worth of the object received in return.

More significant perhaps is the relation between Rome and her provinces. Much of the trade flowing from the provinces to Rome was in fact an annual tribute levied by right of conquest. There was exchange, or at all events commodities were sent to Rome, but the provinces did not send their wares of their own free will, nor did they receive any value equivalent for much that they sent. There are some instances in modern times that are essentially similar, notably the relation between Great Britain and India during the short period of the "Investments" (1772-83). But such a predatory relationship is not characteristic of modern times. Modern trade is a voluntary exchange of values that are as nearly as possible equivalent.

Free interchange of equivalent value has been achieved slowly, because of the difficulty of creating the necessary mechanism. There is need of markets for the determination of values of merchandise, need of uniform laws governing commercial transactions throughout vast stretches of territory, need of devices for the liquidation of the great payments arising in the trade between different populations. The problem of defining economic growth is in a large measure a problem of describing these different aspects of change in relation to each other. There is in addition the necessity of pointing out the relation of the institutions and structure of primitive society to the organization of the city-states of the

² P. J. H. Grierson, *The Silent Trade*, p. 44.

Mediterranean world that produce the first conscious descriptions of their own past.

The early period may be described as "exchange without general measured value." Commercial development is from mere exchange to an exchange of values recognized as equivalent and expressed in terms of standardized units of measure. The achievements of this period are the development of weights and measures, of monetary systems, and of an organized market.

The second stage of commercial growth is characterized by the existence of "isolated" markets in a cosmopolitan world. It embraces a period of apparently inordinate length, bringing us from the dawn of history to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But these dates are not inconsistent with indications from many other fields of human thought and endeavor. The changes of the last two centuries have carried Western civilization into a decisively new period of history, of which we as yet see only the first fruits. The general heading of the long second period is designed to emphasize the curious antithesis between an intense localism on the one hand and a broad cosmopolitanism on the other. Classical antiquity and the Middle Ages present both of these contrasts with modern times, and the contrast is as real in the institutional as in the intellectual sphere. The city-state was in form an "isolated" community, but each was characteristically dependent upon the trade of the Mediterranean world. They were self-sufficient in terms of their political structure and in much of their thought; in actuality they were created and maintained by the general conditions of Mediterranean life. In the Middle Ages, this is a little more conspicuously evident. Venice was just such a city-state, in legal theory completely independent. But the stranger that was technically excluded was permitted to dwell in certain designated buildings and by an elaborate set of legal fictions enabled to trade with much freedom. Furthermore, this "independent" state was in fact completely dependent upon the stream of general European trade flowing from the Levant to the industrial districts of the North. Outside of this social organization, as it was, the world these city-states could not have existed. The description of the period thus requires us to trace the growth of the social unit

and of the world in which it had its being. The development of these different aspects of social life leads us into related but distinct problems of economic and social history.

The third period shows us a world composed of metropolitan market systems. This phrase is designed to bring out two ideas: first, that the community grouped around a metropolitan city or a federation of metropolitan cities possesses a kind of functional unity—for many purposes it works as a definite social unit; secondly, that there is a functional recognition of the interdependence of interests with other similar metropolitan cities and their dependent communities. Expressing the idea in the language of the market place, the market has a dual function to perform; it is organized in part with reference to internal needs, in part with reference to communication with the world outside. On the mediaeval markets the stranger had little or no legal recognition. The modern market recognizes frankly its relation to the rest of the world.

If we think of the growth of society in this way, it possesses a real continuity, but consideration of a scheme of periods in the abstract might easily lead us to misunderstand the nature of this continuity. History includes the totality of life, and in our attempts to express its meaning there is a real danger of omitting essential features. The greatest danger lies in our conception of historical continuity. The movement of history partakes of the nature of life itself, and the historian, like the novelist, must avoid arranging events too elaborately. Both must catch "the strange irregular rhythm of life" which Henry James feels so keenly. There is a certain consistency of movement which enables us to conceive of life as a something inherently rational, but nothing is accomplished without struggle. There is an ebb and flow; tendencies assert themselves spasmodically so that the forward movement of history is hesitant, uncertain, and irregular. Certain forms of recession are as much a part of the essence of historical change as the movement forward. This tendency in life is most vividly portrayed in the thematic structure of much modern music. In Wagner's last music drama, the *Parsifal* motif occurs at first in a rather fragmentary form. It is incomplete, and its elements demand further development. It achieves its full expression

slowly, only after the full story of development of the character has been revealed. When the whole course of the story is considered there is an evident consistency of growth, but the growth is not unopposed, and in this opposition lies the explanation of the hesitant and uncertain nature of the process. So when we summarize historical development and present the outline of the changes as an unbroken and unimpeded succession of events, it behooves us not to forget that the entire process of historic growth involves opposition.

It is in this sense that we can find a real continuity of social life between classical antiquity and the Middle Ages. There was in some ways a recession, and yet it was a recession after the manner of the ebb tide—a recession certain to be followed by a succeeding flood. It is no break in historical continuity, merely an evidence of the essential nature of the process of history.

In the periods suggested no place has been assigned to the recognized stages of industrial evolution. It is not desired to imply that such an arrangement of material is unsound in principle nor unimportant, but it would seem that industrial development is subordinate to the general growth of society. It is an old principle that the profitable limits of the division of labor are defined by the extent of the market, and with this principle in mind it is not difficult to relate industrial growth to the expansion of the market. The changes in the market are of two general classes: the development of a general European market for the wares that become associated with the great fair systems; later, the development of what we may call the domestic market. The spread of the northern textiles through Europe and the introduction of the silk industry from the eastern countries resulted in the establishment of the domestic system. The extent of the market for the textile products resulted in an elaborate division of labor and a definite establishment of a capitalist class; but the character of the market for food-stuffs made it necessary to spread the industrial population over as large an area as possible. Under these conditions the character of the industrial system was determined. The industrial system was closely associated with agriculture, and agricultural wealth was the principal factor in the maintenance of industrial superiority.

The full development of metropolitan market systems opened up the entire domestic market to the higher grades of industrial products. Cheaper methods of production brought superior products within the reach of classes formerly obliged to supply their own wants. Improved methods of transportation rendered the predominance of the central market inevitable. Lastly, the possibility of handling larger quantities of foodstuffs, evaluating them with greater certainty, and procuring them from greater distances opened the way to a concentration of industry formerly impossible and to the location of industry with reference to climate, power, and natural resources. Industrial development has been a consequence and result of the changes in the character of the market, and while the relation is close it is not readily shown by schematic arrangement.

The term "metropolitan market system" is intended to describe the modern state in terms of economic structure. It is hoped that this expression will be free from the difficulties involved in the German phrase "national economy," and in the conception of the "domestic market" developed by Mill and his immediate successors. The objections that may be urged against the German phrase are the undue emphasis laid upon policies, the implication that the boundaries of the state necessarily have a close relation to economic organization, and the failure to give due proportion to the relations of the state with the outside world. The conception of the "domestic market" raises another set of difficulties. Mill seeks to establish a distinction between the domestic and the foreign market with reference to the general principles of valuation. The "domestic market" was subject to a régime of values determined primarily by cost of production under conditions of free competition. Trade with the outside world was based upon the principle of comparative costs because there were so many obstacles to freedom of competition. To enumerate the criticisms of this point of view would be to write a history of the economic thought of the last thirty or forty years. Cairnes's conception of non-competing groups, the "utility" theories of value in their Austrian and in their English and American forms, the rise of combinations, monopolies, and other arrangements designed to qualify or destroy

"free competition," the increased mobility of capital and labor, all these varied factors make it impossible to attach much weight to Mill's distinctions. We no longer think of international trade as a distinct problem in value, and we are very skeptical about the existence or significance of free competition at home or abroad. But it is still evident that the commercial and economic problems of the home market are in many ways distinctly individual, and that there is a sufficient community of interest in the domestic area to warrant our treating it as a unit.

One of the most characteristic features of the last two centuries has been the rise of the great capital cities. Political, commercial, and industrial factors have all contributed to their growth and to their place in the community. If we compare the town life of the Middle Ages with modern urban life, we find that in the Middle Ages there were many towns of co-ordinate importance and scarcely any with a distinct preponderance. Today towns and cities are grouped in a sort of hierarchical arrangement about the great metropolitan centers which really dominate the social, economic, and political life of the entire area subject to their influence. They dominate their provinces no less completely than Rome in the time of Augustus, but the domination has no element of military force associated with it. The capital is maintained by a flow of trade, an exchange of equivalent values, and not by a tribute exacted by disciplined legions. The existence of such metropolitan centers is thus a distinctively new feature of institutional life, and it would seem that it is a sufficiently significant fact to be deemed the distinguishing characteristic of the new social fabric that is gradually taking form around us.

In tracing the rise of this metropolitan system it is necessary to draw a distinction which Schmoller expressed as a "territorial economy." This may be described as a "metropolitan sphere of influence." It is distinguished from the fully organized "metropolitan market system" with reference to the relation between the capital and the provinces. In the earlier period the provincial products from the provinces. It is an *entrepot* for certain foreign goods; but, as to be sent to the provincial, but commercial, and

is usually toward the capital. The development of the full machinery of the modern market system makes the capital a general distributing-point. The trade of the capital is not merely its own particular trade in food, raw products, and transit of merchandise; it serves as a center for the concentration of much purely inter-provincial trade. Goods are sent thither to be valued and distributed, perhaps even throughout the area of their production and manufacture. These changes are closely related to the industrial concentration characteristic of the period. Manufacture is highly centralized; valuation and distribution are also centralized.

The rise of centralized banking systems and the organization of the great financial markets in the metropolitan cities present another aspect of their predominant influence in directing the affairs of the community as well as affording the means of systematic commerce with other countries. The simplification of the difficulties of making payments for the wholesale trade of the country can hardly be appreciated unless some study is made of the cumbersome movements of credit and specie in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The rise of a central market for bills of exchange did much to obviate the inconveniences of many shipments of specie that were such a frequent cause of apprehension to the commercial community at that time. The purely financial disturbance gave rise to complaints that are easily confused with the so-called "mercantilist" conceptions of the time.

If these distinctions are tenable, the essence of the individuality of the basic units of modern social life lies neither in political purposes nor in different principles of valuation. From the point of view of commerce and industry, nations are structurally distinct. They are definitely interdependent, but because of topographical, political, and historical factors they are organized in systems of markets which have peculiarly close relations with each other. In France and in England this metropolitan system has apparently achieved a high degree of stability, revealing already the forms that are likely to endure for a considerable period. In Germany and in the United States the economic structure seems less finished. There are many evidences of instability and much is still uncertain. These forms of organization are after all very new, and there is no

reason to believe that we can yet see more than the larger outlines of what is apparently a significant change in the structure of society.

These changes result in a constantly increasing adaptation of each society to its physical environment. In the classic world topography exerted but a slight influence. Some cities were located with reference to commerce and ease of access; more frequently cities were located in places that were not too easy to reach. Plato desired to locate the city for which the *Laws* were prepared in some place not absolutely cut off from the rest of the world, but as nearly isolated as possible. Considerations of safety made the location of cities just a short distance from a nodal point perhaps the characteristic feature of ancient life. Neither in the way nor out of the way was the classic motto. In the Middle Ages the towns were more closely related to the trade routes that developed along the lines of least physical resistance. Points of intersection, or nodes, as Mackinder calls them, became the characteristic factor in the growth of towns. But throughout the Middle Ages historical accident played a prominent part in the rise and fall of towns. The location of the fairs of Champagne is perhaps the most notable instance of the influence of purely political factors upon commercial development. The migrations of the "fair of Besançon" in the sixteenth century is another illustration. But the character of the topography of the country as a whole exerted a persistent influence. The brilliant description of the geography of France and its relation to Paris, by Vidal de la Blache,¹ together with the similar study of the geography of England, by Mackinder,² constitutes a significant basis for the study of the rise of Paris and London to their present positions. The relation of Berlin to the physical features and trade routes of Germany presents a more complicated problem, but there is evidence of a definite relation between the physical features and the economic structure of society. Modern society is elaborately conditioned by its physical environment. It is easy to express such relations in the inflexible language of

¹ *La France: Géographie humaine et économique* (Paris, 1903).

² *The Geographical Basis of European History* (London, 1904).

³ *The Geographical Basis of European History* (London, 1904).

materialistic interpretation of history in order to recognize facts that are becoming increasingly important.

In a discussion of any phase of evolution much must needs be said of growth and change. The many crude descriptions of growth in terms of a purely mechanical transformation require us to consider carefully what we mean by these terms. The purely metaphysical discussion has a long history and is too elaborate to be treated at length.¹ But we must needs reach some definite judgment on a number of questions. What is the nature of change? Is it a mere unfolding of something already present, or does something distinctly and entirely new come into being? Hegel would have said that the future is implicitly present in the events themselves. The process of growth was to him a passage from being implicitly present to explicit and acknowledged existence. Bergson feels that we can hardly admit that all of the future is contained in the stream of life. Much must needs be present by implication, but he feels that something distinctively new is added. He is rather skeptical on the subject of the conservation of energy and the absolute indestructibility of matter. New energy may be acquired in the process by which the *élan vital* makes itself manifest in the world.

In addressing ourselves more definitely to the problems of social evolution, these same general distinctions are evident, but they appear somewhat obscured in form. Social development is, in part at least, a process by which relations that were at one time merely implied or unrecognized are acknowledged and given full

¹ See particularly Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (New York, 1911); L. E. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose* (London, 1913). It is difficult to refrain from comment on the latter suggestive and helpful book. There is a singularly felicitous union of metaphysical power and historical perspective. There is the keen realization of the value of abstract thought and a fondness for the manifold variety of history, perplexing as it may seem. It is significant also to note the relation of this work to the Hegelian thought: "It seemed to me," says Mr. Hobhouse, "that, details apart, the Hegelian conception of development possessed a certain rough empirical value. . . . Further, if this conception was interpreted in terms of experience, it indicated a point of union where one would not expect to find it, between the Idealistic and the Positivistic philosophy" (p. xix). The conceptions of this present essay have been largely influenced by the Hegelian writings, especially the *Logic* and the *Phenomenology*, and it is hoped that the results will suggest the possibility of bringing this complicated aspect of economic development into harmony with other tendencies in social growth.

legal standing in the body of law. It would seem also as if some new relations came into being: new social problems arise, and, although not entirely unlike the problems of the past, they contain elements of novelty.

Social evolution involves the additional problem of consciousness. The process is accomplished by conscious human agency. In a sense, we may agree with Schmoller that the state is the instrument by which social growth is accomplished, but the agency of the state does not seem to be exerted in the way that Schmoller suggested. In his presentation the significant decisions of statesmen are the matters of high politics involved in the execution of the mercantilist policies. The great statesman molds the body politic as the sculptor molds the clay of his model. He shapes it according to his will. But the most powerful prince cannot direct the course of history in such a manner. Great reforms may be accomplished, but they are not accomplished by the fiat of a pen, although we frequently choose to identify the accomplishment with some single decision. Great changes are brought about slowly. The dramatic moments of history do not tell the whole story. The 4th of August, 1789, would have meant nothing to France apart from the minute and persistent changes in the social fabric that had already occurred. The famous scene gathers up in a significant manner all that preceded, but it is only a part of the entire process. If we would know more intimately the nature of historical growth we must study events that are less dramatic, and occupy ourselves not only with the famous statesmen but also with the humble administrative officials, lawyers, and citizens.

Once we leave the field of high politics, too, we find that historical growth accomplishes itself in ways not unrelated to the general forms of change. Many things that are merely implicit are recognized under the cover of legal fictions, until the fiction can be discarded. Many acts which were done without legal recognition or despite legal prohibitions come within the pale of law. All such change is transition from the implied to the explicit. It is accomplished by means of "interpretation" or by substantive enactment.

The significance of legal fictions will be familiar to all readers of Sir Henry Maine's works, but it may not be amiss to suggest an illustration directly related to our subject. The mediaeval town was in theory an autonomous legal entity. A stranger had no legal rights, whether to residence or to legal protection of proprietary rights. But strangers lived in foreign towns for long periods of time and traded with considerable freedom. This was accomplished by the legal fiction of the consulate. In Venice, in the Flemish towns, in London, and elsewhere, special buildings or groups of buildings were designated as a foreign jurisdiction. The area was physically a portion of the town, but it was subject to a different law. The theory of legal isolation and independence was thus maintained without interfering seriously with the trade that was technically unrecognized. In strict theory the town was closed to outsiders, as Schmoller suggested, but in fact the gates were open. By means of the legal fiction the fact of interdependence was covertly recognized. When this fact became definitely predominant the old fabric was swept away and the freer system definitely admitted to be a characteristic feature rather than a mere exception to the rule.

Much social growth is accomplished by according legal recognition to arrangements that appear spontaneously in social life outside the legally constituted institutions. The growth of deposit banking in Venice and later in England would perhaps illustrate this process. Chapters in the history of the Bank of England would also be significant. Responsibilities to the banking system of the country arose as a fact, and even today the position of the bank is as largely determined by custom as by any actual statute. When such new developments must needs be brought within the body of law, the means at hand are substantive laws or the interpretation of existing laws in such a way as to include the new situation within their scope. The doctrine of interpretation contains many interesting suggestions. In theory nothing new has happened: no contingency has arisen that is outside the law; old principles are applied to slightly different circumstances. None the less, distinctively new things come into being by just such a process. A significant illustration is afforded by the relation of the

bill of exchange to the decision of Baldus. Documents similar to the modern bill had been common for some time, but there had been much doubt as to the liability of the maker of a protested bill. Baldus decided that there was an implied obligation, and, from that time, the bill became an important commercial document. The decision was a significant step in the evolution of modern society. It was only a part of a long process, but for that reason it suggests the nature of the changes that constitute the movement of social evolution. These less dramatic moments are a fundamental part of the history of society, and although they have none of the alluring intensity of the moments of high politics, they lead us nearer to the daily activities of the community and frequently bring us closer to the full meaning of social life. It is in the midst of these events that we find that strange irregular rhythm of life which we endeavor to describe as an evolutionary process.

THE SOCIAL SURVEY

A FIELD FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE BY DEPARTMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY

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The social survey of a community is the scientific study of its conditions and needs for the purpose of presenting a constructive program for social advance. The following paper is written for those interested in the development of practical sociology in this country. Its purpose is twofold. It seeks to call attention to the possibilities within the social survey for service by departments of sociology. It attempts in addition to outline a general plan of organization by which the sociologist may best co-operate with the community. The type of relationship described below will be largely based on the experience in social surveys of the department of sociology in the University of Kansas under the leadership of Professor F. W. Blackmar.

To the sociologist there is little novel in the method of the social survey. Perhaps the absence of novelty has prevented an adequate realization of its importance. Indeed a case might well be made for the statement that the social survey was an invention of the sociologist. In every department of sociology in the country beginners in the science have been initiated into this method of community study. The success of the device was immediate and patent. The first-hand study of local conditions vitalized the work of the classroom. Students were convinced that social as well as natural phenomena were susceptible of scientific study. Affective reactions to "conditions as they are" crystallized in the social attitude which Patten terms "the emotional opposition to removable evils."

As an instrument of social measurement the social survey in the hands of the sociologist was until recently confined by the limita-

tions of the classroom. Its technique was relatively simple. Its examination was more or less superficial. Its results were seldom utilized in social improvement. In short, the social survey in the college was little else than a laboratory toy, like the electric light before Edison, interesting for purposes of exhibition and training, but of slight practical value to the community. Social studies of permanent importance were made, not by departments of sociology, but by individuals, or by groups of social workers. Examples of these are Booth's *Life and Labour of the People of London*, Rowntree's *Poverty, A Study of Town Life*, and Jane Addams' *Hull-House Maps and Papers*.

This statement of the origins of the survey is no reflection on the sociologist. The point may rather be well taken if his contribution has not been made. Is not the work of the social scientist, like that of the natural scientist in the case of the electric light, complete with the discovery of the method? Was not the brilliant Pittsburgh Survey but the work of a social Edison who reduced this discovery of the sociologist to human utilization?

The natural gratification of the sociologist in the transformation of his laboratory method into so efficient an instrument of social investigation should not prevent the perception of the future possibilities of service in connection with the social survey. Indeed, the sociologist has not been indifferent to its recent practical development. In the University of Chicago and Columbia University as well as elsewhere the work in practical sociology has always been correlated with the investigation of city, state, and national problems. Other universities and colleges within the last three or four years have been experimenting with various types of service to the community through the social survey. The interest became so general that two years ago at the Minneapolis meeting of the American Sociological Society a committee was appointed to formulate a plan of organization for social surveys and social investigation. The illness and death of Professor C. R. Henderson, the chairman of the committee, delayed and then checked this movement toward a comparison of the methods and the forms of the social survey and a presentation of a definite plan of organization.

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These two years, however, disclosed a growing appreciation of the value of the social survey. In at least two institutions, the University of Kansas and the University of Southern California, courses in the social survey have been introduced. Of greater significance have been the results of the participation of the sociologist in this method of social study as revealed in the differentiation of distinct forms of the survey. This development has been of two types: (1) surveys of the community by the sociologist upon his own initiative or at the request of the community; (2) surveys of the community in which the sociologist has been called upon to direct and organize the work.

The more common form of service to the community through the social survey by the sociologist has been of the first type. A community, or one or more organizations representing the community, has secured the expert service of the sociologist in making an inventory of its conditions and needs. This study may be general or partial. It may include all aspects of community life, or it may be limited to one or more divisions of the life of the community. The extension division of the University of Iowa is furnishing this type of service to the communities of the state. The department of sociology of the Ohio State University made a significant housing study at Circleville revealing conditions of overcrowding which rival if not surpass those of the worst districts in our largest cities. The social survey of Fargo, North Dakota, was made by a sociologist upon the request of a local organization. This form of the social survey is obviously valuable. The study of conditions by an expert makes possible sure and permanent progress upon the basis of an adequate and impartial examination of the situation. Comparison with conditions in other communities stimulates to social action. Last, but not least, is the present significance and future promise of this tendency of the community to turn to the social scientist for expert service.

This type of survey, however, presents a peril: satisfaction with a level of service which is lower than that which may be achieved. The sociologist should not fall short of the full measure of social opportunity presented. As an expert in social reconstruction he has performed but a part of his service in the analysis and

the presentation of the needs of the community. His more difficult and more valuable service is his dynamic participation in the social movement of the community. Vital participation may be gauged not so much by the character of his findings as by the nature of his relation to the organic life of the community, that is, to social agencies, social activities, and public opinion. Which type of survey will better educate the public in regard to the social causes of undesirable conditions, will more effectively diffuse the knowledge of scientific methods of prevention and improvement, and will pave the way for united action of all forces in the community to promote a constructive program of social advance? The sociologist should guard against placing himself in the situation where the doing of the service that is insistently demanded may prevent the performance of the larger service which he should be equipped to render.

This larger service, I believe, is to be found in the second type of the survey. The distinctive characteristic of this form of social investigation is the study of local conditions and needs *by the community under expert direction*. The demand for the survey here as in the other type of the survey comes from the community. But the activity of the community does not cease here. The social expert who is selected to direct the study organizes the community for the work of investigation. This method of organization originated in the Belleville and in the Lawrence social surveys conducted under the direction of the department of sociology of the University of Kansas.

The first principle of this type of survey is that the community as a whole should be organized to promote the survey movement. If feasible, every civic, commercial, religious, and social organization should participate in the demand for the survey. In Belleville, a town of 2,300 persons, the local welfare society, representing practically all the civic interests in the community, initiated and promoted the survey movement. In Lawrence, eight organizations, namely, the Civic Study Club, the Federated Brotherhoods, the "Ladies of the Guild," the Y. W. C. A., the Y. M. C. A., the Ministers' Alliance, the Missionary Union, the Parent-Teachers' Association, the Social Service League, united in the request for the

survey and elected representatives as members of the general social survey committee. This union of social agencies for the purpose of studying conditions is necessary if the survey is to be an organic expression of the social consciousness. A high degree of integration of organized public opinion is thus secured through the general committee representing all the voluntary organizations of the community.

The second principle of this type of the survey is that the study of conditions of life be made by the community under the direction of the expert in the technique of surveys. The sociologist is, or at any rate should be, specially trained to perform this service. He needs skill in two arts: the technical survey methods, and the technique of directing the organization of the community.

In the Kansas surveys the application of these principles took the following form. The general survey committee, composed of representatives of the organized community life, elected an executive committee to co-operate with the director of the survey, a sociologist, in the organization of the work of investigation. The function of the executive committee was twofold, in regard both to the raising of the finances and to the organization of the investigation. First, a method of raising funds to meet the necessary expenses of the survey was adopted and put in charge of a carefully selected finance committee. Secondly, the executive committee co-operated with the director of the survey in organizing the community. In the Kansas surveys the following divisions of the field were made: (1) topography and population; (2) community planning; (3) municipal administration; (4) trade, industry, and labor; (5) public health; (6) housing; (7) dependency; (8) delinquency; (9) recreation; (10) education; (11) churches and religion. Committees with a membership varying in size with the nature of the field of study were appointed to co-operate with the director and his staff of field workers.

As valuable as the organizing function of the director of the survey is his service in securing the co-operation of experts in the different special fields of investigation. The sociologist in his direction of the survey is able, not only to utilize the concrete practical knowledge of the local members of the committees of

investigation, but also to bring to their assistance the special knowledge of experts in the university and in the departments of state. The director of the survey from his point of vantage in the university may offer the community the skilled service of different departments of the university: sociology, economics, political science, history, psychology, education, the extension division, etc. In addition, Kansas experience indicates that he may readily secure the invaluable co-operation of the state departments, such as the state board of health, the department of public instruction, the department of labor and industry. Thus, the social survey, if wisely organized, places at the service of the community both the expert knowledge of the university and the technical resources of the state.

Such, then, in substance is the outline of the organization of community self-study under expert direction. The distinctive advantages of this type of survey deserve further consideration.

The fundamental value of this type of survey lies in its organic relation to the community consciousness. The social survey of the community by the community signifies the development of teamwork. The sociologist as the director is in the position of the coach to the football team. The organization of local committees of investigation signifies a higher integration of the social consciousness. The psychological division of the community into the extremes of "boosters" and of "knockers" disappears before the constructive attitude involved in the scientific study of social problems. The social survey as related to social consciousness may well be described as a method of social introspection checked up by the statistical measurements and the comparative standards of the social expert. Experience shows that the following consequences arise from this type of the organic relation of the sociologist to the community. First, the study of the community by the community under expert direction secures the training of local workers. Secondly, this training of the active social workers of a community often involves on their part a complete change of attitude toward the community. The scientific method of work in the social survey and the methods of investigation tends to rationalize the expression of the humanitarian interest. Thirdly, this participation and

training of workers in the survey furnish a large and efficient group in the community ready and prepared to promote the program of constructive social advance proposed by the survey. On this last point the results of the Belleville and the Lawrence surveys speak for themselves. In Belleville the president of the local welfare society which conducted the survey was elected mayor upon a platform containing several of the most important recommendations of the survey. In Lawrence before the printing of the report three ordinances were enacted as direct results of the survey: one providing for the inspection and the supervision of the milk supply of the city, another establishing housing standards, and another creating a board and superintendent of public welfare.

A second advantage of this type of the survey is found in the nature of its stimulus to the sociologist and to the department of sociology. The sociologist as director of community self-study has opportunity for expression in the two arts in which he has specialized: first, in the use of the impersonal tools of investigation, of statistics, and of interpretation, and, secondly, in the employment of the personal technique required for organizing co-operation and team-work.

The self-expression of the sociologist through the exercise of the "instinct of workmanship" in both organizing and directing community self-study brings out the possibilities of united action on the part of the several social sciences. A feature of the co-operation involved in this type of the survey fulfils one of the historic claims of the sociologist. The director of the social survey, by securing the co-operation of sociologist, political scientist, economist, historian, and psychologist, demonstrates the functional unity of social science. The problems of the community impinge squarely upon the sociologist, but their satisfactory solution demands the united action of all social scientists. Historically, it is fitting that the sociologist should participate in organizing concerted effort. It is also obvious that this union of activity is more readily secured where the sociologist is the director of community study than where his function is merely to report specific individual findings. The larger work of the sociologist, then, lies in the organization, not

only of the community, but also of the expert service of the university and of the state.

There is still another advantage of this type of the survey to sociologists and departments of sociology. The stimulus of research vitalizes the work of the classroom. Society is the laboratory of the sociologist. The social survey provides a unique opportunity both for investigation and for social construction, both for the analysis of mental attitudes and for the study of the control of forces in securing improvement. To the advanced student the social survey affords severe and stimulating training in the technique of investigation and in the art of social action.

The third consideration in favor of this type of the survey inheres in the very nature of the participation of the sociologist in the social movement. Herein lies the solution of the problem of democracy and the expert. The method of community self-study under the direction of the specialist involves the co-operation of the group and the expert. The specialist must of necessity demonstrate his skill and his worth in the acid test of the concrete practical problem; the community realizes at first hand the superiority of the new over the old method. Community self-study under expert direction is democracy being at school to the social scientist. The social survey is to the community what the demonstration station is to the farmer.

The solution of the problem of democracy and the expert is, at best, of secondary importance to the function that the social survey may play in social progress. We have all been surprised and chagrined at the apparently slow onward movement of reform. The word "apparently" was used advisedly for the reason that we are prone to gaze on the superficial indications of change and to be unobservant of the deeper currents that shape our social life. Our reform movements of the past have too often been grounded upon the naïve idea that all that was needed was a simple substitution of the good "outs" for the bad "ins." Of course, no mere mechanical shift can have permanent value. What is necessary is an organic change of habit and of sentiment, the old and better part of ourselves. Such change of inner life cannot be effected by a forced upon a nation wide scale; it must take place on

a community basis. The hamlet, the village, the town, the neighborhood, the city are, from the standpoint of social psychology, the units for the achievement of democratic progress. The family is too small, the state and the nation are too large. In the community the problems of city planning, municipal housekeeping, public health, housing, delinquency, dependency, recreation, education, and social religion are to be worked out. The construction of the American life of the future is fundamentally a problem of the community. The social survey, then, of the type of community self-study under expert direction is the initial step toward the practical realization of efficient and socialized democracy.

A word, in conclusion, should be said in regard to the relation of the sociologist to agencies already in the field. By no implication should this paper be considered an argument for the monopolization of the social survey by departments of sociology. The department of surveys and exhibits of the Russell Sage Foundation has performed fine pioneer service in a series of effective surveys. No doubt, the leadership of the social survey movement will continue with this institution. Yet this one agency cannot hope to respond to all the calls for investigation and so must neglect the smaller cities and towns altogether. The university, on the contrary, with its specialists in all the varied aspects of community life constitutes an unorganized force of experts, a potential staff of social surveyors. The communities, too, are becoming more and more acutely aware of their social problems and are turning to departments of sociology for assistance in their solution. The task of the sociologist is twofold: to secure the co-operation of specialists in the university and of the departments of state and to organize the community for self-investigation under expert direction. For this reason the social survey is an inviting field for constructive service by departments of sociology.

THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN. III

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CIVIC PUBLICITY AND THE VOTER

Opposition to experimentation and change in the social order has a cause in a suspicion that things might be worse. The citizen often has little confidence, distrusting his own knowledge and that of others with regard to the social machine. Civic ignorance breeds a diffidence and a willingness to leave matters as they are. The fullest confidence is not reposed in public agents because so much of their work is not generally known. A better attitude would be established through civic publicity.

Government is work for the expert, but with the transfer of power to individuals there is the danger of the unobserved abuse of that power, and it becomes necessary to develop agencies which will have the effect of placing public servants on a platform of observation and in a light which leaves nothing to the darkness which evil loves. Such transparency of office can be secured by developing official publicity far beyond its present stage. True, we have the reports of officials, as treasurers, commissioners, and boards, though, for example, the services of a congressman are not formally reported. Probably ninety-nine constituents out of a hundred have but the faintest ideas of what their representatives actually do. This is due less to the incapacity of constituents to understand language than to the absence of authentic, skilful, and ample reporting.

Moreover, the governmental report is often unduly difficult to comprehend, and, while its bulk may assure the citizen that his interests are amply protected, its obscure recesses would discourage even the specialist. The art of reporting official acts to the general public should be developed. Men are needed to tell of the

work of the various offices, and thus lay a foundation for an understanding of plans of improvement and of an appreciation of exemplary service.

Even the laws are largely unknown by the public. While every citizen is presumed to know the law, no one believes that the citizen has more than an inkling of the laws under which he lives. To learn whether a city has a given ordinance may entail a visit to the city hall and exploration of a poorly arranged mass of legislation. Legislatures adjourn after sending statutes to the public printer, with little concern as to making known to the citizen what laws have been enacted. The voting public is a board of directors, but could it be imagined that a successful private corporation would be so uninformed in regard to the activities of its agents as is the voting public? Every significant detail of social administration should be flashed upon the public mind through the perfection of agencies of civic publicity, and the limitations of public attention should be recognized in ingenuity of reporting. It is idle to expect the citizen to be himself a competent collector of that information which he must possess in order to vote and legislate properly at the polls. The miscarriage of modern politics is probably due more to lack of civic publicity than to lack of mentality or character.

Of special interest are the attempts at civic publicity represented by the municipal journals of Baltimore, Los Angeles, New York, Tacoma, and various other cities. The voters' pamphlet in Oregon, and the project of a state journal of governmental information in that commonwealth show an awakening to the need of agencies of civic communication in excess of those represented by the private newspaper, whose aims and interests render it not the most useful or perfect medium of political intelligence. The universities should train men and women in the technique and ideals of civic journalism. Probably most voters need only to know the sensible thing to do it, and only from lack of information vote incompetents into office or respond to disingenuous appeals which result in legislation deviously contradicting their most cherished interests.

Much is said first or last—or left unsaid—in regard to the ignorant voter. With over five million illiterates in the United

States, there is a vast amount of ignorance in regard to general subjects and an amount of ignorance in regard to civic matters which should be alarming. But the essential consideration is whether ignorance represents mental incapacity in many cases or merely lack of information. It is probable that the general and civic ignorance of the illiterate and the civic ignorance prevailing among literates are but rarely due to lack of ordinary capacity. The average citizen would be found able to reach up to the point where the functions of the civic expert should begin. It is important that the special knowledge which functions in good citizenship be widely diffused and that there be actual preparation for civic responsibilities.

The idea that ballots should be weighed rather than counted is likely to occur to one when instances of civic ignorance come under observation. It is not pleasant to realize that the most judicious exercise of the ballot may be neutralized by the vote of the individual who would not appear at the polls except for the diversion of a free ride. The value of some ballots is vastly greater than of others; there are the widest differences in the actual qualifications of voters to make intelligent decisions. There are differences in age, experience, traditions, mentality, and specific information. Statutory equality by no means implies equivalence of fitness, and in fact the exclusion from the ballot of all below twenty-one years of age and of women would indicate that prevailing tests of fitness are far from exact. Who should vote? What qualifies a person to vote?

Evidently one should know the subject-matter of elections—issues, candidates, measures, political conditions, and the trend of society. One should have a preparation comparable to that which would warrant expressing an opinion on architecture, sanitation, engineering, agriculture, or poetry. If issues have been reduced to simplicity and there is a leadership in which confidence may justly be reposed, a minimum of social science may serve, by making use of the analytical powers of others. A person who has been trained in a social science is competent to judge the value of a conclusion or by accident. But the test of information is one which is relied upon in judging the qualifications of physicians, philo-

chemists, and postal clerks, and it evidently should have exceptional weight in ascertaining fitness to fill the position of voting citizen.

But how could a mental test be applied? While there is a sentiment in favor of educational tests for voters, and in at least one state (North Dakota) the constitution enjoins upon the legislature the duty of establishing educational tests, practical difficulties interpose. Yet no one can question the need of distinguishing between fitness and unfitness. With constitutional amendments and measures in detail coming before the electorate, especially under direct legislation, it is reasonable that the civic board of directors, which is the collective body of voters, should be admitted to the exercise of their function only upon proof of competence.

Fortunately an effectual educational test is within easy reach and indeed is in process of realization. The submission of specific measures, as under the initiative and referendum, tends to make voting difficult, requiring not only interest but attention and reasoning. Heretofore voting has required the barest minimum of information. But with a lengthy ballot containing matter which must be read with attention to be understood, and with the relegation of partisan and personal considerations, voting becomes a feat of slight appeal to any who are not conscious of the nature of public questions. A weeding out in the electorate accordingly results, as witness the diminishing vote of Wisconsin under direct primaries and direct legislation. The relatively small vote usually cast upon constitutional amendments and city charters when submitted to the electorate is evidently not due to their unimportance but rather to the absence of an interest derived from knowledge. There is an inevitable mental test when measures are submitted to voters, and a diminished vote may be construed as meaning that a stimulus is being applied which should result in citizens studying their lessons more thoroughly. The person who knows nothing about the merits of a proposal on his ballot will naturally not vote on it, thus becoming automatically disqualified by ignorance. Mechanical voting, even for candidates, should be rendered unlikely or impossible. While perhaps sufficient difficulties are inherent in direct legislation, surely no predigestion

of subject-matter should be attempted in behalf of those, no matter how large their numbers among rich or poor, male or female, who are indolent, careless, illiterate, or incompetent. The intelligent and the thoughtful should rule, and civic incompetence should not be afforded an opportunity to vote by means of a ballot so designed as to allow voting to be an unthinking process. Voting has been much too easy. The man who conscientiously follows political questions should not have his vote counteracted by that of one careless of knowledge of public affairs. The inequitable character of easy balloting is evident, for the person who takes pains to inform himself is not rewarded by a larger measure of participation. With the ballot itself so devised as to be an educational test every citizen fitted to vote has the privilege, and disqualifications may be removed by effort. Voting should necessitate reading and understanding whatever might appear as an educational test upon the ballot.

Inasmuch as one's interest in a subject is closely related to his knowledge of it, the actual number of those voting upon a measure would approximate the number of voters really prepared to vote, and the smallness of the number of votes cast should not be at all disconcerting. Such provisions of law, as that of the constitution of the state of Minnesota, which requires that a high percentage of the electorate must ballot upon proposed constitutional amendments for a valid decision, are of doubtful wisdom, especially if adequate provision is made for publicity with reference to pending measures. When once freely informed of issues, the individual who does not vote may wisely in most cases be thought to be lacking in those qualities which should count for most in elections, and the smallness of the number balloting be regarded as good evidence of its select character. Surely the right to vote should be contingent upon the correlated duty of knowing upon what one is voting; it is a common rule of life that one should know what he is doing.

No educational test would work properly in the absence of stringent enforcement of corrupt-practices acts. The citizen who has so little interest and information as not to go to the polls of his own volition should not be solicited. That one should have to be urged to vote indicates that his ballot might safely be

dispensed with, and the ardors of rival candidates or the self-seeking of special interests should not be allowed to inject into the results of elections the foreign substance of the unintelligent ballot. Improper solicitation of votes should be made impossible, and the few worthy citizens who forget election days if not sent for might well be a sacrifice to the general cause. Under the foregoing conditions balloting would take on a character of distinction, and the seriousness of an examination for the credentials of the profession would to a degree appear.

The questions of negro and woman suffrage would easily be resolved under the principle of mental fitness. Such negroes and such women, and as well, such present voters, as whose capacity and information qualified them to vote, would realize the right. The line of separation between voters and non-voters would not be tortuously and artificially drawn according to sex, property, or color, but would nearly coincide with actual personal fitness. Thus there would be every incentive to acquire acceptable attainments, and no one would be excluded from voting for any except purely appropriate reasons.

The submission of propositions under direct legislation stimulates civic intelligence. If balloting be merely upon names, perhaps followed by party symbols to guide the unthinking and ignorant, as in Massachusetts and New York, there is less incentive for political exertion. The intelligent voter even is affected when channels of civic expression are through party candidates whose attitudes upon issues cannot be fully foretold; whereas in voting upon definite proposals there is incentive to study government. So indirect and faulty is popular control of government when based upon the voting merely for candidates that citizens disgustedly keep away from the polls. The submission of question after question to the electorate, perhaps with greater frequency of votings during the year, would connect public opinion directly with government and result in a far higher level of civic intelligence.

VIEWS OF PROPERTY

Efforts to survive underlie migrations, wars, explorations, social groupings, and specialized employments. Wherever is discerned

an opportunity to secure subsistence by supplying a utility or service there appears a functionary to provide it for compensation. Such improvisation ultimately crystallizes into commercial custom, which in turn implies clergy, judiciary, and legislatures. Social institutions represent a glorified elaboration of the impulse to snatch at food when hungry. The basis of historical explanations could hardly be other than economic.

Institutionalism has on the psychological side a foundation upon the primal instinct of self-preservation. The nut-hiding tendency of the chipmunk or the blue jay, as well as the active sense of possession exhibited by the child, find expression in higher forms in the market place. In the life of the miser the instinct to possess attaches narrowly to money, while in more normal lives possessions include a variety of values. With the trust the ingathering impulse finds peculiarly effective expression, and, in the light of biology, such vast acquisitiveness suggests a giant amoeba surrounding its food.

The problem of a more equitable distribution of wealth becomes urgent in view of the existence of remarkable opportunities which have come about for individual absorption. Like a tumor whose cells cheat the rest of the body of nourishment, octopi of acquisitiveness drain the body politic; and a situation develops from the license of instinct which needs to be dealt with by rational methods. The greedy, clawing disorder which characterizes present economic distribution is unworthy of a race possessing ideals of science and system. The world approaches a parting of the ways: either a better system of distribution must be developed or society will stand a fair chance of being wrecked through the evils of plutocracy and of poverty. Man has overcome nature through science; the supreme challenge to his intelligence is now the controlling of social forces. Even the preservation of the state is threatened by economic powers virtually superior to the law—subverting justice, ruling and pensioning subjects, making war with private gunmen, supplanting the government of civil divisions, and limiting the sphere of state action by creating vast foundations and institutions.

The paramount social issue is the distribution of wealth, an issue in which are comprehended a multitude of subsidiary

questions. The identification of wealth with self-preservation and with welfare in a thousand relations exalts this issue. Life cannot continue without a measure of wealth, and access to utilities is one with happiness and welfare. Men press forward for life, which is almost synonymous with the possession of wealth. The sustenance which is sought by the prowling wild beast or the fish darting about in quest of food appears, raised to a higher power, in the money hunt in modern society. In following almost any clue to social explanations one is likely to come at last upon an economic fact. We live notably in terms of wealth. The seeming exception of the monk or the "poor scholar" is explainable on the ground that they do not really live; they renounce various relationships which others must sustain; and even under the vow of poverty the benefits of wealth are virtually assured through the utilities which a productive society supplies in manifold ways.

Is popular intelligence sufficient for solving the problem of distribution? There is need of clear thinking and a reorganization of popular sentiments. To loosen the grip of instinctive possession calls for a new culture with reference to property. There are considerations which should have force in establishing attitudes more consistent with the aims of democracy.

In a multitude of cases the personal ownership of a utility is not at all important for its enjoyment. A concrete walk in front of one's house is of no more utility to the owner than is his neighbor's walk over which he passes; of course as such walk would raise the value of his property and would therefore have an exchange value when he came to sell and buy something else, there would be a decided advantage in its ownership. But for practical enjoyment a multitude of objects are perhaps even best owned by someone else. It was Thoreau who visited various farms, talked with their owners in regard to his purchase of them, and went away without buying, having absorbed, so he wrote, the real value in them from having seen the views from the road or from having clambered over their picturesque acres. He left to the farmer the burden of ownership while he stole away with the principal delights. Even the Great Man who talks for a dollar admission fee may deign to say a few words to the group at the railroad station, and anyhow

his likeness is in the discarded magazine, and his remarks, even perhaps more inclusive than those actually made by him, may be found in a newspaper from the waste-paper basket. So many values become uncorked that the veriest hobo is not to be denied his share in a free wealth of society. Here and there are individuals who say they cannot really enjoy unless they own the book or the picture, but of such are not the ideal commonwealth. What difference does ownership make provided one has the use of a thing? It is only for use that ownership rests at all in reason rather than solely upon the acquisitive instinct.

Now under modern conditions it is coming about that uses can be enjoyed increasingly in common, and to this extent private ownership is growing to be an anachronism. Not by any means that great wealth has become more than faintly reduced to common uses, but the tendency is manifest. The number of utilities in whose use the public may readily share is growing. Why should a man having boys buy them sets of tools when the city school has it equipment of hammers and saws? Few private collections of books can equal those of a modest public library, and one's home may well be used for other purposes than the storage of books not in active use. Free lectures are as inspiring as if paid for dearly, and they are numerous. The counsel of an expert of the United States Department of Agriculture is as valid as if he took fees for advice and one were to give him two-thirds of the first year's crop upon the contingency of a good yield. The public school returns one's child in as good condition as if from the ministrations of a tutor, and the postman who delivers one's letters would not be complimented to be told that he has all the faithfulness of the expressman.

But, to be sure, we all own a share in these governmental agencies—we own them, but not as private owners. Joint ownership thus is not exclusive, and it carries with it a distinctly higher social sense. And this sense of common ownership is a most desirable trait. Property sentiments may be transferred to public ownership, and the feeling of exclusiveness may be overcome. Property prejudice. Really only a few things need be privately owned, these being utilities whose use could not be shared; but

in an increasing number of cases joint enjoyment is possible and tolerable. The things one would not share with others belong especially to the sphere of food, clothes, and physical maintenance. The fruitlessness of the holding of wealth by the overrich is revealed by willingness to part with it for a slight consideration of repute, and the inability to make other than social use of great wealth is evident. The development of common wealth stores will follow the conviction that one need not own in exclusion in order to enjoy.

With social ownership the sense of possession would simply be transferred to social types of property, and what is "mine" would include an undivided share in what society owns. One requires wealth only for its actual consumption or for the assurance of future income; accordingly the primal instinct of self-preservation, which appears as the desire for possession, would be amply recognized in the common ownership of social utilities, which are legion, and especially in the guaranty by the state of an adequate income, resting upon individual contribution to the total production of society.

The effect of social ownership upon the outlook of the citizen would be far-reaching. The government would be his business. The interest of the man of independent means is now often solely that there be no interference with his income; he rarely feels a common cause. A social point of view can scarcely develop under dominant private ownership. Common ownership affords a basis for a brotherhood preached but not practiced. The antagonism between ethics and business will continue until economic causes are removed.

Not only may culture establish a sense of public property, but definite gratification may be developed with regard to the participation of others in all those utilities which might be made accessible through social ownership or through the impressing upon private ownership of ideals of common enjoyment. Narrowly instinctive possession is accompanied by callousness with reference to the privations of others. At the present stage in the evolution of social sentiments striking indifference to the extent of others' deprivations unfortunately appears.

The dealer in pianos is indifferent as to whether he sells one piano at a profit of a hundred dollars or two at a profit of fifty dollars each. In numberless cases a far wider use of commodities would be made if the principle of maximum use were substituted for an indifference as to the number making purchases provided the profits are the same with a large or small number of sales. If the success of a railroad were judged by the number of persons or tons of freight transported for a given annual net profit, rather than by profits alone, public welfare would be immensely furthered. Under social ownership the opening wide of the gates of transportation would be an ideal and the actual extent to which the public uses railroads would be the test of efficient management. The extent of consumption is the most acceptable criterion. The management of the telegraph should be judged by frequency of use. Today when a citizen of the United States receives a telegram he fears someone has died. The public librarian counts success by the number of volumes drawn for use. Consumption, not profit, is the true measure of success.

Through the ownership of the means through which labor operates to produce wealth, namely, capital and tools, a few are enabled to exclude the many from utilities which might be caused to exist, and indeed bring it about that in a world where endless productivity is possible, with resulting welfare, the securing of a job, at modest compensation, becomes a goal of intense rivalry, to obtain which laborers not infrequently break one another's heads. The exclusion of people from work is, upon consideration, a remarkable fact; but as work is merely a means to a living, the real fact illustrated is the exclusion of people, sometimes in great numbers, from the privilege of securing goods whereby to live. When the producer creates more wealth than he can buy back with his wages he contributes to his own downfall, and is even denied the opportunity of further employment, for "overproduction" occurs and men are thrown out of work. Ownership results in the exclusion of would-be producers from tilling idle lands, and occasionally from the use of their own tools. The world is full of "wonderful" things which the public would be very pleased to consume if they had the money with which to buy. Joblessness is a strange feature

of a system of production. Of all economic mysteries that of exclusion from productive labor is the most outstanding. It is possible so to order industry that production would not need to back-pedal lest there should be too much produced of those things people really want.

A phase of privation to which even some honor is accorded is that of self-exclusion from enjoying the utilities which one actually succeeds in securing the means to pay for. Thrift, so far as it inures to increased production, evidently has merits, but, so far as it implies a pinching of life, is distinctly opposed to a higher civilization. The effort to save up enough money with which to pay one's self a pension during old age often results in a life of meagerness, and a legacy. The recipient of a two-thousand-dollar income who saves half of it is a thousand-dollar man in the meantime, with the limits of experience and outlook which go with such expenditure. One must spend to grow; hence the doubtful virtue of strict economy. And such economy most often falls hardest upon the wife; is this a reason why woman has been so long retarded in civic and intellectual development? The world is really relieved from the possibility of a desperate stagnation by the person who spends money. Were saving governed only by discretion as to choice among ways of spending money, an immense acceleration of progress would ensue from the development of new wants and a consequent broadening of experience and mentality. To save money so as to be able to buy desirable goods or services, resulting in personal development, is one thing; but to save to accumulate a fund the interest from which will support one in old age, in the meantime paring down life to meagerness, may be necessary under present conditions but should not be mistaken for a virtue.

Consumption is really the test of civilization, and by it may general advancement be judged. It is accordingly significant when the exclusion of the masses from wealth and its absorption by the few determine the character of consumption. As a result almost different species of people are created, for, as in the lower animal world, the organism tends to come into adjustment with its environment, and the traits and markings of the slum dweller and the factory hand become differentiated from those of indi-

viduals of higher economic status. Differences of breed accumulate under economic extremes, and equality disappears under a distribution of goods which creates wide contrasts of environment.

The sentiment of exclusion and the emphasis on private ownership tolerate a waste illustrated in the cost of advertising. That such commodities as salt, soap, or flour should require pages of text and illustration in the most expensive advertising mediums is a most notable fact. It costs millions, it would seem, to convince the consumer of wants of which he could by no possibility be ignorant. It would indeed be a kindness to instruct the public in regard to a new device, and a paragraph of description would be a welcome service, but the thunderous persuasion of a public that knows what it wants, and whose principal difficulty is in securing the means with which to buy, not only, in spite of the solemnity of commerce, irritates the sense of humor, but represents downright miscarriage of energy and enormous loss. Energy which might properly be placed upon a larger, and, what is more important, a better, production is expended in acute competition to find buyers, and the spectacle is afforded of a score of shoe salesmen "making" the same few stores in a small town in a season, leaving behind a trail of lithographs. And yet there are people who need shoes. The shifting of emphasis in the commercial world from the producing to the selling activity and the hysteria of advertising are evidence that the natural appetite of the consumer suffers from an artificial indigestion. There is rarely produced a quantity which consumers might not quietly receive if they had the money with which to buy.

But it is objected that if everybody could buy everything he wanted, he would want the earth. Is there any reason why he should not have it? The nineteen superfluous shoe salesmen might easily contribute to production to the extent of providing shoes enough for everybody, eliminating pasteboard soles and lithographs. The things which any person would want for exclusive personal use could no doubt be very well supplied by production for the use of a man by himself. But for the things he would share with others, like books, schools, parks, steamboats, and trains and telegraphs, he could have the earth along with others.

Congested wealth gives rise to desperate efforts to push over to the consumer the things which he really wants but cannot buy, and causes the occupancy of a job to be regarded with suppliant awe. The means whereby to purchase being largely centralized, the purchasing power of the lowly public is often not sufficient to keep labor employed or to supply an open channel through which utilities may pass to the would-be consumer. Hence a standard of living which consorts ill with civilization. Instead of being governed in consumption by the limitations of nature and of production forces, the consumer is subjected to an exclusion resting rather upon peculiarities of a social order. Poverty is an unscientific and an unhappy state. The citizen needs the services of a physician, and the physician waits for employment; he wants fruit, which is dumped by carloads lest the market price fall; he wants to travel, but the braid and buttons of exclusion call for three cents a mile though the car is empty—a strange disharmony in the man-made world, strange by confession; for a captain of industry says, "What is one man's privilege is another man's right."

Immeasurable benefit would follow if only the things which might be, and even the things which are, could be dispensed under ideals of maximum consumption. Now and then an owner is struck by the absurdity of exclusion and opens an art gallery or private grounds to the public; it would be acceptable if exclusion from satisfying the humbler but more insistent needs might be declared against by a democratization of capital which would cause consumption to be limited only by factors of production and which would turn the fear of losing a job into the joy of being useful. Private ownership runs riot when it takes the form of choking off the public from a possible access to utilities.

Very likely the instinct to own would not appear in so extreme form if it were not for the ever-present fear of not being well taken care of in old age. Impelled by this fear many find less than possible enjoyment in life year by year, and an unworthy obsession drives them to accumulate more and more. When actual happiness comes to be given due consideration in the social economy the abolition of unnecessary concern about support in old age will

receive attention. The net result of this fear is to subtract from daily joy, without supplying the best set of motives for conduct and enterprise. The greed of property and the disputatiousness of bargaining rest to a large degree upon considerations of personal safety which might be more happily recognized in social assurance of care in disability and old age. Even the possession of large means does not dispel such fear, for one's property may be lost.

The tendency to private rather than social ownership arises partly from great expectations. The individual dreams of the golden fleece, of a lucky strike, of great good luck. A much-advertised success fires with the hope of individual aggrandizement and puts the virus of non-co-operative selfishness into the blood. With every man expecting that he will be the one to "strike oil," the prosaic certainty of fairly uniform meagerness of income has little chance of credence. To face the truth that under existing conditions the fate of the great majority is to remain below a certain economic level, and that personal ambition can rarely avail if system is opposed, is less agreeable than to indulge hopes of special providence. The most stupefying social inequalities therefore pass without challenge—for tomorrow I may also be of the chosen. Under exceptional conditions, as in the industry and trade of pioneer communities, based on limitless natural resources, self-sufficiency has a degree of justification, but under more usual conditions the expectation of individual wealth lacks support. One of the first steps for economic democracy is to convince the individual of the fact that no bank has more than one president, and that the wealth of the world would not suffice to make every clerk a man of millions. Upon which considerations a bristling assurance of not being as others are would suffer a certain eclipse. There is a kind of hope which delays the arrival of a rationally ordered economic society. The billions of organized wealth in a few hands rest largely upon the obsession of money adventure which afflicts the mind of the individual.

A state of mind which constitutes a real obstacle to progress as well as reveals a feeble logic is illustrated in opposition to paying

taxes. The dislike may be partly due to fear lest one should pay more than his share, but presumably is rather because the services and utilities which the state affords are not so clearly realized as are those bought individually. To the extent to which public money is expended inexpertly the citizen may well resist, but only through civic nearsightedness could the collective purchasing by society of schools, medical attendance, expert service, fire protection, parks, and transportation be opposed. A common playground renders it unnecessary for every family to own sufficient backyard to serve as a private playground. One may see the ocean and reflect upon barnacle-incrusted rocks as fruitfully in the public park of a seaport town as from any other vantage point, and one's contribution to the social purchase of utilities should be made with a downright satisfaction not even attending the paying of the druggist. Far from grumbling upon payment to the state, the citizen should suppress such emotions of *laissez faire*, and in their stead cultivate a satisfaction in social ownership. By contributing to the purchase of public libraries the citizen secures the vastness of literature for next to nothing. Under equitable circumstances one should watch the mounting rate of taxation with real satisfaction, not to say enthusiasm, and realize that when his public contributions perhaps far exceed his private expenditures the trick will be turned and the day of common wealth will have dawned.

To be consistent in the dread of taxes the citizen should flinch as little from direct as from indirect payments; but the atavistic nature of this fear is evident when one considers that a dollar paid out indirectly under the tariff is as really spent as if paid to the tax collector. The future psychologizing historian may well class among the monstrous incunabula of humbug the indirect tax and exclaim at its actual popularity in various forms. What changes would follow the translation of every indirect tax into direct taxation! Then the seemingly sourceless money so prodigally spent on battleships would seem to be dug out of the private purse, and peace would be popular.

The fallacy of indirect payment appears likewise in the reserve attending the compensation of public servants as contrasted with the prodigality of incomes paid indirectly. The community which

would cavil at paying a public servant three thousand dollars a year pays uncomplainingly perhaps ten thousand dollars to the president of the local bank and beholds with equanimity the gathering in of the unearned increment on a township of land by the prominent citizen amounting to scores of thousands of dollars annually. In either case the public pays, but whether directly or indirectly, whether by formal act or merely in reality, makes a difference.

The farmers of a state pay with acquiescence their contributions to individual commercial incomes ranging upward to hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, but demur at the payment of more than meager living expenses to men employed in state universities, who, if properly buttressed financially, might declare an intellectual independence taking the shape of a more active espousal of the interests of citizens of small means.

That the origin of wealth, under organized political and industrial society, is social is beyond question, and the payment of incomes to individuals is as truly by society when in the form of dividends or profits as when voted by public boards and paid on warrants drawn by public officials. But the popular reaction to incomes paid directly differs widely from the reaction to indirect payment. Thus it comes about that while the man who markets a scientific product may receive an income of a hundred thousand dollars a year, the nation pays the director of federal experiment stations less than five, and that while a member of the cabinet whose work relates to manufacturing is paid twelve thousand dollars a year, a beneficiary of the steel trust is awarded by the same public an income which permits the easy gift of library edifices sufficient in number to serve as mileposts from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Providence, Rhode Island.

Emphasis upon private possession and failure to conceive the larger freedom of co-operation result in an unnecessarily severe subsistence competition, in which the aim is to get the most for one's self regardless of how others are affected. The tricks and cruelties of trade are inevitable under an economic and industrial disorder.

It would be fortunate if conditions were arranged to bring out the best in people. Human nature has its fundamental and abiding

tendencies and also qualities which are simply reflections of environment. Whether a man becomes a prize fighter or a soldier of the Lord depends upon a few guiding influences. The channels of expression afforded by one's social setting lead to large consequences. A power of imagination which under right culture might issue in scientific hypotheses may under a wrong culture qualify the consummate liar. Mere exhortations to integrity have but slight effect if the whole pressure and argument of daily circumstance are to the contrary. The individual is responsive to conditions under which he must maintain himself, even to the disregard of ideals. The iniquity of circumstances is as real as the depravity of men. If one manufacturer puts shoddy in his cloth others are likely to do the same or go out of business; we are good or bad together. There is scarcely a lawyer who would not prefer to fight the battles of the poor—if he could support his family as well.

With society habituated to a subsistence competition it is not surprising that money success should lead to vanity. Lavish display and unbridled expenditure appear, and, at the lower end of the economic scale, a feverish and exhausting effort to keep up with leaders, with values passing rapidly out of goods because of shifts of fashion originating in an abnormal power to purchase. Competition in display naturally accompanies competition for maintenance. This competitive consumption is not noble; it is opposed to higher development.

With physical maintenance assured, and in the absence of disproportionate private wealth, competition would assume forms now barely possible. Instead of being controlled by financial considerations, the individual would be relatively free to apply his energies to ideal tasks. There are millions today whose aptitudes for creating things in the spirit of art are stunted because of dog-eat-dog economic conditions. To compete in advancing the common good under a system permitting co-operation rather than resulting in collision and the neutralization of efforts would amount to being civilized. The desire to excel may be enlisted for social purposes. It is a matter of social organization whether two retailers or physicians hate and envy or pull together. People prefer to compete for good opinion but they have to live first.

That an unpleasant competition for subsistence must prevail is a fallacy of the popular mind. Harmonious relationships and enterprise would be possible were there social provision for physical maintenance. For a higher civilization a minimum subsistence must be assumed, that energies may be set free for better forms of effort.

There is about as much moral excellence in the world as there can be considering the stake in making money. Without a better economic order one can imagine the people of ten thousand years hence cheating, grafting, adulterating, skinning jobs, hiring lawyers to find loopholes in statutes, swearing off taxes, and gouging the helpless. A low form of subsistence competition emphasizes these activities and gives the trader a foxy air.

It is not to be argued, however, that what Stevenson calls a "strong sense of personal identity" is not a valuable social asset. Unselfishness is pleasing, so let a word be spoken for selfishness. The preferring of others to one's self has bounds beyond which the results are harmful. Whenever individuals in a class are content with little they place a ball and chain upon others who have spirit and ambition. The school teacher who is willing to work for forty dollars a month, because of undeveloped wants, supplies an element which causes professional solidarity to crumble, and through a consequent weakening of education tends to defeat the very aims of civilization. The working-man who does not mind eating from the confines of a hot tin pail delays the arrival of an industrial commissariat and the uplift of labor. The assertion of self is self-respect, and one cannot properly respect others until his own wants are positive. A willingness to be nothing is a crime against mankind. The amount of actual damage which the humble and contrite of spirit can inflict upon the class to which they belong, upon the coming generation, and upon relatives is equaled perhaps by nothing short of war and pestilence. To fail of self-assertion is to carry backward the hopes of others.

The course of civilization is the resultant of forces exerted when individuals go forward for what they want. The first duty is to get up which will exempt the individual from pulling his own oar. The alternative to a state of social strain in which

law-makers, manufacturers, educators, and journalists are sharply directed by public demand is an infinitude of mush.

But with selfishness discredited there must be offense, and for selfishness without imagination little that is good may be said. There is self-seeking in whose defense no one can speak. It is the altruistic variety of self-assertion which may be commended. Let us work for pure milk, for if others' children are safe mine will be. Here is the circle of considerations which enlightened selfishness, more reputably known as altruism or social service, pursues. To be selfish in a large way is to help others. In seeking personal ends with imagination advantages gained overflow to the general good.

[*To be continued*]

THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL DATA^{*}

GUSTAV SPILLER

London

DEAR SIR: I should highly esteem your permission to invite through your pages counsel and criticism relating to the subjoined outline scheme of classification and interpretation of data appertaining to the sociological field. In an age of co-operation like ours no apology should be deemed necessary for soliciting the advice of fellow-workers.

I. INTRODUCTORY COMPREHENSIVENESS AND COMPLETENESS

1. It is suggested that when the most general sociological or social problems (e.g., the development of primary institutions or the reality

^{*}The writer of this argument is the author of a textbook of psychology which has received unusually favorable notice in England. His letter of transmission is subjoined, as well as the main communication. It is superfluous to say that the editors of this *Journal* do not accept the rendering of sociology which the communication proposes. It is published, however, as a stimulus to criticism. Mr. Spiller's first letter is as follows:

"DEAR SIR:

"I sincerely trust that you may find space for the inclosed letter in the *American Journal of Sociology*. America is the country *par excellence* where the study of sociology is assiduously cultivated, and one naturally turns to its sociologists for counsel and criticism. This could not be more completely and effectively accomplished than through the instrumentality of your valuable *Journal*.

"The Letter manifestly does not reflect or represent a casual or capricious thought. Three years ago the (British) *Sociological Review* published an article of mine purporting to show that theoretical and practical race bias and race discrimination had slender foundations in fact. The following year the same review contained a brief sketch by me relating to the mentality of the Australian aborigines as revealed in official and other documents. And last year there appeared in that periodical a lecture by me on "Darwinism and Sociology," where the ground for the present Letter was prepared. Indeed, the background for these various efforts is a volume on the subject of the distinctive nature of man which I have nearly completed, and I am seeking to publish this Letter in order that the volume might comprehend the minimum number of serious blemishes. But for the *Sociological Review* having temporarily suspended publication, I should have also asked its editor for similar hospitality.

"Hoping to hear that you will grant my request,

"I remain,

"Yours truly,

"G. SPILLER"

of progress) are under consideration, past, present, and future should be conceived comprehensively—that is:

- a) The past—from pre-Paleolithic times to approximately today.
 - b) The present—comprising roughly the last quarter of a century and the one succeeding it.
 - c) The future—stretching millions of years beyond our time.
2. The foregoing requires to be supplemented by the statement that in each of these three categories all peoples are to be included.

Note to 1 and 2.—An all-embracing bird's-eye view, such as the preceding, appears to be alone consistent with a socially all-embracing science. Much which would otherwise remain obscure becomes transparent when we advisedly concern ourselves with sweeping periods and with peoples generally.

3. Similarly, instead of examining chance facts of a more or less restricted order, a comprehensive and inclusive classification of the subject-matter of sociology, like the following, is indispensable:

- a) Language and transport.
- b) Buildings and furniture.
- c) Implements and industrial production.
- d) Domesticated animals and cultivated plants and discovered energies and raw materials.
- e) Trade and tribal intercourse to internationalism.
- f) Dress and education.
- g) Play and pastimes and inner life and its expression.
- h) Nutrition and care of health.
- i) Morals and religion.
- j) The family and other groupings (excluding state, district, and commune).
- k) Law and government.
- l) Science and art.
- m) Miscellaneous.

Note 1.—(i) *a* to *l* virtually cover the material sociological data. (ii) No distinct chronological or other order is aimed at in the foregoing list, for the development has been simultaneous along most lines. (iii) The coupling of two items under one number has for its main object to reduce the total numbers, and the coupling does not indicate any necessary or even intimate connection, although a certain relation will generally be patent to the reader. (iv) The object of the list is to reduce an infinity of particulars to a manageable aggregate of fixed and readily comprehensible categories. In the absence of such a list the treatment of sociological data is bound to be seriously inadequate.

Note 2.—For many purposes a simpler classification will often suffice—e.g., physical, somatic, economic, intellectual, moral, religious, aesthetic, and political facts; also, in other connections, individual, sex, family, vocation, class, caste, nation, race, humanity, animal life, plant life; and neighborhood and hamlet to city, district, province, substate, state, and federation of states.

4. Past, present, and future are best regarded as constituting the indivisible unity of time, and *each* of the three aspects should therefore be taken account of in every general problem. Likewise, as far as possible, *all*, rather than only one or some, of the items in 3 should be considered when a general question is approached. And this principle of inclusiveness or completeness ought to be adopted with *all lists*. Only in this way will bias and superficiality be avoided and defeated.

II. HUMAN NATURE ELUCIDATED THROUGH A COMPARISON WITH ANIMAL NATURE

Since human activities are the expression of human nature, therefore to understand the former we must ascertain the latter.

5. In all species of plants and animals (disregarding man for the moment) we remark that, for all intents and purposes, unless vast epochs are focused during which one species is transmuted into another—

- a) the species remains stable as regards more important characteristics, and
- b) its groups or members are virtually equal in their capacity of dealing with their environment in given circumstances.

Accordingly it seems fair to assume, provisionally at least, that this universal law applies to man; that is, that—

- a) the human race is virtually stable as regards more important characteristics, and
- b) its groups or members are virtually equal in their capacity of dealing with their environment in given circumstances.

Characteristics in man seemingly contradicting this would be, on this assumption, ascribed to secondary factors. Else it is difficult to conceive why only the human race should be unstable or its groups and members alone should prodigiously vary in capacity—that is, if natural selection readily changes the stability and uniformity of one species, it should as readily transform all; but if this happened, species attributes would be so fluid that they could cease to exist, and the rules governing the evolution of life would be in the constantly altering and unsteady advancing condition of human culture and that of the higher animals would ultimately be approximately as advanced as man.

6. Entering more circumstantially into the nature of animal life, on the basis of 5, we learn—

- a) that with particular animal species there has taken place during their past virtually no increase in possessions (such as nests) and in intellectual capacity (such as power of dealing with the environment);
- b) that individuals and groups of particular animal species do not appreciably vary either in space or in time so far as possessions and intellectual capacity are in question;
- c) that virtually nothing capable of being denominated as improvement in the nature of the possessions and of intellectual capacity is discernible in any given animal species, even when enormous epochs are considered; and
- d) that either co-operation between members of an animal species is altogether wanting or it is restricted to co-operation among the living members of comparatively small and non-co-operating groups, in which case, however, the co-operation is virtually determined and guided by inborn needs and methods and virtually precludes individuals or groups profiting by the experience of fellow-individuals and fellow-groups, contemporary and ancestral.

Yet so far as man is concerned—judged by 3, treated according to 1, 2, and 4—

- a) there has taken place during the human past an incalculably great increase in possessions and intellectual capacity, as exemplified in the present-day contents of the great cities of the West and in man's present power of dealing with his environment;
- b) individual men and groups of men vary incalculably in space and time so far as possessions and intellectual capacity are in question—e.g., pauper and multimillionaire, illiterate and Doctor of Science, Central Africa and England of today, and Paleolithic times and the present;
- c) stupendous progress is traceable from pre-Paleolithic times to our day—i.e., gradual development of language from a few inarticulate signs to speech, writing, printing, and telephone and telegraph with and without wires, or transport including roads and bridges and conveyances on land, water, and air, or buildings, furniture, implements, etc. (to the end of the list in 3);

- d) the whole of mankind—past, present, and future—tends to act as a single force, general possessions and capacity of dealing with the environment being primarily a pan-human and species product, and individuals and groups readily profiting by their own experience and by the experience of fellow-individuals, fellow-groups, and ancestors, however remote.

Note.—To be just, man should be compared only with *one* particular animal species and not with many or all in respect of possessions and intellectual capacity.

7. Carrying the analysis of the animal outfit a step farther still, we might enumerate the hereunder-mentioned factors:

- a) inborn needs or native impulses;
- b) innately determined modes of procedure or instincts;
- c) congenital means or organs wherewith the need might be satisfied—e.g., senses, claws, poison fangs, spinning apparatus;
- d) general adaptive structure—e.g., the suppleness of the cat or the peculiar organism of the mole;
- e) certain protective structures, as fur or the tortoise's armor;
- f) automatic acts;
- g) reflex acts;
- h) individual intelligence to meet particular or unusual circumstances; and
- i) the fundamental structure and the correspondingly fundamental needs and modes of procedure—e.g., system of obtaining, maintaining, and utilizing energy.

In man, on the contrary, *i)* is alone of salient import, together with the unique peculiarity of dependence on species-thought. Nevertheless, being descended from the primates, his physical structure intimately resembles in many material respects the structure of the highly developed biological family to which he belongs. Indeed, man is an animal in whom *a)* to *h)* have been largely superseded or supplemented by a new method of approaching his environment and fulfilling his needs.

Note.—To speak of "instinct" as generally explaining the activities of

man is to say on a scientific principle that he is an animal.

... Abstract man's civility and culture and he is just one of a countless number of animals, except that they are fitted for their environment and he is not.

8. There being thus an almost infinite difference between man and animals, we must search for an interpretation of this anomalous fact. We propose the ensuing explanation:

- a) Individual members of any animal species, be they flourishing in isolation or in groups, depend almost exclusively on *inborn* needs and impulses, means or organs, and methods or instincts, for the purpose of doing justice to their nature. Their life is, therefore, self-contained, and whatever lessons experience teaches them are almost entirely buried within them and with them. Hence results virtually complete stability and uniformity.
- b) Man, on the contrary, appears to depend almost exclusively on *pan-humanly* discovered, preserved, adapted, and improved needs, means, and methods, and for this reason—because billions of human beings pool their possessions and reflections (instead of as among animals where each individual is self-limited)—human life is—
 - (i) almost infinitely richer;
 - (ii) almost infinitely more diversified as to space and time;
 - (iii) almost infinitely more progressive; and
 - (iv) almost infinitely more interdependent in relation to individuals, groups, and periods, than the life of any particular animal species whatsoever. For the satisfaction of their needs animals depend, then, primarily on their *organic outfit*, and secondarily on individual thought; human beings primarily on *the thought of their entire race*, comprising untold legions of individual thinkers. Accordingly, the cultural data appear to be consistent with the law of the stability of animal species and the virtual equality of their groups and members. That is, human culture may be explained without postulating that man forms an exception to the universal law controlling all species, by assuming that culture is the massed product of the microscopic contributions of individuals of all human groups and ages. (See, however, 15.)
9. a) *The true human unit* is therefore not the individual, as with the tiger, say; or the group, as with the ant, say; but *the whole human species*, embracing all its members of all lands from man's emergence from apehood to his exit from life's stage (if that ever occurs). (See 18.)

- b) Accordingly it appears inappropriate to speak of man as a *social* being or of the science of man as *sociology*. Rather should we speak of man as a *species* being, of culture as a *species* product, and of the science of pan-human culture or *pan-sophiology*, since unfettered and collective thinking is only observable in human beings.
- c) *Culture*, again, might be conceived as a comprehensive term equivalent to cultivation and be employed in contradistinction to native power or spontaneity. Culture would be thus divided into physical, intellectual, moral, religious, aesthetic, economic, and political culture, and would comprehend the totality of the products of the corporate human mind.
- d) And the term *civilization* may be said roughly to express at any date the last stage of the total of the material and other inventions and discoveries developed, and postnatally preserved, by the co-operation of the whole of mankind from the earliest times, in order to meet the demands of human nature which depends for effective guidance and satisfaction on culture and not on heredity.
- e) We might also state that what *heredity* is to the animal, *heritage*, or the cultural heritage, is to man, and heritage we might define in the largest sense as the *tradition of mankind*.

III. MAN FORMS A KINGDOM BY HIMSELF

10. Since man is differentiated from all plants and animals in a crucial respect, he should be regarded as constituting a kingdom by himself—plant life, typifying *changeability* in form *without* free movement of organism and *without* freedom in response; animal life, *changeability* in form *with* free movement of organism and *without* freedom in response; and human life, *changelessness* in form, *with* free movement of organism and *with* freedom in response; or progressive indeterminateness in form, locomotion, and response, respectively.

11. Further, adaptation in the new kingdom being cultural instead of biological, a single species is substituted for an indefinite number of species.

12. Lastly, the possibilities of progress in the new kingdom being endless, knowledgeless perfection in physical, intellectual, moral, economic, and political, tends to be reached in the course of time.

Note.—The cause of pre-man becoming a species being may perhaps be found in (i) his having been the most highly developed animal intellectually and (ii) his having been placed in singular circumstances making collective thought the alternative to degeneration or extinction.

IV. THE NATURE OF MAN

13. With man, then, a novel and momentous factor enters in biological evolution—dependence on the material and other inventions and discoveries of virtually all the members of his race from the earliest times to his own. From this ensues—

- a) that but for fundamental structure, and fundamental needs resulting therefrom, a human being is obliged to place reliance primarily on his fellows far and near in space and time in order to realize himself;
- b) that the more extensive the accumulated fund of thought, the more propitious are his chances of realizing himself;
- c) that he depends on completest culture for completest living and that he will therefore be able to realize himself fully only when the quality and the quantity of this fund of thought have reached infinity;
- d) that hence only the ideal satisfies man truly, the ideal being simply that which adequately satisfies his needs and which corresponds to the plant's and animal's fixed hereditary outfit; and
- e) that since the individual who truly realized himself would have achieved this through absorbing the substance of what trillions have accomplished, he would be trillions of times the superior of any individual animal, omitting here the additional superiority due to the active co-operation and comparison of these trillions. (Man even learns from animals, plants, and inanimate nature.)

14. Moreover, reasoning from the past to the future, we appear justified in concluding that with the ages collective or pan-human thought leads necessarily—

- a) to an almost infinite growth of material and other inventions and discoveries;
- b) to an almost infinite improvement of these;
- c) to a complete equalization of economic, political, moral, intellectual, aesthetic, and other advantages among individuals and peoples; and

- d) to humanity becoming a single organized co-operative totality.

Note.—(i) The advance hitherto reached can be properly estimated only by *ignoring* the equal distribution of the benefits of culture, and the advance to be reached in the future will largely be measured by its *realization*. (ii) The fear that our achievements will be annihilated by the cooling of the earth's crust millions of years hence disregards the future advance of science. (iii) And the dread that human nature partakes of the tiger and the beast, and can therefore not do justice to the ideal, appears to express a gratuitous and uncritical assumption.

15. Is it, however, correct to contend that *a*) peoples and *b*) individuals are virtually one another's equals so far as native capacity is in question?

- a*) is rendered probable, *inter alia*, by the statement in an official report relating to the school education of the dusky offspring of the Australian bushman (who is regarded as touching the zero level of human culture) that "age for age and opportunity for opportunity the attainments and mental powers of these children are equal to the average white children," and by the fact that thousands of Africans have passed through the highest seats of learning in Europe and the United States with apparently no greater effort than Europeans and apparently constituting no more exceptions than the European students; and

- b*) is shown to be probable—

- (i) by a closer study of the relevant data—e.g., on applying 1 to 4 systematically by consulting specialized histories we shall find that the almost painfully slow, piecemeal, and *continuous* human advance excludes the assumption that a few "men of genius" are responsible for what we call human civilization, or that men are "born" to solve the almost infinitely minute portion of the problem which happens to emerge in their day and which they have more or less successfully coped with; and
- (ii) by the consideration of the fact that the cultural causes which account for the cultural diversity of peoples and ages, presumably account for the individual cultural differences between individuals, the same causes being necessarily operative in the two instances.

a) and b) should be experimentally tested by the adoption, under equal but decidedly elevating circumstances, of newborn infants representing different sexes, classes, peoples, and races. (The children should be unaware of being adopted and the foster-parents should act as genuine parents.)

Note.—It is likely that the belief in men of genius is a survival of the belief in the ancient gods and heroes. If the *precise* individual contribution of any "great" man be envisaged, our conclusion will probably appear to be consonant with the facts of history. It might be also noted that possibly over 95 per cent of man's inventions and discoveries are admittedly unconnected with "great men." (Apply 1 to 4 to the problem.)

16. From man's dependence on pan-human thought and from his being subject to the biological law of stability and uniformity it follows—

- a) that the individual human being (allowing for germinal, prenatal, and postnatal malformation) is capable of absorbing the substance of any civilization, however advanced, and
- b) that he is able to advance this civilization in an infinitesimal degree.

Expressed in the form of a definition: The stock of humanity's acquisitions, divided by the number of human beings who have lived, assuming the actual physical and cultural conditions, approximately yields the single individual's intellectual, moral, and practical capacity for invention and discovery, and, vice versa, the single individual's intellectual, moral, and practical capacity, multiplied by the number of human beings who have lived, assuming the actual physical and cultural conditions, approximately yields the stock of humanity's acquisitions.

17. We might define man accordingly as—

- a) the sole cultural or species being;
- or stated less ambiguously,
- b) man is the sentient being which primarily depends on species developed and traditionally preserved culture (for satisfying its needs);
- or, more exhaustively,
- c) what defines man most truly is that the necessary means for adequately gratifying his needs are, in a growingly satisfactory form, provided—not, as in animals, by instinct, by individual intelligence, by learning incidentally from neighboring members of the same species, by accidental traditions, by group co-operation, or by a combination of several of the just-enumerated means—but by the steadily increasing

collection of material and other inventions and discoveries made and developed by his species as a whole and transmitted postnationally from generation to generation;

or, aphoristically,

d) man is the super-animal and depends on completest culture for completest living.

18. From the foregoing definitions we may infer that—

- a)* humanity is the culture-supplying,
- b)* human groups are the culture-mediating, and
- c)* the human individual is the culture-demanding and augmenting sociological unit.

There exist thus three sociological units, as well as one primary factor—pan-human co-operation in thinking and acting. From this primary factor four dynamic laws may be deduced:

- a)* the law of limitless accumulation of cultural products;
- b)* the law of the growth and elimination of inequality and error;
- c)* the law of limitless progress or improvement in cultural products; and
- d)* the law of mankind tending to become an organized unity.

V. PRACTICAL DEDUCTIONS

19. The suggested definition of man also implies—

- a)* the existence of societies or communities, the individual being wholly unfitted by nature to live by himself;
- b)* the innate mental and moral equality of individuals, sexes, families, classes, castes, nations, and races, from which follows the demand for equal opportunities and treatment;
- c)* the need to provide thorough home and school education for all—physical, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, civic, and vocational;
- d)* science becoming man's guiding genius in all departments of life and thought;
- e)* the indispensability of co-operation in all spheres of life and on an equal basis;
- f)* the need for institutions which shall store the accumulations of the past, present, and future—e.g., government, law, marriage, etc.;
- g)* equal respect for past, present, and future, or for conservatism, presentism, and futurism (which might be merged into pan-temporism);

- h*) as the supreme end the striving collectively and individually to promote the cause of the ideal, and a sense of oneness with all humanity, of which the individual is but an expression;
- i*) as a rule of conduct and action the exhibiting in all the relationships of life of a profound fellow-feeling, guided by fullest information and circumspect thought, accompanied by geniality and refinement, and intelligently realized by strenuous and firm-bent will—the mind acting as a whole;
- j*) and respect for the fundamental needs—hunger, exercise, etc.

Since, if substantially correct, the conception contained in this rudimentary outline is of revolutionary consequence, both theoretically and practically, the writer would greatly appreciate remarks and criticisms. Sociology, it is superfluous to insist, would immensely profit by possessing a viewpoint derived from the nature of man as scientifically established.

NEWS AND NOTES

TENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The annual meeting of the Society was held in Washington, D.C., December 27-31, 1915, in connection with the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress. All the sessions were held in the Hotel Raleigh, which was the headquarters, not only of the Sociological Society, but also of the Economic and Statistical Associations.

In view of the many attractive features offered by the various organizations at the same hours, the Society should congratulate itself upon the attendance at each of its sessions. The rooms assigned in each case proved too small to accommodate the large number of persons wishing to attend. Another commendable point in the program was the fact that President Ross saw that each session started promptly on the hour scheduled.

In view of the fact that Professor Ross (according to the custom of the Society) retired after having served two years as President, many expressions of appreciation were heard regarding the two splendid programs presented by the Society during his administration, the one at Princeton on "Freedom of Communication," and the one at Washington on "War and Militarism in Their Sociological Aspects."

The Society's Committee on Academic Freedom (U. G. Weatherly, chairman) during the year was merged with a similar committee from the Association of University Professors. The report of this committee is accessible to any member of the American Sociological Society.

The Society will hold its next annual meeting in connection with the American Economic and Statistical Associations and the American Association for Labor Legislation, at Columbus, Ohio, as guests of the city of Columbus and of Ohio State University.

It is the plan of the Secretary, through the co-operation of those who participated in the program, to issue the volume of *Papers and Proceedings* this year not later than March 1. All agreed that the value of the papers would be much increased if published without delay.

The report of the Secretary-Treasurer showed the Society to be in excellent financial condition and growing in membership. Three

hundred new members were added in 1915, the greatest accretion in any single year in the history of the Society.

During the year the deaths of the following members of the Society were reported to the Secretary: Charles R. Henderson, Samuel G. Smith, Theodore L. Keppler, Charles F. Adams, and E. P. Phelps.

The following were elected officers for the calendar year, 1916:

President, GEORGE E. VINCENT, University of Minnesota

First Vice-President, GEORGE E. HOWARD, University of Nebraska

Second Vice-President, CHARLES H. COOLEY, University of Michigan

Secretary-Treasurer, SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, University of Chicago

The two new members of the Executive Committee are Miss Julia Lathrop, of the Federal Children's Bureau, and Professor Carl Kelsey, of the University of Pennsylvania.

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Dr. J. L. Gillin has been promoted from the rank of Associate Professor to that of Professor of Sociology.

REVIEWS

Introduction to the Study of Sociology. By EDWARD CARY HAYES.

Pp. xviii+718. New York: D. Appleton & Co. \$2.50.

Probably it has never occurred before that in the same year two American books on sociology have appeared which could be appraised as equal in value with the volumes by Blackmar and Gillin and by Hayes. Each fills a place in our literature which had not been occupied before. As the former book is noticed elsewhere in this number it is sufficient to add by way of comparison that each book purports to be an introduction. Fortunately, or unfortunately, no one can persuade anyone else that he knows the exact point between the cradle and the grave at which introduction to sociology might most favorably begin. Probably as many variations of introduction to sociological study might be wise as there are gradations in observation of human facts and reflection upon them. Each of these books would admirably meet the needs of students at a certain stage of acquaintance with social phenomena. They would not meet the needs of equally immature students. Neither book gets down as far as someone sometime will reach in elementary sociological interpretation. My impression is that a given teacher would be able to get satisfactory results from Blackmar and Gillin with younger students than could profit by Hayes's book. Indeed, it would be an ideal arrangement to give Juniors, with half a dozen well-chosen social-science courses as a background, a semester with Blackmar and Gillin as their guide, followed by a semester going over the ground covered by Hayes.

The first merit that impresses me in Professor Hayes's book is that the author's force does not exhaust itself upon terminology. There is a gratifying absence of neologisms, while there is from beginning to end a businesslike handling of real things. One cannot tackle the problem of justifying a new "world-view" (p. 12) without incurring responsibility for abstractions and generalizations that strain most men's vision. Professor Hayes follows out his analyses until only the relatively expert could follow him, but he always arrives at something which it would be worth the while of the most expert to consider.

It seems to me, too, that Professor Hayes has performed a notable service to sociological method in drawing the distinction as sharply as he does in principle between the antecedents of societary phenomena and societary phenomena in the strict sense (Part I, "The Causes Which Affect the Life of Society"). I should have to debate with him about the application of the principle. After he has discussed the geographic, the technic, and the psychophysical "causes which affect the life of society," it would seem to me to be time to recognize the advent of another type of cause by force of the very caption, "Social Causes," etc. (Div. IV). If the title of Part II, "Nature and Analysis of the Life of Society," had been set back so as to include chaps. xvii and xviii, the transition zone between the preconditions of society and the activities of society would seem to have been more precisely located.

I am impressed further by the emphasis that runs through the book on the belief that the purely abstract aspects of sociology must eventually find their justification as indications of wisdom in conduct. While science may not always bear fruit for immediate popular consumption, on the other hand sterility is not necessarily science. Even in cases of sociological perceptions which are admittedly tentative it is often useful to consider alternatives of action in the light of relations which we find to be actual, although no invariable formula of their action is at present calculable. Not merely under the distinctive title "Social Control" (Part IV), but under the heads "Nature and Analysis of Society" (Part II) and "Social Evolution" (Part III), Professor Hayes has wisely indicated at every important step that he is not dealing with problems that end in abstractions. He has shown that he is dealing with abstractions and generalizations which are merely wholesale expressions of commonplace detailed transactions, and that the commonplace will be thoroughly humanized only after it is conducted with due deference to the general relations of cause and effect which it illustrates.

This characteristic of the book seems to me to reach its most significant expression, not in its connection with the more familiar problems of social pathology, but in the recognition of religion, public opinion, and education as agencies of social control (chaps. xxxiv, xxxv, and xxxvi). The relative importance of these chapters as pointers to strategic applications of social resources far exceeds the ratio of the sixty pages which they occupy to the total bulk of the book.

As a fair sample of the analytical quality of the book, the passage on "Prestige" (pp. 323-32) may be selected. It shows discrimination

of the most instructive sort, and it incidentally adds carrying power to the lesson that social psychology is worth the while of everyone who wants to prevail with men.

This is emphatically one of the books which everyone whose mind has begun to move in the modernistic way should not only read but study.

ALBION W. SMALL

Les Sciences et la Méthode reconstitutives. By ANTONIO DELLEPIANE. Translated from Spanish to French by EMILE CHAUFFARD. Paris: Giard et Brière, 1915. Pp. 160.

This book contains the chief substance of a course in the philosophy of law given at the University of Buenos Aires. The main thread of its teaching may be indicated as follows:

Every branch of the law is intimately related to philosophy. This is especially true of procedure. The theory of proof is a chapter in applied logic and involves problems of psychology and even of meta-

The judge must not only understand the law, he must also be able to reconstruct the facts of the case to which the law is to be applied. The latter task requires special training distinct from his training in the law. It is a training common to a dozen sciences that aim to reconstruct the past, including geology, paleoclimatology, paleozoölogy, paleobotany, paleoanthropology, paleoethnology (social evolution), history, and judicial proof (critology).

The reconstructive sciences are divisible into two groups, composed of two distinct kinds of sciences. Reconstructive sciences of the one kind are abstract and state the general principles in each field; the others are concrete and deal with particular cases. Thus in geology we have a general theory which deals with the formation of dunes or of glaciers, as well as more specific explanations, for example, explanation of the Rhone Glacier. Likewise we have a general history, which is "retrospective sociology" (p. 15), and also a special or concrete history, that is, history proper. Each phenomenon has a specific identity dependent on variation of time, place, and circumstance, but phenomena exist also in repetitious classes, varying sometimes only in time and place, at other times in greater yet subordinate or even negligible degree.

Sciences that deal with the past depend for their fertility in points of view, interpretations, and hypothesis upon the advancement of

sciences that deal with facts of the present. Thus our interpretation of man's past depends upon the adequacy of our knowledge of his psychology, which may be studied in the present. But with this knowledge must be coupled extensive and accurate observation and comparison of the vestiges, traces, and effects of the past realities which we wish to describe and explain. "Proof is the daughter of doubt and the mother of verity" (p. 31).

Proof seldom results from the use of a single method alone. First, as a rule, come the discovery, collection, preservation, and description or reproduction of traces and documents; then there is required a combination of methods for the interpretation of evidence and the construction and verification of inferences. The nature of these methods the author indicates.

The reconstructive sciences fall into two groups—the natural and the moral. This use of the word "moral" as a designation for all the sciences that deal with human activity seems to the reviewer interesting and significant, and presages the thorough recognition of ethics as a matter of science rather than of speculation. The general principles of ethics thus conceived are fundamental principles of sociology.

The peculiarly interesting characteristic of this book is that it treats as one group, having in the main common methods, all the sciences that seek to afford knowledge of past realities, from the history of the earth's crust to the development of languages and religions. It also illustrates the fact that the student of the philosophy of law has availed himself of the sociological point of view.

EDWARD CARY HAYES

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Individual Delinquent. A Textbook of Diagnosis and Prognosis for All Concerned in Understanding Offenders. By WILLIAM HEALY. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1915. 1 vol. Pp. xvi+830.

Doubtless there will be some who will regret that the splendid accumulation of data which has been amassed by the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute of Chicago was not presented in some other form than as a textbook. As such, however, the volume is sure to prove of first-rate value. One is early convinced of its intelligent and professional handling of cases, and the student must inevitably be stimulated from the first to

a close reading of the text by its sincerity and the irresistible enthusiasm with which the data were collected and the volume was written.

The book reports an investigation the chief concern of which is stated to be the determination of "the basic factors of disordered social conduct." The study of the juvenile delinquent for this purpose is pointed out to have many advantages over the study of the more mature offender, because "the effects of alcoholism, morphinism, years of social degradation, the evil results of imprisonment, and the never-to-be-forgotten inexorable laws of mental habit render difficult the later apperception of beginnings." Healy would underline, with much justice, the fact that mental habits obscure causative factors, acknowledging at the same time that mature types do also present diagnostic facts which have genetic value. The study was delimited to recidivists—"individuals who, in spite of reprimands, warnings, probation, or punishment, proceed to further anti-social deeds"—as those among the court cases most jeopardizing to society and as constituting therefore the most crucial social problem.

The material summarized concerns 1,000 cases, and "most of the subjects were adolescents, the average age between fifteen and sixteen years." This makes the material handled by the volume of value, not merely to those dealing with court cases, but to those concerned with the problems of vocational guidance. Book I, which includes the first 182 pages, deals with "General Data"; Book II (pp. 182-830), with "Causes, Types, Causative Factors." The latter presents as well as any printed word could do so a descriptive account of the individuals who find their way to such a clinic, the procedure of the examination, an analysis of its results, and a grouping of causative factors thereby isolated. This emphasis upon the description and prognosis for a long series of individual cases has obvious merit for the student. For the clinician, on the other hand, in a laboratory of his own, facing an equally long and carefully worked-out series of individual case records, it is rather Book I and that portion of Book II which is concerned with the grouping of causative factors that are of interest. Healy himself regards the method of searching out and establishing the relative value of the several causative factors as one of the more valuable contributions of his study. This mode of procedure he sets forth as follows: "We have entirely enumerated the factors by first setting them in rough chronological order as they apparently produce the career of the offender, afterward estimating them as far as possible in their relative importance" (p. 127). Under the heading "Statistics," there is presented "first the

enumeration of counter factors,—under their general heads and then as analyzed in detail. The latter will include findings concerning the equipment of offenders, both mental and physical. Then will come the table of offenses, and finally statistics and charts of facts which have significance for students of criminology in general. The latter are given for what they are worth; some of them point one way and some another. Certain of the special findings, for instance those on heredity, deserve to carry great weight" (p. 130).

The reviewer is most interested perhaps in Healy's emphasis, for practical purposes, upon the need for mental examination before any social statistics can have meaning or value. The student is told to look critically at the older classifications where "the statistics we are offered concerning criminals, whether about their deeds, their ears, their religious faith, or what not, are presented without knowledge of essential facts, such as whether or not they were mentally defective; and thus lead us nowhere for purposes of practical treatment. . . . In the light of these facts and of the constructive possibilities of our own findings we have become certain that the development of mental tests and psychological analysis is doing more toward the establishment of true theories and of practical classification of criminals than all other methods of study combined. In the past there has been great mistake of incidental for essential" (p. 17). It is only fair to quote also "there are many cases in which sole dependence on the psychological standpoint would be a grave mistake. Repeatedly I have asserted the opinion, still held, that it is very difficult to decide which in general is the most important investigatory vantage ground—social, medical, or psychological—the point is clear, however, that one can most surely and safely arrive at remedial measures through investigation of the mental factors." Again—"Finding direct mental determination of delinquency demonstrates the prime consideration of the mental life of the individual as being the straightforward way of discriminating most causal factors. Not only is this shown by the undue proportion of feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, and insanity among delinquents, but also by the mental disappointments, irritations, and conflicts which very frequently are at the roots of offending careers. Our groupings by weight of the facts show much more necessary allegiance to psychological than to any other classification of both offenders and causes" (§120, p. 163). These statements from one who is a physician even before he is a psychologist have much weight.

Healy's listing of social, mental, and physical conditions, etc., in order of causative factors is as follows:

GROUP II

SUMMARY OF CAUSATIVE FACTORS BY GROUPS AND TOTALS IN 823 CASES—
560 MALES, 263 FEMALES

Group of Causative Factors	No. of Times Appeared to Be Main Factor	No. of Times Appeared to Be Minor Factor
Mental abnormalities and peculiarities.	455	135
Defective home conditions, including alcoholism	162	394
Mental conflict.	58	15
Improper sex experiences and habits.	46	146
Bad companions.	44	235
Abnormal physical conditions, including excessive development.	40	233
Defects of heredity.	0	502
Defective or unsatisfied interests, including misuse or nonuse of special abilities	16	93
Defective early developmental conditions.	0	214
Mental shocks.	0	3
Deliberate choice.	1	0
Sold by parent.	1	0
Use of stimulants or narcotics.	0	92
Experience under legal detention.	0	15
Educational defects extreme.	0	20
	823	2,097

These statistics indicate that educational defects of extreme order are primal causes in no case, secondary causes in 20 cases; that in only 162 cases is defective home conditions, including alcoholism, the chief cause of delinquency. Another significant fact is pointed out in the tables on p. 148, where it is shown that in 525 families which have more than one child only one child is delinquent, while in only 48 such families were all the children delinquent. Of the 1,000 families there were 119 instances in which the delinquent was an only child. "The significance of the above figures is great for anyone who would attribute to family conditions *per se* the largest share of the causation of delinquency." Mental abnormalities and peculiarities, on the other hand, it should be noted, figure as the estimated main cause of delinquency in 513 cases.

It would be impossible in a short review to do justice to the multitude of detail and analysis of this volume. One of its chief merits is that it brings together the material which is so scattered in the literature of this subject, and which cannot afford to be overlooked by anyone who intends to apply

psychological methods to the problems of the delinquent. The tests involve a series which admits of a very fair analysis of a large variety of mental capacities and characteristics. The need for an exact duplication of the method of conducting the tests and for a trained experimenter to apply them is clearly insisted upon. The account of these tests, as first published in *Tests for Practical Mental Classification*, by Healy and Fernald, cited the record of but a single individual in the way of resultant scores. The present volume adds much desired norms and indicates the range of variation of the group as a whole. Need for standardization of the tests upon normal individuals is emphasized, and the volume cites in brief such standards as have already been set by Dr. Clara Schmitt, one of the Institute's former assistant psychologists.² Even yet the records of the court cases in the mental tests as presented in this volume do not do full justice to the amount of data in the files, the further analysis and presentation of which would be of so much value as to merit an early publication in greater detail.

JEAN WEIDENSALL

LABORATORY OF SOCIAL HYGIENE
BEDFORD HILLS, N.Y.

Education through Play. By HENRY S. CURTIS. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. xix+355. \$1.50.

America's growing appreciation of organized play has not as yet found expression in our public-school systems. It is the aim of this book to hasten the adoption of an adequate play policy within the schools; and to this end the English and German methods, and that in force in Gary, Indiana, are attractively presented. The thoroughness of treatment is based upon the author's initial preparation, his extensive observation in Europe and America, his practical administrative work in the field, his lecture courses on the subject, and the six years spent in writing the volume.

Within the field treated the argument is uniformly convincing, but from a sociological point of view the whole tendency toward centralized and congregate play has yet to reckon with the rights of the home.

As matters now stand, the home has a grievance which the play movement cannot ignore. In the first place, if large provision for public

² A more detailed account of Dr. Schmitt's investigation has since been published: Clara Schmitt, *Standardization of Tests for Defective Children*, The Psychological Monographs, Vol. XIX, No. 3.

play condones the present industrial aggression whereby the home area is made less and less adequate to the proper rearing of children, if it transfers the happiness and loyalty of children from the normal home center and the wholesome family group to any secondary institution whatsoever, a net loss will result. Also if public play tends to allay just agitation for childhood and family rights as against ignorant and greedy real-estate methods, so that we have a form of public philanthropy rather than the reality of public justice, the result will be a net loss.

Again, it is a fair question as to how far public measures should supplant parental responsibility. There must be some limit to the temptation to parental indifference or laziness in turning children over almost wholly to school and playground. The home must not be robbed of its legitimate functions, and the play of parents with their own children in their own homes ought to be encouraged.

However, the author does not set out to consider this phase of the subject, and it is quite probable that a proper and generous play program in the schools will ultimately diffuse its benefits to all the homes concerned. The need of enriching the family experience as such is even greater than the demand that play be institutionalized.

ALLAN HOBEN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The History of Melanesian Society. By W. H. R. RIVERS. Cambridge: The University Press, 1914. 2 vols. Pp. xii+400; 610.

Dr. Rivers is one of those students, fairly numerous in England, who have been seduced from their original fields of research by the superior charms of anthropology. His earlier interest lay in the field of physiological psychology, and it was in the capacity of psychologist that he went to Torres Straits as a member of the Cambridge Expedition, which investigated so exhaustively the natives of this region. He won his scholastic spurs by the publication in 1906 of *The Todas*, a work distinguished by an almost meticulous devotion to the niceties of scientific method. In 1911 he was president of Section H at the British Association meeting in Portsmouth, where the writer of this review had the pleasure of listening to his noteworthy address on "The anthropological analysis of Culture." During the last few years he has published a substantial valuable volume, *Kinship and Social Organization* (1914),

a number of essays,¹ equally important to the sociologist and the anthropologist, and finally the present extensive work on Melanesia. Its title will sound strange, perhaps, to those who had supposed that savage and barbarous peoples have no history and that a sociological survey must necessarily deal with a community advanced in culture. But these two volumes, as others recently published, are indicative of the present tendency in anthropology to dwell on the historical relations of peoples and to interpret these relations from a broadly social point of view.

The Melanesian Islands, stretching in a long, semicircular chain from New Guinea to the southeast, have figured prominently in anthropological literature since Bishop Codrington in 1885-91 published his fine book, *The Melanesians*. It is in the first place as a supplement to Codrington's account that Dr. Rivers prepared his own work. He visited those parts of Melanesia under English control, namely, the Solomon Islands, the Santa Cruz Islands, the Banks Islands, and the New Hebrides. He did not visit the Loyalty Islands and New Caledonia, which are under the control of France. The omission of any account of these islands, too little known, is a regrettable, though doubtless unavoidable, circumstance. His account of the Bismarck Archipelago, until last year a German possession, is comparatively brief and is based on the recent investigations of German scholars in the archipelago. On the other hand we are favored with new information from Fiji, where Polynesian and Melanesian elements are intermingled, and from Tonga, Samoa, and the Hawaiian Islands. Dr. Rivers was able to supplement his own observations with much material gained from native teachers of the Melanesian Mission.

Dr. Rivers puts forth his book "primarily as a study in method." In order the more clearly to differentiate his facts from his conclusions he has divided the work into two parts. The first part is devoted to a narrative of field work in the various islands. The second and larger part presents the inferences to be drawn from the material there gathered. This procedure, though not without advantages from the scientific point

¹ "On the Origin of the Classificatory System of Relations," in *Anthropological Essays Presented to Edward Burnett Tylor*, Oxford, 1907; "The Genealogical Method of Social Inquiry," *Sociological Review*, III (1910), 1-13; "The Sociological Significance of Myth," *Folk-Lore*, XXIII (1912), 307-311; "The Primitive Conception of Death," *Hibbert Journal*, X (1912), 393-407; "The Disappearance of Useful Arts," in *Festschrift Tillagnad Edward Westermarck*, Helsingfors, 1912; "The Contact of Peoples," in *Essays and Studies Presented to William Ridgeway*, Cambridge, 1913; and "Kin, Kinship," in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VII.

of view, does not conduce to an attractive literary presentation of the evidence. Needless to say, Dr. Rivers, in common with modern ethnographers, has been scrupulously careful in collecting his data and in pointing out the varying degrees of their trustworthiness. His work is a good example of those minute and detailed ethnographic descriptions now happily in fashion.

As a theoretical student Dr. Rivers occupies a position intermediate on the one side between those who accept the evolutionary view of society, the unity of the human mind, and the existence of certain "elementary ideas" common to mankind, and on the other side between those whose sole interest lies in the problems of the geographical diffusion of cultures. Indeed, he seeks in a measure to reconcile these opposing viewpoints by the demonstration that while in Melanesia social institutions have been modified chiefly as the result of the influence of immigrant peoples, the modifications, once introduced, have been slow and gradual and have followed an evolutionary development. This "middle-of-the-road" attitude, this attempt to preserve a standpoint essentially evolutionary while using a method essentially historical, will not please the extremists of either school. But to others it will appear as additional evidence of the author's poise and balance of mind.

The material presented in Vol. I is somewhat scrappy in character, for Dr. Rivers does not attempt to make a complete survey of Melanesian culture, but only to present those features of social organization inadequately stressed or entirely omitted in Codrington's work. Perhaps the most valuable information here presented relates to the secret societies (chaps. iii-v). They are very numerous in the Banks Islands. The islet of Mota, little more than two miles in diameter, contains no less than seventy-seven of these bodies. The full account of the complicated association called *Sukwe* (Codrington's *Syqe*) reveals the fact that there exists between it and the *Tamate* societies a definite connection hitherto unsuspected. How vast is the influence exerted on the people by these organizations and how beneficial on the whole is their social functioning are points here well brought out (I, 139 ff.). It is impossible, within the limits of this review, to dwell on the many other aspects of Melanesian life—the social structure, the systems of relationship, the institutions of marriage, property, and money—which have been carefully set forth in this first volume.

The second volume and part is devoted to the author's interpretation of the evidence. He reaches the general conclusion that Melanesian culture, as we now know it, is the result of the interaction of two

immigrant peoples, denominated, respectively, the kava people and the betel people, who came from the west by way of the Malay Archipelago. To the changes introduced by these immigrants must be attributed, in the author's opinion, the institution of individual marriage and the social recognition of paternity, displacing the original sexual communism and gerontocracy. Similarly the secret societies are believed to have developed from the totemic groups of immigrants who settled in relatively small numbers among an aboriginal population. The suggestion is highly plausible, though it seems unnecessary to accept Dr. Rivers' further explanation that the secrecy of these associations was due "to the need felt by the immigrants for the practice of their totemic rites away from the alien population among which they found themselves" (II, 222). As a matter of fact the dramatic and magical performances of totemic clans in Australia, Torres Straits, and New Guinea usually bear a secret or semi-secret character and are confined to the initiated members of the totemic group immediately concerned. To the fusion of alien peoples is attributed the dual organization of Melanesian society, as well as many other Melanesian institutions. Dr. Rivers endeavors also to set forth the probable interrelations of Melanesian-Polynesian culture with that of Indonesia. He even ventures to speculate on the relations of Oceanic culture to that of the world in general. But he frankly admits on how slender a basis of fact all hypothesis of the origin and diffusion of Oceanic culture must for the present rest.

The technical consideration of the validity of Dr. Rivers' argument must be left to special students of things Melanesian. To the sociologist with a dawning interest in anthropology it will be well to point out in the first place that the author has proved pretty conclusively that special features of systems of relationship are the direct result of social conditions and that distinctions in nomenclature are "definitely associated" with distinctions in conduct (II, 45). He may be said to have now made untenable the view that the classificatory system means nothing more than a collection of terms of address. In the second place, he has greatly strengthened the argument for sexual communism and the monopolistic control of women by the old men as the earlier form of social life, at least in the Melanesian area (II, 59, 67 ff., 140 ff.). In the third place, he has shown the vast importance in rudimentary society of the institution of marriage as a regulator of descent, inheritance, and succession (II, 145). In the fourth place, he has made it at least extremely probable that the dual organization of society may arise from a process of fusion, and not, as most students still hold, to the fission of a pre-

viously undivided commune (II, 557 ff.). And finally, the present reviewer cannot resist expressing his feelings of satisfaction that Dr. Rivers adequately emphasizes "the great value of secret societies and secret cults as repositories of ancient cultures" (II, 592).

It remains to say that these two volumes, in their format, are a fine example of the English printers' art. A broad page, clear large type, excellent paper, and serviceable binding make them easy to read and a pleasure to own. There are six full-page maps in black and white, a large colored map of Melanesia, twenty-five plates from photographs, and a number of illustrations in the text. An ampler index would have been desirable.

HUTTON WEBSTER

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

The Natural History of the State. By HENRY JONES FORD. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915. Pp. viii+188. \$1.00.

"The purpose of this treatise is to examine the foundations of political science from the naturalistic point of view established by the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859" (p. 1). The first problem attacked and the one to which most of the volume is devoted is "whether or not in the formation of the human species the operations of natural selections have been direct or indirect, individual or social" (p. 12). The question is approached from the viewpoint of the data of biology, psychology, linguistics, and anthropology, respectively, the writer reaching the following conclusions: "(1) Although biology indicates different modes of evolutionary process it is at present inconclusive as to the mode pursued in the case of man. (2) Psychology, linguistics, and anthropology indicate that the mode pursued in the case of man must have been the process distinguished as social evolution and not the process distinguished as individual evolution. (3) When appeal is made to evolutionary doctrine for social and political criteria, the only hypothesis that can be regarded as having solid claims to consideration is that of social evolution" (p. 145). From this it is argued that the hypothesis of social evolution may be regarded as sufficiently probable to warrant consideration of its political and social implications.

According to this theory, the undivided commune is the primordial form of the state. It conceives the differentiation of man from the antecedent

animal stock. "Thus 'the state' is the permanent and universal frame of human existence. Man can no more get out of the state than a bird can fly out of the air." It then follows, according to Professor Ford, that the state includes society and that society is not a part of the whole but is coextensive with it. The author's position here is rather more confusing than useful and it is certainly in conflict with the accepted usages of the terms employed. It amounts to the identification of the term "state" with "society" and results in consequent confusion.

In the discussion of the state as an organism the work is more persuasive and useful. The writer makes it clear that the treatment of the state as an organism does not depend upon supposed physiological parallels between animal life and state life, "but solely on the nature of its own being as a product of social evolution." "Profound changes of environment produce profound changes of government. State species unable to effect readjustments of structure to meet new conditions, tend to disappear, so that from age to age there is a succession in state species analogous to that which takes place in biological species" (p. 176). The object of the state is the perfecting of the human life, and the social value of any institution is to be determined, not by individual advantage, but by the advantage to society.

The volume is a very interesting and instructive survey of the conflicting evidence as to the social nature of evolution. Its main value, however, will be in providing a basis for an evolutionary viewpoint of government and society as distinguished from the obsolete theories of government and the state based upon the social contract and its resulting theories of individual rights. In this respect it furnishes an excellent approach to the modern view of the theory and function of the state.

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Social Legislation in Iowa. By JOHN E. BRIGGS. Iowa City:

State Historical Society of Iowa, 1915. Pp. xiv+444. \$2.00.

This volume contains an account of Iowa's social legislation from 1838 to 1914. "The work is chiefly a statement of the contents of laws without their legal verbiage; it is not an effort to account for cause, effect, or value" (p. x). The legislative history is divided into periods represented by the official codes of 1851, 1860, 1873, and 1897, and it is upon these codes that the history is based. Naturally enough, more than half of the volume is devoted to the final period from 1898 to 1914,

the period that perhaps will always be noted because of its amount and extent of social legislation.

The material in the final period is arranged topically, a chapter being devoted to each of the following subjects: dependents, defectives, delinquents, pensioners, laborers, public health, public safety, public morals, and domestic relations.

In the opening chapter the writer essays the difficult task of defining social legislation, it being admitted that, generally speaking, all legislation may be considered social. "At the same time," the author argues, "it is clear that certain statutes affect the welfare of society much more directly and vitally than others; and these constitute the body of the legislation which would be designated as social" (p. 4). Again, in defining social legislation the author declares that "above all it consists of those protective measures the object and purpose of which is to effect certain changes in the conditions of human life. . . . Social legislation aims to control human weaknesses and to develop the habit of self-reliance. It deals with adverse conditions the causes of which are founded on natural phenomena and human association" (p. 6). It thus appears that to a large extent at least the distinction between social and other legislation is one of degree. It would not include "such purely political measures as relate to the form and organization of the various departments of government" nor those activities "which are so completely dominated by the economic factors as to warrant the ignoring of the social element," such as the control of corporate interests or the regulation of commerce, though it would include such matters as mothers' pensions and minimum-wage laws. This conception of social legislation is as consistently adhered to throughout the volume as its indefinite nature would seem to permit.

The work has been well done and affords an excellent opportunity for an interesting and valuable comparison of the prevalent theories regarding the scope and functions of government as represented by the legislative enactment of the several periods. It will also be of value to the practical student of government and legislation. A perusal of the volume will convince one of the author's observation that the legislation has been a question of expediency rather than of principle. This oft-repeated criticism of American lawmaking seems amply justified in the experience of Iowa. An excellent and exhaustive index has added materially to the value of the volume.

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Scandinavian-American. By ALFRED O. FONKALSRUD, PH.D., with the collaboration of BEATRICE STEVENSON, PH.D. Minneapolis: K. C. Holter Publishing Co., 1915. Pp. 167.

This is the sort of book of which we may anticipate many more from representatives of different nationalities as they become able to look at themselves objectively but before they have lost sympathy and linguistic connection with their parent stock. This book is based on a Doctor's thesis at New York University and shows some of the limitations of a work written for such a purpose.

We are given the romantic and traditional as well as the historical background of the Scandinavian, and an account of the immigration and settlement in America. A great deal is made of the racial qualities which are manifested by North Europeans, and especially the Germans, in common with the Scandinavians, the word "race" being used somewhat loosely. It is unfortunate that more definiteness is not used in distinguishing Norwegians, Swedes, and Danes, for notwithstanding their close relationship, their institutions are separate and their nationalisms often antagonistic.

The Scandinavian assimilates too quickly; he forgets his language and is unable consciously to contribute to America much that is of value in his institutions. In recent years increasing efforts have been made to prevent the rapid loss of language. This has been done chiefly by the Lutheran church, to which the vast majority of the Scandinavians belong. The purpose is partly nationalistic, but mostly religious, and a great many schools have been founded, including high schools and colleges. The church is the most significant force in the life of the Scandinavian-American, and is described at some length. The economic, political, literary, and social contributions to American life are also set forth.

HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER

OBERLIN COLLEGE

The Industrial and Commercial Schools of the United States and Germany. By FREDERICK WILLIAM ROMAN, PH.D. New York: Putnam, 1915. Pp. xv+352. \$1.50.

This volume is the outcome of an investigation of the German school system, made by the author, who was commissioned by Governor Beckham, of Kentucky, to report the results of such an investigation to the State Superintendent of Education of Kentucky. While in Germany he took a course of instruction at Berlin University on the purposes and

methods of the continuation schools, thus gaining a better basis of interpretation. The results of his investigation first appeared in Germany in the German, and were later added to and published in the present volume. The twenty-one chapters offer an intelligent prospectus of the essential features of the commercial and industrial systems developed in the two nations, Germany and the United States.

A comparison of the literary training of the two countries shows that "Germany graduates 15 to 20 per cent more of her pupils from the eighth grade, and 25 to 30 per cent more of the pupils of the sixth grade" than does the United States. The attendance of children in the schools of American cities of 8,000 or more inhabitants is about two months short of that of the pupils of the German schools, while for the remaining two-thirds of American pupils the time devoted to school is less than one-half that of those of Germany. Hence America has much to accomplish toward giving its youth an equally good preparation for taking up vocational training (p. 22).

Germany's system of practical education began in the efforts of the church in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to secure a higher culture among its people. It established continuation schools and used its Sunday schools for industrial and practical training, of course with the view of strengthening the church. Although the various German states gradually established continuation schools to displace the commercial and industrial Sunday schools, in spite of the breaking up of the guilds, of the apprenticeship system, of the appearance of modern industrialism and capitalism, not much was accomplished by the state system of public education prior to 1870 (chap. ii). After that date the transition to the German system as now so fully developed took place rapidly (chaps. iii-vii). Two items of importance in the further development of the German system absorb attention: whether professionally trained teachers or men in industry shall teach in the continuation schools, and how teachers in these schools may be further prepared. At present, most of the instruction is given by part-time teachers, but there is a rapid increase in the number of full-time teachers in Prussia. In industrial and commercial continuation schools instructors are preponderatingly drawn from the body of public-school teachers, although there is a rapid growth in the number of teachers from other vocations. While in guild and family schools the number of teachers

is small, the same school teachers are given a high appraisal on the teaching efficiency of teachers drawn from practical workers. An effort is made to give teachers drawn from non-teaching callings a pedagogical training (chap. viii).

A classification and the statistics of the commercial and industrial schools of the United States are given, and the present tendencies in the movement toward a more efficient system of industrial education are indicated (chaps. ix-xviii). Our schools are much less fundamental in the nature of the training subjects than are those of Germany, although they seem to provide a very efficient readiness for taking up the actual work of business. This is especially true of commercial schools. Germany has developed nothing of a private nature educationally which in the volume of its business compares with our correspondence schools. The author notes that scarcely anything about American education astounds the German so much as the account of the growth of such correspondence schools as that at Scranton. Indeed, the facts astound an American, and, as the author points out, indicate great shortcomings in our public-school system. It is surprising how extensively such schools of America have developed a student clientèle in Europe and Australasia.

Chaps. xx and xxi deal with the economic importance of commercial and industrial education, and with the effect of such training on the morals and habits of individuals. After discussing the various explanations given to account for Germany's industrial greatness, the author says: "one comes to the conclusion that it was not this thing nor that, nor any one of a dozen things, but that the combined influences of racial temperament—such as economy, hard work, integrity, etc.—an harmonious sentiment and action on the part of the Government, manufacturers, and labor organizations, have played a great rôle in making Germany industrially great. The schools are the cause and also the result of these same influences" (p. 357).

Professor Roman has succeeded in portraying in a most interesting and fruitful manner the significant elements in the educational systems of Germany and the United States relative to the topics treated. The volume is useful for either a reference work or a text.

JOHN M. GILLETTE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

Affirmations. By HAVELOCK ELLIS. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. 2d ed., with a new Preface. 8vo. Pp. xii+252. \$1.75.

More than once it has occurred to me to reflect whether anyone is doing quite so much for the study of sociology at the present moment as

Havelock Ellis. The six volumes of his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* have done more than anything else to lift the taboo from the study of sexual questions and to put the reproductive field among the regions within which we seek to establish a rational control.

The present charming volume deals with Nietzsche, Casanova, Zola, Huysmans, St. Francis, and others, and its interest for the sociologist lies in the recognition that "there is a literature which is not all art—the literature of life. Literature differs from design or music by being closer to life, by being fundamentally not an art at all, but merely the development of ordinary speech, only rising at intervals into the region of art. It is so close to life that largely it comes before us much as the actual facts of life come before us. So that while we were best silent about the literature of art, sanctified by time and the reverence of many men, we cannot question too keenly the literature of life. In this book I deal with questions of life as they are expressed in literature. Throughout I am discussing morality as revealed or disguised by literature."

W. I. THOMAS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Outlines of Sociology. By FRANK W. BLACKMAR, PH.D., and JOHN LEWIS GILLIN, PH.D. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. viii+586. \$2.00.

This new (revised) textbook in sociology is probably more symptomatic of the newer synthetic tendencies of the science than any other, a fact which is exhibited in its defects as well as in its virtues. As an attempt to take the best from the leading sociological and anthropological writers and to form this material into an organized presentation of the chief facts regarding the evolution and organization of society it is to be commended, though this task has not been performed with anything like finality. In fact, its chief weakness is the imperfect and sometimes poorly proportioned way in which its data have been organized.

Three introductory chapters on classifications and relations are founded largely upon Giddings and Ross. Indeed, the influence of these two sociologists seems to be well marked in the book as a whole. Thirteen chapters on social evolution deal primarily with the development of typical social institutions and controls. While these chapters are decidedly uneven in value, they provide good material for class study and discussion. Parts III, IV, and V are concerned with different aspects of the problem of social control. Part III analyzes briefly—largely

according to Ross and Giddings—the psychic factors at work in the social situation. Part IV attempts to analyze and formulate the ideals which function effectively in society. Thus these two parts emphasize primarily the psychic factors and processes and apparently obscure in considerable measure for the time being a larger emphasis upon geographic and economic factors which may be discovered in the earlier part dealing with the evolution of institutions. But in Part V, “Social Pathology,” the authors get back, by implication at least, to a stronger emphasis upon the environmental and economic factors, here considered as important causes of social maladjustment.

Part VI consists of two chapters on methods of social investigation, and Part VII of two chapters on the history of sociology.

In the reviewer's opinion the best thought-out and organized chapters are those dealing with the evolution and problems of the family, the state, and religion; the social forces; poverty and crime; and the methods of social investigation. In general one might say that the book is best where it deals with practical problems. It is also generally satisfactory where it retails the recent findings regarding the evolution of social institutions and of institutional control. Perhaps it is least satisfactory as a synthesis of the various theories of the nature and organization of society. Here the text is often burdened with the statement of many theories which are not always properly correlated; it takes on too much the appearance of a collection of incompletely edited data, which remind one of lecture notes better suited to the classroom than to a textbook. Here too, at times, there are disturbing signs of controversy, resulting in a lack of definiteness of orientation which might have been avoided by less involved, if more dogmatic, statement. From the standpoint of class use this constitutes a serious fault. But with all these defects of assimilation, and possibly of organization, the advantages of the synthetic method as here applied are in the ascendancy, because of the wider range of social facts which it brings to the student's attention, if for no other reason.

One omission which many will be slow to excuse is the failure to include a treatment of the biological factors, especially of the eugenic factors, in society. On the other hand, it may be urged that the authors go far too much into detail regarding methods of administering charity and that they might as well have omitted (as far as elementary students are concerned) some of the more scholastic chapters on classification. Certainly a greater unity of treatment and a better sense of proportion, such as might have been secured by greater consistency and definiteness

of viewpoint, would have improved the text for classroom purposes. On the other hand, the writing is usually clear and the occasional illustrative references to economic and political conditions and needs in our time do much to keep the interest alive and to give it a functional orientation. While no set treatment of the biological factors in society is offered, the authors range themselves by implication with those who use the term "instinct" loosely, so as to cover a wide range of tendencies which many sociologists now classify as learned (pp. 83, 86, 121, 175, 176, 251, etc.). They commit themselves to belief in "moral inheritance" (p. 400) and accept the phrase "moral imbecile" (p. 491) as a legitimately descriptive term. Therefore in their attitude toward the question of the relative merits of heredity and environment as social factors they are by no means as critically radical as they are regarding economic questions; which fact may possibly be regarded as further evidence of incomplete synthesis of viewpoints. A purely mechanical difficulty, but one which the reviewer finds serious enough to deserve mention, is the lack of continuity in the numbering of chapters throughout the whole of the book.

However, it is too much to hope for a perfect textbook at this stage in the development of sociology. To have advanced definitely some steps in the process of necessary synthesis and elimination of sociological theory and data is in itself a gratifying achievement.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. By THORSTEIN VEBLEN. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. viii+324. \$1.50.

The person who has become wearied of *mere* descriptions of institutions and cultures should be delighted with this book. It is an explanation of German culture rather than a mere description, and is of course written from a genetic point of view. It does not attempt to present recondite materials or historical data that are not generally accessible and well known. But it does weave together these well-known facts of German history and the general principles of the social sciences into a coherent and convincing synthesis. It is an excellent example of an explanation of German culture. This explanation is a concrete example of the Veblenian interpretation of history.

The English culture is given almost as much attention as the German; this is because of the necessity of a term of comparison and because the German situation is in many ways a derivative of the English. The book is thus a correlation and comparison of these different and somewhat divergent lines of cultural development. But it is not an addition to the war literature, for it was projected before the outbreak of the war and makes few direct references to the war. Nevertheless such an explanation of the two cultures must, of course, be of value to a person who may be interested in explaining the war.

The general run of the argument is that the divergence in cultures is not due to differences in racial stocks, for both are dolicho-blond hybrids, and there is no essential racial difference. The divergence is a matter of habituations, of "use and wont," and is to be explained largely by economic and especially by industrial causes.

Two principles of outstanding importance appear in this account of the divergent cultures, namely, hybridism and borrowing. In a hybrid population there is a large facility for acceptance of novel ideas from the outside and a wide range of adaptation in all the arts of life, but this diversity prevents any scheme of "use and wont" from attaining a definite stability or authenticity. Because the North-European peoples are hybrids they borrow freely, and easily incorporate new elements into their old systems, but they give only a permissive consent to social control and easily break away from established systems of culture. Hybridism does not explain the divergence of the English and German cultures, but it does explain much that is common to both of them.

Borrowing is the second principle used by Professor Veblen. A technological element borrowed from the outside is introduced into a new culture without the system of wasteful, superstitious, or other practices that enveloped it in its original habitat. Consequently this borrowed element has a chance to develop more consistently. But in the course of time it produces an effect on its new cultural surroundings until they become adapted to each other. Thus England, in early Tudor times, borrowed many elements of the handicraft system from the Continent and developed this system to a greater extent than it had previously been developed, being assisted in this by her insular position and by her consequent freedom from warfare. This new technological system reacted on the culture, and a system of individualism and democracy, with the principle of "live and let live," was established, while the "industrial slack" was taken up by the wasteful practices of the leisure class. In the meantime Germany was getting

a more thorough training along the old line and had developed a dynastic system of control in which loyalty and fealty were the chief virtues. Into this culture about the middle of the last century the technological system which had been borrowed from England was introduced. It was, in Germany, freed from the wasteful display characteristic of it in England and was put to the uses of the dynastic state and thus carried to a high point of development. But the technology has not yet had time to work its effects on the cultural system, or to cause a renunciation of the dynastic state and its attendant virtues. Germany today differs from England because she is still in her novitiate so far as the technological system is concerned. The modern technological system of Germany is out of harmony with the mediaeval state, and the culture must be modified in the course of time.

This book is of first-rate importance from several points of view—as an analysis of the nature and causes of institutions, as a study of the industrial revolution in Germany and England, as a general interpretation of history illustrated from the histories of Germany and England, as an explanation of the present war, as a continuation of the author's former study of the leisure class, and as an analysis of such principles as hybridism and borrowing. It is not eulogistic or homiletical, and ethical judgments are studiously avoided. The trenchant irony is the only indication of disapproval.

It is to be regretted that such a remarkable book is marred by lack of organization, by repetition, and by Professor Veblen's usual cumbrous method of statement.

E. H. SUTHERLAND

WILLIAM JEWELL COLLEGE

Wage-Earning Pittsburgh. "The Pittsburgh Survey." Edited by PAUL UNDERWOOD KELLOGG. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1914. Fully Illustrated. Pp. 582. \$2.50, net.

The task of reviewing a volume to which the reviewer has made a contribution, however slight, is not without embarrassment. In the present case it is undertaken in the hope of serving in some measure as interpreter.

This volume and its twin, *The Pittsburgh District*, bring to a close a unique study of an American industrial community. The Pittsburgh Survey was made without the help of any precedent. It was an experiment, almost an adventure, upon the uncharted sea of social inquiry.

In the years which have passed between 1907 and the appearance of this closing volume in 1914, the study of American cities by the method introduced by the Pittsburgh Survey has become an accepted part of our social activities. The craft of the interviewer has been ennobled, being used in an honest effort to get the simple truth, that its ray might illumine dark corners of industry, unsuspected by all save the workers. Official reports have been made increasingly to serve as raw material for the texture of the tale of the humble life of useful men and women, their needless hardships, their cramped and shortened lives. Statistics have become a means to the end of presenting the life of the people. It is, however, safe to say that no other survey compares with the first one in the breadth and comprehensiveness of its scope, the number and diversity of the inquirers enlisted, and the fertile, constructive imagination contributed by the inventor of the idea.

The sixth and closing volume is divided into four parts, with twenty-four appendices, which alone fill more than 125 pages, as follows:

Part I. "Community and Workshop." By Paul U. Kellogg.

Part II. "Race Studies."

Immigrant Wage-Earners. By Peter Roberts, who needs no introduction to readers of race studies.

A Slav's a Man for A' That. By Alois B. Koukol, whose qualification for writing on his theme is suggested by his work as secretary of the Slavonic Immigrant Society in 1907, when he acted also as investigator of industrial accidents for the Pittsburgh Survey; as pastor of the First Slavonic Presbyterian Church, of Peckville, Pa., 1895-99; as pastor of the Bohemian Brethren Church, of Nelsonville, Tex., 1899-1904; and as an assistant pastor in New York City, 1904-7.

The third and fourth Race Studies deal with:

Mediaeval Russia in the Pittsburgh District. By Alexis Sokoloff, graduate of the University of Moscow and of the Academy of Mines in Vienna, and engineer in Tangier, Morocco.

and finally with

One Hundred Negro Steel Workers. By R. R. Wright, Jr., formerly a field secretary of the Armstrong Association of Philadelphia.

Part III. "Industry," embraces:

Wage-Earners of Pittsburgh. By John R. Commons and William M. Leiserson.

Factory Inspection in Pittsburgh (with special reference to working conditions of women and children), by the reviewer.

Industrial Hygiene of the Pittsburgh District. By H. F. J.

Porter, consulting industrial engineer and expert on fire prevention of the New York State Factory Investigating Commission, and founder of the Efficiency Society.

Sharpsburg: A Typical Waste of Childhood. By Elizabeth Beardsley Butler. This fourth section is the final contribution of a talented and eager inquirer into social conditions, whose work death has since cruelly cut short.

Part IV. "The Reverse Side."

By James Forbes, secretary, for many years, of the Mendicancy Committee of the Charity Organization Society of the City of New York. This peculiarly distressing chapter is a study of:

- I. The Police, an Organism.
- II. The Underworld.
- III. Yeggs.
- IV. Beggars.
- V. Lodging Houses.
- VI. Prostitution.
- VII. Social Police.

An unusual tribute to the Pittsburgh Survey as a whole has recently been made public. Mr. Charles M. Cabot, of Boston, had, as a stockholder in the United States Steel Corporation, protested against certain statements made with regard to the steel industry in a preliminary report distributed in 1908. When these statements were all substantiated, Mr. Cabot determined to make the facts known to his fellow-stockholders, and spent three years in the successful effort to get from the Corporation the list of their names, after which he carried out his purpose. Throughout his few remaining years Mr. Cabot was the unwearied advocate of short working days and weeks, and an apostle of the responsibility of stockholders for the social conditions arising from industries.

Mr. Cabot died in September, 1915, bequeathing to three trustees, of whom Mr. Paul U. Kellogg was named first, the sum of \$50,000 to be used "to procure or encourage or promote the investigation and study of industrial conditions in this country and in the publication of the results of such investigation and study to the end that industrial abuses and hardships of industrial laborers may be known and remedied."

This bequest gives reasonable grounds for hope that the work recorded in the six volumes of the Pittsburgh Survey has only begun, and that *Wage-Earning Pittsburgh* may prove to be, after all, not the end of a task, but a link in a chain of effort.

FLORENCE KELLY

NEW YORK CITY

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Dwellings in Berlin.—The unfavorable housing conditions in Berlin are not caused by ignorance, but by the patronage of the government to a rich minority who own the land and control the town council. The increasing cost of maintaining the wide streets compelled landlords to use every available foot of building space; consequently the blocks were solidly built of tenements five or six stories high around a narrow court. Some of these tenements contain as many as 250 inmates. In 1900, 45 per cent of all households occupied dwellings of only one room, and 70 per cent not more than two rooms. In 1905 there were 726,723 inmates plus 42,599 lodgers in 197,394 dwellings, each dwelling comprising one room and a kitchen. Nearly one and one-half million people live in dwellings of only one room. About one-quarter of the population in 1905 lived in dwellings in every room of which capable of being heated there were from four to thirteen persons. The results of this overcrowding are appalling. Compared with London, Berlin's tuberculosis death-rate is one-half as great again. Of people between fifteen and twenty-five years of age, Berlin's death rate is 30 per cent greater. The proportion of illegitimate births is over 17 per cent as compared to London's 5 per cent. Patriotic citizens have repeatedly advocated the opening of large areas skirting Berlin, and the construction of car lines and tramways to accommodate those desiring to move to the suburbs, but their efforts proved fruitless against the opposition of the rich property-owning minority who cater to royalty and control the housing situation.—T. C. Horsfall, *Town Planning Review*, July, 1915.

J. L. P.

Causes for the Growth of Philadelphia as an Industrial Center.—Many interesting factors have combined to make Philadelphia a center of industry. The happy combination of its earliest heterogeneous settlers, skilled in business and mechanical arts, together with the natural factors which were utilized, gave the city a great advantage in industrial development. The city is located at the confluence of the Delaware and Schuylkill rivers, not far from the sea, and with twenty-five miles of water front. These rivers, a system of canals, turnpikes, and the many railroads connecting it with the surrounding country have made it the center of a large productive area. Its many smaller rivers and creeks together with the large deposits of coal provide cheap power for its mills. Its harbors and shipping facilities promote extensive export and import business, especially in sugar, textiles, tanning, linoleum, oilcloth, bridge steel, armor plate, and locomotives. Its climate is especially favorable to the textile industry. It is called "The City of Homes," with the fewest number of persons per dwelling among the thirty-two largest cities. Rents are cheap, near-by fruit and truck farms provide cheap food, and fuel is likewise cheap. The supply of labor is adequate and skilled, and the extensive system of technical educational institutions provides a relatively high standard of workmanship.—R. Malcolm Keir, *Bulletin of the Geographic Society of Philadelphia*, July, 1915.

J. L. P.

Certain Social Aspects of Invention.—An important problem both for the psychologist and the sociologist is to ascertain, if possible, the factors, individual and social, that are involved in invention. The invention and the perfection of machinery used in the cotton industry presents interesting social phenomena. The flying shuttle invented by Kay in 1733 developed a social crisis by putting 50,000 weavers out of full-time employment and raising the price of cotton thread. To meet this new situation, Arkwright in 1769 invented the jenny to spin cotton thread. This put the people back on full-time employment for a short time, for with these improvements the demand for cotton could not be met by the cotton-growers. This increased demand

for raw cotton produced the cotton gin, invented by Eli Whitney, of Georgia, in 1790, which produced great economic and social effects. The invention of the power loom in 1841 by Cartwright increased the production of cloth, which in turn increased the demand for more clothing and resulted in the invention of the sewing machine by Howe in 1846. In every stage of these inventions, as well as with the other great inventions, society received severe shocks, and new adjustments continually had to be made.—Amy E. Tanner, *American Journal of Psychology*, July, 1915.

J. L. P.

The Movement from City and Town to Farms.—The "Back-to-the-Land" movement is largely localized, and is not for the single-minded purpose of promoting agriculture for agriculture's sake. It does not replace either the agriculture or the people who were the real farmers of the land. The movement is most general in New England and in the Middle and North Central states east of the Mississippi River. Five classes of people are included in this exodus, as follows: (1) Those who own farms and live on them throughout the year. The bulk of such people are failures. They buy farms and move to them with a lack of experience and knowledge of agriculture and marketing, a lack of endurance, and with the visionary purpose of getting rich. (2) A smaller class of those who own the farms and who live on them throughout the year, but who have their main business in a near-by town or city. These farms are small and serve to supplement the wages of the owner by fruit-vegetable- and poultry-raising. (3) The more wealthy class of seasonable renters who have two homes and who make agriculture a mere incident of their country life. (4) Farm tenants and renters who move to the farms on account of city economic pressure. (5) Wage laborers who farm for temporary employment, including those who migrate to the country in the time of harvests and whose labor is generally not satisfactory. The movement to the farm does not offset the movement to the city, either in numbers or in the quality of labor. On the whole it is not desirable and it is only justified as a means of securing health and of relieving extreme economic pressure.—G. K. Holmes, *Yearbook, United States Department of Agriculture*, 1914.

J. L. P.

Artificial Regulation of Wages in Australia.—In 1894 the legislature of Victoria provided for Wages Boards with power to prescribe minimum wages in certain trades where women and children were employed. From this as a beginning has been built up an elaborate system of industrial regulation. Minimum wages are prescribed for nearly all trades and occupations. The hours of labor are regulated. The meal-time, holiday concessions, number of apprentices, and the like are all regulated in minutest detail. All matters that may be the subject of an industrial dispute are considered fit matters for regulation. The tendency has been each year for the regulation of details to increase, and it becomes each year more complex and inelastic. So far the system has never been put to a real test. Australia is in a period of material progress, labor is scarce, and employers have been able to pass on the added costs of increased wages and shortened hours. The system has been advantageous in some respects. Child labor is strictly controlled. Women and child laborers are guaranteed decent factory conditions. The public has been made more sympathetic to the worker's agitation for a higher standard of comfort. It has, however, decreased the efficiency of the laborer by giving him a feeling of security in his employment. The minimum wage established has generally become the standard wage. It has failed to prevent strikes, but has been valuable in settling them after they have actually commenced. The time is probably not far distant when the whole present elaborate system will be abandoned and in its place will be substituted a relatively simple system that will provide a minimum day, a Board of Trade to prescribe a minimum wage from time to time, a system of apprenticeship and industrial education, and special acts fixing the hours of labor and minimum wages for females. This will prescribe a bare standard below which there will be no competition for employment. The whole will be a free play of individual quality, which leads to efficiency and a high standard of living. (George S. Beesby, *Economic Journal*, September, 1915.)

E. B. K.

Militarism and Culture.—Wide circles in foreign countries are at present trying to prove that militarism and culture are opposed in principle. German liberalism has

encouraged this. If we recognize that humanity is more or less consciously wandering toward enlightenment then we may regard *Kultur* "as the totality of those forces, abilities, and developments which support and favor the onward march of human society out of the darkness of a low, miserable, and animal-like life into the light of a higher, richer, more soulful, and more conscious life." The nation has always been the bearer of culture, but a people can only maintain its civilization through national bonds; one of these is militarism. The state is not the end of national life, but it is the most important means which secures this end; consequently we must also accept the militarism which it employs in gaining this end. The nations of the world are not simple partnership combinations, but are very determined competitive combinations. No other people has paid so dearly as the German to learn that national culture without a proper military holding together of the people's energies is doomed. Of course militarism must change with the needs of the state. The geography of a nation is a large factor in this. Thus England believed only in *Marinismus* on account of its insular protection. The German spirit will see to it that this militarism of the German nation will not be misused. In Rome the idea of being a carrier of world-culture came after the state had grown up; in Germany the idea was first and the state grew up afterward. To sum up, to the German of today the following are matters of judgment and conscience: no human culture without national existence, no national existence without national culture, no national culture without a national state, no national state without militarism.—Dr. Kurt de Bra, "Militarismus und Kultur," *Nord und Süd*, August, 1915.

C. C. J.

Is Social Work a Profession?—In order to define what is meant by a profession, let us agree on its six criteria, viz.: professions involve essentially intellectual operations with large individual responsibility; they derive their raw material from science and learning; this material they work up to a practical and definite end; they possess an educationally communicable technique; they tend to self-organization; they are becoming increasingly altruistic in motivation. Tried by this test, plumbing is a handicraft, not a profession; banking is a trade, with certain professional leanings; pharmacy is an arm added to the medical profession but is not itself a profession. The work of the trained nurse is another arm to the physician or surgeon. She carries out orders, subordinates her intelligence to his theory, and is effective in precise proportion to her ability to second his efforts. Such activity is, by our test, of secondary nature and cannot be deemed a profession. But medicine, law, engineering, literature, music, and painting emerge from all clouds of doubt into the unmistakable professions. What of social work? In the technical and strict use of the term, is it a profession? From the bulletins published by the various schools of philanthropy we judge that their activities are intellectual, not mechanical. The worker must possess fine powers of analysis and discrimination, breadth and flexibility of sympathy, sound judgment, skill in using whatever resources are available, and facility in devising new combinations. These operations are assuredly of intellectual character. Is the responsibility of a mediating or an original agency? The engineer works out his problem and puts through its solution; so do the physician, the preacher, the teacher. The social worker takes hold of a case; having localized his problem, he is usually driven to invoke the specialized agency—professional or other—best equipped to handle it. There is illness to be dealt with—the doctor is needed; ignorance requires the school; poverty calls for the legislator, organized charity, and so on. The responsibility for specific action thus rests upon the power he has invoked. The very variety of the situations he encounters compels him to be not a professional agent so much as the mediator invoking this or that professional agency. Would it not, though, be at least suggestive to view social work as in touch with many professions, rather than as a profession in and by itself?—Abraham Flexner, *School and Society*, June, 1915.

E. E. M.

Violent Temper and Its Inheritance.—Reports are now available from a study of 165 families in the history of the antecedents of wayward girls in state institutions. The general problem attacked is: In how far does heredity play a rôle in those traits, usually of a high, "emotional" sort, that lie at the basis of criminal behavior? The first subproblem is the classification of the cases of violent temper occurring in these

families and a determination of their hereditary basis, if there is any. The general method employed is that of research by a field worker into the history of the families concerned, and at times further investigation by a specialist, to discover the traits as exhibited in their natural environment. About a dozen investigators had a part in this study, and previously recorded studies were also drawn upon. The results appear in tables and charts. The study as a whole leads to the following conclusions: (1) The outburst of temper, whether more or less periodic or irregular, and whether associated or not with epilepsy, hysteria, or mania, is inherited as a positive (dominant) trait; typically does not skip a generation; and tends to reappear, on the average, in half of the children of an affected parent. (2) Further, epilepsy, hysteria, and mania are not the causes of the violent tempers frequently accompanying them. Rather the violent outbursts of temper are due to the factor that causes periodic disturbances (possibly paralysis of the inhibitory mechanism?). However, these "tantrums" are likely to be associated with those various neurotic conditions, though they have no necessary connection with them.—Charles B. Davenport, *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, September, 1915. M. T. P.

The Relation between Theology and Sociology.—Theology and sociology are complementary. The corollary of the doctrine of the fatherhood of God is the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. Because man is a social being he is a religious being; apart from his fellow-men he is a non-religious being. The message of the Old Testament leaders was not ceremonialism; God was represented by the prophets as calling the people to righteousness. The social significance of the teachings of Jesus has been generally discovered only within the past generation. Washington Gladden, Josiah Strong, Richard T. Ely, and their followers have given the church a vision of the social significance of the teachings of Jesus that has entirely changed theological thought and is largely changing ecclesiastical polity. The social teachings of Jesus are gathered largely from the Sermon on the Mount and the parables. We are coming to believe that the fundamental purpose of Christ's coming into the world was to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on earth; the church is not an end in itself. Paul's systematic treatise, called Romans, deals with anthropology, theology, and sociology. A survey of the theological and sociological science shows that there is a vital relation between the two. Both in the theological and in the practical aspects of the work of theological seminaries place is being made rapidly for sociology. Considerable improvement is still possible.—E. Guy Talbott, *Biblical World*, September, 1915. M. T. P.

Vocational Education in Brazil.—Vocational education has come from the United States with increased interest. Several schools have been established, the best one being a department in a large engineering school at Porto Alegre. This is an industrial and educational center and receives state and federal aid. The school is free to poor boys. It has three distinct sections—the Elementary School, the Vocational School, and the Commercial Shops. The Elementary School is maintained because so many people do not get a common-school education. The requirements are a minimum age of twelve, good health, and proof that the student is unable to attend any other than a free school. No girls are admitted. Last year the enrolment was over 500. The time required is seven hours a day, five and one-half days a week, thirty-six weeks for the year. After the four-year course is completed, which includes manual arts and the usual elementary studies, the student takes half a year in the shops and then gets an examination. If successful he may choose a profession and take advanced work in the Vocational School. This is a five-year course. At the end of it the most capable get two years of study in Europe at the government's expense. The teachers in the Vocational School are foreigners, while those of the Elementary School are all natives. The Commercial Shops employ hired men to help reduce the expenses of the school. Students receive four cents an hour from the first year on, with an increase as the quality of the work improves. The whole sum is paid to them at graduation. The present crisis has temporarily halted the establishment of vocational schools, but the government has promised the establishment of a similar school for girls.—H. E. Everly, *Manual Training Magazine*, June, 1915. C. C. J.

The German Economy: Industrial Germany Considered as a Factor of War.—

In the face of the economic arguments for the relative impossibility of war, we have one of the most industrial nations, Germany, instigating one of the most terrific of wars. What explains this paradox? In considering the situation we note the very rapid rise of present-day Germany from a poor and rural country to one of the most wealthy and urban of nations. Conspicuous features in this process were the application of every branch of science to every phase of production and business, the relative disappearance of the rural population, and the checking of emigration. More important still was the passage of her industries to a state of economic dependence on other lands and nations. Germany came to depend upon other lands for a large proportion of her breadstuffs, raw materials for manufacture, and capital. Thus German industry and business enterprise compelled the government to enter a course of world politics. Outside markets were developed by premiums and tariffs; German interests were promoted by agents connected with foreign newspapers. Russia became a reservoir of cheap labor; France a similar source of banking resources; other materials were supplied by other nations. German industry had outgrown her own resources, rather than that her population had outgrown her land. The alliance of the imperial government with the industrial interests was perilous to the maintenance of world-peace, because it required that force, if necessary, be used to render other peoples and other territories industrially subservient to German enterprise. And in this England was met as a formidable rival.—Henri Hauser, "L'Alliance économique," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, August-September, 1915. C. C. C.

The City-Manager Plan in Ohio.—Nearly 250,000 people living in eighteen American cities are under city-manager government. Of this number, 175,000 live in Dayton and Springfield, Ohio—cities which are now completing their first year under this type of administration. The most common test of the character of government—though not necessarily the best—is that of economy. Tested from this viewpoint we find that in Springfield the new government has been more economical than the old and has reduced the floating debt; in Dayton the administration has more money than its predecessors; it did not materially reduce the floating debt and did not operate at the usual deficit; and it did pay from current revenues expenses formerly paid in bonds. The charters of Springfield and Dayton are among the few city charters which provide in detail how the city budget shall be made. Their carefully planned detail-budget eliminates the necessity of frequent transfers by ordinance. It is in the purchasing of supplies that the most notable savings have been made. The city managers in both cases are men of engineering training, a fact which may explain the notable progress made by the department of public works. The charter of each city provides for a department of public welfare which directs activities having to do with the social and moral conditions of the citizen—health, charities, recreation, correction, etc. All told, the results achieved have far exceeded those attained in the great majority of municipalities.—L. D. Upson, *American Political Science Review*, August, 1915. E. E. M.

Prophylaxis of Criminal Abortion.—It has often been noted that criminal or intentional miscarriage is a widespread cause of depopulation. Some cases of abortion are spontaneous, the result of physiological accident or abnormality, but from the writer's observation the majority of abortions are purposely induced. Many women suffering from illness as a result of such abortions present themselves at the maternity hospitals, where they receive the same care as do actual mothers. In this case there is danger of physical infection of women in actual confinement. Much greater, however, is the danger of moral contamination, the danger that mothers in associating with women who are shunning motherhood will contract their moral habits. The proper course is to establish special hospitals for the segregation of women who give conclusive physiological evidence of practicing self-abortion. Admission to these hospitals would become disgraceful, and so a check would be put upon the practice. That such a reform might tend publicly to implicate physicians as professional inducers of abortion, and so render them subject to the action of the law, is no objection to be urged against a reform. No more is the truth that the establishment of special hospitals would somewhat depopulate and hence inconvenience the present maternity hospitals

an objection to the reform, but rather an argument for it, inasmuch as this would show the public the extent to which the abuse is now being carried.—Dr. G. Lepage, "La Prophylaxie de l'avortement criminel," *Revue d'hygiène*, August, 1915.

C. C. C.

The Home of the Street Urchin.—In the city the neighborhood often becomes an enlarged and parentless home. At best the street urchin's home is a dirty cell in a vast hive of poor and wretched workers. The neighborhood which the street urchin knows presents a conglomeration of different ideals, morals, and standards. His brothers and sisters appear plentifully, and as their number increases the affection bestowed upon them by their parents grows smaller. The influences of the street alienate the child from his parents. They neglect their duties to the child or do not know what their duties are. No rational punishment is or can be given by the parents. Work takes them away from their child for the larger part of the time. The full effect of such treatment is to render dubious the development of such traits as make for effective citizenship. Inside such a home as the street urchin knows dirt is everywhere present, rags are adequate for clothing, food is unnourishing and improperly eaten, privacy is impossible. Everywhere he meets with corrupting influences.—B. J. Newman, *National Municipal Review*, October, 1915.

C. C. C.

War and Marriage.—One evident effect of the great war upon the women of Germany will be their enormous numerical preponderance over men. This condition involves two possibilities: either celibacy, or more or less discernible, subsurface polygamy. Celibacy will mean a woefully incomplete life and a bitter, unaided struggle for existence on the part of innumerable women. In the light of the halo of glory that now surrounds our men at the front, I realize it is dangerous to speak of the evil in their life, but the facts must be faced. The war, undoubtedly, will be followed by an overwhelming increase of venereal diseases among men. Moreover, a distinguished physician, Dr. A. Niesser, contends that a similar increase of disease among the women left behind will become evident. However, this latter prediction is not probable, because there will be few desirable men remaining behind, due to the fact that the flower of the nation's manhood is at the front, and the average woman left behind will not enter into illicit intercourse without a concurrent affection which springs from her soul. Monogamy is spiritually and socially the highest form of marriage, and any force that tends to replace it by an insidious, semi-legalized polygamy tends to undermine our whole civilization. The increasing number of divorces are due primarily to unfaithfulness on the part of men. This moral turpitude comes from giving free rein to the baser, primitive passions that are liberated by war.—Grete Meisel-Hess, "Krieg und Ehe," *Die neue Generation*, June, 1915.

A. C. K.

In Defense of the Professor Who Publishes.—After a discussion of university ideals and organization to the point of exhaustion, in numberless books and papers, the "professor who publishes" is now advanced to the rank of a "problem," even though his number is very small. The indictment is that he tends to skimp his class work; that the teacher's temperament is not compatible with that of the writer; that the teacher must have "personality," the writer, a certain "aloofness"; and finally that junior members of faculties are pressed to publish their doctrines, often prematurely, and later in life are forced to defend these ideas, as some men are doing today. The accusation is exaggerated, but pressure exists and it is growing. Older colleagues ask, "What has he done?" Writing a book helps a man to perfect his knowledge on the subject; public criticism will force him to do so. Discontent is not likely to flourish in an institution where a man can be judged by his works. The relation of teacher and student today is that of master and apprentice. The student believes in works. Moreover, the professor's time is not all taken up by academic duties and business. He has not the full steel back that many faculty men have. This is a weakness, but it is not the one that is usually charged against him. He is not a "bookworm," and he is not a "pedagogue." He is a man who is trying to do his best, and he is doing it in a very real sense.

It is true that the professor who publishes can be of great service. The use of knowledge to be extended to the public is one of the highest purposes of education. Our institutions of higher learning are not to be judged by the number of books published, but by the quality of the work that is done. The professor who publishes is not a "bookworm," and he is not a "pedagogue." He is a man who is trying to do his best, and he is doing it in a very real sense.

and of greater force in the intellectual world when this right and duty of productive scholarship receives more general recognition.—Alvin S. Johnson, *The Mid-West Quarterly*, July, 1915. C. C. J.

Race Segregation in the United States.—After the Civil War and the abolition of slavery the North for a time obstructed the natural adjustment of the relations of the freedmen and their former masters. But happily the mongrelization policy of Stevens and Sumner failed, and the white and black populations of the South are again highly prosperous and rapidly progressing. The most conspicuous feature of the present relations of the races is their complete segregation in every department of life except the industrial, and even there the gap is widening. Shortly after the emancipation the negroes withdrew from the white churches that they might more freely indulge in demonstrations of religious feeling than had been possible so long as they were in the churches of their masters. This isolation has given them an opportunity to demonstrate their capacity to build up and manage institutions of their own. The separation in the schools was not voluntary as it was in the case of the churches. But the negro in no sense resents the separation; he rather favors it, as it gives employment for more black teachers. The impoverished condition of the South for a time after the close of the Civil War and the hostile partisan attitude of the federal courts made it both economically and legally inadvisable to require the tram-car companies to provide separate accommodations for their white and colored passengers. But the evils that sprang from the personal contact of the whites and blacks when traveling, especially as the first generation of negroes born free became troublesome, forced the provision for separate cars or compartments for the races. Now the rule is universal throughout the South. In theaters, picture-show houses, and all places of public diversion the separation is complete. In the urban centers the residential areas occupied by the blacks and whites are strictly separate, and neither race is allowed to encroach upon the other. The segregation, natural and legal, along these and other lines has helped the negro to build up his businesses and professions. The principal remaining points of contact between the races are in the relationship of employer and employee and of master and servant. In both these relationships it tends to decrease. As fast as immigrant labor comes into competition with the negro the latter is displaced. As fast as the white race can get other servants the harassing inefficiency of the present generation of untrained negro domestics ceases to receive further toleration.—Philip Alexander Bruce, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1915. E. B. R.

The New Profession for Women.—The book trade in the United States is in a bad way. The Publishers' Co-operative Bureau estimates that one person in 7,300 buys a book in the course of a year, while in Great Britain the ratio is one in 3,800; in France, it is about the same; in Germany and Japan it is rather better; and in Switzerland it is one in 872. Bookstores are disappearing in all our cities and towns. The old-time bookstore, managed by a man who knew books and loved them, is now little more than a tradition. Cultivated men and women have always counted good books among their most valued possessions and one cannot believe that this taste can be sacrificed without definite loss to our civilization. Why do not more people buy books? Many things may enter into the answer to this question, not the least of which may be that the distributing facilities of the book-trade are strangely lacking. Is it not possible that we have in our college-trained women terminal facilities that would bring the books and their buyers together? Training might be provided, just as it has been for those women who want to become librarians or to take up the work of the associated charities, public playgrounds, or other institutions which are shaping social service. The college woman could find congenial employment and earn a fair income by opening a bookstore. By combining with it the selling of periodicals, music, photographs, or tickets to concerts and lectures, the right woman might exercise a large influence in directing the public taste in these matters. In order to succeed, the plan must have the hearty co-operation of the book-publishers of the country. They must sell on such terms as to relieve this local bookstore of its burden of dead stock. It is true that the most educated women in the community are probably doing less to create an intelligent attitude toward property than any other equivalent group of people in our midst, but it is equally true that many college women have demonstrated

their ability to carry on an independent business. As an industrial agent, the young woman of the college class would be handling goods that would make for intelligence and for social betterment. At the same time she would be helping to settle the vexed question of her relation to the economic life of the community.—Earl Barnes, *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1915. E. E. M.

Our Incestuous Marriage.—The mysticism that surrounded the primitive man's ideas of sex has been destroyed by the civilized system of marriage. The system ignores the spirit and stresses the form and the appearance. By nature marriage is the most individual of human acts, but the modern system has socialized and materialized it. The trend of society has been away from individualism and toward communism and so away from the influences making for monogamy and toward those making for communism in sex relations. Primitive society was monogamous because of the mystic attitude toward the marriage relation. An elaborate system of marital rights and taboos in common home life, and periodic separation of husband and wife, kept alive an ideal of personal rights and good manners. The close and constant association of man and woman in the present form of marriage produces a subconscious aversion between the two. Harmony and love are impossible without privacy and personal rights, and these are a mockery in the typical home atmosphere. The near and constant association of brother and sister and other near blood relations is what gave rise to the system of exogamous marriage and the taboo on consanguineous marriage. This same close and constant contact between husband and wife creates the same feelings and sentiments in the married pair. The revolt against this more or less incestuous relation is seen in the divorces and in the increasing number of unmarried and in the large number of childless marriages. The reformed married relation will allow the woman to keep her name, her freedom, her personality, and her private life and interests.—*Forum*, December, 1915. E. B. R.

Smuggling Chinese into North America.—The Chinese exclusion laws of 1882, 1892, and 1902 are not very effective in keeping Chinese laborers out of the country. Their number is still large, if not increasing. Formerly entrance via Canada was greatly preferred, but since the United States officers are permitted to operate on Canadian soil the influx seems to have diminished from that source. Although the Canadian head tax is \$500, over 18,000 Chinese came to that country from 1911 to 1913. The other entry for the Chinese is Mexico. They come in hidden in wagons, in barrels, or dressed as Mexican laborers. Some concerns contract to smuggle one, five, twenty, or a hundred Chinese into the United States. As fast as such men appear they are arrested, tried, and then deported. The courts are pretty severe in their fines and sentences for convicted smugglers. Many Chinese of Mexico, when they wish to return home, come across the border to be arrested and deported at the expense of the United States government. Not until Mexico and Canada will exclude Chinese labor will it be possible to enforce the United States laws consistently.—Dr. Schultze, "Chinesenschmuggel in Nordamerika," *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaft-Biologie*, June, 1915. C. C. J.

Estimates of a Living Wage for Female Workers.—Ten American states have recently passed minimum-wage laws. The wording of the statutes of the different states varies but the clear intent in general is that the normal needs of proper living shall be provided the employee. Estimates as to the actual cost of living fall into three groups: those of \$10.00 or more; those less than \$7.00; and those about \$8.50. The estimates below \$7.00 are attempts to get a bare subsistence figure. Miss Bosworth's investigation of the budgets of 450 women workers of Boston shows that women getting less than \$9.00 to \$11.00 per week do not have incomes to meet their expenditures. The women getting \$9.00 to \$11.00 save a few dollars per year, while those getting more than \$11.00 save on an average of \$31.63. Expenditures for food, clothing, housing, and other necessities are estimated at \$9.00 to \$11.00 per week. The estimate of the Massachusetts Board of Labor is \$10.00 per week. The Social Survey Committee of the Consumers' League of America, in studying the problem of a living wage in Portland, puts the rate above \$10.00. The estimate of the Massachusetts Board of Workers is \$8.20. The board acknowledges this is not a true

living wage for it does not provide for any saving or insurance. Studies in St. Louis and Kansas City closely agree; the former giving \$8.53, the latter \$8.50. Investigation in the Twin Cities of Minnesota give \$8.65 to \$8.82. These differences are due to more liberal allowances for education, vacations, insurance, and saving. The provisions of the state minimum-wage laws vary from \$8.25 to \$9.00 per week. Due consideration of the various estimates will lead to the conclusion that \$8.50 is a fair working basis for a minimum-wage scale.—Charles E. Pearsons, *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association*, July, 1915. C. A. D.

Problems of the War concerning Social Insurance.—On account of the disturbing effects of the war the government of Germany passed on August 4, 1914, laws which it is hoped will so minimize the effects of the war as to leave the whole system of social insurance intact. The first thing done was to extend the term of office of insurance officials to December 31, 1914, and, in case no election could be held by the boards of the societies on account of men being off to the war and on account of business disturbances, to December 31, 1915, as a limit. Before the war only regular physicians could handle applicants for benefits, but this law provided that the services of students of two semesters' clinic experience were acceptable. There was much anxiety as to the ability of the sick-benefit funds to pay all demands. Events have proved, however, that this fear was not justified. The fact is that there has been a relatively smaller number of sick than before the war. This may be due to the fact that those insured are so taken up with the excitement of the war that they give their minor ailments no attention. All the regular allowances continue. The amount to be paid in has been fixed at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the original wages or salary. In case of any local fund not receiving sufficient funds from the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent rate the employer must make up the additional sum required. In spite of all that could be done, considerable suffering has come to families where the husband has been called to the front. Mothers for two weeks previous and six weeks after confinement have been reasonably provided for. No difference is made in case the mother is not married. Accident insurance has not been affected much because as soon as men have gone to the front they are under the care of the government. What the later effects will be cannot be foretold, but an increase of accidents may be expected since many skilled workmen, having gone to the front, are replaced by less skilled. The strenuousness of the war will greatly lessen the power of men to resist disease and the consequences of accident to those returning and going to work will be much more serious. It is believed, however, that the reserve funds are large enough to overcome all difficulty.—Hoffman, "Kriegsfragen der Sozialversicherung," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungs-Wissenschaft*, May, 1915. C. A. D.

The Social Survey and Its Further Development.—The social survey—an attempt to take stock of the conditions affecting the welfare of a certain community or district—is an expression of one phase of a great movement to get exact working knowledge of conditions. The movement has now gained great headway and in some cases is in danger of becoming a fad for unoccupied people rather than a scientific investigation. In scope the survey may be limited or extensive. It may be intensive or merely prospective, and, in either case, may be general or may apply to some special problem. It may be made by either trained experts or by local, untrained workers. Both methods present advantages and disadvantages which must be taken into account in any case. The survey as it exists at present has numerous defects, and some further steps in its development are necessary. (1) It must be made more adaptable to the varying needs of different places and situations. (2) There should be an improvement in the standards and units of measurement used. (3) It is necessary that the evils of commercialized professionalism that are creeping into it should be corrected. (4) There should be a standardization of method so that the findings of different surveys will be more comparable. (5) A standing committee formed from all the organizations interested in surveys should be formed to co-operate in working out the things just enumerated and thus to give direction as well as impetus to this social survey movement.—J. L. Gillin, *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association*, September, 1915. R. W. S.

The War and International Socialism.—Socialists advocate peace, yet today they are fighting with all the armies of the great European war. Probably a million and a half are with the German and a million with the armies of the Allies. And their participation in active warfare has not been compulsory. Three times Socialists in the Reichstag voted for Germany's stupendous war loans, while in Belgium and France Socialists have taken the unprecedented step of allowing their representatives to accept portfolios in their cabinets which have practically resolved themselves into councils of national defense. There has been a division of sentiment in England, Italy, and Russia, but on the whole Socialists in Europe are bearing their share in the war. The assertion is therefore being made that Socialism has failed at sight of this great war crisis. To understand we must remember that imperialism is a comparatively new term in the political dictionary of Europe and means more than in former centuries. It means, not only the possession of colonies, but the endeavor to unite them with a dominant international power—an empire. Great Britain, France, and Germany had in the past few years made such large additions to their possessions that practically all undeveloped sections of the globe were pre-empted. Each country suspected its neighbor of trying to steal its colonies, which feeling was not quieted by the adjustments following the recent European wars. Further, almost as soon as war was declared Belgium, Serbia, France, and, to some extent, Germany were invaded by the "enemy." There was no time for deliberation; Socialists acted upon the same impulse as other classes in the population. Even as Internationalists, the Socialists cannot fail to recognize the importance of the national unit in the economy of modern civilization. Accepting duty as citizens has not blinded European Socialists to the policies which have brought about the war. They have systematically worked against militarism and for the gradual reduction of military service, but the Stuttgart Congress recommends duty as a citizen and work for the war's speedy termination. Indications are that the peace policy of the Socialists will prove a vital force in bringing about peace as well as in uniting the forces divided by the sudden outbreak of the war.—Morris Hillquit, *Yale Review*, October, 1915. G. G. M.

The Italian Temperament.—Like the Italian language, the Italian temperament seems easy to understand until one studies it. There are those of red-hot ambition, yet there is the slumber of the *lazzaroni*, ideals and stilettoes, wisdom and illiteracy, the indolence of the Neapolitan slumberer but the industry of that Italian who is found wherever the world is building railways or doing an engineering miracle. Easy-going, with elaborate laws which are poorly enforced, the Italian loves his native land and has hurried back from all countries at tremendous sacrifice to answer his country's call. When taunted with being disingenuous the Italian is most ingenuous. Italy had no notion of putting herself up to auction before going into the war. There were knaves and fools to be overcome at home as well as abroad. She was sensible to know first what she stood to win before she risked her money and her men. The army shows little likeness to a machine, but the soldiers exhibit noticeable calmness, sobriety, and initiative. The Italian shows a semi-feudal fidelity and familiarity, a happy-go-lucky meeting of engagements, a superficial sense of romance. He cons pretty phrases about art, music, poetry, and love, swears by Dante, but withal he is a practical man who arrives at his ends—though in a surprising way. These wonderful sons of the morning preserve their good humor during adversity, in the lightness of their serious moods, in the mental science of their national therapeutics.—Herbert Vivian, *The Fortnightly Review*, September, 1915. G. G. M.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF ANTICIPATION

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Sociologists generally have held that the essential difference between the popular and the scientific view of a proposed law or policy is that the one takes in only proximate effects, while the other embraces ultimate effects as well. The shortsighted perceive the first order of effects, but not the train of consequences to which these effects give rise.

Now, this notion, borrowed from physiology and medicine, does not fit well in sociology. It is another of the limping analogies which have cluttered up our field. The fact is that the contrast between sage and tyro in social science does not hinge chiefly on the distinction between near consequences and remote consequences, but upon a distinction of a different character.

Shallow persons see the actions, good or bad, of individuals and governments as so many isolated facts. For them each case of lying, extortion, pardon, subsidy, or charitable relief stands by itself. The thinker, however, perceives that mankind is always taking action as a clue to future conduct, interpreting it as an indication of policy. And once people who are subject to the action of others discover, or imagine they discover, a policy behind it, they accommodate themselves as best they can to this policy.

Hence, action which leads the objects of it to anticipate like action in the future modifies conduct, sometimes in ways unintended and undesired. The social scientist ought to *anticipate these anticipations* and thereby arrive at a judgment as to how particular policies will work "in the long run." In matters social, then, what distinguishes sage from tyro is that, while the latter considers only the direct effects of a mooted policy, the former takes into account how the policy will react upon people through their anticipating its operation and endeavoring to adjust themselves to it.

The principle of anticipation may be stated as follows: *Any established and known policy, whether of government, of an association, or of an individual, which affects people favorably or unfavorably according to their conduct, will come to be anticipated and will result in modifying behavior. A favorable reaction will call forth more of the conduct, condition, or type of character favored, while an adverse reaction will tend to repress it.*

Let us now examine the more striking operations of this principle in the various provinces of social life.

ANTICIPATION IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIME

Authorities object to paying a reward for the return of an abducted person and "no questions asked" because such a policy lays a financial foundation for the following of abduction as a business. Here is a plain conflict of interest between the wealthy parent, anxious only to recover his child, and society, intent on discouraging the practice of kidnaping.

The practice of "compounding a felony" illustrates a like conflict of interest and is justifiably frowned on by the law.

The authorities go to great expense in order to pursue, ferret out, or extradite the individual lawbreaker, the expense being justified by the consideration that, if it is apparent that frequently the lawbreaker comes off scatheless, the dread of the law will be weakened in the hearts of the evil-disposed and crime will increase. On the other hand, a show of resolution and relentlessness, a demonstration that the law will never let up and that in the end justice will always get its due, fills the hearts of bad men with a deterring dread.

Failure to graduate legal penalty, so that the punishment for robbery is as severe as for robbery with murder, has the effect of causing the greater crime to be preferred to the lesser in case it happens to be more lucrative or safer to commit. "One might as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb."

The policy of suppressing prostitution by prosecuting the harlot fails because she is often not a responsible person, and moreover she is not a resident with property or reputation to lose. But the "abatement of nuisance" policy of prosecuting the owner of property used for immoral purposes strikes the Achilles' heel of commercialized prostitution because it attacks the resident property-owner, the one person in the infamous partnership who has most to lose in the way of money and reputation.

The resort to the use of money by a public utility company in order to gain its will in a legislature acts in the end as a boomerang. The word travels through the political underworld that certain rich corporations are "easy," and the grafter strives desperately to get himself elected to a seat in the legislature. The quality of the legislators declines, "strikers" multiply, the necessity to use money in order to protect the legitimate interests of the company grows, until in the end the company is financially worse off than if from the first it had taken its chances with the uncorrupted representatives of the people.

The policy of compensation for accidents is a challenge to the ingenuity of imposters. In 1866 "dream neurosis" was first recognized in Germany as a form of nervous hysteria due to railroad accidents. Later it was accepted as a legitimate basis for compensation in the insurance system. At one time nearly 1 per cent of German pensioners drew money for this disorder. The fact that after lump-sum compensation the sufferer regained health with wonderful rapidity awakened suspicions. Investigation proved that the state had been the victim of skilful shamming. Compensation ceased and "dream neurosis" as a distinct malady disappeared.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the saddest result of a workmen's compensation law is, not that injured workmen get something, but that employers, anticipating their new full liability, adopt

safety devices and measures which greatly reduce the number of accidents.

One of the most shortsighted policies which an employer can embark on is the hiring of spies to worm their way into the labor unions and warn him of their plans. A demand for trouble will not long remain unanticipated. In order to justify and prolong their jobs spies take the lead in inciting to policies of outrage and thus stir up much of the mischief which their employer pays them to report to him.

Likewise to hire watchmen supplied by private detective agencies is to plunge into a quicksand of graft. These agencies live on the dread of industrial violence; hence they see to it that there shall be no lack of violence. Since the worse property-owners are frightened the more guards they will hire, nothing is more profitable to the detective agencies than an epidemic of strikes, even of arson and murder. From the moment their mercenaries, recruited from the desperate and vicious elements in society, arrive on the scene, a labor struggle enters upon a new and darker phase.

A repressive government has the same experience. Its dependence upon men of reptilian type, who work in the dark and can deceive their employers, is discounted to the extent of their organizing anarchist groups and instigating, even executing, the deeds of violence which cause the government to lean upon them. A few years ago it came out that a certain Azeff, who for sixteen years was a paid agent of the Russian police, had himself been the chief organizer of acts of terrorism among the social revolutionists. One will never know the amount of bad blood such *agents provocateurs* have stirred up between government and people in Russia and between employers and workingmen in the United States.

As the practice of tax-dodging becomes known, it produces a sense of unfairness and a resentment which leads other persons to evade their taxes. This in turn becomes known and creates still wider zones of resentment and evasion until finally only moral heroes declare all their taxable property. The experience of American states shows that in from five to eight years a stiffening of the tax laws designed to bring to light more personal property runs through a cycle of demoralization ending in a state of things as bad as ever.

The pardoning of convicted persons is much more likely to be discounted and to lead to crime than the forgiveness of injuries. If the wronged person forgives the evildoer after having him in his power—heaps “coals of fire” upon his head—the latter’s sense of fair play is powerfully appealed to, and he is not likely to discount such forgiveness by a wanton repetition of the offense. The state, however, cannot safely pardon unless there is clear evidence of sincere repentance and a desire for amendment. Forgiveness not based upon such repentance may easily constitute an encouragement to evildoing. This does not forbid us to emphasize forgiveness in God’s attitude toward the wrongdoer, for God cannot be deceived by empty professions of repentance. The toleration of injuries is more likely to lead to their repetition when states are concerned than when persons are concerned. Between states there is no room for an appeal to the offender’s better nature. The neglect promptly to protest against violation of the rights of a neutral by a belligerent may encourage the belligerent to a contemptuous disregard to neutral rights which may exasperate the neutral people to a point making war inevitable. On the other hand, a quiet, but vigilant, consistent, and firm policy by the neutral government may keep the belligerent within bounds and thus prevent the growth of bad blood between the peoples.

ANTICIPATION IN THE SPHERE OF GOVERNMENT

Taxes levied on voluntary actions or on the results of such actions have the same effect as fines, so that they modify behavior rather than yield revenue. Thus heavy taxes on windows may lead to shutting the light out of dwellings; on date trees, may lead to chopping down the trees; on wine, may cause the vines to be pulled up or the wine to be emptied into the river; on produce, may throw land out of cultivation. Inheritance taxes may lead to gifts between the living; customs duties, to smuggling. A tax will thus deform the economic society or economic life unless it is light or is broad and general and presses uniformly.

The principle of anticipation, which is a system of taxation, has often been enforced upon despotic governments by a *démocratie* or by the *principle of anticipation*. The more thoughtful persons of a nation could be organized into a society which could

there is presently no wealth produced to seize. If the tax-gatherer leaves nothing which the cultivator can count on for his family, he emigrates, and soon the land is empty of taxpayers. This is one reason why the revenue system of government was early rationalized so as to guarantee to the wealth-producer a fixed and fore-knowable share of what he should produce. This is why, when absolutism ends and the people through their representatives come into control of government, the difference is on the side of what the people get for their money, not on the side of their payments. For instance, the Manchus in China were not at all impossible in their methods of raising revenue, but they gave the people almost nothing in the way of benefit.

ANTICIPATION IN INTER-INDIVIDUAL RELATIONS

The doctrine that the end may justify the means has fallen into merited odium, because the moment you learn that other people are acting on such a principle you know not what to expect of them. Character no longer gives a clue to conduct in particular situations. Since the very saint may lie, steal, cheat, forge, defraud, or forswear himself for the sake of some larger good, to you unknown, you have to be on your guard against the good man as well as the bad man. Thus the foundations of confidence of man in his fellows is destroyed. No wonder a doctrine so unsettling became infamous.

One important factor in the upbuilding of England's Indian empire has been the policy of truth-telling on the part of the English administrators; the result being that Hindoo leaders and statesmen accept official statements at par and rely serenely upon the fulfilment of England's promises.

"Honesty is the best policy" for one conducting a business or following a profession in one place, because in time customers or patrons know the treatment they will receive and govern themselves accordingly. The merchant who overreaches his customers in ways they finally are aware of presently has no customers.

It was this same perception that induced the Indians not to plunder the fur-trader who ventured among them. Their leaders were able to foresee that if they robbed him no other fur-traders

would come within their reach; so that the way to get guns and knives easily was, not to take them by force, but to buy them with peltries.

The high standards of honesty in Chinese merchants and bankers seem to be due, not to conscience, but to a slowly evolved perception of the real foundations of all continuing businesses.

Lord Bacon perceived how veracity creates a capital. "The ablest men that ever were," he says, "have had all an openness and frankness of dealing, and a name of certainty and veracity; . . . when they thought the case indeed required dissimulation, if then they used it, it came to pass that the former opinion spread abroad, of their good faith and clearness of dealing, made them almost invisible."

A theater manager stages a play of high tone, and finds half his patrons bored and leaving him. But if he perseveres in the presentation of clean, fine drama he is presently recompensed by the patronage of people dissatisfied with what they get in other theaters and by a growing attendance from the non-theatergoing public.

The lawyer who refuses every case he does not believe in is likely to have at first a scanty practice, but in time his reputation for championing only righteous causes gives his pleadings great weight with a jury and he will be much sought after because he has the name of winning lawsuits.

The writer, speaker, or expert witness who yields to the temptation to produce conviction by exaggeration and emphasis finds, unless he keeps on the move, that his influence diminishes; whereas the man who is consistently cautious and accurate in statement steadily grows in authoritativeness, provided that he is able to keep in the public eye.

The eloquent but mercenary spellbinder, after shifting twice or thrice to the side which offers him the more money, finds himself in a few years without a retainer, because the public has learned to discount his hired stump eloquence to such a degree that his services are no longer of value to a political party.

We are wary of itinerant peddlers, doctors, or promoters just because we realize that they are not subject, like the local

merchant or practitioner, to the operation of the *principle of anticipation*.

One "spoils" children, not simply by being "easy" with them, but by being so easy with them that they *count on* favor and leniency. They observe that if they will not wash or dress themselves somebody will do it for them; if they break or lose their toys they are promptly replaced; if they transgress the threatened punishment is never inflicted. The parent or schoolmaster who keeps himself unpredictable in the discipline of his children may safely forgive or overlook much.

ANTICIPATION IN THE SPHERE OF CHARITY

Social science began with the discovery that the treatment of the case in hand reacts, through anticipation of like treatment in the future, upon human conduct and character. In the moral sphere this led to the perception that "honesty lasts longest," "honesty is the best policy," "truth is the cement of all societies." In the economic sphere it brought insight into the reaction of laws upon enterprise and the accumulation of property. Next it put charity in a new light and gave currency to the view that "charity causes half the suffering she relieves, but she cannot relieve half the suffering she has caused."

It is now a century or more since it became clear to the wise how paupers are created by thoughtless benevolence, how indiscriminate alms constitute a standing premium on idleness and unthrift. In its youth political economy rode this idea so hard that benevolence was put on the defensive and the hard heart supplied with reasons for doing nothing. Later it was seen that charity may be "scientific" and that there is still a broad field for the help that does not harm.

The workings of anticipation in the field of charity are various and startling. If the beggar's whine opens the purse, mendicancy will be followed as a trade. If the moving "hard-luck" story draws forth alms, imposture will be developed into a fine art. If the maimed and twisted capture the coin from the passer-by, artificial deformations and mutilations will be forthcoming, as if society

had announced: "Produce me such and such ghastly spectacles and I will pay for them."

A system of public outdoor relief is likely to be counted on until it becomes in effect a bounty on idleness and improvidence. Under the Poor Law in force in England up to 1834 the pauper was often better off than the poor laborer, who was thus disheartened in his struggle to maintain his independence. Hence as time went on the proportion of paupers grew. In some parishes rents were so generally paid by the vestry that the poor made no effort to provide their rent. Landowners have been known to tear down cottages so as to keep out pauper settlers and to draw their labor from surrounding parishes which made up the deficit in wages by an allowance. When farmers were allowed to have the labor of the idle at a shilling a day, the deficit being made up by the overseers of the poor, they turned away their laborers, thus creating an idle class, in order later to get them back at the cheap rate. Where employers were required to hire paupers rather than the self-supporting, saving was seen to be a bar to employment, so that thriftlessness was encouraged. The policy of a regular allowance for the out-of-work prompted some laborers to be as lawless and useless at work as possible, so that they might be discharged and supported in idleness.

The readier relief of the married man than of the unmarried encouraged reckless marriage. One laborer when married went straight from the church to the poorhouse, having trusted to the parish to support a married man. Another demanded a house in advance, on the ground that he was about to take a wife. Not only did laborers marry earlier than was the custom before the allowance system grew up, but it was noticed that they married younger in liberal parishes than in strict parishes.

The prospect of additional money for every child born into a pauper family removed the check which anxiety naturally places upon the size of the family. The granting of 2s. a week for a bastard child, but only 1s. 3d. for a legitimate child, on the ground that the former had no father to support it, probably encouraged illegitimacy. Since the mothers of such children were more comfortably kept than married women, many, we are told, considered

it the best way to provide for themselves. Moreover, loose women with children were preferred as wives to modest women because of their incomes from the parish.

After 1834 the poorhouse became a workhouse; but even this was discounted. Its practice of giving lodging to destitute wayfarers created professional vagrants. The freedom to go and come called into being a class of loafers who availed themselves of the hospitality and the mixed company of the workhouse, but, when they craved a change, left it and lived as they pleased. When deterrent regulations were adopted, vagrants found jails more comfortable, and did little to escape imprisonment for a week or two for vagrancy or petty thievery. In Manchester an enormous prison-like casual ward was built on the newest deterrent model. The number applying for lodging fell off at least half, many homeless men preferring to sleep in the streets. Philanthropic people then provided a free shelter under lax management. This emptied the ward and the lodging-houses and attracted great crowds from neighboring towns. Public opinion forced the closing of the shelter and again the men slept out.

A recent critic of the English workhouse writes:

It was a curious experience in visiting a large number of workhouses to find, as one went from one place to another, that what one had to look for was the most spacious and prosperous-looking institution in the place, set in the best-kept grounds, surrounded with expensive walls and handsome gates. . . . "Indoor-relief" has bred a class of lazy parasites, willing to submit to any conditions so long as they are well fed and relieved from all responsibilities. They are not even precluded from injuring the outside community, inasmuch as the law permits them to go in and out at their pleasure, using the workhouse as a convenient resort and a protection to their noxious lives from the discipline of hunger and cold.²

The Poor Law Commission reporting in 1909 recommends that no outdoor relief be given save to persons leading respectable lives in decent houses. Slum areas should be proscribed, inasmuch as the attraction of these degraded areas lies, not in low rents—they are really high—but in the absence of restraint and the liberty to overcrowd and to lead irregular lives which is to be found under the slum landlord.

² Helen Bosanquet, *The Poor Law Report of 1909*, p. 186.

Nothing so lends itself to anticipation as *endowed* outdoor relief, which is sure to become widely known and which works blindly, in good years as in bad years. Not only has it been found that in English cathedral towns with endowments for the poor pauperism is far greater than in other towns, but fixed doles always attract to a place more than enough paupers to absorb them all. No doubt many a down-and-out has drifted to New York because of the publicity the Sunday newspapers have given to the midnight "bread line" maintained by the endowment of the baker who started it.

It is often proposed that the overcrowding and low wages resulting from our present immigration might be effectually diminished if only benevolent societies or government would take care of the immigrants, get them out upon vacant land sold to them on easy terms, and aid them until they had reached the point of self-support. This policy might give excellent results provided that immigration were restricted. But with the present situation such a policy could not but encourage immigration, so that presently we should have two or three hundred thousand more every year, and the more we did for immigrants the more immigrants we should have to do for. Such a stimulated influx might in the end cause more overcrowding and depression than the colonization could prevent.

In unexpected ways anticipation spoils the effect of the best-intentioned acts. The tender-hearted public which habitually turns aside to buy the wares of the smallest newsboy or peddler is unconsciously drawing children out of school and into industry. An enlightened kindness would deal quite otherwise with the children in the street trades.

The giving of tips to waiters, after it has become general and customary, is of no benefit to them. The starvation wage received by porters in standard sleepers in comparison with those of tourist sleepers proves that the generosity of the traveling public has been anticipated and capitalized by their employer, the sleeping-car

The granting of a subsidy of public money to a private charity is often the beginning of a process of shifting the entire burden of

support of the institution upon the taxpayers without giving their representatives any control. "Those institutions that have received public aid the longest most commonly receive least from private contributors." Such aid "tends to dry up the springs of private benevolence."

Subsidies which vary with the number of dependents constitute "a standing premium to the institution to keep the inmates longer than is necessary and to develop the work in magnitude." Thus there is a "strong tendency on the part of subsidies to increase the problem with which the subsidized institutions have to deal."

In the beginning the payment of subsidies is always urged on the ground of economy. With a given number of dependents in sight it is cheaper to pay for their care by an existing institution than to maintain them in a public institution. What the legislator overlooks is that as soon as subsidy-granting has become an established policy of the state with respect to private institutions doing a particular kind of work (e.g., caring for dependent children) the number of qualified subsidy-claiming institutions begins to multiply, and soon the charge upon the public is vastly greater than anyone had contemplated. Who could have anticipated that the subsidy-earning institutions in Pennsylvania would grow from 8 in 1880 to 176 in 1905? In 1875 a speaker before the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, referring to the union of public and private benefactions in the charities of New York, predicted that most of the aided institutions would eventually become entirely self-supporting, thus relieving the public treasury. But he failed to take into account the effect of subsidy anticipation in drying up private benefactions and in increasing their dependency. In 1870 New York City gave a third of a million dollars, i.e., a fifth of its appropriations for prisons and paupers, to private institutions. In 1898 it gave three and one-seventh millions, or 57 per cent. At first the state is looked upon as coming to the aid of private charity. Later, private charity is looked upon as coming to the aid of the state.

When subsidies are granted to institutions caring for dependent children there is a vast increase in the number of such children. In New York City the number grew from 14,773 in 1875 to 33,406

in 1895. The annual subsidy to orphan asylums in the state of California grew from \$58,000 in 1880 to \$410,000 in 1898. "It has almost killed any efforts to place the children in family homes, has in a large measure demoralized many families whose children are thus supported, and has reacted unfavorably upon the spirit and motive of many of the charitable societies themselves."

ANTICIPATION IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION

H. G. Wells points out that the early endeavor to stimulate popular education in England by the government making grants in accordance with results obtained in examination gave rise to "grant-earning," which was by no means the same as education.

The task of examination was intrusted to eminent scientific men for the most part quite unaccustomed to teaching. . . . Year after year these eminent persons set questions and employed subordinates to read and mark the increasing thousands of answers that ensued, and, having no doubt the national idea of fairness well developed in their minds, they were careful each year to reread the preceding papers before composing the current one, in order to see what it was usual to ask. As a result of this, in the course of a few years the recurrence and permutation of these questions became almost calculable, and since the practical object of the teaching was to teach people, not science, but how to write answers to these questions, the industry of grant-earning assumed a form easily distinguished from any kind of genuine education whatsoever. [Competing firms] set themselves to produce textbooks that should supply exactly the quantity and quality of knowledge necessary for every stage of each of the five and twenty subjects into which desirable science was divided, and copies and models and instructions that should give precisely the method and gestures esteemed as proficiency in art. Every section of each book was written in the idiom found to be most satisfactory to the examiners, and test questions extracted from papers set in former years were appended to every chapter. By means of these last the teacher was able to train his class to the very highest level of grant-earning efficiency, and very naturally he cast all other methods of exposition aside. First he posed his pupils with questions and then dictated model replies.¹

It is also to be noted that the system of "payment by results" led to teachers putting undue pressure on dull and weak children, often to their great injury.

¹ *The New Machiavelli*, p. 22.

The policy of intimidating by occasional dismissal university professors of economic opinions distasteful to the men of wealth who constitute the governing board is in its outworkings one of the most mischievous that could be devised. Once it were understood that a professor is subject to supervision as to his utterances on questions of public interest, and liable to dismissal when these do not please the governing powers, men of virile character and independent mind would avoid the calling. In the end the quality and standing of the universities would be lowered. Again, unless radical professors are safe, conservative professors lose the confidence of the public. The one thing that makes it worth while to cite the judgment of university professors in opposition to wild and crude proposals is the freedom with which, in our universities generally, opinions of a different tendency can be expressed. Once let it be understood that the conservative professor has to teach and talk as he does, or lose his living, and his influence with the public is at an end.

Free theological education with support no doubt enables some strong men to enter the Christian ministry, but it also tempts into it some youths without a "call" or a message, who are looking for the easiest route into some profession.

The instituting of graduate fellowships no doubt adds to the ranks of scholars, but it is likely that the existence of such aids shunts into college teaching many of no great vigor of intellect or character, but of excellent capacity for assimilation, who allow the line of least resistance to determine their life-work.

ANTICIPATION IN THE REALM OF LAW

In the history of social control one is struck by the fierce insistence of the people that judges apply law and not their own notions of right and wrong. In the absence of statute, judges are to apply customary or common law and, wanting even this guidance, they are to follow the trend of earlier decisions. All this has been prompted, not so much by mistrust of the individual judge as by the need of knowing in advance the rules of conduct in order that one might discriminate the licit from the forbidden. So hotly has uncertainty been resented that at times the people have sprung to

arms because judges did the will of their royal master, or administered strange law instead of the ancient well-known laws of the realm. "Political" courts have justly become infamous, and burghers become deeply agitated when their visiting monarch writes *voluntas regis suprema lex* in the municipal album.

The primitive ruler, to be sure, sat at the city gate or in his judgment hall, heard such suitors as appeared, and gave judgment according to the promptings of his conscience or the state of his digestion; but no modern autocrat dares regulate the conduct of his subjects in this way. Be he czar or even sultan, his people insist upon being regulated, not by his whim, but by settled customs or his published laws, so that they may know in advance what is not permitted.

So strong was the pressure from business men to know what was lawful under the Sherman Anti-trust act that the Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of virtually writing into the statute the word "unreasonable" before "restraint of trade," although Congress had consistently refused, for good political reasons, to insert this word.

It is just because a censor does not bind himself to decide according to explicit rules that a censorship has such a paralyzing effect upon literary production. Thus Tolstoi once wrote:

You would not believe how, from the very commencement of my activity, that horrible censor question has tormented me. I wanted to write what I felt, but at the same time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not be permitted, and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I abandoned, and went on abandoning, and meanwhile the years passed away.

So blighting is a censorship that our unlicensed press is considered a "free" press, although it is certainly subject to legal prosecution for defamatory or seditious utterances. The motion-film board of censors has been subjected to great pressure to formulate the principles of its discriminations, so that manufacturers may know in advance of production which films are likely to find favor.

It is owing to the principle of anticipation that our law must not be adjusted to social needs without damage to private rights. Some strongly denounce a bankruptcy law and perceiving that its action

will be anticipated by creditors, who will protect themselves by including in the selling price of their goods an insurance premium for the risk they run. In like manner, a homestead-exemption act need not wrong creditors, for they will reckon on it.

In the ancient world the law's recognition of the right of the borrower to pledge himself as security for the repayment of his loan wrought terrible evil by reducing great numbers to servitude. The prohibition of slavery for debt caused little loss to creditors, for they discounted their weaker legal situation by exercising greater care in lending.

In tropical South America I have heard peonage justified on the ground that the peons are so destitute that they need the right to pledge their labor in order after a bad season to procure from the planter the food necessary to keep them from starving. The true policy is to abolish the contract of peonage and let the laborer develop the capacity to look out for his future himself. Anticipating his plight without a master to fall back on, the laborer will be stimulated to save and to make himself a reputation for reliability. Thus he will rise in the scale of moral beings.

It is in consequence of anticipation that enforced laws may be so very potent in influencing economic life. Let the law provide adequate protection for some kind of property that does not exist—say artificial oyster beds on the bars of Chesapeake Bay—and if the state of the oyster market justifies it capital will be invested. Since capitalists are likely to have both foresight and far-sight, nothing is so shrewdly discounted as laws and conditions affecting invested capital. A general attack upon the institution of property or random condemnation of the rich without discrimination may discourage saving or investment. On the other hand, a discriminating agitation to curb a certain kind of property or to convert it to public uses need not check accumulation or investment. This is why, after a reform movement affecting some species of property has been worked up by radicals, it will succeed better if carried out by a conservative statesman who is not suspected of having other anti-property reforms “up his sleeve.”

The syndicalists who propose that the workers organize and take over and run the particular mills and factories in which they happen to find themselves do not foresee the effect of such action

upon industry at large. Certainly private individuals would no longer invest their savings in building plants from which they are liable to be ejected by groups of malcontent workers. Unless these groups voluntarily set aside a part of their product for new plants and drew in other workers to run them, no means would be forthcoming for the building of new mills and the opening of new mines to furnish employment and goods for an expanding population.

The socialists, on the other hand, have met this point by proposing that the capital necessary for the upkeep and extension of the industrial equipment of society be set aside out of current production by the collectivist state.

From what has just been said it does not follow that it is well always to give property the benefit of the doubt. The historic decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Fletcher vs. Peck*, validating a huge grant of public land so fraudulent that every member but one of the legislative majority which voted it was interested and a party to the transaction, was a powerful encouragement to capitalists to engage in the corruption of legislatures. For the decision meant that any special privilege, any act bestowing property or creating new property, even if obtained by the grossest bribery, was a vested right which no subsequent legislative act could rescind.

ANTICIPATION IN THE SPHERE OF RELIGION

Nothing seems more likely than that the endowment of religious orders will promote the cause of true religion. At a given time the monks are observed to be devoting their time to the propagation of religion. If they were free from the burden of self-support, and there were more of them, surely the cause of religion would be advanced. But it is fallacious to assume that after the order controls rich endowments the quality and spirit of the brethren will be the same as it now is. The present members joined themselves to poverty and are spiritual men. But after an order is known to control wealth a different type crowds in, the prevailing tone changes, the spirit of enjoyment and ease spreads, and the ideal of service fades out. In time society wakes up to the fact that instead of a brotherhood of apostles it is harboring a nest of dissolute parasites.

The conditions set forth by Ulloa and Juan in their secret report to the King of Spain regarding the state of Ecuador and Peru about 1740 illustrates this principle:

The Gentile tribes bordering on the Province of Quito are so numerous that the missions there established are proportionally few, and the religious orders who consecrate themselves to them with evangelic zeal are still fewer; for, with the exception of the Jesuits' order, who have for many years sustained the mission of Maynas, all the other either have no missions or keep up a station here and there, which is barely enough to serve as an apology for calling over missionaries, the latter being afterward employed for the private ends and emolument of the order itself, for it is never known that they go to preach and spread the gospel among the heathen. This is so general that there is no religious order which does not adopt the same course, for it is also the practice of the Jesuits; so that, of every twenty individuals who go from Spain, there is scarcely one, or, at most, two, who join the mission, because the order itself does not appropriate a greater number for this service. It is true that the order of Jesuits sustains a greater number of stations among the Gentile Indians than any other order; but the number it retains permanently in the colleges is not less on this account than those retained by the former, but, on the contrary, far exceeds that of the others, which arises from the fact that they send for missionaries more frequently, and receive a greater number of them by every arrival from Spain.

In Spain, it is generally supposed (and the same opinion obtains in the convents themselves) that the missionaries who go to the Indies are to proceed immediately to the conversion of the natives; and many of them, full of zeal for the propagation of the faith, offer to go and connect themselves with the missions; but as this does not take place, they are disappointed when they arrive there, finding how different their situation is from what they had anticipated, and that it is impossible ever to get back again. The case with the missionaries who are sent is, that immediately on their arrival there, they are distributed, if Jesuits, in the colleges, or, if of other orders, which use rotation, in the convents of all the provinces; and some devoting themselves to professorships, others to the pulpit, others to attorneyships, and others to the management of the farms, precisely as is practiced in Spain, they keep them employed in these functions, or exchange them, by transferring them from some to others, but always for the benefit of the convents. Hence it appears that the only proper object of missionaries and missions is that which is least thought of; for when the limited number of stations which compose the mission is furnished with curates, it is only when one dies, or another wishes to retire, burdened with the weight of years, that a substitute is appointed in his place, and a long period frequently elapses without the occurrence of either event.¹

¹ Ulloa and Juan, *Secret History*, pp. 142-45.

Heresy-hunting seems defensible until one looks ahead and notes how the practice will affect the composition of the clergy. No matter how fixed in the doctrines of his church a man may feel himself to be at the time of his entering the ministry, he should allow for the possibility of growth and change. The greater his intellectual vigor and the more independent his mind, the more this possibility becomes a probability. Hence the prospect of being unfrocked for heresy after one is committed to one's calling and well on in life will repel from the ministry virile young men likely to make the pulpit a power; but it will not deter those weaker in intellect or character. The church that is jealous for the dignity and leadership of its clergy will satisfy itself as to the orthodoxy of those whom it ordains, but, save in extreme cases, it will not pursue with a heresy trial the clergyman who has come into disagreement with its creeds. It will leave the question as to his continuance in its pulpit to his conscience and sense of propriety.

DEDUCTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

It is recognition of the workings of this *principle of anticipation* that makes the chief difference between the attitude of the intellectual and that of the emotionalist in matters of policy. The emotionalist says: "This couple are unhappy together. Why not let them go their separate ways?" The intellectual replies: "Make divorce too much a matter of course and instead of having fewer unhappy marriages you will have more. For people will form risky and unstable unions because they know they can obtain a divorce if the union does not turn out well. Lessen the amount of caution and seriousness in marriage and the number of unions calling for divorce surgery will grow." The emotionalist says: "What is the good of hanging this murderer and orphaning his children? Have pity and let him go." The intellectual replies: "A too-free use of the pardoning power encourages the evil-disposed to yield to their criminal impulses, and thereby augments the amount of suffering among the innocent." The emotionalist urges. "How cruel to ostracize this girl for giving herself outside the marriage relation!" The intellectual queries: "Is there any other way to keep girls from yielding to their tempters?" The

emotionalist sees only the need of the lone woman with small children and demands mothers' aid. The intellectual prophesies that aid to abandoned mothers will stimulate desertion, while relief to the mothers of illegitimates will encourage laxity. A few seasons back an emotionalist in the United States Post-Office Department directed postmasters to turn over "Santa Claus" letters to local philanthropic societies. It was not long before the number of moving and apparently naïve petitions to Santa Claus from artful children for sleds, skates, and other objects of juvenile desire greatly multiplied; and the local societies came to realize that they were being "worked." The order had to be rescinded.

The emotionalist set up the revolving cradle in front of the foundling asylum so that foundlings might be deposited secretly. The theory was that this facility of disposal would do away with the murder of undesired infants. It certainly resulted in an alarming growth of illegitimacy and an irresponsible dumping of children upon the foundling asylums. A perfect case of short-sighted emotionalism is that of the late Empress Dowager of China, who, when she felt a tender impulse, would buy caged birds in the market and release them in the open. Aside from the fact that the courtiers just over Coal Hill snared these same birds and returned them to the dealers, it is obvious that the greater the demand for these birds in Peking the more active would be the bird-catchers in the provinces; so that the Empress releasing birds on Coal Hill was unconsciously setting the snarers to work in Shantung. Had she freed the caged birds in the market instead of buying them her action would have been more to the purpose. The tearing of egret feathers out of ladies' hats by our customs inspectors, although ruthless, has been effective for the end in view.

The *principle of anticipation* does not tell against the relieving of distress which has not been brought about nor could have been averted by any act of the sufferer. Widowhood, orphanhood, loss of health, and distress arising from such unforeseeable calamities as fire, flood, war, earthquake, or epidemic may be relieved without fear of pauperizing the unfortunates.

Again, if only the lesser part of a particular kind of distress can be relieved, the prospect of relief will not tend to augment the volume of such distress. Thus well-guarded accident or sickness insurance

need not increase the number of cases of accident or sickness. Free medical clinics or hospitals or dispensaries will not weaken the health of a people, although they may slacken the endeavor to lay by sums to provide medical attendance. By the policy of "matching dollars" such givers as Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Fels have avoided drying up the natural support of the institutions or causes they wish to aid.

The more the relief of the destitute and the pardon of the wrongdoer is discriminating, and based on a knowledge of merit in the individual case, the less will such action be presumed on by the unworthy. Carried away by their discovery that help and mercy, by being reckoned on, encourage idleness and crime, the early social scientists seemed to bring under suspicion all charity and pity beyond one's own circle. We now deem it safe to give rein to these nobler impulses provided that their action waits on thorough investigation. Wise relief or leniency implies, not only discrimination, but discrimination based on a sound principle. This principle is that *anti-social types of conduct and character should not be encouraged*. It is not enough that help be withheld when it will foster laziness. No such consideration enters into the question of relieving the aged poor; yet in the administration of an old-age pension system the problem must be faced whether pensions shall be granted to habitual drinkers and persons who have gained their livelihood by vice, such as gamblers, tipsters, liquor dealers, panderers, and streetwalkers.

It is now clear that good things made gratuitous do not pauperize. Getting something for nothing does not pauperize. Only those gifts pauperize which, being anticipated, encourage undesirable types of behavior and character. Thirty years ago Herbert Spencer declared that public libraries and reading-rooms pauperize, overlooking the fact that the pursuit of knowledge makes men better, not worse. The sneer of "free soup for the mind" is quite pointless. Free schools and universities, free lectures and libraries, free museums and art galleries, free social centers and churches, free entertainments and band concerts, free playgrounds, athletic fields, swimming-pools, and baths do not pauperize, seeing that they make people stronger and better and wiser, not lazy nor self-indulgent nor vicious.

The pioneers in social science also went too far in condemning mercy. A discriminating treatment of offenders is justifiable. The probation of first offenders holds no cheer for the professional criminal. The parole of convicts who have "made good" is not likely to encourage lawbreaking. Substituting reformatory for penal institution does not lower the hedge against crime; for if there is one thing the evil-disposed regard with horror it is reformation, especially after they learn of the regimen by which reformation is brought about. The policy of deterring the ill-intentioned by the relentless punishment of all caught lawbreakers assumes that foresight is universal. We now know that there exist born criminals too strong of impulse or too weak in self-control or foresight to be deterred from crime by even the smart of punishment, let alone the example of it. To set aside such offenders for cure rather than punishment is not to embolden the evil-disposed.

Publicity feeds anticipation; hence we should shun publicity for things we do not wish people to anticipate. Pardon, save of those exonerated, should be kept quiet, mercy should work under cover, charity should be furtive. "When thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth." The secret help that passes between kinsfolk, friends, comrades, neighbors, fellow-workers, and fellow-members of the same church or lodge or union does little harm. At the other extreme are endowments or fixed funds or special taxes set aside for the relief of the poor. Because they become well known they are sure to be reckoned on. Such provision, therefore, is more likely to breed poverty than the fluctuating relief flowing from the current contributions of the charitable.

On the other hand, we should court publicity for things we wish people to anticipate—rewards or benefits held forth for desirable kinds of conduct or character. There cannot well be too much publicity for conditions of security of life and property, protection of contracts, low taxes, bounties, tax exemptions, military or civil pensions, thrift agencies, government aid to industry, honorary titles, scholarships, hero medals, and monuments or honors to public men.

Recurrence breeds anticipation. "In seizing a state," says Machiavelli in *The Prince*, "the usurper ought to examine closely

into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits." The sage quite misses, however, the philosophy underlying his sound counsel and offers the fanciful reason: "For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavor of them may last longer."

It is in the contrasted effects it produces in consequence of being anticipated that social reform is so much superior to charity in dealing with widespread or chronic misery. Think of the competition which determines the distribution of income in society as a race in which all who run receive, according to their speed and endurance, prizes varying in value from a trifle to a fortune. Charity now comes in to relieve the distress of those who from lameness, or having stumbled, or being tripped are unable to win even the trifle. But since running is not easy and the petty prizes for the slowest runners leave them worse off than those succored by charity, many resort to the trick of stumbling or giving up when they are really able to run. And the more charity does, the more malingerers there are.

Altogether different are the methods of social reform. It removes from the course the stones and pitfalls by which runners are thrown down. It punishes tricky runners who trip up or "spike" those who are just ahead of them and in their way. By a little forethought it greatly lessens the number of halt and ailing who cannot even enter the race. By providing all with a little instruction and training in the art of breathing, running, taking hurdles, etc., the number of those who can manage their feet well is greatly increased. Then, since there is much that is arbitrary in the relative magnitude of the prizes for swiftness, social reform aims to cut down the big prizes and add to the size of the prizes for ordinary running. Since it notices among the great throng of runners that some who either are or are able to employ the prizes for motorcycles or automobiles won in some previous race or left them by their fathers, it endeavors to handicap these contestants in the future of those who rely on their legs.

To be sure, this image is faulty in that the running does not create the prize, while in the real world there would be no prizes were there no running. But for the purpose of contrasting the methods of charity and social reform the image is fair enough. Charity in caring for the crippled or unlucky unwittingly tempts others to drop out of the race. Social reform fits more persons to run, shows them how to develop their speed, clears their course, encourages the slow with bigger prizes, and altogether incites a much larger proportion to get into the race and do their best.

Only slowly do habits, standards, and social customs change in response to a changed outlook. Not only does it take time for a policy or practice to become sufficiently well known and understood for people habitually to reckon on it, but a process like pauperization is a gradual one. Very slow likewise is the substitution of the ease-loving for the spiritual types in a religious order which has become wealthy. The same is true of the processes of regeneration. With a population like certain subject peoples in the Turkish empire, whose bad economic habits are due to the long-continued influence of arbitrary and rapacious government, the introduction of justice and security does not at once make the people industrious, thrifty, and enterprising. It may be that the adults will never form better habits and that a new generation must appear upon the scene before the expected fruits appear.

The sage lawgivers of antiquity understood very well the *principle of anticipation*, although they did not formulate it. In their eagerness to take advantage of it they often drifted too far from the principle of individual responsibility. Bills of attainder, punishing the blood kin of the law-breaker, branding with ignominy the child of illegitimate amours, letting the child of the unworthy suffer with its parents—all these harsh policies shock our sense of justice and have been renounced, although there is no doubt that they aided in repressing undesirable conduct. In the same way hereditary offices and hereditary titles and privileges rewarding signal public service are no longer granted, while society is more and more inclined to restrict the inheritance of large wealth, despite the consideration that the privilege of transmission to one's heirs undoubtedly supplies a motive to accumulation.

NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS—AMERICAN*

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1. *For what?* The title assumes belief that as a nation we ought to be prepared for *something*. We have not yet found out how many Americans adhere to the possible alternative versions of what that something should be. Evidently the primary job for us as a nation is to find out whether there is something which practically all of us want, or which all of us would want if we were fully informed about the meaning of life, and, if so, how we may get together in expressing this want and in trying to satisfy it.

2. *Resources for answering this question.*—It would be foolish to waste time thinking about the foregoing problem as though it were a mere matter of logic. Nations never have done much of anything in a logical way, that is in the sense of excavating down to ultimate principles and building upon them, and it would be futile to suppose that they will suddenly become scientific. It would be childish to expect that our own nation will make itself an exception to this rule. The task before Americans—those who are aware of it and those who are not, those who care and those who do not care—is to make the most of our resources for knowing our common wants and for progressing toward realizing them. No one can touch a button and set in motion all the machinery that might help Americans toward a common state of mind. The desirable teamwork must come about chiefly through the voluntary co-operation of independent organs for the formation of public opinion. We have vast systems of agencies which are both professedly and actually interested in promoting national welfare as each understands it. The people who are chiefly concerned with one of these systems tend to form ideas as to what national welfare means,

* This paper is virtually in continuation of remarks by the writer on the subject, "War and Militarism in Relation to Government," in *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, X, 93.

which differ in more or less important details from ideas most prominent elsewhere.¹ They are alike, however, in wanting to serve American national welfare. They are alike in having some sort of regard—again varying greatly in kind and degree—for an assumed something which is of national value; that is, of importance to all the people, over and above the things which they want more especially for themselves or for their more intimate groups. Without attempting to speak of these agencies in the order of their relative importance, we may specify the educational system; the churches; the press; the various economic organizations, both of capitalists and of laborers; the various professional and scientific associations, clerical, legal, medical, engineering, pedagogical, etc., and the respective societies devoted to pure knowledge, physical and social; the different fraternal organizations; the societies and foundations for investigation, relief, and prevention of abnormal social conditions; political organizations, local, state, and national, etc. Each of these in its way acts and avowedly acts in part as a public outlook apparatus. Each has its eye in part upon causes and effects that operate throughout the nation and perhaps beyond. Each is trying to throw a spotlight on certain things which, from its point of view, will sooner or later show importance for Americans in general. Each has some manner of regard for consequences beyond the range of its own immediate group interests. The three tailors of Tooley Street are always first and foremost for themselves; but they have a point of view which is reflected in their version of "we the people of England." No three tailors of Tooley Street, nor the representatives of any other interest, great or small, are entitled to speak as the nation. Each interest, however, is entitled to speak as a part of the nation, and not merely on the subject of its own special wants, but also on the subject of the whole national life, as seen from the viewpoint of the particular interest. The resultant of all these estimates must at last for better or for worse form the national standard.

3. *How to mobilize the resources.*—In the absence of common control of these agencies for creating or crystallizing public opinion,

¹ Cf. Symposium, "What Is Americanism?" in *Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, XX, 433 and 613.

a feasible plan for utilizing them toward a common result must be a program for energizing their voluntary co-operation. Mr. Carnegie or Mr. Ford might have used more wisely a part of the money that each has used less wisely, if he had subsidized an organization to convince such agencies as we have referred to that the question, *For what?* is vital to our nation, and to induce such agencies to fix their attention on that question until they have agreed upon an answer. Since no such subsidy has been provided, progress must for the present be made by joining voice to voice of those who are aware that the question, *For what?* is vital, until it becomes the fashion for all our American leaders of thought to agitate the question. In season and out of season all far-seeing American men and women ought to force the questions to the front. What ought Americans to aim at? What test should we apply to all policies and programs which demand a franchise among us? Perhaps ridicule may drive some of us into substituting serious thinking for jaunty indifference to the problem. Perhaps some of us are accessible through pride of intellect. It is sorry superficiality to leave such a matter to luck. Sense of duty, economic, political, religious, should be keen enough with many to arrest and hold attention until a constructive national faith has been formed. In spite of the parochialism of our history hitherto, it is incredible that we Americans can hold ourselves so detached from the assaying process which is testing civilization in Europe that we shall still decline the challenge to prove ourselves. All Americans who realize that living together as members of a nation is a physical, mental, and moral experiment should join in creating a national demand for the mobilizing of all our physical, mental, and moral resources upon the efficiency of the experiment. All Americans who realize that the quality of our national life sets the limits for the quality of our individual lives, physical, mental, and moral, should make it their first and foremost public concern to protect national attention against distraction until we have achieved a commanding conception of national destiny.

4. *A common standard of national effort.* —No one has sufficient evidence to justify the assertion that even those agencies of leadership to which reference has been made could unite upon a statement

of belief which might serve as a common starting-point for shaping American co-operation.

It would certainly be preposterous to imagine that a theological or a philosophical formula of our national situation could be constructed which in any near future might command the united assent of all the organizations above indicated. Suppose we restrict our range of thinking, for the present purpose, to the hard realities of our national situation in two of its most literal aspects, our political and our economic activities. Suppose we fix our attention on the question, What kind of political and economic life should we be trying to realize? Of course our question refers not to programs but to standards, to qualities of life which cannot be fitted out with details of procedure in advance, but must gradually develop their own methods of expressing themselves in action.

The best that is possible by way of experimental answer is a proposal which would be accepted as a matter of course by many, but it remains to be seen whether such a proposal can serve as a platform for more intensive American co-operation.

Is it possible for Americans to unite in their underlying political thinking upon some such preconceptions as these:

(1) The human lot is incessant experimentation in using men's endowments so that there will be steady improvement in the circumstances and qualities of people in general.

(2) Nations are at present the most inclusive organizations which we have developed for carrying on this experimentation through co-operation on a large scale.

(3) The national experiment is confused whenever some groups in the nation prove to be subject to comparatively unfavorable terms, or other groups prove to enjoy comparatively favorable terms with reference to participation in such benefits of the experimentation as have already been derived.

(4) The terms of partnership in national experimentation must include, as a minimum *negative* standard of justice, progressive removal of all conditions which tend arbitrarily to handicap certain groups, and of all conditions which tend arbitrarily to prefer certain groups in their respective relations to the common benefits of co-operation.

(5) The terms of partnership in national experimentation must include as a minimum *positive* standard of justice, a policy of progressively extending to each retarded interest, legitimate in itself, insurance that it shall have the support of the nation in gaining its due share of the common benefits of co-operation.

(6) The terms of national co-operation, as a matter of technical efficiency, measured by purely intellectual standards, must include as a minimum, provision for continuous and systematic survey of the whole field of national interests, and publicity of findings in so far as they bear upon further co-operation.

Is it possible for Americans to unite upon some such pre-conceptions as these?

If it is not, then that fact presents our fundamental national problem, in so far as those elements in the nation are concerned whose influence is exerted by rational means. If we are not of one mind upon such primary propositions as these, why not? Is it because of untruth in the propositions, or of mental or moral obduracy in ourselves, or of some more inscrutable reasons? In any event, if we have no common opinion upon these elementary matters, the fact amounts to intellectual and moral anarchy. We are chasing illusions if we suppose we can build a superstructure of secure civilization with no firm foundation of basic unity. If we do not agree upon something that covers the ground of these propositions, all our educational, and religious, and philanthropic, and economic, and political campaigns are an incoherent medley. They not only do not systematically reinforce one another, but they cannot avoid doing much to defeat one another and to frustrate our essential human interests. We are in a pitiable plight so long as we are content with working out theories and programs that attract minor groups, while we fail to make progress toward oneness of national purpose. No one intelligent enough to understand that unity of ethical ideals is essential to unity of moral action is guiltless, if he does not do his part toward realizing American agreement about elementary principles of national co-operation.

5. *The problem for believers in this standard.*—But how does the case stand with those of us who assume substantially the principles

above scheduled? What can we do toward the sort of preparedness to which these principles point? Still more specifically, supposing that the propositions stated above fairly represent our basic social beliefs, what can the readers of this *Journal* do to influence national action accordingly? We are a group in the first place of college teachers. No other single calling is as strongly represented in our number. But there is scarcely a vocation pursued by people of trained and serious minds which has not its quota in this company. To say the least, we are on the whole people of the type who help to make public opinion, rather than the type which merely absorbs the opinions of others. We all do something toward directing currents of thought. If the entire constituency of this *Journal* were of one mind about the problems of national preparedness, and if that single mind were expressed in the common will to get its full share of influence for this group mind, we should together touch so many springs of action that we might be one of the cardinal factors in shaping our immediate national future.

As in the case of every other problem of moral influence, however, the first practical question is, How may we succeed in *fixing attention* upon the values involved? It is a problem of publicity, a problem of advertising, a problem of securing a hearing for the ideas which will win their own way if they are allowed to have a fair field.

This practical question resolves itself into the subordinate question whether we are agreed that this problem of all-around national preparedness is so strategic that we must not fail to make it the focus of our thoughts and efforts; whether it impresses us as so timely and so imperative that it would be the great infidelity if we dissipated our influence upon anything else. It is a question, not of the formula of our belief, but of the intensity of our allegiance to its substance.

Here is the call for social revivalism. Political evangelists of the purest prophetic type might sell their lives in the United States today as dearly as the worthiest of their predecessors in world-history. If the central secret of the scheme of things had been an intention to flash upon the American people a vision of

their actual condition, and of the alternatives for the future, that would galvanize them into redemptive action, the intention could hardly have taken a more revealing shape than we have before us in the European war. If we will not learn from that demonstration, no angel from heaven could teach us anything. The interests that are lodged in men's hearts incessantly strive for realization. They do not stop short until they have been overmastered by other interests wielding superior power. Power belongs to right, but if right does not assert itself, and ally itself with other right, and vindicate itself by appropriating the resources of might, its hour strikes, and it surrenders to termless interregna of wrong.

The United States of America is an assertion that the earth and the fulness thereof belong to the type of people who will not knowingly cloud one another's title to the benefits of this endowment. The United States of America is a resolution to achieve a national life which realizes this principle. Since 1776, however, it has slowly become evident that the complete implications of our national purpose cannot be expressed by the negative terms of its original proclamation. In order completely to appropriate the world and its fulness to the uses of men, the economy of men's relationships to one another must standardize itself in more veracious codes than the opportunist rule "Let alone! Hands off! Every man for himself!" We have discovered that a world literally of every-man-for-himself would be a world of disinherited men. The world and its fulness would have closed the largest and best of its resources to them. The life that our present knowledge of the world invites us to realize is a life of each-for-all-and-all-for each. Our best judgment today is that an economy controlled by this spirit will be just because it will be reciprocal, and it will consequently yield the largest and most fairly distributed dividends.

Unless my reading of the minds of sociologists is utterly at fault, all this is commonplace among us. The only doubt concerns whether and when and how we shall mobilize it. This is frankly an exhortation to concentrate all our energies around two main tasks: the first is of the nature of the declaration that the nation is a nation in the making. We Americans have not inherited a notable social achievement. We have inherited responsibility

for carrying on a fairly begun social process. Even the oldest portions of the country—say greater New York for instance—are hardly yet aware of the engineering tasks which they must complete before they are equipped to do business on the scale demanded by present conditions. In the country at large, our agriculture, our mining, our manufactures, our transportation, and our merchandizing impress one who has taken thought of our resources as pioneer phenomena, hardly to be regarded as beyond the rule-of-thumb stage. There is not a fraction of our political life, from town or county management to diplomacy, which is not chiefly notable for its crudity—crudity of conception of the functions to be discharged, and crudity of execution. Our economic life is not merely in an apprentice stage technically, but it is stunted by irresolution about liberating itself morally. “Capital” and “labor” in their present status are as impossible in perpetuity as the ancient social division into freeman and slave. Our intellectual life is mostly fooling itself away upon frivolities instead of massing itself upon drives into unconquered regions. Our religious life lacks light and leading, because it spends so much of itself trying to reconcile us to the God who was real to the Holy Roman Empire that it fails to put us in touch with the more real God whom we are yearning to discover.

Just as the profits which a few Americans are making out of the war partially obscure our understanding of the total calamity of war, so our prodigal material prosperity in America has betrayed us into national shallowness about the conditions of prosperity in its full dimensions and in the long run. We have not assimilated the fact that we are so far merely taking the initial steps in national life. We are laying the foundations of our house. We are shaping up plans for a career. We are giving our hostages to fortune. We are forming our national habits and adopting national standards. May we not count on a saving element of Americans who realize that our nation-in-the-making needs all the wisdom anywhere available for assistance in this process? The Chicago city administration is said recently to have reached the conclusion that the question of intramural transportation must be “taken out of politics,” and the ablest engineers in the country must be employed

to draw plans for a scheme of subways to be submitted to the voters. In like manner and on a larger scale, the intelligence of the United States should converge upon the conclusion that our task of continuing the development of our nationality calls for co-operation of all the different kinds of knowledge and skill which the world has thus far developed.

The second of the rallying-points for which I appeal is a verbal symbol for all the foregoing, the word which furnishes the title of this paper and which has suggested the form of the argument, viz., *preparedness*. I urge the practical policy of adopting the word "preparedness" as the slogan of every patriotic movement for more intensive co-operation in achieving worthy American nationality.

Whether as an abstract proposition the word "preparedness" is the best symbol which might be proposed for the purpose is beside the mark. The war has thrust the problem of preparedness in the military sense so insistently upon us that "preparedness" has suddenly become the most central word in the American vocabulary. It is a word to conjure with as much as the words "republican" and "democratic" have been in earlier stages of our history. It is in the first instance, to be sure, a partisan word, just as the words "republican" and "democratic" have been in the larger bulk of American usage. The impulse behind it, however, is far deeper than partisanship. It is the impulse that springs from intelligent or instinctive reference to the belief which I have placed foremost, namely, that we are a people with tasks on our hands, and that we must make ready for them. No more spontaneous evidence to this effect could be possible than the fact that leaders of all shades of thought upon the military problem, from the champions of the biggest army and navy in the world to advocates of literal and complete disarmament, are attempting to commend their various beliefs in terms of "preparedness." It will be good social psychology to make the most of this least common denominator of our present-day patriotism— not for the sake of concealing issues, not for the sake of betraying one another into equivocal positions or entangled programs, but for the sake of facing as one man in the forward direction. The most timely

thing that Americans of good-will can do is to fix on this standard *preparedness* as a proclamation of our common belief that national life is a complexity of problems, and that the only right attitude of the citizen is that of attention to all visible terms of the problems, in wisest provision for future developments.

The vital American question at this moment is whether we are capable of achieving a positive, coherent, constructive national consciousness. It is possible that we may sin away this day of grace by neglecting to use it for saving national consecration. Americans of the responsible and public-spirited type, Americans of equally sincere and devoted allegiance to the nation's welfare, have divergent and in some cases contradictory judgments about ways and means of accomplishing the common purpose. These differences about details are not fatal. In spite of them we may arrive at oneness of will that our nation shall be a community of effort to realize the best in human opportunity. Differences about ways and means will disappear, if we are faithful to the common purpose of finding out what we ought to do and how best to do it. At the present moment, Americans who believe in the fundamentals which have been recited may do most to minimize the losses from cross-purposes, and to reinforce one another's essential loyalty, if all will hold their particular opinions subject to the developing implications of the prophetic standard—*Preparedness*.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LIVING AND THE DEAD

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In this paper I propose to treat the subject—the relations between the living and the dead—not in its application to early or primitive society in general, but in reference to a single pagan tribe of the northern Philippines.

In his excellent volume, *Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*,¹ Lévy-Bruhl has treated this subject at length and has outlined a scheme, or a series of stages, through which he believes the less civilized races consider their dead and living to pass. I wish to apply this scheme to the Tinguian people of Northern Luzon, but first shall briefly review Lévy-Bruhl's attitude which leads him to adopt his method of treatment.

He holds that human mentality, in the main, is a social or collective product and that "the collective representation of primitive men differs fundamentally from our ideas or concepts, nor are they their equivalents." Civilized man acts in accordance with the precepts of logic, while the mind of primitive man is molded in accordance with the law of participation which, he asserts, is relatively indifferent to the law of contradiction. Such a mentality Lévy-Bruhl labels "prelogical."

To a man in this stage of society there is only a weak line of demarkation between the living and the dead. He lives with his dead, feeds and converses with the departed, and finds no contradiction in the fact that the deceased still participates, in a way, in the society of the living. For this mentality, death consists in participation or non-participation; that is, a dead person passes through a series of stages in which he participates more or less in life or death. In choosing examples for the elaboration of this argument, Lévy-Bruhl has considered only races of the type least

¹ Paris, 1910; for excellent reviews of this work see Goldenweiser, *American Anthropologist*, XIII (1911), 125, and *Current Anthropological Literature* (1912), 103.

civilized "where the totemic organization is still recognizable, if not in its virgin strength, as in the races of the Australian type."

Considering such a race, he selects an adult man who has been initiated and married and hence has attained his place in society. This individual dies and then passes through the following stages:

I. *Death between the time of the last breath and the funeral ceremony.*

Immediately after death the spirit is near by, and since it probably has not yet attained its spirit condition it is necessary to take heed lest the dead be angered and take revenge. The magic power of the funeral severs the participation of the dead with society, at least to a certain extent, and he enters stage

II. *The period between the funeral services and the end of mourning.*

By the time of the end of mourning the spirit has become adjusted to its new condition, and the taboos which previously rested on the family are removed. The ceremony held at that time has as its sole or principal object the final rupture between the social group and the dead, and the latter then enters stage

III. *The period during which the dead awaits reincarnation.*

After a time, more or less long, the spirit is reincarnated and passes into stage

IV. *The interval between actual birth and naming.*

Birth, like death, is considered of long duration. It begins at delivery and is accomplished only when the child is named and initiated.

V. *Covers the period of the naming up to initiation.*

VI. *Extends over the lifetime of the initiated adult.* When death again occurs the cycle is repeated.

The Tinguians to whom we shall now apply this scheme are a pagan people inhabiting the rugged mountain districts of Northwestern Luzon. They do not form a true tribe under the leadership of a single ruler or a body of rulers, but are broken up into many village groups, each one of which is governed by an oligarchy of old men. One of these, because of his better fitness, is called *lakay*, and he is really the head of the village; but all matters of importance are decided by the old men in council. Young men have little or no influence in the government. The people know

of the fact that the Igorot, who live to the south, have their villages divided into *alos* or exogamic groups; they also know that each *alo* contains its men's and women's dormitories in which the unmarried members of the group must live: but there seems to be no trace of such a custom ever having existed with the Tinguian, nor is there any other trace of a clan organization nor totemism.

Practically every act in the daily life of the people is governed by a belief in the spirit world. If a house is to be built, a field constructed, or a journey undertaken, the spirits are consulted, and if they are unfavorable the project is delayed or abandoned. A crop is never planted, harvested, or placed in the storehouses until suitable ceremonies have been held, while at all critical periods of life the spirits are consulted.

Above all is a powerful being known as Kadaklan. Next to him in importance is Kaboniyán, a friendly spirit who in ancient times taught the people how to sow and reap and how to cure sickness; and it was he who explained to them the details of the various ceremonies necessary for their well-being. Besides these two there are more than one hundred and fifty lesser spirits who are known by name, and many, many more who are less well known. These spirits are not the souls of the dead, of whom I shall speak presently, nor are they the forces of nature, although certain of them control the winds, the rain, and the lightning; but they are those who have existed throughout all time.

The superior beings communicate with mortals through the aid of mediums. These mediums are generally women past middle life, though men are not barred from the profession, who are chosen by having trembling fits when they are not cold, by warnings in dreams, or by being informed through other mediums that they are desired by the spirits. A woman may live the greater part of her life without any idea of becoming a medium and then, because of a notification, take up such duties. The candidate goes to one already initiated and from her acquires the details of the various ceremonies; she learns the gifts suitable for each spirit and the chants or prayers which must be used at certain times.

This training occupies several months, and then the candidate seeks the approval of the spirits. The wishes of the higher beings

are learned by means of a ceremony, in the course of which a pig is killed. The liver of the animal is examined and, if certain marks appear on it, the candidate is rejected or must continue her period of probation for several months longer before a trial is again made. When finally accepted, she may begin to summon the spirits into her body. Seating herself before a mat, she calls the attention of the spirits by striking certain shells or a bit of lead against a plate, then covering her face with her hands she begins to chant. Suddenly she is possessed and then, no longer as a person but as the spirit itself, she talks with the people. Certain mediums are visited only by low, mean spirits; others may have both good and bad, while still others may be possessed even by *Kadaklan*, the greatest of all. When not engaged in ceremonies, the mediums lead much the same sort of lives as the rest of the people; but when occupied with their duties they form a sharply marked, though unorganized, priesthood.

Magical practices enter all the ceremonies, but pure magic, generally used for evil purposes, is frequently employed against enemies. A little dust taken from the footprints of a foe, a bit of clothing, or an article recently handled by him is placed in a dish of water and is stirred violently. Soon the victim begins to feel the effect of this treatment and within a few hours becomes insane. A fly is named after a person and is put into a bamboo tube. This is placed near to the fire and in a short time the victim of the plot is seized with a fever. Likewise magical chants and dances may bring death to all the people of a dwelling.

I have dwelt thus at length on the spirits, mediums, and magic, because the life of this people cannot be understood without having had at least a glimpse of the forces which to such a great extent shape and control their daily activities.

I shall now start at the middle of Lévy-Bruhl's scheme and first treat of birth.

Shortly before the child is expected, two or three mediums are summoned to the dwelling. Spreading a mat on the floor, they place on it gifts for all the spirits who are likely to attend the ceremony. Then, bidding the men to play on a certain peculiar bamboo instrument, the mediums squat beside a bound pig and, dipping

their fingers in oil, stroke its side. Meanwhile they chant appropriate *diams* or prayers. This done, they begin to summon the spirits into their bodies, and from them the people learn what must be done to insure the health and happiness of the child. Later, water is poured into the pig's ear, that "as it shakes out the water so may the evil spirits be thrown out of the place." Then an old man cuts open the body of the animal and, thrusting in his hand, draws out the still palpitating heart which he gives to the medium. With this she strokes the body of the expectant woman, and later touches the other members of the family as a protection against harm.

The ceremony continues for several hours, and shortly before its close *gipas*, or the dividing, is made. The chief medium, who is now possessed by a powerful spirit, covers her shoulder with a sacred blanket, and in company with the oldest male relative of the expectant woman goes to the center of the room where a bound pig lies. After many preliminaries they decide on the exact center of the animal, then with their left hands each seizes a leg; they lift the victim from the floor and with the head-axes, which they hold in their free hands, they cut the animal in two. In this way the mortals pay the spirits for their share in the child, and henceforth the superior beings have no claims to it. The spirit and the old man drink of sugar-cane rum to cement their friendship and the ceremony ends.

After the delivery, the greatest care must be exercised, for otherwise the child will suffer from the acts of those about him. A fire is kept burning beside the mother, and for this the father must carefully prepare each stick of wood, for should it have rough places on it, the baby would have lumps on its head. The afterbirth is put in a small jar and is intrusted to an old man who must exercise great care in his mission. Should he squint while the jar is in his possession, the child would be thus afflicted. Bamboo leaves are inserted in the jar "so that the child will grow like the bamboo." If it is desired that he be a great hunter, the jar is hung in the jungle, while if he is to be an expert swimmer, and a successful fisherman, it is hung in the sea. The jar is hung in the house, and a small bowl is kept burning below the house, while a miniature shield and bow and arrow hang just above the infant's head.

Within a few hours after birth the child is bathed and placed on an overturned rice winnower which is held by an old man or woman. Raising the winnower a few inches above the floor, she addresses the child, asking, "What is your name?" Then she drops the winnower. Again she raises it, tells the babe the name it is to bear, and again drops it. Two or three times more the winnower is raised and, after the child is advised to be diligent and obedient, is dropped. For a month certain exact rules must be followed; then on the last day of the period the mother carries out the little hearth on which the fire has been continually burning. At the same time she calls to the *anito*¹ mother to throw out her fire. It is the belief of the Tinguian that when a human child is born an *anito* child is likewise born, and the *anito* mother follows the procedure just described. There seems to be no further connection between the spirit and the human child.

Should the child be ailing, a ceremony may be made to aid in its recovery, and the following procedure not infrequently takes place. The infant may be placed on an old rice winnower and be carried out to a refuse pile and left, while the parents assert that they are throwing the child away, since they do not care for it. Evil spirits witnessing this will consider the child dead and cease to trouble it. Soon a woman from another house will pick up the child and secretly convey it back to the dwelling where it is renamed.

If the infant progresses normally nothing further is done for it until it is about two years old, when a ceremony known as *ol-og* is held. Time will not permit a description of this ceremony, the evident object of which is to keep the child in good health and to cause it to grow as lustily as the bamboo which plays an important part at this time.

The next event of importance in the child's life is its engagement. When a youth is very young—nearly always before he is eight years of age—his parents select a suitable wife for him, and if her people are agreeable a great celebration known as *pakálon* is held. At this time partial payment for the girl is made and a part of the amount is at once divided among the girl's relatives who thus become interested in the successful termination of the match, for

¹ The *anito* are lesser spirits.

otherwise they must return the gifts received. From this time until the children are considered old enough to marry, they live with their parents, but the final ceremony often takes place before either of the couple has reached puberty.

For the purpose of this paper it is not necessary for us to consider the elaborate ceremonies which are connected with marriage; but it is important for us to note that there are no observances when a child reaches puberty, nor are there ceremonies or observances of any kind to mark the passage from childhood into adult life. As a matter of fact a young man or woman is of little consequence in the more weighty matters of Tinguian life. It is only when advancing years and experience have gained for him the respect of his fellows that the man assumes a position of importance in the group.

When a man dies he is bathed and placed in a death chair, while about and above him are many valuable gifts which he is to take with him to his ancestors in Maglawá. A barricade of pillows is placed in one corner of the room, and behind this the widow clad in old clothes is compelled to remain during the three days that the body is kept in the dwelling. Meanwhile two or three old women sit near the corpse fanning it and wailing continually, but at the same time keeping close watch to prevent evil spirits from approaching the body or the widow. Near the door a live chicken with its mouth slit down to the throat is fastened as a warning to the evil spirit *Seld-Ey* that a like treatment awaits him if he attempts to injure the corpse. Many similar precautions are taken against other evil spirits.

During the first two days that the body is in the house the friends and relatives gather to do honor to the dead and also to partake of the food and drink which are always freely given at such a time. Burial is beneath the house, and on the last day an old grave already occupied by one or more of the ancestors of the deceased is opened. When the diggers reach the stones covering the chamber in which the skeletons are placed, they make an opening and thrust in burning pine sticks, meanwhile calling to the dead within: "You are here, you are here, you are here!"

Before sunset the grave is resealed, and then one of the mediums seats herself in front of the corpse, covers her face with her hands,

and trembling violently begins to chant and wail, bidding the spirit to enter her body. Suddenly she falls back in a faint, and for a moment is left in this condition; then fire and water are brought, the spirit is frightened away, and the medium gives the last messages of the dead man to his family. The body is now ready for the grave, but before it is moved a hole must be burned in each garment for "a dead person is always dressed in his best clothing and is sure to be robbed by the evil spirit Ebwa unless the garments are burned." The corpse is carried from the house, but before it can be taken to the grave it must be rested for a moment in a *balaua*, a large spirit house built only by well-to-do families having the hereditary right. Unless this is done the spirit will be poor in its future life and unable to build *balaua*. As soon as the corpse is deposited in the grave and the earth is filled in, a small pig is killed and its blood is sprinkled on the loose soil. Meanwhile the evil spirit, Seld-Ey is besought to accept this offering and to leave the grave untouched. As a further protection an iron plow point is placed over the grave, "for most evil spirits fear iron." That night the men gather in the house of mourning and sing *sang-sang-it*, a song in which they praise the dead man, encourage the widow, and pray for the welfare of the family. During this night and the nine succeeding a fire is kept burning at the foot of the house ladder and at the grave—a further protection against evil-disposed spirits.

During a period of ten days none of the relatives of the deceased is allowed to leave the village, neither may he take part in labors or pastimes. Should he violate this rule the spirit of the dead will exact vengeance, usually by taking the life of the culprit.

The morning following the burial, a shallow, box-like frame is hung above the grave and in it are placed dishes, food, tobacco, fire-making outfit, weapons, and clothing. Within the house the mat of the dead lies spread out ready for use, while at meal-time food is placed beside it for the spirit to eat.

At the end of the period of taboo the relatives and old men of the village gather in the house where, after many preliminaries, each one is anointed with oil and pig's blood. For this purpose the medium dips different kinds of twigs in the blood and oil, and as she draws them across the wrists or ankles of the people she says, "Let the *lew-lew* leaves take the sickness and death to another

town; let the bamboo make them grow fast and be strong as it is, and have many branches; let the *atilwag* turn the sickness to other towns." Last of all the widow is anointed and then she is free to go about as she desires, but until the final ceremony is made she is prohibited from wearing good clothing or ornaments, and is obliged to abstain from dancing and merry-making.

About a year after the funeral a great celebration called *layog* is held "to take away the sorrow from the family." Animals are slaughtered in great numbers and all kinds of food and drink are prepared for the guests. Most of the time is spent in feasting, drinking, and dancing, but spirit offerings are not neglected and, as in all other events of this kind, the mediums play an important part. The clothing and ornaments of the deceased are placed near to the dancing space, while close by are food and drink. At the conclusion of the dance the members of the family go into the house, roll up the mat used by the dead, open the doors and windows, and all are again free to do as they desire.

As has been indicated by the foregoing, the spirit of the dead stays near to his former home until the ten days of taboo are over, ready to take vengeance on any relative who fails to show him proper respect. After the blood and oil ceremony, he goes to his future home in Maglawa, a place midway between earth and sky, where conditions are much the same as on earth. The spirit will return to his former home at the time of the *layog* ceremony, but only on very rare occasions has one been known to appear after that. No further ceremonies are made for him, nor is he worshiped. He lives forever in Maglawa and never returns to earth in another form.

Now to consider Lévy-Bruhl's argument again. It would seem, according to his treatment, that the activities preceding birth and for the two years following would indicate that the child is not yet completely born, and that the magical acts performed at that time help him to attain full life. On the other hand, we have seen how strong adults may be affected by magical practices. The close connection between an individual, his garments, objects recently touched by him, or even his name, must be considered to apply even more forcibly to the helpless infant and the afterbirth. So strong is this bond that even unintentional acts may injure the babe.

We have already seen that evil spirits are always near, and that unless great precautions are taken they will injure adults if they can get them at a disadvantage, particularly when they are asleep. This seems to me to give the key to the problem. The child is not able to protect itself, therefore the adults perform such acts as they think will secure the good-will and help of friendly spirits, while they bribe or buy up those who might otherwise be hostile; and lastly, they make use of such magical objects and ceremonies as will compel the evil spirits to leave the infant alone. As the child grows in size and strength he is less in need of protection, and at an early age is treated like the other younger members of the community.

Naming, as we have seen, follows almost immediately after birth, while puberty and initiation ceremonies are entirely lacking. Apparently, then, a child at birth is fully alive, and at no time does he undergo any rites or ceremonies which make him more a part of the community than he was on the first day that he saw the light. If this is true, stages V and VI are not found in this society.

Passing now to death, we find ourselves in somewhat closer agreement with Lévy-Bruhl. After leaving the body, the spirit remains near to the corpse until after the funeral, and even then is close by until the ten days of taboo are over. He still finds need of nourishment and hence food is placed near his mat during this period. He has not yet visited Maglawā, and hence has not accommodated himself to his new existence. During this period, as at the time of birth, he is not in a position to protect his body from the designs of evil spirits, and if his relatives fail to give the corpse proper care it is certain to be mutilated. Many of the folk-tales tell of instances in which the relatives neglected the body which, as a result, was mutilated and eaten by base supernatural beings. It seems quite as plausible that the presence of the spirit near its old haunts may be for the purpose of seeing that its body is carefully attended to, as that it is awaiting the time when it will become adjusted to its new existence. We have already seen that certain acts of the living toward the corpse can affect the position of the spirit in Maglawā, and hence it is of supreme importance that its former owner guard against any possible neglect or injury to the body.

When this danger is over the spirit at once leaves its old home and returns again only at the time that the ceremony to take away the sorrow is made. From that time on he continues his existence in the upper world, neither troubling nor being troubled by mortals on earth. The idea of reincarnation is unthinkable to the Tinguian, and hence the third division of the scheme is lacking here.

Reviewing the material now before us, it appears that Lévy-Bruhl's fundamental thesis, namely, that for primitive man birth and death are only incidents in the cycle of the individual's life, or that birth, death, and reincarnation are only links in the chain, does not apply to the society we have just been considering. Neither does the idea hold that birth is incomplete until the individual, through initiation and marriage, comes into the possession of all the secrets and knowledge of the group.

We find ourselves in complete agreement with the conclusion that death does not completely sever the connection of the deceased with the group, and that the ghost still participates, to a great extent, in the affairs of the living. However, our survey of Tinguian beliefs and customs leads us to give a different explanation for the acts and ceremonies following the last breath, namely, the protection of the corpse from harm, and the endeavor to so treat the body that the ghost may be assured of a suitable position in the life to follow.

In conclusion I want to raise the question whether or not we are justified in saying that primitive man is indifferent to the law of contradiction and that his mentality is "prelogical"—as opposed to our logical method of thinking—even though we agree that he looks upon his dead as still participating in the life of the living.

In discussing this subject Rivers points out that the logical processes of primitive man are comparable to our own, but that his method of classification is different. He says, "If we grant the savage his categories, the beliefs and practices he deduces therefrom become plausible, nor do they involve any fallacy."¹

As a case in point he refers to the custom of burying alive which Lévy-Bruhl considers an example of contradiction since the people act as if a person could be both living and dead at the same time.

¹ Rivers, "The Primitive Conception of Death," *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1912.

Rivers holds that this is true only as we apply our categories in place of those of the natives, for to them a man who is dead or who because of age, severe sickness, and the like, ought to be dead is *mate* as opposed to *toa* ("living"), and the burial of such a person is the perfectly logical consequence of his *mateness*. In other words, many examples of prelogical mentality may, with more exact knowledge, be merely cases in which the facts of the universe have been classified and arranged in categories different from our own.

While he thus differs from Lévy-Bruhl as regards the prelogical mentality of primitive man, Rivers adopts his idea of the "cycle of life" and gives it as his opinion that the categories of *mate* and *toa* are probably universal in low grades of society.

Referring again to our Tinguian material, we find that, at first glance, it appears to bear out this conclusion. A dead person or animal is referred to as *matay*, so also is one who is very ill and is expected to die; but if the speaker wishes to make it plain that life has actually ceased, he adds a suffix meaning "complete" or "finished" and refers to the dead as *matayen*. Here then a plain distinction is possible between the dead and the near dead although it is not regularly brought out in general conversation.

While we do not believe that, in this case, Rivers' example is valid, we do agree with his general argument that the difference between the mentality of the savage and civilized man is not so much in the way he reasons as in the way he classifies the facts of the universe.

We are in full accord with Lévy-Bruhl's statement that human mentality is, in the main, a social or collective product. If this be true we must expect to get different products in those circles of participation which vary, but it does not appear to us that hence it follows that "the collective representations of primitive men differ fundamentally from our own ideas or concepts, nor are they their equivalents," for in other circles we may still find their ideas or concepts equivalent to our own. Even in our own society, which is doubtless governed more by rational thought than is that of primitive man, we may find ourselves apparently acting in accordance with the laws of logic in some of our activities, while in others we are illogical, acting in harmony with the thought of our group.

PSYCHIC CAUSES OF RURAL MIGRATION

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In modern civilization the increasing attractiveness of the city is one of the apparent social facts.¹ Social psychology may reasonably be expected to throw light upon the causes of this movement of population from rural to urban conditions of life. Striking illustrations of individual preference for city life, even in opposition to the person's economic interests, suggest that this problem of social behavior so characteristic of our time contains important mental factors.

Since sensations give the mind its raw material,² the mind may be said to crave stimulation. "In the most general way of viewing the matter, beings that seem to us to possess minds show in their physical life what we may call a great and discriminating sensitiveness to what goes on at any present time in their environment."³ This interest of the mind in the receiving of stimulation for its own activity is an essential element in any social problem. The individual reacts socially "with a great and discriminating sensitiveness" to his environment, just as he reacts physically to his stimuli to conserve pleasure and avoid pain.

The fundamental sources of stimuli are, of course, common to all forms of social grouping, but one difference between rural and urban life expresses itself in the greater difficulty of obtaining under usual conditions certain definite stimulations from the environment. This fact is assumed both by those who hold the popular belief that most great men are country-born and by those who accept the thesis of Ward that "fecundity in eminent persons seems then to be intimately connected with cities."⁴ The city may be called an

¹ Gillette, *Constructive Rural Sociology*, p. 42.

² Permeloo, *The Science of Human Behavior*, p. 290.

³ Royce, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 21.

⁴ Ward, *Applied Sociology*, pp. 169-98.

environment of greater quantitative stimulations than the country. The city furnishes forceful, varied, and artificial stimuli; the country affords an environment of stimuli in comparison less strong and more uniform. Minds that crave external, quantitative stimuli for pleasing experiences are naturally attracted by the city and repelled by the monotony of the country. On the other hand, those who find their supreme mental satisfactions in their interpretation or appreciation of the significant expression of the beauty and lawfulness of nature discover what may be called an environment of qualitative stimulations. The city appeals, therefore, to those who with passive attitude need quantitative, external experiences; the country is a splendid opportunity for those who are fitted to create their mental satisfactions from the active working over of stimuli that appear commonplace to the uninterpreting mind. If Coney Island with its noise and manufactured stimulations is representative of the city, White's *Natural History of Selborne* is a characteristic product of the wealth of the country to the mind gifted with penetrating skill.

Doubtless this difference between rural and urban is nothing new, and from the beginning of civilization there have been the country-minded and the city-minded. In our modern life, however, there is much that increases the difference and much that stimulates the movement of the city-minded from the country. Present-day life with its complexity and its rapidity of change makes it difficult for one to get time to develop the active mind that makes appreciation possible. Our children precociously obtain adult experiences of quantitative character in an age of the automobile and moving pictures, and an unnatural craving is created for an environment of excitement, a life reveling in noise and change. Business, eager for gain, exploits this demand for stimulation, and social contagion spreads the restlessness of our population. The urban possibilities for stimulation are advertised as never before in the country by the press with its city point of view, by summer visitors, and by the reports of the successes of the most fortunate of those who have removed to the cities. In an age restless and mobile, with family traditions less strong, and transportation exceedingly cheap and inviting, it is hardly strange that

so many of the young people are eager to leave the country which they pronounce dead—as it literally is to them—for the lively town or city. It is by no means true that this removal always means financial betterment or that such is its motive. It is very significant to find so many farmers who have made their wealth in the country, or who are living on their rents, moving to town to enjoy life. May it not be that a new condition has come about in our day by the possibility that there are more who exhaust their environment in the country before habit with its conservative tendency is able to hold them on the farm? One who knows the discontent of urban-minded people who have continued to live in the country can hardly doubt that habit has tended to conserve the rural population in a way that it does not now. And one must not forget the pressure of the discontent of these urban-minded country parents upon their children. The faculty of any agricultural college is familiar with the farmer's son who has been taught never to return to the farm after graduation from college. That the city-minded preacher and teacher add their contribution to rural restlessness is common thought.

In the city the sharp contrast between labor and recreation increases without doubt the appeal of the city to many. The factory system not only satisfies the gregarious instinct, it also gives an absolute break between the working time and the period of freedom. In so far as labor represents monotony, it emphasizes the value of the hours free from toil. This contrast is often in the city the difference between very great monotony and excessive excitement after working hours. It has been pointed out often that city recreation shows the demand for great contrast between it and the fatigue of monotonous labor. So great a contrast between work and play—monotony and freedom—is not possible in the country environment. In the midst of country recreations there are likely to be suggestions of the preceding work or the work that is to follow. It is as if the city recreations were held in factories. Country places of play are usually in close contact with fields of labor. Often indeed the country town provides the worker with very little opportunity for recreation in any form. In rural places recreation cannot be had at stated periods. Weather or market

conditions must have precedence over the holiday. Recreation therefore cannot be shared as a common experience to such an extent by country workers as is possible in the city. Since the rural population is very largely interested in the same farming problems, even conversation after the work of the day is less free from business concerns than is usually that of city people.

The difficulty of obtaining sharp contrast between work and play in the country no doubt is one reason for the ever-present danger of recourse to the sex instinct for stimulation. One source of excitement is always present ready to give temporary relief to the barren life of young people. Not only of the girl entering prostitution may it be said that with her the sex instinct is less likely "to be reduced in comparative urgency by the volume and abundance of other satisfactions."¹ The barrenness of country life to the girl growing into womanhood, hungry for amusement, is one large reason why the country furnishes so large a proportion of prostitutes to the city.

This civilizational factor of prostitution, the influence of luxury and excitement and refinement in attracting the girl of the people, as the flame attracts the moth, is indicated by the fact that it is the country dwellers who chiefly succumb to the fascination. The girls whose adolescent explosive and orgiastic impulses, sometimes increased by a slight congenital lack of nervous balance, have been latent in the dull monotony of country life and heightened by the spectacle of luxury acting on the unrelieved drudgery of town life, find at last their complete gratification in the career of a prostitute.²

Consideration of the part played in the rural exodus by the nature of the stimuli demanded by the individual for satisfaction or the hope of satisfaction in life suggests that the school is the most efficient instrument for rural betterment. The country environment contains sources of inexhaustible satisfaction for those who have the power to appreciate them. Farming cannot be monotonous to the trained agriculturalist. It is full of dramatic and stimulating interests. Toil is colored by investigation and experiment. The by-products of labor are constant and prized beyond measure by the student and lover of nature. Even the struggle with opposing forces lends zest to the educated farmer's work.

¹ Flexner, *Prostitution in Europe*, p. 72.

² Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, VI, 293.

This does not mean that such a farmer runs a poet's farm, as did Burns, with its inevitable financial failure, but rather that the farmer is a skilled workman with an understanding and interpreting mind. If the farming industry, under proper conditions, could offer no satisfaction to great human instincts it would be strange indeed when one remembers the long period that man has spent in the agricultural stage of culture. City dwellers in their hunt for stimulation are likely to face either the breakdown of physical vitality or the blunting of their sensibilities. Country joys, on the other hand, cost less in the nervous capital expended to obtain them. The urban worker, in thinking of his hours of freedom in sharp contrast with the time spent at his machine, forgets his constant temptation to use most of his surplus income in the satisfying of an unnatural craving for stimulation created by the conditions of his environment. This need not be true of the rural laborer and usually is not.

It is useless to deny the important and wholesome part that the urban life and the city-minded man play in the great social complex which we call modern civilization, but he who would advance country welfare may wisely agitate for country schools fitted to adjust the majority of country children to their environment, that they may as adults live in the country successful and contented lives. We need never fear having too few of the urban-minded or the able exploiters of talent who require the city as their field of activity. The present tendency makes necessary the development of country schools able to change the apparent emptiness of rural environment and the excessive appeal of urban excitement into a clear recognition on the part of a greater number of country people of the satisfying joys of rural stimulations.

CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT¹

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The dependence of culture on physical environment is a time-honored problem. The degree and nature of their interrelations have been variously estimated by different writers and continue to occupy the minds of ethnologists, historians, and sociologists. Following the lead of Buckle, historians have often attempted to interpret culture in terms of its physical environment,² and a similar tendency is noticeable among ethnologists, particularly since the time of Ratzel. A gifted modern writer on geography, Miss Ellen Churchill Semple, building on the foundations laid by Buckle and Ratzel, has constructed an elaborate and apparently self-sustaining system of historical and cultural interpretations based on environmental influences. Attempts to express national and racial traits in terms of physical environment continue to impress our minds and carry conviction. I propose in the following pages to discuss the general relations of culture and environment in the hope of clarifying some of the theoretical issues involved.

Before proceeding with our argument attention must be drawn to the types of causal interpretations applicable in historical problems. On the one hand, we may be interested in following up all the antecedents of a given event or cultural phenomenon. Strictly speaking, there is no limit to such an inquiry; what we obtain is, to speak with Spencer, a regressive multiplication of causes. On the other hand, we may be interested in studying the direct causes of a phenomenon, disregarding their antecedents, and thus secure an insight into the character of those factors that appear as causes of cultural changes. Thus the environmentalist will often agree with the anti-environmentalist that certain changes in a culture

¹ A lecture read before a joint meeting of anthropologists and geographers, on February 19, 1914, at New Haven, Connecticut.

² A striking recent example will be found in Myres's *The Dawn of History*.

may be due, not to the influence of its physical environment, but to certain cultural features introduced from another group; but, objects the environmentalist, these cultural features were, in their turn, produced by the physical environment of the group from which they are derived. Now, even if true, this retort is irrelevant to the issue, if what we are interested in is to ascertain what kind of factors appear as causes of cultural phenomena rather than to follow up each factor to its ultimate traceable antecedents. Another consideration to be kept in mind is that a factor may be regarded as a determinant of a cultural phenomenon only if the phenomenon necessarily follows from that factor and from it alone. If other factors are involved, each may only be regarded as a partial cause of the phenomenon, as a codeterminant.

Let us now examine the proposition, often made, that the material culture of a group, particularly in primitive society, is determined by its physical environment. The snow house of the Eskimo is thus said to be determined by the Eskimo's arctic *milieu*, the wood industries of the Northwest coast natives by the cedar forests of that area. Now while it will be admitted that snow is a *conditio sine qua non* of snow houses and that the elaborate wood-carvings of the Northwest coast would probably never have developed in the absence of the cedar forests, neither of these two factors may be regarded as a determinant. The refutation is right at hand: the Siberian Chukchee, whose environment is practically identical with that of the Eskimo, have no snow houses, while the natives of California, whose forests excel even those of the Northwest coast, have scarcely any wood industry and specialize in basketry. Moreover, even in primitive society the historical factor may not be neglected. Tribes often utilize materials not found in their own locality: thus the Toda of Southern India use pots imported from the Tamil, while the Australian Dieri travel some 300 miles to secure the pituri root cultivated by the natives of Central Queensland. And as we pass from primitive to more civilized conditions, the dependence of the material culture of a group on its physical environment becomes less and less conspicuous. Nor is this all. While it may be stated as a general proposition that the materials utilized by a group for its dwellings, means of

conveyance, clothing, and food are largely dependent on the flora and fauna of the region, the determination thus disclosed has but a limited cultural significance. If, for instance, one classifies the cultures of a number of tribes according to the materials utilized by them in their industries and for food, the resulting grouping will not represent the cultures of the tribes but the flora and fauna of the different regions; for there is more to a house or canoe or garment than the material it is made of, more to food than the animal or vegetable substance it contains.

Our suspicions are at once aroused against any attempt to represent physical environment as a determinant of culture when we consider that culture is essentially dynamic while environment is static. Notwithstanding the conservatism inherent in all culture, the culture of the most primitive group changes as the generations go by, while the physical environment remains unchanged. And even in historic society the physical environment changes but little when compared with the tremendous transformations of culture. Miss Semple sees in this permanence of the environment an argument for the environmentalist: the environment alone is always there and it changes but little; hence it alone can exert a lasting effect, and the accumulated weight of its influences must be enormous. In reality, however, the situation resolves itself into a strong presumption in favor of the opposite camp. For, if the same environment conditions a continuous series of cultural transformations, or, to put it differently, a series of slightly different cultures, either the environment in its entirety is active all the time, and then some extra-environmental cause must account for the difference of effect, or different sides of the environment come into action at different periods, in which case some extra-environmental cause must determine the selection.

The latter alternative does indeed correspond to reality. As culture progresses, new sides of the environment come into play or old sides are being utilized to better advantage. Suppose environment= E , culture= C . Then, if the environmental feature is a favorable one, the result may be represented as $E \cdot C$. If the environmental feature is a negative one, the result will be E/C . Thus a river is a positive feature for communication along its course; it is such even with most primitive methods of navigation,

but its utility vastly increases as the sailor takes the place of the canoe, and the steamer that of the sailor. On the other hand, the river is a negative feature from the point of view of communication between its shores; the hindrance is overcome by the canoe, then by a light bridge, good for pedestrians only, then by a solid structure which serves to carry a street across the river.

This is only one instance of the continuous action of environment, which, however, is changed in its bearings through the intrusion of an extra-environmental factor, culture. A field continues to be an environmental feature when transformed by the application of agricultural appliances, but its cultural bearings are vastly modified, both in kind and in degree. Similarly the flora and fauna of a region, while continuing to constitute part of the environment of a group, become thoroughly different in their significance with the change in methods of hunting and plant gathering, in the preparation of food and industrial utilization of animals and plants, in the domestication of animals and the cultivation of plants. As culture progresses it makes different uses of the same environment, and different cultures make different uses of similar or identical environments. In all such cases environment alone cannot be held accountable for the discrepant results. Environment absorbs culture and becomes saturated with it, and while it continues to be an active factor it is no longer environment alone which acts, but environment plus culture.

The culture-environment relation may be looked at from yet another standpoint. All culture may be conceived of as a resultant of invention and imitation, of progress and inertia, of radicalism and conservatism. How then do the inventor and the imitator, in the widest sense, appear in their dependence on culture and environment?

Now, it is not beyond the range of probability that certain features of the environment, which we know not, may favor or hinder the appearance in a group of inventors, innovators, reformers.¹ However that may be, the specific contributions of these

¹ It may be objected that innovators, reformers, etc., need not have inventive minds. This is true. The three terms used in the text must thus be understood to designate those individuals whose psychic caste tends toward originality, departure from the old, in practical thinking, theory, morality.

individuals depend altogether on culture. Richard Strauss, had he lived in Verdi's time, would have composed *Aida*; Beethoven, if a native of China, would certainly have written some of that music which jars so terribly on our ears; Raphael, if born in Bushmenland, may have decorated his cave with a steatopygous madonna; a paleolithic Edison may have conceived the first fire-making apparatus. Similarly, in abstract thought, in literature, in decorative art, in ethical theory, the specific contributions of the original minds of all times were determined by their cultural setting. The uniformity of inventions at given periods and within restricted culture areas illustrates the same proposition. With spreading internationalism and the effacement of sharply characterized cultural areas, the relative uniformity of inventions becomes an all but universal phenomenon.

We may now turn to the imitator, the standpatter, the conservative. Again, we may allow for the possibility that certain features in the environment, which we know not, may favor or check the development of those traits of the human mind which stand for the reception and faithful reproduction of ideas. But psychic inertia is a general trait of human, nay animal, psychology, and, as such, is quite independent of any specific environment. What is to be assimilated is determined by culture; the mechanism of reception, assimilation, reproduction of ideas is determined by human psychology; environment has nothing whatever to do with it.

Now both of these factors are fundamental prerequisites of culture. Inertia, the basis of conservatism, conditions the solid framework of society and makes culture possible. Invention, on the other hand—initiative—determines change, progress. In both of these respects culture is independent of environment.

All cultures, finally, are historical complexes. Every culture combines with traits that have originated within its own borders, other traits that have come from without, from other cultures, and have become amalgamated with the recipient culture. Now these foreign traits are obviously independent of the environment of the recipient culture. Thus, as a historical complex, every culture is largely independent of its environment.

These brief remarks will suffice to indicate that a large set of environmental influences, while actual, are not significant for culture; that in another set of cultural phenomena culture and environment co-operate and must be regarded as codeterminants; that in two of its fundamental aspects, that of invention and that of imitation, culture is independent of environment; and that, finally, every culture is largely independent of its environment in so far as it is a historical complex.

These considerations should not discourage us from studying the specific influences doubtless exerted by environment upon culture, but they might serve to emphasize the folly of any attempt to interpret any culture in terms of environment alone. Speaking with reservations, culture must be regarded as a closed and to a large extent self-sustaining system.

THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN. IV

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THE PROBLEM OF COMPENSATION

Evidently the most outstanding consideration with reference to incomes is that of their relation to the general welfare; and a social control is implied by the fact that incomes are rewards which society fixes or tolerates. Society is a party to every contract from which profits accrue. Should it be found that the interests of society are not suitably recognized in prevailing relations between services and rewards, the need of regulation would hardly be denied.

It may be objected that society does not fix compensations. In the case of the postal clerk or the governor of a state or the nurse in a city hospital, society, acting through the appropriate civil authorities, does actually set salaries; but what of the farmer's, the manufacturer's, or the physician's income? Are not these functionaries, though of society, yet apart from it for all purposes of profit and accumulation? These men go about their private affairs, making such profits as they may. Quite true; and under normal conditions society could perhaps do no better than to leave them alone, when compensations thus gained concur with what society for its own interests might specifically decree. But nevertheless income-takers are in and of society; there is no Crusoe's island of individualism. Even in the case of the farmer, the government aids in the production of corn and wheat, which the farmer delivers at the railroad station in all the pride of ownership. In manifold ways society assists in the preparation of utilities for the market, and, in affording a market, supplies the factor without which all values would vanish. Income to private citizens is therefore hardly distinguishable, logically, from incomes paid public officials for avowed public service.

There is a question as to whether the welfare of society is promoted by compensations made upon current terms. Are there

not services rendered for which society pays too little, or, through precedent, privilege, or indifference, for which it pays too much? Are the interests of society suitably recognized in current allotments of income among individuals in the several pursuits and occupations? What is signally rewarded and therefore honored has an immense prestige over services and ideals which are stigmatized by non-payment or poverty. Bonusing an activity stimulates it. Is the social system of rewards, which is the total mechanism of compensation, really adapted to stimulate activities to the most desirable ends?

Is it to be supposed that takers of large incomes are by this token to be rated as having rendered society correspondingly valuable services, or that a small income means a small man? Observation does not admit an affirmative reply. For example, every little while one runs across evidence of the undesirability of selling whiskey. That a man who has made a million dollars by selling whiskey has any real claim to compensational, and incidentally social, preferment over a faithful superintendent of schools in the same city is not to be claimed. Here the rewards are in picturesquely perverse ratio to contributions to social welfare. Now the whiskey jobber gets his money, it is true, from people who want to buy whiskey, and not as an appropriation from the legislature, yet we can scarcely say that society, in the last analysis, does not reward him for circumventing laws, debauching citizens, and promoting crime. In certain sections of the United States embossed signs exhort to "chew Copenhagen snuff." Owners, field agents, and district managers of the combine which stands back of this pestiferous confusion draw salaries which would look big to preachers of righteousness. Compare the incomes of the railroad president and the president of a state board of railroad commissioners; of the scientist and the banker; of the corporation lawyer, who fights the public, and the state's attorney, who fights for the public. Compare the incomes of the taker of unearned increment in a city and the park commissioner or the man who sweeps the streets. Unquestionably the most significant and productive service is the rearing of children; but what of the compensation of mothers? Lumber barons who slaughter forest without replanting

and owners of factories in which children are exploited receive, on the other hand, financial returns which, conceived as expressions of approval, highly honor the recipients.

Inequalities have arisen from various causes. Historical opportunity has been a prolific source of individual aggrandizement. The pioneer who stumbled on a gold mine, the patentee of an immense acreage of new land, the early railroad promoter who secured the inevitable right-of-way, the homesteader whose horses went lame on land destined for office buildings, and the chosen who "get in on the ground floor," all illustrate the wisdom not only of being born at the right time but at the right place. Especially in new countries does historical opportunity appear, and a variety of peculiar advantages to individuals are afforded. However, as population settles into environment frontier privileges disappear, and large taking of wealth comes to rest upon other grounds, though, of course, inheritance often relates great modern incomes to ancestral "sooners."

Inheritance plays a leading part. Not only the possessions of the wealthy, but of the merely well-to-do, are determined in a great number of cases by the accumulations of ancestry. Early inequalities of income result in similar inequalities today. The form of the doctrine of compensation which reads that families pass from "shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves" in three generations looks suspiciously like a consolation of mythology. Inheritance occupies a very commanding position among the factors making for current inequalities.

But men's present occupations have singularly different economic outcomes. Something like historical opportunity appears in connection with new forms of goods. The automobile industry began gradually, and has created fortunes. Men so situated as to be led into this field have generally achieved a success less possible to persons of small original capital in older lines of commercial activity. Manufactured breakfast foods, from which immense incomes are derived, had an auspicious moment for investment. Doubtless there are still ahead novel processes and unique devices to be seized upon for great profits, though that the nascent stage for fortune building has, in the case of various utilities, like oil or

armor plate, passed is evident. Systematic exploration for economic opportunities by the powers of wealth does not tend, moreover, to the financial increase of the ambitious individual of small means. There are perhaps bigger fish in the sea than have ever been caught, but they are likely, unless all signs fail, to be landed by a commercial armada rather than by a rowboat.

As between occupations whose aim is gain, and others, like teaching or civil service, which afford no speculative chances, the advantage for wealth accumulation lies all with the former. A very large percentage of people are in no position to expect more than mere maintenance. The salary status opens to no expansive outlook, while wages are usually modest. Extreme economy and compound interest may combine to a considerable saving, yet stated compensation, so widely prevalent, sets firm limits. Oftentimes, persons of large wealth have had their start in this way, but at some notable moment a more likely method presented itself.

Of ways to wealth the surest is monopoly. Monopoly appears when one has something which another wants and cannot get elsewhere. So far as strawberries for supper are concerned, it is evident that the local supply controls purchasing; it matters not that there is no national strawberry combine, or that strawberries are going to waste in the Hood River Valley. The one taxicab before a thunder-storm represents a monopoly. One wants to buy a fireless cooker, but the particular kind is made by a single firm, which has an iron-clad agreement, signed, with hardware dealers not to sell at less than a given price, seemingly exorbitant—another monopoly. Whenever a dealer or professional man can make one pay his price or go without the desired utility or service, there is a form of monopoly illustrated. We are all, perhaps, at one time or another, monopolists; there are, coming and going, millions of monopolies, most of which are petty and transient. But the ideal monopolist is one who squeezes into a central position, cunningly attaches himself to a main conduit of popular sustenance, and taxes every breath, imitating the function of government in assessing dues upon a populace.

Those gifted folk who are monopolists in skill or genius, whose capital is personality or attainments, as the author, musician, or

actor, represent services for which society gladly pays tribute. The money taken in by a wholesome and noted public speaker, a faithful physician, or a daring aviator seems, regardless of amount, singularly free from taint. In league with the phonograph, however, the earnings of the famous singer stand a chance of being viewed with less equanimity.

But no matter how gained, great individual wealth raises questions of social welfare. Wasteful consumption, demoralizing standards of living, the poverty reflex of high life, the fixation of orders in society corresponding, undemocratically, with economic levels, even the development of wretched human varieties—these considerations do not permit the man of wealth to be the sole judge of the acceptability of bloated ownership, though the delicacy of the issue and the concurrence of wealth with position have indeed delayed the day of rational interference.

It would be a bold debater who should attempt to show that gradations of income correspond, within miles of approximation, to degrees of social desirability; the misfits are too plentiful. No university president could hope for such pecuniary reward as is enjoyed by the human terminus of a money pipe-line leading to a reservoir of privilege. And, coming to the quality of service rendered, we find that the moral hardness and conscienceless exploitation, on which riches often rest, enforce a strict selection of beneficiaries. Sensitive intelligence could hardly meet the tests of moral induration required in various phases of big business, and thus favors go to a brusquely acquisitive type.

Various activities from which wealth is derived have an anti-social character; and others, distinctly pro-social, are without substantial remuneration. There is no presumption of acceptable service because dividends are large, nor is to be inferred from one's poverty that society does not profit by his services. Wealth is produced by labor, yet is often garnered by those who toil not. The marketing of adulterated, short-weight, and shoddy goods; the foisting upon the public of noxious products; the decoying of buyers through a multitude of sham claims; the artificial creation of scarcities; the "hold-ups" of exorbitant prices for the necessities of life; the pandering to ignorance and vulgarity: these pass muster

in the prevailing system of social rewards. The question as to what one *does* to get his income—how he actually affects society—is never asked with authority, except in a narrow list of conventional offenses. There is no rational attempt on behalf of society to appraise services and adjust compensations.

Thus the society tolerates or condones the getting of money even by means which imply injuries to the public. In certain cases communities may mildly embarrass the money-taker, but there is a fairly open field for fraud and privilege. Society might well ask every man just how he gets his income. There is really nothing more interesting than knowing other people's business, and even in the face of objections there is nothing which should be more legitimate. In fact, society very much needs to know; for means of support, which are so largely invisible, are related to the subject-matter of social justice, and an unheard-of publicity commends itself.

Great inequalities of possession, arising from systemless social rewards, give rise, among other evils, to the particular one of the suppression of opinions. An untrammelled issuance of ideas from active minds conduces to welfare. When, however, the yeast of thought is imprisoned through a prudence whose origin is fear of economic powers, there falls upon society a conventionalism, and conversations are diverted to safe if unprofitable themes. Though there is evidence of a freedom of utterance, even a literature of exposure, yet the circumspection of the business and the professional man is notably stultifying, and, being so, represents the loss of a social asset; business modifies the truth of intercourse. The fear of "getting in wrong" with superior commercial powers has a repressive influence, revealed, for example, in unwillingness to be quoted as to explanations of the high cost of living; and there is nothing more hopeless and depressing than the conversational positions of agents of large industrial concerns who are schooled in defensive economics. One is impressed with the seeming unanimity of fundamentalistic thought which may be caused to prevail. Probably this is a necessary evil, for it is difficult to have freedom of opinion by open speaking to prevent an insulated control of opinion from hardening into a lasting domination, but it is unpleasant to know

that a large number are today silenced effectively as to the positive support of newer ideals. The shadow of big business chills numbers of thoughtful men in salaried positions. With less economic dependence no doubt the volume of frank talk would prove so interesting that one would have renewed objection to the approach of old age.

There is an opposition to welfare implied in the very existence of wide inequalities of income. The significant reforms of the day center in the correction of abuses in the distribution of wealth, and the collective force of privilege is opposed to means which would set society upon a more rational basis. Great private wealth obstructs, perverts, and prevents. To what ramifications of undesirableness may planless compensation not lead? Not only the patent deficiencies of poverty, but, as well, forces tending to defeat civilization appear under plutocracy. The difficulties of social betterment are increased when large prizes function in opposition and when pro-social activities so often must rely on charity.

But is the time ripe for the social control of incomes? Beginnings are being made. Under the Wisconsin minimum-wage law, a commission orders wages increased, and thus virtually orders employers' incomes decreased; here is the principle in full working order. The income tax is an example of the taking off of the tops of incomes to build other incomes up from the bottom. There is the inheritance tax. Further extensions of the principle will doubtless follow and tentative rules of procedure should not be hard to formulate. Where incomes are larger than necessary or desirable and where they are smaller than welfare requires, there let remedies apply. The peculiar advantages of profit-taking which are afforded by society to those who follow certain occupations might properly pay special tribute; for no man alone in these days "makes money"—society makes or helps make; it is a civic idiosyncrasy that the individual so often takes it. The "risk" of investment is an exaggerated and specious argument for license; for who risks more than those who risk their lives—miners, rock blasters, trainmen, and shirtwaist makers? The man who receives only a living wage runs risks; he is imperiled through lack of sur-

plus income with which to secure the services of nurse and physician; he may be unable to marry, or if married be subject to squalid conditions; he risks poverty and dependence in old age. Where businesses are of doubtful character, the principle of taxing the community therefor through the dealer should certainly yield to the plan of actually taxing the income of the individual thus engaged, even to the destruction of the employment. Irrationalities in income apportionment could be brought under discussion and deliberation by a central industrial and compensation commission. Those who are underpaid should receive more; those who are overpaid should be given less; bonuses should go to good workers; evil-doers should not be rewarded—not liberally. Abnormal acquisitiveness should not be allowed to flaunt socially desirable traits.

In times past the money hunt has been subject to one leading principle: get as much as possible. This principle still holds, modified by but the slight restrictions of the penal code. Unregulated accumulation, however, with no natural equity in opportunities for wealth-getting, results in wide variance of desert and income. Some, whom society should most generously reward, must "struggle for a living"; others tap the total social income for returns astoundingly out of proportion to their essential services. The idle may even luxuriate, while skill, industry, character, and intelligence have a hard time to get along. Society has not undertaken the suitable apportionment of the wealth which the prevailing system of production has brought into being. The division of wealth today is not rational; it is chaotic.

THE SPIRIT OF LABOR

Intelligence may be judged by the circumstances under which one is content. Many labor under conditions which they know to be unsatisfactory but over which they have little if any control. But if the conditions under which large numbers work are unjust the fact is an indictment of the collective intelligence which functions in government, for government determines, actively or passively, all social conditions not chargeable to nature itself. Are conditions of labor fitted to the nature of workers?

A large fund of human energy is usually latent, a fact shown when people engage in sports. Even the lazy youth, so called, will surprise his elders by the head of steam developed when a fishing trip is under consideration, and if spading for angleworms could be appropriated for purposes of tilling the garden, a family supply of vegetables would be a universal luxury. The tale is told of a designing person who suggested to a group of boys that a ditch was on fire and that the stones in a near-by pile were buckets of water. The boys put out the "fire," incidentally moving the stone heap, with great enjoyment and actual refreshment. In the world at large here and there are individuals who work in the spirit of play; they do much with far less fatigue than was experienced by the negro who sat on the plow handles "hurrying up sundown." But in a multitude of situations today the spirit of joyful accomplishment is absent. Freight cars are slammed together—they belong to "the company." The plumber is deliberate. Workmen loiter and the comings and goings of the boss are noted with an interest which does not appear in putting in window casings. The ticket agent who "damns" the railroad upon opening his envelope, containing in fact a slight advance in wages, reveals a state of mind. The spiritless and sodden tread of millions headed for factories cannot but be impressive. Enthusiasm is guarded against by system, lest the employee produce more than the rules of his fellows allow; and this is not to criticize a method of warfare, for warfare it is. How many are joyful over the day's work? How often is the clock not stared out of countenance? What of the inner strain and depression of employees in factories when they "look upon their employer as an aristocrat, their foreman as a slave driver, their machine as a treadmill, and the world at large as against them," and when "their faces are frozen in a perpetual frown?"

Of all wastes that of untapped or improperly tapped reservoirs of human energy should receive first consideration. To align occupations with the currents of nerve force deserves the attention of science, not alone for increase of production, but especially out of regard for the increase of the sum total of happiness, for the whole world labors and too rarely happily. Differences in zest are not entirely peculiar to the individual; the eager employer and the

lagging crew are fundamentally alike, as would be shown upon exchange of places. If the wheels of the world's work turn slowly, or if, when they turn, they revolve with the friction of joyless effort, it is no fault of original nature, for that nature is a dynamo of nerves and muscles whose very joy is exertion. Of course the world's work, at least some of it, gets done; but how?

A large part of modern employment is an evident maladjustment to the worker. Due to technicalities and abnormalities of land ownership or transportation or profits, the factory worker too often suffers a wearing outrage of instincts by being confined in a species of artificial inferno. The division of labor has committed the toiler to a monotony of task which is absolutely without warrant in his psychological economy, for a natural environment affords a range of experiences and draws upon all parts of the organism rather than overtaxes a nerve center or set of muscles. The forced production represented by slave-labor and the difficulty of getting people to work with spirit suggest that there has been historically and is today an almost complete neglect of the organization of industry with reference to natural incentives. People cannot be kept from working, provided employment corresponds to nervous organization. Need there be so complete a divorce between spontaneity, preference, and play and the job? Must work be drudgery? Cannot the distinction between work and play be greatly lessened if not abolished? Nothing is more unsuited to human nature than the steady grind imposed by the division of labor and the factory system, which tend to make man a machine. Especially odious is the antithesis of routine and initiative and of physical and mental activity represented by the workroom and the office; one performs, the other manages; one is hands, the other head. In splitting up work we split up people. One has to be trimmed down to fit into a niche.

It might seem difficult to introduce into a system of production a distinct recognition of the individual tendencies related to travel, experimentation, curiosity, sociability, sympathy, hunting, leadership, and the like, but only by more fully conforming to natural interests may the time-honored curse of drudging labor be transformed into joyful effort. For example, why should not employees

occasionally travel, even if more goods could be made and sold by keeping for a lifetime one man on the road and another stationary? A larger recognition of natural interests and capacities in industrial organization would indeed involve many changes, but it is beyond dispute that the demoralizing of employees by monotony and the development of a sizzling animosity which today condemn our industrial order, the everywhere observed discord between occupation and interest, the hating of the job, bode no good. The short answer, "Quit your kicking or get out," is hardly a comprehensive or an appropriate one to the problem of irritating and unnecessarily artificial conditions.

But it is in connection with the sense of utility and remuneration that the problem of motivation becomes most acute. Not that the employee of a swollen trust sees no use in making window glass or steel billets; the social use of manufactured goods must appeal even to resentful labor—barring commodities of worthless or shoddy character—but of what use is it to one to sow that another may reap? To the factory hand it must be a sobering thought to realize that for his cents others take dollars. "I should think your employees would strike," said an unsophisticated western lawyer to an old-time friend, the manager of a textile factory in New England, on being told that the profits of the concern were over 300 hundred per cent the previous year. "They *would*, if they knew it," was the reply. A recent writer of conventional point of view naïvely remarks: "The size of the profit per unit of output is not generally known to the mechanical departments."¹ When compensation is limited, bearing no equitable relation to the profits of an industry, there is not the slightest incentive to labor with enthusiasm; on the contrary, to a thinking person, there are strong motives for virtual if not pronounced sabotage. With the spirit of emulation planted deep in the nature of man, implying an eternal struggle for equality of conditions, it can scarcely be expected that the process of shaking the bough for someone else to get the apple can be lastingly typical of production. The only peace in the industrial world that may exist under the wage system depends upon not letting the employees know what

¹ James Hartness, *The Human Factor in Works Management*.

the profits are; hence the popularity of watered stock and the secrecy of business details. Indeed, the exhibition of wealth tends to incubate revolutionistic philosophy or inspire with the numbing sentiment, "What's the use?" If resentment smolders the more is the pity; for people are not happy when they smolder, and the world has the makings of happiness. The suddenness of modern wealth-making has concurred with a miracle of inertia on the part of the general public to postpone the day of reckoning, and the preposterous abortion of the present distribution of wealth is only recently producing its effects upon emotions.

The current disposition to identify religion with the affairs of the day results in disinclination to rely upon the righting of the balance in the hereafter through the difficulty with which the rich man enters heaven as compared with the welcome to the expropriated. The employee is willing to take his share of the world's goods now, and suffer the consequences, though the idea that poverty is a blessing has a longevity which is but slowly affected by actual evidence of its devastating character, as shown in the operating rooms of hospitals, in stagnant farm homes, in the aged faces of child-labor, in jaws made toothless from lack of a dentist's services, and in the dulness and bigotry of isolation and absence of books. The impecunious religious enthusiast of old looked forward to golden streets, in the meantime being disdainful of his neighbor's higher economic status, but the theoretical ulterior advantages of poverty are depreciated when the vital functioning of wealth for welfare appears at every turn. Indeed even not yet fully laid is the poor-student myth; that anyone should believe that an undernourished youth dividing his daily energy between hard labor and studies should thus make sure of laurels is about as reasonable as to expect a horse from a laundry wagon to reach the wire ahead of a racer in the pink of condition.

There should be proper and sufficient motivation in industry. To work because one fears to lose a position is a low condition, and the dread of the displeasure of the boss reduces one to the status of dumb driven cattle. Even to spend a lifetime in labor for the sake of anticipating funeral expenses does not strike one as adequate motivation. There must be sizable returns or explicit

approval; there must be the feeling that one is getting somewhere, that he is getting something out of his work for himself, and that every stroke tells for an objective point. To exhort one to love his work when he gets nothing out of it is unseemly. Our systemless compensation leaves the great bulk of population without effective incentive. True, the occasional person sees an opportunity for a "killing," and his community is afforded the spectacle of a man really in earnest, but the average workman, and, under present conditions; in many cases the governmental or civil service employee as well, suffers from lack of motive. Probably no grocer would personally deliver articles at the door of his customer without looking at the accompanying slip to see if it corresponded with the goods being delivered; then what does it mean when, according to testimony, not one delivery clerk out of a dozen takes the pains to do the same? The proprietor of a clothing store shows a real interest in selling goods; but his clerks, especially in his absence, may greet the incomer with a look of glazed indifference; yet such will "yell their heads off" when the home baseball team scores.

An argument for motivation may be drawn from the small farmer. He directs his own labor and feeling that he is free is really little concerned with the measure of gain; he is "independent," and the fact, which should be disconcerting, that he often throws in his labor to obtain such a return on his capital as, otherwise invested, he might secure with little or no labor, impresses him but slightly—he is his own boss. Indeed, the hope of securing liberty with a few acres inspires a great many people in cities. Now to clamp a person into a position where he neither knows how much he produces, but is sure that his compensation will in any event be a minimum one, nor has a voice in the management of his employment seems a peculiarly obnoxious affront to personality, and "industrial war" is a logical result. It is a scientific wonder that the gear of industry does not clog hopelessly under these conditions. Industry must sooner or later answer to each man his question, *Of what use is it to me?* To substantial, rational, and satisfying rewards, not complicated with gross advantage to others, the productional system must move forward, presumably through

occupational autonomy, but in any case in conformity with the psychology of motive.

Where there is a feeling of injustice in economic relations, where there is imperfect motivation for effort, a spirit of indifference and protest develops which results in a kind of sabotage. Sabotage is not new; it is as old as the hills, if by it be meant injury to the quantity as well as to the quality of the product. The difference in zeal between the man who has a stake in the outcome of an enterprise and one who believes he has none is so wide as not to have escaped attention the world over. Soldiering and inefficiency are characteristic of millions today, who under a different industrial organization would be energetic and optimistic. A subtle sabotage may be discovered in a thousand quarters—the waste of materials, neglect of tools and equipment, and manifold unwillingness to take pains. But how idle to expect the employed to take the same degree of interest as the employer, if the latter reaps preponderant benefits.

It is a question of much importance whether real pleasure is taken in work. The actual mental attitudes prevailing among people working for wages and salaries are, if among the more elusive, yet among the most important conditions of society. If there is chronic discord between the man and his job, something is fundamentally wrong. Even in cases where irritation does not take the shape of open complaint, a seated sense of injustice deeply influences happiness on earth. Young men set out in high hopes, to become soured and careless upon being inoculated with the suspicion that a square deal in the economic system is out of the question. They see great rewards going to questionable beneficiaries; they see the industrious exploited; they come to fear that everything worth going after has been gobbled up by the representatives of privilege and corporate influence. They ask if it is worth while to try to get ahead; they believe the cards are stacked against them. The rewards which society should place before the individual should in one respect be like the penalties for crime—they should be certain.

The loosened moral fiber of great numbers, the flabby attack on difficulties, the disposition to go with the current, and the apparent passing away of a certain Spartan quality of perseverance are

associated with a growing skepticism in regard to certainty of reward. When a carpenter avowedly works only just enough to keep himself going, because he believes that his labor chiefly enriches someone else, a striking bit of evidence is afforded.

There are a multitude of the so-called shiftless. The labor market is full of men who lack incentive; is it solely their fault? But shiftlessness is bound to increase with intelligence if there seems a lessening chance of success. Is the spirit of play, of adventure, of exploration, of wager, if you please, lacking in those who make up the army of the unemployed and the millions who merely mark time? Tenant farmers—and three-fifths of the farms of Illinois are operated by tenants—are notoriously shiftless. Shiftlessness would lessen if they owned the land and did not expect to be robbed in the market. The tenant who is thought to make too much money for the landlord may lose caste. It is less a wonder that so many people do so ill than that in the absence of appeal to effective motives so many do so well.

It may be argued that conditions are no worse than in the past; but it is really not by the past that the sufficiency of motivation should be judged. It is rather by the possibility of releasing energy and joy in work under more ideal conditions. Work has been a "curse," and even now the great majority, barring, among others, artists, Chautauqua lecturers, mothers, and dray drivers, who often seem to be enjoying life, seek their pleasures apart from the employments in which their lives are spent. It is commonly accepted that there is to be little happiness during working hours; some fleeting digression from occupation is looked forward to as the justification for industry, and vain amusements feebly fill a want which would better be supplied by pleasure in one's tasks.

Fear is still a dominant motive: fear of discharge, of disgrace, of the gun man and the militia, of starvation. The masses are not really inspirited to labor; they are driven and compelled under a fear system so rooted as to be respectable. Insufficiency and uncertainty of reward are coupled with a lagging which only the threat of suffering may overcome. But fear is blasting in its effects, even if men are so wonted as not to be acutely conscious of it. The stimulation to effort is often a push instead of a pull,

there are problems of reorganization fully as onerous and complex as those of political democracy now in process of solution.

A SENSE OF HUMANITY

Under present conditions a calamity in any part of the world affects every other part. War and waste, flood and famine set up influences that reach far. The retardation of any nation, its ignorance and illiteracy similarly menace other nations—through diseases brought in at ports or through an emigration carrying with it low standards and brutish qualities. A country cannot long maintain a civilization far above the average; no country can safely be insensible to conditions prevailing elsewhere. A highly cultivated family living among the ignorance and dirt of neighbors is constantly menaced. So with a nation. It is important that there be no backward nations for they are a drawback to civilization the world over. The evolution of the working class is hampered by the existence of serf states of mind in the farthest country on the map. To better one's own condition one must think in terms of fraternity. Brotherhood is dictated by economic considerations. The recognition of interrelationships is a needed part of one's mental equipment. It is necessary that parochialism and provincialism be done away with, and that a ruinous patriotism, out of which conflicts and hatreds rise, be dispossessed by a world-consciousness.

This consciousness is appearing, to a large extent arising from causes not deliberately set in motion. International commerce has developed a non-provincial point of view. To become friendly when there is mutual understanding is as inevitable as once to regard the stranger as a natural enemy to be defrauded, killed, or eaten. Acquaintance and communication make for a world-sense. Hence the advantage of the convening of hundreds of international congresses to consider scientific and other subjects not confined to national boundaries. The interchange of instructors among the schools of various countries is of promise, and the development of fraternalism represented by the international socialist movement, which binds together the working-classes of the more developed peoples, is a contribution to world-betterment whose importance can hardly be exaggerated.

It is especially desirable that there be appeals to the emotions in behalf of internationalism. The man who thinks knows already that there is everything to gain by world-concord, so it is the man governed by other people's ideas who needs to be reached, and he requires a training of the emotions. An international flag would have great possibilities. The fetishism of millions could be attached in course of time to an international emblem, always to float above the flags of nations, which now stand in part for the concentrated prejudices and hatreds of centuries, fortifying evil moods by perpetual reminder.

The emphasizing of the social rather than the national aspects of history weakens virulent patriotism and establishes a better outlook. The egotism of race is inflamed by attention to old-time military episodes and by the selection of historical materials which, as in Germany, may be designed rather to form willing recruits to the colors than to make intelligence impartial. While rational people usually claim recovery from early impressions received from textbooks in history, a recrudescence of juvenile prejudice perhaps awaits but the blare of the band, and Fourth of July oratory and reminiscence are not without saddening implications. The provincialism which conceives the foreigner as a barbarian or a beast should, not only be consciously conserved in the name of patriotism, but most definitely caused to disappear.

Membership in clannish groups makes for anti-social states of mind. It is natural to form clans and groups, but it is important that the sense of kinship shall not be too limited. The member of a gang is unfitted for society because his world is too small. If his loyalty extended to the general public he would be a good citizen. The politician whose world is confined to his "friends" is, let us hope, to be permanently superseded by the servant of the public whose devotions are not even confined to his "party." So the individual content to hurrah for his city, college, baseball team, denomination, or country should be regarded as having stages of mental development ahead of him. The Negro recognizes and responds to this sentiment expressed in the words, "The world is my country and to do good is my religion."

The chief impediment to world fellowship is war, or the attitude which regards foreign peoples as enemies to be destroyed.

for there is no reason, no logic, for war. It is in essence a purely instinctive reaction to a situation. War does not improve a race; it does not improve morals; it does not in general help business; it does not add to happiness; it has not a single rational justification. On the other hand it combines evils so almost scientifically that if we did not know its instinctive bases it might be regarded as the masterpiece of a diabolical intelligence. There is no well-reasoned and uninspired support of war, and it is the problem of dealing with its peculiar psychology that is today uppermost.

The psychology of war is primitive, and the primitive mind is found in undeveloped adults and in adolescents. The armies of the North in the Civil War were made up largely of boys—virtually constituting a children's crusade. Boys like nothing better than war tales, this selection representing their sharing in the emotional life of primitive man; however, except in cases of a virtual arrest of development, sometimes even appearing in men of otherwise consistent maturity, youth is likely to outgrow the militaristic stage and acquire peace traits.

It is instinctive to react to an affront by the most direct method, to strike back. This native response, hardly exhibited at all in the shooting of strangers in long-drawn-out campaigns, appeals especially to intelligences little prescient of results and impatient of judicious delay. The physical rather than the mental resolution of a difficulty implies an absence of rationality. Worst of all in debate, the undeveloped man may ejaculate, "Well, I can *lick* him anyhow"; failing to repair a machine, he feels like smashing it; unable to command the intelligence required to deal with child or horse, he "gives it a good thrashing"; whenever intelligence fails to solve a problem, force is resorted to. To be sure, either party to a fight may alone be the undeveloped individual. But in every case a fight is a resort to instinctive rather than rational alternatives, and every conflict implies either a primitive mind or a bullying for unfair advantage.

So far as wars represent the willing participation of the private soldier, the motives are not far to seek. The travel impulse is a dominant one among adolescents, the desire to see new places

being among the strongest of interests.¹ Enlistment has been a means of securing travel, which historically has been beyond the purse of the average youth. The appeal is made to young men to join the navy in order to "see the world." One can imagine the downright delight of the adolescent in former periods, before the days of the locomotive, when a call to arms meant an excursion from England into France or from France to Ireland. During the period of chronic wars only the rich could travel, and the migratory instinct, of which the railroad today is the principal outlet, was corked up. Even the known dangers of arms presumably barely dampened the ardor for such seeing of new places. The time is now scarcely past when one who had been abroad was venerated and envied. The talk of the young men who volunteered for the Spanish-American War was of seeing Cuba or the Philippines, while the dangers of the war were appropriately minimized. In the time of the Civil War, few northerners knew much of the South, and the romance of a strange land, uniting with the music interest, swelled enlistments. Lacking such incentives, the call to arms, North or South, would have perhaps met with an indifference which would have dictated a reasoned settlement of differences.

Cheap travel accordingly tends to let the gas out of the bag of militarism, and the moving picture representing far-away scenes perhaps relieves Wanderlust and makes for peace. In view of the fact that the desire to see new places is so strong that life will be risked, the cheapening of transportation is important as a peace measure. The desire to liberate the Cuban reconcentrado might, as a result of intelligent travel to our great cities, have given way to an interest to deliver millions of Americans out of rotten slums.

The peculiar susceptibility of adolescence, with its impulsions and ignorance, to militaristic expeditions suggests the wisdom of

¹ Professor Thorndike in his *Principles of Teaching*, p. 101, gives a list of ten interests; viz., being present at a party; eating a good dinner; playing indoor games, such as games of cards; playing outdoor games, such as baseball, basket-ball, tennis; working with tools, as carpentering or gardening; hearing music, as at a concert; being present at a theater; reading a story; resting, such as lying in a hammock or on a couch; traveling or seeing new places. It is the experience of the present writer that when adolescents are asked to indicate their preferences in order among these interests the first choice falls to traveling or seeing new places, with hearing music in second place.

quarantining society as much as possible against such influence. The very fact of adolescence will permanently afford some basis of appeal which may be made use of by such interests as would keep the world armed, though we can hardly know how successful would be efforts to teach children from the first the advantages of peace. But if war were declared, not by monarchs, nor by Congress, which, while thought sometimes not to be sufficiently responsive to public opinion, is often unduly subservient to mere opinion, but by popular election, to be participated in only by voters above the age of twenty-five years, with cumulative voting by parents, the likelihood of war would be vastly diminished. Such voting would represent deliberation, which is always fatal to a fight.

The spirit of youth is in league with militarism because of its adventure, its novelty, and its opportunities for heroic action and display. There is a subtle thread of sex interest. A youth will perform strange feats to win favor, and not only heroic actions but heroic appearance counts. Feminine admiration of the uniform has had its effect, but if every maid realized, as she would if it were called to her attention, that every fruitful bullet appointed an unfruitful woman, feminine influence would be cast for civilization. Every man killed means an "old maid" or a widow. A woman's life is lost with every man's.

But is there not a still deeper reason why men fight? Is it not a struggle for life? Nothing that is now meant by life can be as well secured by fighting as by united effort. Mutual help brings life. Life is to be had by co-operation, even as the cells of the body co-operate in health. Fighting is a luxury. The world cannot afford to fight.

But the fighting tendency, directed to suitable ends, is valuable, indispensable, for it supplies motive power. A substitute for fighting against people may be found in fighting against evils, with mankind enlisted under one banner. It is the condemnation of war that its targets are people. There is surely enough to fight—poverty, disease, ignorance, ugliness, erosion, weeds, bad roads. Let wars be made against evils, not against people. The fighting against people, when there are so many evils to fight, is dire waste.

The winning over of the military class to peace would be

furthered by adequate provision for the interests of the professional soldier, whose investment of time, devotion, and money in his specialty would seem lost were wars to cease. It is a serious matter for one to have cause to fear loss of occupation when at an age when the learning of other arts presents difficulties. It is quite human, therefore, for the military class to magnify its calling. The soldier should be assured of employment in police duty, the forestry service, public engineering works, and other activities in which military preparation would function advantageously.

It is inconceivable that the intelligence of the world should not ultimately prove sufficient for the abolition of war, even though there is still war and preparation for war. The highest intelligence of the world is perfectly clear as to the unwisdom of war, but much of the keenest intelligence is aligned with private interests which profit in some way from militarism. A great mass of people, the successors of vast slave, serf, and peasant populations, possess a mental development which exposes them to manipulation for military purposes. War lives because there are millions who do not think. Wars may be "pulled off" by the action of a few who are in a position to manipulate the ignorant elements of population. Thus ignorance breeds war, and the ignorant man is a menace. But ignorance is lack of nurture, it is not necessarily incapacity; there are relatively few feeble-minded. The teaching of peace is all that is lacking to make war impossible. The suggestion may be caused to prevail that it is better to sign the inevitable treaty of peace before rather than at the close of hostilities, and that the interests of the workers of the world are one.

ABORIGINAL MAIZE CULTURE AS A TYPICAL CULTURE-COMPLEX

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In maize culture as practiced by American farmers we have a fine example of a borrowed culture trait. It should be especially interesting to anthropologists and historians, since it is one of the few cases of culture transmission from a lower to a higher form of civilization concerning which we have much in the way of historical data. As everyone knows, maize was found in cultivation among the Indian tribes of our Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf coast, and was carried to the Old World by the very first explorers, where its use developed and spread with great rapidity. Familiarity with the cultures of these Indian tribes reveals a large culture-complex based upon the production of this highly original New World food.

To set the case before the reader a brief enumeration of the elements making up this complex may be necessary. Naturally, the fundamental concept is the propagation of maize which embraces the related processes of preparing the soil, planting the grain, protecting the crop, gathering the ears, and preserving the seed. Each of these is a fixed procedure and must be followed in a definite order. While this is in itself a respectable complex, it is but the nucleus. The food production processes are numerous: maize was eaten green, hulled, and ground, with various forms for each. Mixed dishes of maize with beans, squash, or meat were prepared according to definite recipes. Looking in another direction, we find numerous religious ceremonies and social observances definitely associated with maize. Perhaps we have gone far enough to reveal the general characteristics of the maize-complex in the cultures of our North American Indian tribes, but, if not, the reader is referred to the literature of the subject,

especially A. C. Parker's book on the *Iroquois Uses of Maize and Other Food Plants* (Albany, 1910).

One striking characteristic of the Indian maize-complex is its similarity throughout. It should be noted that our Indians were composed of many small groups independent politically and in many cases distinct as to language and most traits of culture as well. If we pass in review the successive tribal cultures from the Gulf to the St. Lawrence we shall encounter considerable diversity of traits, but throughout we shall find the maize-complex almost entire, particularly in all but its ceremonial elements. So far as our data go, the same varieties of corn, the same methods of planting, fertilizing, and cooking prevailed everywhere in the Mississippi Valley and eastward. It is difficult to account for this uniformity in one culture trait unless we assume that it was distributed from one place in its complete form. In that case each tribe would be relieved of the necessity for devising ways and means of utilizing maize and so make no important original contributions.

After having made an inventory of Indian maize culture it may be interesting to examine our own maize culture to see how completely our ancestors took over this aboriginal complex and to what extent it still survives. Our farmers formerly planted, and often yet plant, maize in hills; this was the universal Indian mode, four to five grains being dropped at one place at regular intervals of about three feet, quite like a cornfield of today. In cultivation, the Indian hoed the earth up around the growing stalk, which is still the principle of the mechanical cultivator. For husking, our farmers use a husking pin, which, while now of iron, was not so very long ago of bone and wood, precisely like those still in use among our surviving eastern Indians. Ears of corn to be dried or preserved for seed often have their pendant husks braided together; this is typically Indian. The corn crib was used by the Indians and elevated on posts to keep the contents dry and to protect it from rodents. The type of crib which is larger at the top than at the bottom was also in use by the southern Indians.

The Indian planted beans and squashes among the corn. This has always been a favorite custom of our farmers. He also understood the art of testing his seed and of preparatory germination in

warm water. Where fish were available they were used for fertilization, the rule being one fish to a hill.

The methods of cooking corn are, not only still about the same among us, but we also retain many of the Indian names for such dishes, as hominy and succotash. The famous roasting-ear in all its forms was known to the Indian. Then we must not forget the favorite mush, which is stirred with a wooden ladle strikingly like those of the Algonkin tribes. Some years ago our country people still made "lye hominy" with wood ashes, just as described by some early observers of the Indian.

Corn-husk mats may still be seen in some country homes. As I recall a few specimens examined, the technique was the same as the Iroquoian examples to be seen in our museums.

The one important innovation of the white man was the substitution of the mill for the mortar. Later, of course, came various kinds of machinery for the cultivation and gathering of corn, but all such machines are but mechanical appliances to perform more expeditiously the same old processes. It is clear that in pioneer days the white farmer took over the whole maize culture-complex entire, except its ceremonial and social elements. Even here we find some curious similarities. The husking-bee, which was one of the great social events of our fathers' times, is strikingly paralleled by an old Indian custom. No doubt if we knew more of the homely history of our forefathers we should find some surprising intrusions of ceremonial and superstitious practices to propitiate the growth of their crop.

If we reduce these data to a generalization, it appears that the white colonist took over the entire material complex of maize culture. He did not simply borrow the maize seed and then in conformity with his already established agricultural methods, or on original lines, develop a maize culture of his own. In fact, he has no basis for any claims to originality except in the development of mechanical appliances and the somewhat recent rationalization of agriculture by scientific investigation.

In this connection the maize culture of the Old World is particularly suggestive. At the discovery of America, samples of maize were carried home, seed was planted, and in a surprisingly

short time its cultivation spread even so far as China; but the maize-complex of the Old World has scarcely anything in common with that of the Indian and the American farmer. The reason is plain—it was the isolated plant that came into European culture, necessitating original experimentations with the new seed, or, at least, the adaptation of its culture to the methods or “patterns” for the raising of other plants. The first American farmers, on the other hand, found themselves projected into the midst of a new culture, where it was much easier to adapt trait-complexes than to invent them. It is more than likely that we are here illustrating two characteristic modes of culture diffusion: in one case a new object or an isolated idea is carried far afield and dropped into the midst of a strange culture group, and in the other the group itself is dropped into the midst of a strange culture, or merely brought into contact with it. In the latter, whole complexes will be taken bodily; in the former, a new trait will be originally developed or simply adapted to some already existing pattern.

The taking over of the maize-complex by the whites has its parallels. One striking example is the tobacco-complex, where again the colonists took over all the essential parts of the trait-complex. The manufacture of maple sugar is another. On the part of the Indians we have the taking over of the horse-complex of the Great Plains before the general assimilation of white culture began. Also, in the wide distribution of aboriginal traits we have presumptive evidence of intertribal borrowing, and the fact that distinct complexes like pottery making, coil basketry, acorn meal, soft buckskin tan, etc., are often found among many adjacent tribes without essential variations, indicates that one tribe after another took over these complexes entire in just the same way as our typical example of maize culture was taken over by the American colonists.

Returning to our discussion of maize culture, another suggestive fact is that the distribution of the American type of maize culture is not as uniform as in prehistoric times. To like manner, certain traits of the horse culture, which were derived from Spanish colonists and were somewhat different from those of the English type, still persist among the settlers of our Western states in

contrast to those of the East. In general, students of the world's culture history have from time to time noted the tendency of specific culture traits to persist in one geographical locality regardless of racial and even linguistical change in the population. The preceding data suggest that the underlying condition of this is the observed tendency to take over entire culture-complexes instead of developing them from a single element. In other words, when a culture-complex once develops as an adjustment to a locality and works fairly well, it tends to persist in that locality and may prevail over complete changes in blood and language. It need not be the best adjustment of its kind, but it offers the practical advantage of immediate and certain return and, once adopted, inhibits other adjustments, however superior they may be.

This also has a bearing upon the much-discussed question of the geographical environment. If it appears that certain culture-complexes have become localized and in a measure fixed, regardless of the coming and going of social groups of men, there must be some extra-human agency at work. Anthropologists recognize a number of aboriginal culture centers in North America, each of which at the period of exploration occupied a more or less definite geographical area. Although archaeological research has been far less systematic and extensive than the study of the historical Indian tribes, we have at hand a fair amount of data as to the prehistory of the historic culture centers. These data as they stand indicate that in such traits as leave archaeological traces most of the fundamental elements in the culture of a historic center took their origin in that locality. At least a distinct and independent form of prehistoric culture has not yet been found in the vicinity of these centers. Doubtless time will modify this view, but it is almost certain that the great age of each culture center will be demonstrated. In the light of the preceding discussion this may mean that the original elements in a type of culture began as adjustments to the locality in which the participating social group lived. When these adjustments worked, they were perpetuated. Other social groups drifted in, some hostile, some friendly, some no doubt related by blood and language, some not so related, but all finding it much easier to take up the adjustments of their hosts than to

devise new ones. Since the blood of the group can be changed but slowly, its languages only somewhat less slowly, we may expect the course of time to eliminate any historical correlations that may have once held between blood, language, and culture. The term culture as used by anthropologists generally includes such groups of traits as social organization, ceremonial activities, art, and material culture. Of these, it appears that social organization is less readily changed in contrast to the last. It is the food, shelter, and transportation complexes of material culture that the intruding group will take over bodily. Then the chances are that one by one the associated ceremonies always found intimately connected with food production will be taken over to displace those now made useless and ultimately drag in their social counterparts. Even a superficial review of the data so far accumulated by anthropologists will show how well this hypothetical picture fits the facts for the several culture centers.

Now it is clear that the objective condition contributing to this result is the stable geographical environment, chiefly the climate, fauna, and flora. We may conclude, therefore, that one of the important factors accounting for the lack of correlations between the somatic types, languages, and cultures of our North American Indian tribes is to be sought in the objective environment. It should be noted, however, that in this case the environment is not a formative factor but only a perpetuator. The formative factors are to be sought in the initial social groups. While these observations are based upon concrete facts in North American primitive culture, it is highly probable that they will hold for other parts of the world.

CREATING SOCIAL VALUES IN THE TROPICS

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The constructive sociologist, he who would aid in creating social values, finds in the tropics a virgin zone for speculation and for work. Though in some areas in this region of the world society has reached a relatively high development, in others it barely exists in a form that is worthy of the name.

The social history of the tropics is unique. In successive periods of the life of man and in widely separated regions a comparatively high civilization was brought forth, flourished for a period, and fell into decay. In this connection the mind pictures Babylon, Egypt, ancient Greece, and Rome.

In the cool and calm temperate zone progress was slower, less emotional, less feverish, but the foundations of society were laid more securely and in more lasting fashion. The outcome was the gradual overcoming of the life of the tropics by the life of the temperate zone.

Strong governments of the temperate zone came to reach out to assume control of the weaker organizations of society in the tropics. For many millions of human beings life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness came to be, not a right, but a privilege which was bestowed or withheld. Property was taken, labor was enslaved, life came to be forfeited as distant masters directed.

Power emanating from the temperate zone through conquest and bloodshed, through exploitation of the fruits of labor and of the free bounties of nature, for generations and centuries has despoiled the tropics. The unnatural conflict warped and twisted human nature.

Handicapped by great heat and rain and what these produced, beset by disease in numberless forms and of universal extent, kept in poverty through oppression and exploitation, the native of the

tropics has for centuries made little headway. He has lacked that fundamental of growth as a social animal: a healthy belly well filled with that which nature intended it to hold.

In the meantime the people of the temperate zone prospered, not only by the fruits of toil in their own lands, but by the labors of fellow-men in the tropics. With material progress and a strengthening civilization and culture came altruism; lust of power and love of gold came gradually to be replaced in the minds of men by love of fellow-man and man's responsibility to man. Men went out into distant lands to carry a message of love and saving. Great religious organizations sprang up. These reached out over all the world. They spread most largely in the tropics.

For generations and centuries appeals have now been made to the spiritual. Intellect and personality have sought to win the minds and souls of the men whom that same intellect and that same personality had hindered in development both material and spiritual. What wonder that men have preached faithfully and long without really marked results! What wonder that when preaching ceased the lesson was prone to be forgotten! What wonder that the great and splendid missionary organizations of today have an overwhelming task!

The path of civilization lies through the stomach. To the native of the tropics, the message of love calling on all to cease to slay, to cease to covet neighbors' goods and women, to cease to live in the filth of the passing day, unmindful of the needs of the future, may express a hope and a longing, but it cannot express a reality while life remains a bitter struggle; while food is rare; while homes are overcrowded one-room mud hovels occupied by men and women, young and old; while the body is sick and suffering; while the mind is ignorant.

The methods of the past of attempting to create social values in the tropics through appeals to the spirit alone appear unsound and impractical. They would seem to fail to recognize the fundamental principle of evolution that concern for physical life precedes concern for spiritual life. Moreover, no organization, no matter how powerful financially, controls adequate funds to carry on constant, comprehensive religious work among the millions who are in

need of it and of such a character as to leave an extensive impression. Wonderful work has been done both by those who carry the message and by those who strive to win the heart by healing the sick and suffering, but it would seem to be wonderful as a work rather than as a harvest.

And yet all materials to make a wonderful harvest are close at hand. There has been prejudice against using these materials. It has not been thought proper by many to speak of the belly and of the spirit in one and the same breath. It has been thought even less proper to speak of the belly first and to whisper of the spirit only in later chosen moments. It would seem to presage a great day for the upbuilding of the civilization of the tropics when those who have this great work at heart will, in ever-increasing numbers, come to accept the belly route rather than the spirit route to salvation and civilization.

The materials for this great work await a bidding to be used. Millions of human beings wait to be taught how to live a life of material success; having been taught this, they may next be taught how to live a life of spiritual success. This will be relatively easy, for it will be in accord with the very nature of things. The spiritual work will appear as an acceleration of the process by which the peoples of the more favored climates and regions themselves attained spiritual maturity. Teach the benighted and belated on the road to civilization how to till the soil, harvest a crop, raise stock, collect food, build a house, gather in fruits which are the bounty of nature and care for them and garner them for times of scarcity; cure his body of manifold sicknesses against which he is helpless and which beset him in his ignorance in great numbers and with large dangers; make his body strong and give him understanding to keep it so. Let his mind feel peace, and comfort, and happiness.

Even if nothing else were done, just this alone would kindle in his mind the joy of life, and love, and good-will. Having done this, it will be possible to follow up with the spiritual message of the living God. Mental strength to profit by physical well-being may be reinforced by moral strength to covet not a neighbor's goods and belongings.

Civilized man, by introducing his mental and moral equipment into the social and economic situation of the tropics, will mold the helpless, shiftless native into a producing machine which makes far more things than it needs to live. Great social values, it is insisted, can be created in this way by approaching the problem from an economic standpoint. The striking thing about this method of attack of the problem is the fact that no inexhaustible supply of capital is required. The constant drain of missionary funds which go never to return, while carrying a spiritual message only, can be avoided; the heathen can be made to work out his destiny by means of his own brain and brawn. What he needs is direction and teaching. Done in this manner the work will be likely to be lasting; self-help will be its foundation, and self-help when once learned is as long as life itself.

Obviously, a certain danger lurks in the proposed method. What shall be the limit of production? When will production become exploitation? Restrictions must be placed on agencies which undertake such work, limiting the amount of profit to be derived to a fair business return. Any balance beyond this should be devoted to an extension of the work. The native worker must be paid a fair wage. He must be squarely and honestly treated. Christian principles must govern so that the heathen mind may unconsciously be prepared for the great spiritual truths of Christianity that are to follow.

At this moment plans are under way through which a unique organization with belief in the soundness of the principle that economic welfare must precede spiritual growth will soon start out to begin a work of Christianity and civilization in the heart of Africa. The business aspects of the undertaking have been worked out in great detail and have received the indorsement of prominent business men who have specialized along the lines of work to be taken up. If the confidence of those interested in the movement is supported by experience, it may probably safely be said that a new era will have been reached in the method of creating social values in the tropics.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF NEGRO-WHITE AMALGAMATION IN THE UNITED STATES

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The fourth annual report of the "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People" calls attention to the fact that that Association in 1913 defeated in several state legislatures proposed statute laws prohibiting negro-white intermarriages. A survey of the existing legal status of such marriages in the United States may be interesting at this time.

The constitutions of six of the American states prohibit negro-white intermarriages. Twenty-eight of the states have statute laws forbidding the intermarriage of negro and white persons. Twenty of the states have no such laws; in ten of those latter states bills aimed at the prevention of negro-white intermarriages were introduced and defeated in 1913.

The state constitutions and statute laws against intermarriage are, so far as their wording is concerned, far from agreement as to what a so-called "negro" is. Differences in the stringency of conditions following enforcement of these legal enactments therefore result. Those specifically most stringent make intermarriage illegal between white persons and others having any percentage of negro blood.

The Alabama constitution prohibits the legislature from passing a law legalizing the intermarriage of white persons and *any* descendant of a negro. This means that a person whose ancestry may be traced to a negro—even though that person has no detectable physical mark of negro ancestry—may not marry a white person.

The Florida constitution prohibits intermarriage between white persons and others possessing even one-sixteenth or more negro

blood. Many such persons do not physically show their affinity with the negro race.

The other four states, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, by their constitutions prohibit the intermarriage of white persons and others having one-eighth or more negro blood.

Thus, in the matter of the institution of legal marriage, as that institution is fixed by the state constitutions, in Alabama the descendant of a negro is forever a negro; in Florida the descendant of a negro is such for only four generations—provided one ancestor in each generation is a white person; in Mississippi, in both North Carolina and South Carolina, and in Tennessee the descendant of a negro breeds “white” in the fourth generation, if one ancestor in each generation is a white person.

By statute laws three states prohibit the marriage of a white person with *any* descendant of a negro. In Arizona marriage is prohibited with “negroes and their descendants”; in Georgia marriage with “persons of African descent is forever prohibited”; and in Oklahoma marriage is prohibited with “any person of African descent.”

With the exception of this wholesale prohibition of negro-white intermarriages which are specifically and indisputably defined (such as noted in the laws of Arizona, Georgia, and Oklahoma), no state takes specific notice by statute law of the percentage of negro blood in a candidate for marriage, if that blood is diluted to less than one part of negro blood to seven parts of other blood.

Eleven states prohibit intermarriage of white persons with negroes having one-eighth or more negro blood. During the historic period of slavery such persons were commonly called “octoroons.” The following states have laws of this class: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. The Alabama law reads “descendant of any negro to the third generation inclusive”; the laws of Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas are also couched in terms of the “third generation.” The Florida law reads: “Every person who shall have one-eighth

or more negro blood shall be deemed and held to be a colored person or negro"; Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and North Dakota also word their laws against the "one-eighth" or more negro.

Thus, though persons possessing negro blood (if less than one-eighth) may marry white persons in the eleven states just enumerated, they may not marry them in Arizona, Georgia, and Oklahoma.

In one state, Oregon, the prohibition is against the intermarriage of white persons with individuals of "one-fourth or more" negro blood. This prohibition includes persons commonly called "quad-rooms." Nebraska also had the same law until 1913 when it was changed to cover persons having one-eighth or more negro blood—as cited in the preceding paragraph.

Thus, though persons possessing negro blood (if less than one-fourth) may marry white persons in Oregon, they may not so marry in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas.


In seven states the prohibition is against marriage of white persons with negroes and mulattoes; the word "mulatto" scientifically means a person of one-half negro blood. These states are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, and South Carolina.

Thus, though persons possessing negro blood (if less than one-half) may marry white persons (if the term "mulatto" is legally used as scientifically defined) in the seven states just enumerated, they may not so marry in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.

Six states so word their laws that little uniformity of interpretation or enforcement can be expected. For instance, prohibition of marriage with white persons in Louisiana is against "persons of color"; in Nevada prohibition is against "any black person, mulatto"; in South Dakota prohibition is against "any persons belonging to the African race"; in Utah and in West Virginia white persons may not marry with "a negro." In Virginia marriage

is void between a white person and a "colored person." The wording of the laws in the states named is so unspecific that every jury and judge in these states may decide whether a given person is or is not prohibited from marriage with a white person. Though the legal status of a so-called "negro" might be determined in these states, the same individual might have an entirely different status in the fifteen states named in the preceding paragraph.

The accompanying map will enable the reader to visualize the area of the United States covered by laws aimed to prohibit



negro-white intermarriage. Those states shown in black have such laws, and the texts of those laws together with the texts of the six state constitutions which prohibit negro-white intermarriage follow in this article. No other states have such laws; however, those banded with black lines attempted in 1913 to pass laws prohibiting negro-white intermarriage. The bills aimed at that end were defeated in the numerous state legislatures by the "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People." One exception should be noted, however. In Minnesota, where such a bill was introduced and defeated, it was not defeated by the organized effort of the National Association, because at that time there was no branch of that Association in the state. The bill was defeated largely by the individual efforts of negro citizens of Minnesota.

The map also fails to show that in California and Colorado, where laws now exist prohibiting negro-white intermarriage, the National Association also defeated in 1913 new bills proposed to affect the present status of the laws.

The chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Association in his *Fourth Annual Report* for the year 1913 speaks of the influence of the Association on the legislatures of the states where bills were introduced prohibiting negro-white intermarriages as follows:

The National Association, during the year 1913, has continued the fight against race discrimination, for which it alone has the necessary machinery. The past year has been characterized by a flood of discriminatory legislation—anti-intermarriage bills, "Jim Crow" bills, segregation ordinances in cities and segregation in the federal departments at Washington. Everywhere we have witnessed efforts to officialize caste. The anti-intermarriage bills appeared almost simultaneously in Congress and in the legislatures of California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. In only one state, Nebraska, did the bill get through, and here the act as passed merely amended the law then in force, by extending its provisions to include Chinese and Japanese, and by enlarging its application to persons of African descent by making the percentage of African blood one-eighth instead of one-fourth, as in the old act. The Association was unable to accomplish anything in this state because it had no branch there, and was unable to get into touch with any friends. To the legislatures of all the states mentioned the Association sent the following formal protest signed by its officers, setting forth its position in firm but conservative terms:

March 8, 1913

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People earnestly protests against the bill forbidding intermarriage between the races, not because the Association advocates intermarriage, which it does not, but primarily because whenever such laws have been enacted they become a menace to the whole institution of matrimony, leading directly to concubinage, bastardy, and the degradation of the negro woman. No man-made law can stop the union of the races. If intermarriage be wrong, its prevention is best left to public opinion and to nature, which wreaks its own fearful punishments on those who transgress its laws and sin against it. We oppose the proposed statute in the language of William Lloyd Garrison in 1843, in his successful campaign for the repeal of a similar law in Massachusetts: "Because it is not the province, and does not belong to the power of any legislative assembly, in a republican government to decide on the complexional affinity of those who choose to be united together in wedlock; and it may as rationally decree that corpulent and lean, tall and short, strong and weak persons shall not be married to each other as that there must be an agreement in the complexion of the parties."

We oppose it for the physical reason that to prohibit such intermarriage would be publicly to acknowledge that black blood is a physical taint, something no self-respecting colored man and woman can be asked to admit. We oppose it for the moral reason that all such laws leave the colored girl absolutely helpless before the lust of the white man, without the power to compel the seducer to marry. The statistics of intermarriage in those states where it is permitted show this happens so infrequently as to make the whole matter of legislation unnecessary. Both races are practically in complete agreement on this question, for colored people marry colored people, and white marry white, the exceptions being few. We earnestly urge upon you an unfavorable report on this bill.

(Signed) OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD
Chairman Board of Directors

(Signed) W. E. B. DU BOIS
Director of Publicity and Research

Four states appear from their statutes to acknowledge that the existing laws against negro-white intermarriage do not reach all causes of negro-white amalgamation. Three of those states have, in addition to laws against intermarriage, laws against cohabitation¹ and against concubinage.² They are Louisiana, Nevada, and South Dakota. The texts of their laws, so far as cohabitation and concubinage are concerned, follow:

Louisiana.—"Concubinage between a person of the Caucasian or white race and a person of the colored or black race is hereby made a felony. . . . For the purpose of this act concubinage is hereby defined to be the unlawful cohabitation of persons of the Caucasian and of the colored races whether open or secret."

Nevada.—"If any white person shall live and cohabit with any black person, mulatto, Indian, . . . in a state of fornication . . ."

South Dakota.—"Illicit cohabitation of any persons belonging to the African, Corean, Malayan or Mongolian race, with any person of the opposite sex, belonging to the Caucasian or white race, is hereby prohibited."

Alabama.—Alabama is the only state which would seem to have attempted to reach all the causes of negro-white amalgamation. Her laws include this phrase: "If any white person or any negro . . . live in adultery or fornication with each other, each of them must, on conviction, be imprisoned. . . ."

This law, it would appear, if interpreted fully and exactly, ought to prohibit even a single sexual offense. But, as the law has been

¹ Cohabitation is the act or state of living together as though married.

² Concubinage is habitual cohabitation.

interpreted, it does not so prohibit. That law has been interpreted to mean that, though the two offenders have lived together only one day, they nevertheless intend to continue to live together. So in reality the law reaches no other cases than those reached by the laws of Louisiana, Nevada, and South Dakota, which prohibit cohabitation and concubinage. It does not prohibit what is generally understood by the terms "adultery" and "fornication."

If the purpose of the makers of the laws in the various states is to attempt to check negro-white amalgamation, the texts of the various laws presented herewith show how far short they are of being able to do what they attempted.

If negro-white amalgamation is undesirable, every form of negro-white miscegenation should by statute law be made a felony punishable on the commission of one offense, without regard to the intention of future mutual relations of the offenders. Miscegenation cannot be stopped if only the habitual offenders are punished.

A law making a felony of every form and every instance of miscegenation would also carry protection to negro women who are now so often victims of the dominant white man. Such a law as this, it would seem, would meet the favor of the intelligent and moral leaders among both the negro and the white Americans.

The negroes in America have had two leaders of rare ability and integrity: Dr. Booker T. Washington and Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois. The excerpt quoted on p. 5 from the 1913 *Report* of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, signed by Dr. Du Bois as director of publicity and research, tells us specifically that he does not advocate negro-white intermarriage. He says he opposes laws framed to prevent such intermarriages because, among other things, they "lead directly to concubinage, bastardy, and the degradation of the negro woman," and because of the "moral reason that all such laws leave the colored girl absolutely helpless before the lust of the white man." Dr. Washington did not favor negro-white miscegenation. Under date of December 4, 1911, he wrote me as follows, with permission to quote:

In reply to your letter of November 27 permit me to say that the only reason I have not said anything on the subject you mention [negro-white

amalgamation] is because I have not hitherto seen any particular advantage in doing so. I have never looked upon amalgamation as offering a solution of the so-called race problem and I know very few negroes who favor it or even think of it, for that matter.

What those whom I have heard discuss the matter do object to are laws which enable the father to escape his responsibility, or prevent him from accepting and exercising it when he has children by colored women. . . .

Those who are fighting race distinctions are doing so, I think you will find, not because they want amalgamation or because they want to intermingle socially with white people, but because they have been led to believe that where race distinctions exist they pave the way for discriminations which are needlessly humiliating and injurious to the weaker race.

Let me add that I do not wholly share this view myself. While there may be some serious disadvantage in racial distinctions, there are certainly real advantages to my race, at least.

So it would seem that if laws can protect the racial integrity of the negro and the white Americans, and can also protect the present unfortunate victim, the negro woman, such laws would be wise, moral, and desirable. A careful study of the following texts shows that present laws, if aimed to prevent negro-white amalgamation, are ineffectual. Because they are ineffectual they embody race discriminations against the negro without fairness. In an un-American way they discriminate against a woman in favor of a man. They do not check the negro-white amalgamation—which is the only justification for their existence. If effectual legal barriers against negro-white amalgamation are desirable, they should perfectly agree as to the legal and racial status of the so-called "negro," and miscegenation of every form and every instance between negro and white persons must be made a felony in every American state.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS AIMED AT PREVENTING NEGRO-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE

Alabama (Sec. 102 of the amended 1901 Constitution).

"The legislature shall never pass any law to authorize or legalize any marriage between any white person and a negro, or descendant of a negro."

The Alabama constitution as it existed between 1875 and 1901 laid down no such

... between a white person and a negro, or between a white person and a negro of negro descent to the fourth generation, inclusive, are hereby forever

Mississippi (Constitution of 1906, Art. 14, sec. 263).

"The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto, or a person who shall have one-eighth or more negro blood, shall be unlawful and void."

North Carolina (Constitution of 1883, Art. 14, sec. 8).

"All marriages between a white person and a negro, or between a white person and a person of negro descent to the third generation, inclusive, are hereby forever prohibited."

South Carolina (Constitution of 1895, Art. 3, sec. 33).

"The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto, or person who shall have one-eighth or more negro blood, shall be unlawful and void."

Tennessee (Constitution of 1896, Art. 11, sec. 14).

"The intermarriage of white persons with negroes, mulattoes, or persons of mixed blood, descended from a negro to the third generation, inclusive, or their living together as man and wife in this state is prohibited. The legislature shall enforce this section by appropriate legislation."

STATE LAWS AIMED AT PREVENTING NEGRO-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE

Alabama (Criminal Code, 1896).

Sec. 5096: "If any white person and any negro, or the descendant of any negro, to the third generation, inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation was a white person, intermarry, or live in adultery or fornication with each other, each of them must, on conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than two, nor more than seven years."

Arizona (Revised Statutes, 1901).

Sec. 3092: "All Marriages of persons of Caucasian blood, or their descendants with Negroes, Mongolians, or Indians, and their descendants, shall be null and void."

Arkansas (Kerby's Statutes, 1904).

Sec. 5174: "All marriages of white persons with Negroes or Mulattoes are declared to be illegal and void."

California (Kerr's Code, 1906).

Vol. II, Part III: Personal Relations: paragraph 60: "All marriages of white persons with negroes, mongolians, or mulattoes are illegal and void."

Colorado (Mill's Annotated Statutes, 1891).

Secs. 1320-2989: "All marriages between Negroes or Mulattoes, of either sex, and white persons are declared to be absolutely void."

Delaware (Revised Code, 1893).

P. 593: "Marriage shall be unlawful between a white person and a negro or mulatto. If a marriage, prohibited by this section, be solemnized, it shall be void, and the parties thereto shall each be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined one hundred dollars and if any preacher shall knowingly and willfully solemnize such marriage, or if any person shall knowingly and willfully procure or aid in the contracting or solemnizing such marriage, he shall be deemed equally guilty and shall be fined in like manner. Or if the parties to any marriage prohibited by this section, although the same may have been solemnized in another state, shall cohabit as husband

and wife in this state, they shall each be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined one hundred dollars."

Florida (General Statutes, 1905).

Sec. 2579: "It shall be unlawful for any white male person residing or being in this state to intermarry with any negro female person; and it shall be in like manner unlawful for any white female person residing or being in this state to intermarry with any negro male person; and every marriage formed or solemnized in contravention of the provision of this section shall be utterly null and void."

Sec. 2580: "Every person who shall have one-eighth or more negro blood shall be deemed and held to be a colored person or negro."

Georgia (II Code, 1895).

Sec. 2422: "The marriage relation between white persons and persons of African descent is forever prohibited, and such marriage shall be null and void."

Idaho (Revised Code, 1908).

"All marriages of white persons with negroes or mulattoes are illegal and void."

Indiana (Burn's Annotated Statutes, 1908).

"No person having one-eighth part or more of negro blood shall be permitted to marry any white woman of this state, nor shall any white man be permitted to marry any negro woman or any woman having one-eighth part or more of negro blood, and every person who shall knowingly marry in violation of the provisions of this section shall, on conviction, be fined not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, and imprisoned in the state prison not less than one year, nor more than ten years."

Kentucky (Carroll's Statutes).

Sec. 2097: "Marriage is prohibited and declared void between a white person and a negro or mulatto."

Louisiana (Civil Code, 1908).

Art. 94. "Marriage between white persons and persons of color is prohibited, and the celebration of all such marriages is forbidden, and such celebration carries with it no effect and is null and void."

[Acts of the General Assembly for the year 1910, Act No. 206. House Bill No. 220. "To make concubinage between a person of the Caucasian race, and a person of the colored or black race a felony, fixing the punishment therefor, and defining what shall constitute concubinage, and to declare the amount of proof necessary for a conviction"]:

"Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, That concubinage between a person of the Caucasian or white race and a person of the colored or black race is hereby made a felony, and whoever shall be convicted thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction, shall for each offense be sentenced to imprisonment at the discretion of the court for a term of not less than one month nor more than one year with or without hard labor.

"Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, etc., That the living together or cohabitation of

... of the Caucasian and of the colored race shall be illegal on the violation of this ... statute is more recent than the Florida constitution. On January 15, 1875, a bill was introduced to the Florida legislature of which the following explanation of the nature of the difference stated above was published, but no reply has been received.

provisions of Section 1 of this Act. For the purpose of this Act concubinage is hereby defined to be the unlawful cohabitation of persons of the Caucasian and of the colored races whether open or secret.

"Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, etc., That it shall be the duty of the judges of the several District Courts of this State to specially charge the Grand juries upon this Act.

"Sec. 4. Be it further enacted, etc., That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act be and the same are hereby repealed."

Maryland (General Laws, 1904).

P. 878, Art. 305: "All marriages between a white person and a negro, or between a white person and a person of negro descent, to the third generation, inclusive, are forever prohibited, and shall be void; and any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of an infamous crime, and punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than eighteen months, nor more than ten years."

Mississippi (Code, 1906).

Sec. 3244: "The marriage of a white person and a negro or mulatto or person who shall have one-eighth or more of negro blood, . . . shall be unlawful, and such marriages shall be unlawful and void; and any party thereto, on conviction, shall be punished as for a marriage within the degrees prohibited by the last two sections; and any attempt to evade this and the two preceding sections by marrying out of this state and returning to it shall be within them."

Missouri (Annotated Statutes, 1906).

Chap. 50, sec. 4312: "All marriages between white persons and negroes, and white persons and mongolians, are prohibited and declared absolutely void, and this prohibition shall apply to illegitimate as well as legitimate children and relatives."

Sec. 2174: "No person having one-eighth part or more of negro blood shall be permitted to marry any white person, nor shall any white person be permitted to marry any negro or person having one-eighth part or more of negro blood; and every person who shall knowingly marry in violation of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for two years, or by fine of not less than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than three months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and the jury trying any such case may determine the proportion of negro blood in any party to such marriage from the appearance of such person."

Nebraska (Laws, 1913).

Chap. 72, sec. 5302, Void Marriages: "First—When one party is a white person and the other is possessed of one-eighth or more negro, Japanese or Chinese blood."

(Compiled Statutes, 1911.)

Chap. 25, Divorce and Alimony. Sec. 31, Consanguinity or Miscegenation: "Upon the dissolution by decree or sentence of nullity of any marriage that is prohibited on account of consanguinity between the parties, or of any marriage between a white person and a negro, the issue of the marriage shall be deemed to be illegitimate."

Nevada (Revised Laws, 1912).

Sec. 6517: "If any white person shall live and cohabit with any black person, mulatto, Indian, or any person of the Malay or brown race or of the Mongolian or yellow race, in a state of fornication, such person so offending shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, and not less than one hundred

dollars, or be imprisoned in the county jail not less than six months or more than one year, or both."

North Carolina (Revised Code, 1905).

Vol. I, sec. 2083: "All marriages between a white person and a negro or Indian, or between a white person and a person of negro or Indian descent to the third generation, inclusive, shall be void."

North Dakota (Compiled Laws, 1913).

Chap. 31, Miscegenation. Sec. 9582: Marriage between white and negro persons: "It shall be unlawful for any white male person, residing or being in this State, to intermarry with any negro female person; and it shall be in like manner unlawful for any white female person, residing or being in this State, to intermarry with any negro male person, and every marriage hereafter formed and solemnized in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be utterly null and void and either or both of the contracting parties to such surreptitious marriage shall be punished by imprisonment in the State penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten years or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by both fine and imprisonment."

Sec. 9583. "Definition of a negro person: Every person who shall have one-eighth or more negro blood shall be deemed and held to be a colored person or negro."

Oklahoma (Revised Laws, 1910).

Sec. 3894: "The marriage of any person of African descent, as defined by the constitution of this State,¹ to any person not of African descent, or the marriage of any person not of African descent to any person of African descent, shall be unlawful and is hereby prohibited within this State."

Oregon (Bellinger and Cotton Code, 1902).

Sec. 5217: "What marriages are void: 3. When either of the parties is a white person and the other negro, or Mongolian or a person of one-fourth or more of negro or Mongolian blood."

Sec. 1999: "Hereafter it shall not be lawful within this state for any white person, male or female, to intermarry with any negro, Chinese, or any person having one-fourth or more negro, Chinese or Kanaka blood, or any person having more than one-half Indian blood, . . . and all such marriages, or attempted marriages, shall be absolutely null and void."

South Carolina (Civil Code, 1902).

Sec. 2664: "It shall be unlawful for any white man to intermarry with any woman of either the Indian or negro races, or any mulatto, mestizo or half-breed, . . . or for any white woman to intermarry with any person other than a white man, or for any mulatto, half-breed, Indian, negro, or mestizo to intermarry with a white woman; and any such marriage, or attempted marriage, shall be utterly null and void and of no effect."²

¹ Constitution of Oklahoma, Art. 23, sec. 11: "Definition of races. Wherever in this Constitution and laws of the State the word or words 'colored' or 'colored race,' 'negro' or 'negro race' are used the same shall be construed to mean or apply to all persons of African descent, whether or not they are pure-blooded negroes."

² In 1913, a letter was written to the Secretary of State of South Carolina by the author, pointing out the marked difference in severity between the statute and the constitution of that state. No explanation has been received.

South Dakota (Compiled Laws, 1913).

Chap. 266, Laws of 1913. Sec. 1: "The intermarriage or illicit cohabitation of any persons belonging to the African, Corean, Malayan or Mongolian race, with any person of the opposite sex, belonging to the Caucasian or white race, is hereby prohibited, and any person who shall hereafter enter into any such marriage, or who shall indulge in any such illicit cohabitation shall be deemed guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the State prison for a term not exceeding ten years or both such fine and imprisonment."

Tennessee (Code, 1896).

Sec. 4186: "The intermarriage of white persons with negroes, mulattoes, or persons of mixed blood descended from a negro, to the third generation inclusive, or their living together as man and wife in this state, is hereby prohibited."

Texas (Willson's Criminal Statutes, 1906).

Art. 346: Intermarriage of whites and blacks: "If any white person and negro shall knowingly intermarry with each other within this state, or, having so intermarried, in or out of the state, shall continue to live together as man and wife within this state, they shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for a term not less than two or more than five years."

Art. 347: "Negro" and "White person" defined: "The term 'negro,' as used in the preceding article, includes also a person of mixed blood descended from negro ancestry to the third generation inclusive, although one ancestor of each generation may have been a white person. All persons not included in the definition of 'negro' shall be deemed a white person within the meaning of this article."

Utah (Revised Statutes, 1898).

Sec. 1184: "Marriage is prohibited and declared void: between a negro and a white person," and "between a Mongolian and a white person."

Virginia (Pollard's Code, 1904).

Sec. 2252: "What marriages are void: All marriages between a white person and a colored person, . . . shall be absolutely void, without any decree of divorce or other legal process."

Note. "A marriage between a white man and a woman who is less than one-fourth negro blood, however small the lesser quantity may be, is legal."

West Virginia (Code of 1906).

Sec. 2917: "Void marriages: 1. All marriages between a white person and a negro."

NEWS AND NOTES

STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

Letters were addressed by the editors to about seventy-five colleges and universities in America, asking for the names of students who are candidates for the A.M. or Ph.D. degrees, and whose Master's theses or Doctor's dissertations fall within the field of Sociology. This list is as complete as the data returned in response to these letters will permit. The dates given are the probable dates of presentation of the Masters' theses and the probable dates of publication of the Doctors' dissertations. The italics indicate the schools where the theses and dissertations are in progress.

LIST OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN PROGRESS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES

- Edward M. Arnos. The Policy of the States toward the Trusts. 1916. *Chicago*.
- Otho C. Ault. The Recent Development of Socialism in the United States. 1916. *Chicago*.
- Margaret Gray Bacon. Present Tendencies in Social Reform. 1917. *Chicago*.
- Florence E. Bamberger. Social Origins in the Curriculum of History and Civics. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Leroy Edward Baumann. Race Amalgamation in Greenpoint (Brooklyn) as Affected by Leadership. 1917. *Columbia*.
- I. B. Berkson. The Adjustment of the Curriculum of Jewish Schools to the Conditions of American Life. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- C. D. Blachly. Organization of Social Statistics in Chicago. 1917. *Chicago*.
- Walter B. Bodenhafer. The Minimum Wage for Women and Minors. *Kansas*.
- Matthias Boemke. The Rural School Problem in the Province of Cape of Good Hope, South Africa. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Marion Emmett Bratcher. A Study of Rural Conditions in Northwest Rhode Island. 1916. *Brown*.
- Barnett R. Brickner. A Study of the Jews in Cincinnati. 1917. *Cincinnati*.
- C. C. Caldwell. Industrial Licensing and American Trade Unions. *Johns Hopkins*.
- John J. Calvin. The Corporate Life of the Woman's College. 1916. *Teachers College*.

- Edwin Leavitt Clarke. American Men of Letters: Their Nature and Nurture. 1916. *Columbia*.
- Howard E. Clarke. The Conception of Evolution in Some of Its Implications for Educational Theory. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- C. W. Coulter. The Religious Organization of the Old Testament. 1916. *Yale*.
- Mary Thompson Cowper. History of Woman Suffrage in Kansas. *Kansas*.
- William T. Cross. Institutions of Charity and Correction. 1918. *Chicago*.
- D. N. Davidson. Farmers' Organizations in the United States. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Herbert K. Dennis. The French Canadian Population: A Study in Race Psychology. 1917. *Harvard*.
- Herbert M. Diamond. Interrelations of Religion and Capital. *Yale*.
- Charles A. Dice. New Factors Affecting the Motive to Save. 1916. *Wisconsin*.
- Aaron I. Dotey. The Relative Efficiency of Different Groups of High School Pupils. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Grove Samuel Dow. The Social History of Martha's Vineyard. 1916. *Chicago*.
- A. M. Dushkin. A Study of the Efficiency of Jewish Religious Schools. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Edna Hatfield Edmondson. The Population of Gary, Indiana. 1916. *Indiana*.
- Earle E. Eubank. A Study of the Deserting Husband. 1916. *Chicago*.
- Alexander Fleisher. Constitutional Clauses Dealing with Health, Charities, and Corrections. 1916. *Pennsylvania*.
- Bessie Gambrell. A Study of the Occupations of College Graduates Ten Years after Graduation. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Walter F. Geissel. Superannuation in American Trade Unions. 1917. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Philip L. Gillette. Korean Gilds. *Yale*.
- Albert R. Gminder. The Operation of Workmen's Compensation Systems in the United States. 1917. *Johns Hopkins*.
- L. Havemeyer. The Drama of Primitive Peoples. 1916. *Yale*.
- Edna Gertrude Henry. The Principles of Medical Social Service. 1916. *Indiana*.
- Henry Horace Hibbs, Jr. A Study of Infant Mortality in Boston. 1916. *Columbia*.
- E. T. Hiller. The Technique of the Strike: A Social Psychological Study. 1917. *Chicago*.
- Roberta Hodgson. Types and Traits of the Negroes of Athens, Georgia. 1916. *Wisconsin*.
- Kremer J. Hoke. The Relation of Intelligence, Achievements and Social Progress. 1916. *Teachers College*.

- Hilary Herbert Holmes. Denominational Control of Colleges. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- C. Roland Hugins. The Use of Armed Force in Labor Disputes. 1917. *Cornell*.
- Edwin E. Jacobs. Feminism: Its Relation to the Family and Society. 1917. *Clark*.
- George Milton Janes. The Control of Strikes in American Trade Unions. 1916. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Percy G. Kammerer. The Unmarried Mother. 1917. *Harvard*.
- George William Kleihege. The Psychology of Social Classes and Political Parties. *Kansas*.
- C. S. Laidman. The Place of the Church in the Modern City. 1917. *Chicago*.
- L. O. Lantis. History of Agriculture in Ohio. *Ohio State*.
- E. Lauer. Wendish Serfdom on the German Church Lands in the Middle Ages. 1916. *Chicago*.
- Ferris F. Laune. The Immigrant and Agriculture. 1918. *Chicago*.
- W. E. Lawrence. Function of War in Societal Evolution. *Yale*.
- Frederick E. Lee. Influence of Jesuit Missions upon Native Races. *Yale*.
- Edwin L. Leonard. History of the Relations of the City of Baltimore to Relief Work. 1917. *Catholic*.
- Ervin Eugene Lewis. Social Factors in Vocational Guidance. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- F. E. Lumley. The Industrial Organization of the Old Testament. 1916. *Yale*.
- Anna Christine McBride. Certain Phases of the Standardization of Conduct. 1917. *Columbia*.
- Lee D. McClean. Characteristics of the Societal Organization of Pastoral Peoples. *Yale*.
- Robert A. F. McDonald. The Increasing Sensitiveness of Elementary School Organization to Variations in the Social School Populations, as Indicated by Adjustments Made through Special Types of Schools and Classes. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- E. F. McGregor. The Family of the Old Testament. 1916. *Yale*.
- Nellie L. McKinley. History of the Relation of University Governing Boards to University Teachers. 1917. *Wisconsin*.
- J. L. Maddox. The Medicine Man. 1916. *Yale*.
- John W. Maguire. An Interpretation of the Records of Juvenile Delinquents in Certain Cities. 1917. *Catholic*.
- Samuel Margoshes. Readjustment of School Methods for the Better Assimilation of the Immigrant Population. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Arthur Raymond Mead. The Development of Free Schools in Connecticut. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Arthur Raymond Mead. A Theory of the Development of Trade Unions in the United States. 1917. *Teachers College*.
- Arthur Raymond Mead. Social Unions in the United States. 1916. *Teachers College*.

- J. W. Morgan. Factors of Social Transformation among the Hill People of Western Virginia. 1917. *Wisconsin*.
- K. Morimoto. The Standard of Living in Japan. 1916. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Paul I. Neergaard. Societal Organization as Revealed in the Norse Sagas. *Yale*.
- Stuart G. Noble. The History of Public Education for Negroes in the South. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Stanton Olinger. A Survey of the Fraternity Situation in Kansas University: A Study in Group Psychology. *Kansas*.
- Rebecca T. Osler. The Safeguarding of Professional Standards. 1917. *Wisconsin*.
- Robert G. Patterson. Methods of Wage Payment in the United States. 1916. *Pennsylvania*.
- Alice Paul. Position of Women under the Laws of Pennsylvania. 1916. *Pennsylvania*.
- Walter W. Pettit. Self Support on the Part of High School Students. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Maurice T. Price. The Missionary Convert. 1916. *Chicago*.
- William Raddatz. Charitable Foundations. 1916. *Wisconsin*.
- E. B. Reuter. The Status of the Mulatto in the United States. 1916. *Chicago*.
- Walter A. Riddell. Some Phases of the Legal Status of Religious Organizations in Canada. 1916. *Columbia*.
- Jesse S. Robinson. The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers. 1916. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Mabel L. Robinson. The Curriculum of Women's Colleges. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Frank Alexander Ross. A Study of the Application of Statistical Methods to Certain Sociological Problems. 1917. *Columbia*.
- Robert F. Seybolt. Apprenticeship and Apprenticeship Education in Colonial New England and New York. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Herbert Newhard Shenton. Social Activities of Certain Religious Organizations. 1917. *Columbia*.
- H. J. Sheridan. The Public Schools and Religious Education in the Province of Ontario. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Jacob Singer. Religious Taboo in the Bible. 1917. *Nebraska*.
- David P. Smelser. Unemployment and American Trade Unions. 1916. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Russell Gordon Smith. A Sociological Study of Opinion in the United States. 1917. *Columbia*.
- W. B. Smith. White Servitude in South Carolina. 1916. *Chicago*.
- Laurence C. Staples. The Economic and Moral Aspects of the Co-operative Movement in Ireland. 1917. *Harvard*.
- Harris E. Starr. Evolution of the Position of Woman. *Yale*.

- James Garfield Stevens. The Feeble-minded in Pennsylvania. 1916. *Pennsylvania*.
- J. Noble Stockett. The Arbitral Settlement of Labor Disputes. 1916. *Johns Hopkins*.
- R. W. Stone. The Rural Survey. 1917. *Chicago*.
- Elizabeth Swift. Viewpoint and Methodology in the Study of Labor Problems. 1917. *Chicago*.
- Victor N. Valgren. Farmers' Mutual Property Insurance in the United States. 1916. *Chicago*.
- J. J. Walsh. A Comparative Study of the Morality of Delinquent Boys and Girls. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Eugene Weiffenbach. Herder as a Precursor of Modern Sociology. 1916. *Missouri*.
- F. F. Williams. The Efficiency of Compulsory Education Laws. 1916. *Teachers College*.
- Tayi Yanigasawa. Primitive Civilization in Japan. 1916. *Columbia*.
- Elizabeth Young. The Social Demand Made on Children. 1916. *Teachers College*.

LIST OF MASTERS' THESES IN PROGRESS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES

- D. C. Andrews. Italians in a Coal-mining Town. 1916. *Columbia*.
- G. B. Austin. Leadership among the Women of an Eastern City. 1916. *Columbia*.
- Ralph Irving Austin. The Public Welfare Board Movement, with Special Reference to Nebraska. 1916. *Nebraska*.
- C. M. Baker. The Present Status of the Grange in Ohio. *Ohio State*.
- Ernest Bishop. An Economic and Social Study of Tuberculosis in Los Angeles. 1916. *Southern California*.
- Lottie Bohrer. Playground Development in the Schools of Oklahoma. 1916. *Oklahoma*.
- K. Borders. A Community in the Tobacco Region of Kentucky. 1916. *Columbia*.
- George Laurence Burr. Organized Labor in Nebraska. 1917. *Nebraska*.
- Lillian Byrnes. The Problem of the Superannuated Worker in Minneapolis. 1916. *Minnesota*.
- J. D. Calvert. Statistical Study of American Newspapers. 1916. *Columbia*.
- M. A. Cannon. The Institutional Life of a Rural Community. 1916. *Columbia*.
- M. Chaffee. Statistical Study of American Newspapers. 1916. *Columbia*.
- Claude P. Clayton. The Theory of Social Unity. *Missouri*.
- John C. Clegg. The Middle-Class Problem in the United States. *Ohio State*.
- John C. Clegg. The History of the Middle-Class Problem. *Ohio State*.
- John C. Clegg. The Social Attitudes of the Middle-Class Problem. 1916. *Southern California*.

- Madeline Davison. *Roofs in Their Relation to Social Problems.* 1916. *Chicago.*
- Helen Dolley. *The Milk Supply of Los Angeles.* 1916. *Southern California.*
- Agnes Drury. *Industrial Education of Women.* 1916. *Ohio State.*
- Mabel Brown Ellis. *Federal Regulation of Child Labor.* 1916. *Chicago.*
- Thomas Finley Ellis. *Recent Development of the Juvenile Court.* *Indiana.*
- Lois Ely. *A Social Study of Christian Hymnology.* 1917. *Southern California.*
- Harold K. Ferguson. *A Psychological Study of Provincetown, Massachusetts.* 1916. *Clark.*
- W. E. Gettys. *A Study in Degeneracy.* 1916. *Ohio State.*
- W. M. Graham. *Scientific Administration of Public Non-Institutional Relief, with Special Reference to the So-called Mothers' Pension Laws of Illinois.* 1916. *Illinois.*
- Andrew Granstedt. *Americanization of a Scandinavian Community.* 1916. *Kansas.*
- Olga S. Halsey. *Compulsory Health Insurance in Great Britain.* 1916. *Wellesley.*
- F. E. Harnar. *An Ohio Town.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- Ross Hodson. *An Economic and Social Study of the Liquor Industry in Los Angeles.* 1916. *Southern California.*
- G. R. Johnson. *Statistical Study of American Newspapers.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- C. L. Knapp. *A Group of Italian Girls: A Sociological Study.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- Lester D. Lacy. *Social Phases of the Temperance Movement in Kansas.* 1916. *Kansas.*
- J. H. Lemkau. *Influence of the Methodist Episcopal Church on the Americanization of Immigrant Germans.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- Elizabeth Long. *The Housing Conditions in Circleville, Ohio.* 1916. *Ohio State.*
- W. J. MacLeod. *A Prince Edward Island Community.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- Everett Mattoon. *A Study of Workmen's Compensation, with Special Reference to California Legislation.* 1916. *Southern California.*
- Daniel F. Meyer. *Comparison of Secondary Education in America and Europe.* 1916. *Oklahoma.*
- M. G. Montgomery. *A Sociological Study of Lumber Camps.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- M. E. Moore. *Sociological Problems in Education.* 1916. *Kansas.*
- M. T. Moore. *Statistical Study of American Newspapers.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- Ralph W. Nelson. *A Constructive Theory of World Organization.* 1916. *Kansas.*
- M. B. Perlman. *Statistical Study of American Newspapers.* 1916. *Columbia.*
- H. F. Pinnell. *The Sociology of Lester F. Ward.* 1917. *Southern California.*
- L. R. Plank. *Statistical Study of American Newspapers.* 1916. *Columbia.*

- Mary Poggi. The Social Activities of the Roman Catholic Church in Los Angeles. 1916. *Southern California*.
- Robert Ray Pruet. Long-Time Agricultural Credit. 1916. *Oklahoma*.
- William Ramsey. A Social Study of Educational Provisions for the Adult Immigrant in Los Angeles. 1917. *Southern California*.
- Will A. Ransom. Public Opinion in Municipal Government. 1916. *Kansas*.
- Irene Raymond. Waste and Its Elimination as Regards Exceptional Children. 1916. *Kansas*.
- Edwin B. Smith. The Public-Land Question in the United States. 1916. *Denver*.
- Gilbert H. Smith. Influence of Religious Denominations among the Students in American Universities. 1916. *Oklahoma*.
- M. D. Smith. Statistical Study of American Newspapers. 1916. *Columbia*.
- A. M. Stitt. Statistical Study of American Newspapers. 1916. *Columbia*.
- J. C. Thompson. Statistical Study of American Newspapers. 1916. *Columbia*.
- Robert Thompson. Attitude of Primitive Peoples toward Amalgamation. 1916. *Minnesota*.
- V. R. Vergades. The Development of Greek Control of Restaurants, Candy Stores, and Shoe-Shine Parlors. 1916. *Oberlin*.
- Maida Wellborn. A Sociological Analysis of the Educational Ideas of Madame Montessori. 1917. *Southern California*.
- William O. Weyforth. The Organizability of Labor. 1916. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Laura Wheaton. The Social Activities of the Protestant Churches of Columbus. 1916. *Ohio State*.
- Harry S. Will. Some Effects of Environment on Mental Processes. 1916. *Ohio State*.
- A. L. Wills. Neapolitans and Genoese in an American Factory Town. 1916. *Columbia*.
- Edna Waterman Worthley. Municipal Sunday Legislation. 1916. *Nebraska*.
- A. S. Yeretsian. Armenian Immigration to the United States. 1917. *Southern California*.
- William E. Zeuch. The Causes of Industrial Conflict in the Metal Trades of Worcester. 1916. *Clark*.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ORGANIZES SOCIAL SCIENCE FRATERNITY

On January 7, twenty-nine members of the faculty of the University of Missouri organized the Social Science Fraternity, an organization for the promotion of the social sciences. The members of the fraternity are: Anthropology, History, Sociology, Economics, Political Science, Psychology, Education, and Social Work. The fraternity has organized a new publication, *Alpha Zeta* (the Greek letters Zeta and Alpha), for the publication of the social sciences.

While the present organization is a purely local one, the organizers have had in mind the possibility of similar societies in various institutions of the country getting together and forming a national organization with the same purpose. Alpha Zeta Pi will attempt to do for the social sciences what Sigma Xi is doing for the natural sciences. Students who have distinguished themselves in the university by giving special promise of future achievement in the social sciences will be stimulated by being elected student members of the fraternity, and may later be elected permanent members. Both student members and permanent members will have equal rights in the fraternity.

The officers for the present academic year are: President, Professor Max F. Meyer, of the department of psychology; Vice-President, Professor C. A. Ellwood, of the department of sociology; Secretary-Treasurer, Professor J. E. Wrench, of the department of history. Other institutions desiring to organize chapters are invited to correspond with Professor Wrench.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

At a recent meeting of the University Council it was voted to make social science work required for Freshmen and Sophomores. Twelve hours are required of those liberal arts students who do not expect to specialize in the natural sciences, eight hours of those who do. Three social science departments are involved, namely, History, Economics, and Sociology. In the case of the twelve-hour requirement, four credit hours are to be given to each of the three departments. In the case of the eight-hour requirement, students are to choose four credit hours each from two of the three departments at their option.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Professor Hutton Webster's *Primitive Secret Societies* has recently appeared in a Japanese translation by Professor Tasaki of the Nagasaki Higher Commercial School.

THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Professor Emory J. Bogardus has just published a lecture given before the members of the Southern California Association of Applied Psychology, on *Psychological Bases of Social Problems*.

Two new courses have been added this semester to the list of courses in sociology offered at the University of Southern California, namely, Social Legislation and Rural Sociology.

A new man has been added as a lecturer to the regular sociological staff of instructors, Mr. H. J. McClean, a graduate of Stanford and now completing the work in law for the degree of Juris Doctor. He will give the courses in Social Legislation and Criminology.

The enrolment in the sociology courses here this semester (not counting out duplicates) reaches the number of 485 students. All of the courses are of upper division and graduate standing, excepting Sociology I.

REVIEWS

Scientific Management and Labor. By ROBERT FRANKLIN HOXIE.
New York: Appleton, 1915.

In the long contest with machinery and division of labor the all-round skilled mechanic has seen his skill turned over to the employer who owns the machine and directs the unskilled laborer who has taken his place. In only a few cases, such as that of the printers, has the trade union been able to "capture the machine" and to secure for its members a share of the increased product. In many cases the union has disappeared, or, if it has reappeared, it has done so, not in the form of a limited union of a particular craft, but in that of an industrial union including all who work in the shop.

Now "scientific management" suddenly appears, with the purpose of turning over to the employer the remainder of the skill which the craftsman still retains in his head and hand not yet transferred to machinery. The object of invention, here, is not that of a substitute machine, but an analysis of the very motions that constitute the skill itself; the breaking up of these motions into their elementary parts; the elimination of waste motions and the selection of time-saving motions; the timing of each motion by a stop watch, and the recording of both time-saving motions and their standard times on instruction sheets, by which almost any unskilled laborer can learn quickly to do the work. These time-and-motion sheets and instruction cards are the property of the employer, and with them goes the craftsman's former ownership of his trade secrets and personal skill, on which his bargaining power and trade union depended.

Not only this, but the time-and-motion studies make it possible to introduce new and ingenious methods of payment which take away from each individual worker the feeling of dependence on his fellow-workmen for the protection which a trade union affords. When a set of motions is timed and a standard time is set for completing the motions, then each workman is induced by the offer of a bonus to reduce the time, to exceed the "task," and to look to himself instead of his fellows for higher wages.

Thus scientific management becomes, not merely an extension of machine methods into the human machine, but an extension of scientific

psychology into working-class psychology. No wonder that this subject is the most fundamental and irrepressible of the conflicts of capital and labor; for it is nothing less than the struggle between centralized efficiency and distributive democracy.

So broad and deep is the subject that Mr. Hoxie does not pretend to have covered it in this short treatise. "Some vital matters," he says, "have been discussed very briefly and one important topic—unfounded and unproved trade union charges against scientific management—has been omitted altogether" (p. vi). He hopes in a later study to discuss these omitted topics fully. Indeed, without them, the present work is but one side of the subject. It is to be hoped that he may have the opportunity of finishing his work in the thoroughly admirable and scientific manner thus far employed.

For he tells us here his entire method: first, a prolonged study of the controversial literature; then two preliminary statements, submitted by him to the opposite sides, on "Labor Claims of Scientific Managers" and "Trade Union Objections to Scientific Management"; then the boiling down of these statements to some two hundred "vital points at issue"; then a questionnaire submitted to employers and employees designed to force the issue on each of these points; then the selection of 35 shops, designated, "with a few special exceptions," by scientific managers; then investigation in these shops accompanied by a chosen representative of the American Federation of Labor and a representative of "employing management," both of whom attached their signatures and gave their "unqualified approval" to his conclusions and to the monograph now published. There could scarcely be a more thoroughly verified piece of investigation or a more surely justified set of conclusions, on so critical a subject of hostile interests, except for the inability of the author to take the final step of submitting it, before publication, to the criticisms of the employers, scientific managers, and labor leaders whose shops, claims, and objections had been investigated. Doubtless before he finishes the second half of his work this also will be done.

Hoxie's method of investigation, which I have just called "scientific" as applied to the social sciences, is in interesting contrast to the same term as appropriated by the originators of scientific management. Hoxie analyzes Taylor's claim of "scientific laws," and these turn out to be just the same *ipse dixit* which in former days was known as "divine law" and latterly as "natural law." They simply stop further discussion and that ends it. "As reasonably," quoting from Mr. Taylor,

"might we insist on bargaining about the time and place of the rising and setting of the sun" (p. 40).

But Hoxie discovers that it takes a highly mathematical and capable astronomer, and many of them together, to ascertain and predict even so precise a thing as the rising and setting of the sun. "Far from being the invariable and purely objective matters that they are pictured," he says, "the methods and results of time study and task setting are, in practice, the special sport of individual judgment and opinion, subject to all the possibilities of diversity, inaccuracy, and injustice that arise from human ignorance and prejudice" (p. 40). "Scientific management as a movement is cursed with fakirs. The great rewards which a few leaders in the movement have secured for their services have brought into the field a crowd of industrial patent medicine men" (p. 117).

There are seventeen points, Hoxie has counted, where "the judgment of the employer, the time study man, or the workers may be exercised so as to produce variation that will affect and alter the task itself" (p. 46). That is, there are seventeen different movable points of observation, from each of which three different persons, with three different interests to serve, may set down three different times for the same sun to rise at the same place. Some of these variables have a list of subvariations as follows: "(1) the general attitude, ideas, and purposes of the management and the consequent general instructions given to the time study man"; "(5) the mode of selection of the workers to be timed and their speed and skill relative to the other members of the group"; "(7) the atmospheric conditions, time of day, time of year, the mental and physical condition of the workers when timed and the judgment exercised in reducing these matters to the normal"; "(11) the judgment of the time study man as to the pace maintained under timing relative to the 'proper,' 'normal,' or maximum speed which should be demanded"; and so on for seventeen varieties (pp. 46, 47).

And what is the class of men hired by scientific managers actually to do this class of work, "the most crucial in the scheme of scientific management"?

The best men in this work are perhaps technically qualified, but . . . the best of them are technicians with little knowledge of the subject of fatigue, little understanding of psychology and temperament, little understanding of the viewpoint and problems of the workers, and almost altogether lacking in knowledge of and interest in the broader economic and social aspects of working class welfare. The bulk of the time study men encountered were immature men drawn from the shop or college. . . . [They] were found to be prevail-

ingly of the narrow-minded mechanical type, poorly paid and occupying the lowest positions in the managerial organizations. . . . The start is often made at \$15.00 a week. A good time study man, according to current standards, can be had at from \$75 to \$100 per month, and \$125 per month is a rather high rating for experienced men. . . . In fact, the time study man, who, if scientific management is to make good the most important of its labor claims, should be among the most highly trained and influential officials in the shop, a scientist in viewpoint, a wise arbiter between employer and workmen, is, in general, a petty functionary, a specialist workman, a sort of clerk, who has no voice in the counsels of the higher officials.

Thus the time when the workman's sun shall be ordered to rise and set is fixed, for the most part, not by the scientist, but by his clerks.

Again, in addition to his method of investigation, Hoxie sets forth his two standards of judgment by means of which he passes upon the merits of scientific management. The first standard is "what it proves to be in its actual operation," and "not what the ideals or theories of its advocates or opponents would have it to be." By this standard he finds some shops which approach in some particulars the ideals of its advocates and many that refute some of the objections of its opponents. Consequently he consistently distinguishes throughout between scientific management "at its best" in practice and scientific management in other shops not at its best. Naturally the conclusions based on such a standard cannot be satisfactory either to advocates or to opponents. They ought, however, to be satisfactory to those who wish to perpetuate "the best" of scientific management and to eliminate the rest.

But this standard is modified by his second one. What is the character, the scope of scientific management, even at its best? Again, he rejects the "theories of its leaders" and adopts as his standard of judgment what actually "exists and persists" in the best shops. Here he finds the absence of one thing which the leaders declare to be the "essence of scientific management," namely, "democracy" (pp. 4, 5).

Evidently the term "democracy" has a double meaning as used by the scientific managers and Hoxie. These two meanings Hoxie very keenly distinguishes. One is the "democracy of science" which sweeps away "the personal authority of the employer and the arbitrary rules and regulations of the workmen with all the machinery for negotiations and the enforcement of decisions created by both, and substitutes in all matters the impersonal dictates of natural law and fact" (p. 100). Such a "democracy of science" springs from a theory of "fundamental harmony of interests" of employer and employee. If these interests are

"naturally" harmonious, then there is no need of negotiation and bargaining. All that is needed is exact measurement, as in the physical sciences.

The other definition of democracy is such an arrangement as "gives the workers power and opportunities, as compared with the employers, to express and advance their viewpoint and enforce their demands" (pp. 103, 104). This is the democracy of equality of bargaining power. Such democracy does not exist in scientific management shops at their best, for "the power of the individual worker against the employer is weakened" (p. 104) and "with rare exceptions" unionism and collective bargaining do not exist (p. 109).

Other topics covered by the book are the incompleteness and hurry of installation of scientific management, "functional foremanship," selection and hiring, instruction and training, specialization of workers, rate-making, modes of payment, maintenance of rates, overexertion and exhaustion, advancement and promotion, discipline, discharge and length of service, industrial democracy, and collective bargaining. To discuss them all would require several papers. They cover, we may say, almost the whole trend of modern business with reference to labor.

Whether it be called scientific management, or something else, the fact is that it is part of a resistless movement for business efficiency which cannot be suppressed either by labor or by government. The union that suppresses it will drive business to non-union shops, and the government that suppresses it will succumb to other nations. Seeing this outcome, Hoxie holds that "the main demands are for a frank recognition of the trend of events and for some method of putting back into the worker's life the content which he is losing as the result of increasing specialization and the abandonment of the old apprenticeship."

JOHN R. COMMONS

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Inventors and Money-Makers. Lectures on Some Relations between Economics and Psychology. By F. W. TAUSSIG. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. ix+138.

These three semi-popular lectures constitute in the main a criticism of the Utilitarian contention that a conscious self-interest must be at the basis of all wealth production. The argument is interesting as an illustration of the influence which biology is coming to exert upon economic theory, for its final appeal is to man's instinctive equipment. The

Utilitarian assumption of the "economic man" is rejected because the author cannot discover any instincts of accumulation and barter (pp. 4, 81). He does contend, however, that man possesses an instinct of contrivance or workmanship which will better explain his inventiveness than will his desire for wealth, though the latter stimulus has not been inoperative among inventors. With the business man also the desire for wealth has been a very strong motive to accumulation, but this desire is not a simple instinct of accumulation. It is rather a composite of the instincts of contrivance, domination, emulation, and sympathy or altruism, which demand wealth for their satisfaction (pp. 79 ff.).

While the author believes his stand against the Utilitarian economics well taken, he has not sufficient faith in the instinct of contrivance to advocate the abolishment of the patent laws (p. 52). Neither is he an unqualified advocate of collectivism as a substitute for the competitive system, for he is doubtful whether the instinct of altruism will be able completely to overcome the opposing instincts of emulation and domination. However, the experience of the nineteenth century has shown that the last two instincts can be greatly modified by training, and therefore a large measure of collectivism is not unthinkable for the future (pp. 125, 133-34).

An adequate criticism of this book cannot be made in a few words. However, the reviewer takes issue with the method of the argument rather than with the author's major conclusions, and this criticism of method may be outlined in two general propositions: First, every fact here explained by means of an appeal to instinct could have been accounted for equally well—and sometimes with greater clearness—on the basis of habits acquired through training. Secondly, all the arguments used in the book to establish the existence of the instincts appealed to are equally applicable if we substitute for the word "instinct" the term "acquired habit." The author seems to have fallen into the methodological error now so common among biologists of referring to well-established and widespread habits as native tendencies or instincts, apparently on the assumption that whatever is common to the race must have been born in the individual rather than have been acquired by him. This is an assumption which works very well when applied to the insects and other lower forms of life, to which the biologists have given so large a part of their attention, but it is open to serious objections when applied to so highly plastic a being as man with his great capacity for learning and with society's varied machinery and resources for offering stimuli

for imitation, which lead constantly to new uniformities of human nature based on habit training. It is interesting to note that the author might have supported his major contentions just as effectively by an appeal to the new educational and social psychology as to the old biology. Economic science has still another step to take before it reaps the harvest prepared for it by the new psychology.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

The Higher Individualism. By EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. Pp. 162.

This book consists of eight sermons preached at Harvard University. "Though not conceived with reference to a general plan, the sermons express certain fundamental ideas characteristic of the constructive tendency in current religious teaching—such as the social nature of the individual, the religious significance of social service, and the modern meaning of regeneration, inspiration, mysticism, and the quest for life." Briefly, Professor Ames has translated the traditional categories of religion into terms of social service.

In this sense it seems that religion consists very largely in busy-ness. The modern commands of Jesus to his disciples are, "Go, teach; build schools and colleges; . . . found hospitals and laboratories, and dispensaries; . . . found settlements and peace societies and boards of arbitration; publish the poetry of love; dramatize the prodigal son and the good Samaritan, etc."—in brief, Go, organize something, and demonstrate the gospel of efficiency. Two or three passages suggest that life reaches its climax on the football field, and one wonders whether in "the quest of life" the author is not thinking of "seeing life." When we somehow connect all of this with "the infinite compassion that throbs at the heart of the world," it seems that we realize "the mystical quality of religion."

Such a conception of religion must be somewhat disconcerting to old-fashioned piety, and even the profane may wonder why it needs the name of religion. Granting that social service plays an important part in life, it seems nevertheless that from a specifically religious standpoint life demands that the busy world of here and now be viewed *sub specie eternitatis*; and this implies a certain element of other-worldliness, a certain detachment, in thought at least, from the passing show, a communing of the spirit, traditionally associated with prayer in the closet and the still small voice—in short, an "inner" life which appears to be

omitted from Mr. Ames's conception of religion. Possibly the inner life may be condemned as unmodern and pathological; but then it seems that we might dispense with the term "religion."

Equally hostile to the traditional demands of the spirit is the sermon on "The Higher Individualism," from which the book receives its title. Mr. Ames condemns both the individualism of *laissez faire* and the individualism of personal culture, and in their place he offers the "higher individualism" of social function. But here again we wonder at the use of the term "individualism." Let it be granted that the individual is to realize his aims in social relations with his fellows: from the standpoint of individualism the higher individualism should be that social order which offered the greater freedom of action. In Mr. Ames's individualism it seems that the individual enjoys the same measure of freedom as one of the gears of a machine. For example, Mr. Ames does not pretend that the switchman of the railroad is gratifying a taste for switching. No, his claim to individuality must be satisfied by the fact that, like the switch itself, he fulfils a specialized function.

WARNER FITE

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Symbiogenesis. The Universal Law of Progressive Evolution. By HERMANN REINHEIMER. London: Knapp, Drewett & Sons Ltd. Pp. xxiii+425.

The title of this work would seem to indicate that the law put forward has not been productive of evolving anything like modesty in the author, while tedious hours spent upon his pages have not given any evidence of the development within the author of either judicial mentality or capacity to grasp the most obvious trends of modern investigations.

As a whole the book is a hopeless jumble of extracts from diverse authors, patched together in the effort to show that the central postulate, bio-economics, operating in a symbiotic manner is responsible for all the manifold phenomena of organized nature. "Love foods" come in for frequent and grotesque treatment, while the interpretation of the data and principles of modern genetics is the most idiotic piece of composition it has ever been my misfortune to discover. The chapters on "Bio-nomics," "Pathogenesis," "Orthogenesis," "Psychogenesis," and "Science and Democracy" show no grasp of the principles of evolution as now known, or of their operation in the organic or superorganic phenomena.

On its surface the book presents some plausibility that might with uncritical reading prove misleading. There is, however, in the whole book nothing to commend it, nor any possible escape from characterizing it as the least logical, worst constructed, most inaccurate and irrational book upon evolution that has appeared in a long time.

The book work is commendable, the typographical mistakes very few, but it is unfortunate that the publishers should have expended valuable materials and energy upon so useless a production.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WILLIAM L. TOWER

Black and White in the Southern States, a Study of the Race Problem in the United States from a South African Point of View. By MAURICE S. EVANS, C.M.G. London and New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1915. 8vo. Pp. 229.

This is a sequel to the author's earlier volume, *Black and White in Southeast Africa*. It is a product of the same searching insight and the same candid observation. The writer spent a year traveling in the southern states, meeting and talking with all sorts of people of both races. Out of this experience he has produced a book which is not the mere random observation of an inquisitive traveler: It is rather the reflections of a student, seeking not so much a solution—because “there is no final solution possible and the Negro will remain a problem for generations to come”—as a wider understanding of a problem already familiar.

The author's personal attitude is reflected in the way in which he defines the problem: “How to ensure that two races so different, yet living in the same land, shall each have opportunity for its full development, without clashing and without fusion.”

So much in general. A further analysis reveals the fact that the race problem is a question of latitudes. It assumes a different shape in the United States and in the West Indies; in the northern and in the southern states. In Central Africa and on the West Coast the problem is that of the white man in a black man's country; in South Africa it is that of the black man in the white man's country.

A white man's country is any part of the world where a white man can live; a black man's country is any part of the world in which the white man can't live and the black man can. It is in this sense that, although the population is overwhelmingly black, South Africa is still a white man's land.

The similarity between the racial situation in the southern states and in South Africa is due to the fact that, in both instances, the black man is living or seeking to live in a white man's world.

"Notwithstanding the markedly different experiences through which each country has gone since European settlement first began, the visitor from South Africa to the southern states sees much that is familiar." There are differences but they are less than the resemblances. "In essence the problem is the same for both of us."

Not latitude alone but numbers are factors in the racial situation. In South Africa the Negro population is vastly larger and is increasing more rapidly than the white. In this country the reverse is true.

The author believes that "the genius of the European peoples concerned will probably enable them to govern their tropical dependencies with justice and consideration, and adjust their methods to suit the development and changing needs of the governed. . . . In South Africa and the United States," however, "the problem is much more complex and difficult." In the tropics the white man is a mere sojourner. Here and in South Africa the races live permanently side by side. It is the problem of the twentieth century to discover a basis of adjustment.

Finally, however, the discussion turns, not on matters of fact, but on those of political dogma. Racial differences, the author holds, are fundamental and they must be preserved. The races must live separately, but they must work out their separate destinies, not in conflict, but in co-operation. This means that the solution of the problem must be found in some sort of bi-racial organization, in which the Negro will be given some sort of political and moral autonomy and remain, as Booker T. Washington phrased it, "a nation within a nation."

ROBERT E. PARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

La Force motrice au point de vue économique et social. By G. OLPHE-GALLIARD. Paris: M. Giard & E. Brière, 1915. Pp. 310. Fr. 7.

No better discussion of the effects of the use of motive power upon industrial and social life could fairly be desired than is afforded by this book, which was rewarded by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. Successive chapters discuss the development and social effects of water power, steam, gas motors, and finally of various electrical devices, throughout the whole range of industry. These latter, the

author thinks, will have as transforming an influence upon twentieth-century civilization as steam power did upon the civilization of the nineteenth. He is wholly optimistic as to the social effects of the use of hydraulic and electrical power in industry to replace steam. He believes that this revolution in the form of motive power used in manufacturing and transportation will do much to counteract the evil results which followed the development of the use of steam power in the nineteenth century. The book is interestingly written and the author is careful to point out that the kind of motive power used in a society is, like other technological devices, not a direct and primary social cause, but a means which, nevertheless, profoundly influences social life.

C. A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Hereditary Fragility of Bone. By H. S. CONARD and C. B. DAVENPORT. Cold Spring Harbor: Eugenics Record Office, November, 1915. Pp. 31. \$0.15.

This is Bulletin No. 14 in the series published by the Eugenics Record Office, the study being suggested by an extensive family history contributed by Professor H. S. Conard, of Grinnell College. The study deals with a peculiar brittleness of bones found in children and called osteopsathyrosis. The literature dealing with this condition has been thoroughly canvassed and every authentic case of its reappearance in the same family has been chartered. The authors conclude that "heredity is the only important etiological factor." They find the trait a dominant one, and correlated with porcelain blue sclerotic coat. The distribution of affected individuals in affected fraternities is in close agreement with the Mendelian expectation. The study is an interesting suggestion of results that may be achieved by the co-operation of individual investigators with the specialized staff of the Eugenics Record Office.

F. H. HANKINS

CLARK UNIVERSITY

Educational Hygiene from the Pre-School Period to the University.

Edited by LOUIS W. RAPEER, PH.D. New York: Scribner, 1915. Pp. xix+650.

As the title indicates, this is a compendium of "the latest information and advice of leading specialists" on the numerous phases of hygiene with special reference to the public school and other educational efforts.

The subject has been treated broadly so that there would seem to be no phase of the health problem, private or public, domestic, scholastic, or industrial, which is not in some way touched upon in this volume. There are four main divisions of the material treating, respectively, "Health Sociology," "The Administration of Educational Hygiene," "The Divisions and Practise of Educational Hygiene," and "The Hygiene of the College." The editor would seem to lay most stress on the third division which includes twenty of the chapters under the captions "Medical Inspection of Schools," "School Sanitation," "Physical Education," "The Teaching of Hygiene," and "The Hygiene of Instruction." There are in all thirty-three chapters and twenty-seven authors. While the contributors cannot be rated as equally authoritative, the high excellence of the material is vouched for by the appearance in the first part alone of such well-known experts as Dr. E. H. Lewinski-Corwin, of the New York Academy of Medicine, Professor C. B. Davenport, of Cold Spring Harbor, and Clarence A. Perry, of the Russell Sage Foundation. The volume includes more than a hundred splendid illustrations, well chosen and full of meaning; a bibliography including books, magazines, and reports; several appendices; and an index. It is in fact encyclopedic, authoritative, and complete. It should have large use both as text and as reference book.

F. H. HANKINS

CLARK UNIVERSITY

Annual Report of the New York State Probation Commission for the Year 1914. Prepared by HOMER FOLKS, President, and CHARLES L. CHUTE, Secretary. Albany: J. B. Lyon Co., 1915. Pp. 505.

This report is such that it is of fundamental value to the judges of the juvenile courts and all the probation officers of New York state. It is also of great interest and usefulness to anyone engaged in probation work.

It consists of the general report of the Commission (67 pages); statistical summaries (56 pages); proceedings of conferences (296 pages); citations of laws of other states (8 pages); and a directory of the probation officers of New York state (56 pages).

The State Probation Commission was created in 1907. Its principal duties, as prescribed by law (sec. 30, chap. 54, Consolidated Laws, as amended by chap. 613, Laws of 1910), are as follows: to meet at stated

times, not less than once every two months; to exercise general supervision over the work of probation officers throughout the state and to keep informed as to their work; to inquire into the conduct and efficiency of probation officers from time to time; to endeavor to secure the effective application of the probation system, and the enforcement of the probation law in all parts of the state; to collect and publish statistical and other information and make recommendations as to the operations of the probation system; to inform all magistrates and probation officers of any legislation directly affecting probation, and to publish each year a list of all probation officers in the state; to make an annual report to the legislature showing the proceedings of the Commission, the results of the probation system as administered in the various parts of the state, with recommendations.

During 1914 the specific activities of the Commission included the following: the holding of regular bimonthly Commission meetings in various cities; the receipt of monthly statistical reports from all probation officers in the state, and the tabulation of the same; the publication and distribution of literature on probation, including the annual report and the *Manual for Probation Officers*; supplying probation officers with blank forms, record books, literature, and information to assist them in their work; visits of inspection and investigation of the work of courts and probation officers throughout the state; special efforts for the extension of the probation system in cities and counties; assisting in civil service examinations, both state and local, for the appointment of probation officers; studying legislation affecting probation introduced or proposed; conducting the following conferences: (a) the fourth series of New York City conferences on probation, consisting of nine meetings; (b) the seventh annual conference of probation officers at Utica; (c) the sixth annual conference of the State Association of Magistrates in Albany.

The main recommendations of the report, which are excellent and which are just as applicable to every other state as to New York, may be summarized as follows: (1) All probation officers should be appointed from competitive civil service examination. (2) Probation work should be standardized everywhere by employing as many officers as the number of cases requires, by paying them adequate salaries, and by systematizing and co-ordinating their work under an efficient chief probation officer in the larger courts. (3) Preliminary investigations should be made by probation officers of all cases before being placed on probation. (4) A system of juvenile courts, either entirely separate, or separate parts of existing courts, should be established throughout the state. (5) In all

the larger cities of the state detention homes should be built for the care of children, pending trial and investigation. (6) Greater co-ordination should exist between probation and parole work, and the state should supervise all parole work.

JOEL D. HUNTER

JUVENILE COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

Outlines of Child Study. By WILLIAM A. MCKEEVER. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. xiv+181. \$1.00.

The secondary title, "A Text Book for Parent Teacher Associations, Mothers' Clubs, and All Kindred Organizations," reveals the purpose of the volume. A section describing aims, methods of organization, and conduct of clubs for child study is followed by 112 programs furnishing topics for speakers, references, and suggestions for further discussion. In the programs the cycle of domestic life in relation to the community is rehearsed: the mother, the care of the baby, pre-school training, pre-adolescence, vacation activities, adolescence, vocations, and religious development. Emphasis is given to conditions prevailing in rural districts.

A third section contains two lists of publications, the first intended to serve as a minimum library, the second as a larger book-shelf for more extended study.

The professional theorist is at first likely to dub a book of this type unnecessary and second hand. There are immediate, live issues, however, which even the specialist in child psychology often fails to meet in training his own children. Light on such questions is a boon to busy unacademic people.

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Industrial Home Work in Massachusetts. By the Department of Research, Women's Educational and Industrial Union. Prepared under the joint direction of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and AMY HEWES, PH.D., 1915. Pp. xxxi+191. \$0.80.

It is surprising that from a painstaking, carefully arranged report, with a preface containing an admirable summary, the total impression is confusing. Facts stand out clearly enough, but their meaning is obscure. One suspects that the meaning of home work in Massachusetts is not a

dire tale of woe; and yet the facts are imposing. Wages are impossibly low; unemployment is great. And yet, because in the majority of households home work is used only as supplementary to outside work and earnings, the looked-for distress is not in evidence.

This study undertaken by the Women's Educational and Industrial Union in conjunction with the Bureau of Statistics was originally published by the state without the introductory matter and the conclusions of the present volume. The earlier document had the value of stating the situation simply and succinctly while the rather mooted "conclusions" of the private organization, which may or may not follow from the text, complicate and probably exaggerate the issues.

The investigators found that in the six industries studied: (1) there were 78 per cent of the workers receiving less than \$150 a year; (2) employment was very irregular; (3) child labor did about one-fifth of the work (child labor was eliminated by the Legislature in 1913); (4) living and working conditions were not bad.

The director of the study pointed out the inadequate nature of the present licensing and the expense and elaborateness of complete licensing, and concludes in favor of prohibition.

The proposal which seems to cover the problem most effectively is one by Professor Cummins, which appears in a footnote. He favors putting large discretionary powers in the hands of the Department of Labor with the assistance of an advisory committee of employers, trade unionists, charity workers, etc., which would decide cases on their merits, subject to appeal in public hearing.

As hinted, the effect of the six separate investigations is repetitive and tedious. From the conclusions one is honestly forced to the impression of much ado about little. Had the facts and the alternative remedies proposed been published alone, a much less imposing but far more readable and effective document would have resulted.

ORDWAY TEAD

Secretary, Massachusetts Committee on Unemployment

The Family as a Social and Educational Institution. By WILLYSTINE GOODSELL. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. xiv + 550.

Beyond indicating that this book is a "history" and in a "textbook series in education," the author does not offer any explanation of its purpose or scope. As history, it follows the time relation consistently,

and only the last ninety pages are devoted to the contemporary family. As a textbook, it is clearly written, has short chapters with brief bibliographies of sources and secondary works, and is an extremely valuable condensation of facts and direct citations which otherwise would require laborious research for the average student.

Exactly what the author had in mind in discussing the "family as a social and educational institution" is rather obscure—not that he does or should present an argument; only in the discussion of present-day conditions does he permit himself any expression of opinion. But in the mere collection of data some preconception of the family must have been a guide. For example, in the minds of some students the family is bound up in the welfare of the child, and infant mortality is a point at which the family and social welfare converge. No treatment of infant mortality other than passing reference is found in the book. Similarly no effort is made to formulate a standard of family life, physical or otherwise, or to discuss efforts in that direction. There is no attempt to measure economic pressure on the family. No consideration of the problem of the aged appears.

This is noted, not to disparage valuable material which the book does contain, but rather to point out that the unifying principle is not altogether clear. As a textbook intended to provide "canned information," the book is increasingly valuable in proportion to the paucity in library facilities where it is used. As a systematic introduction to a problem, however, it is rather descriptive than analytical or searching. Indeed, the same comment applies to the few instances where the author expresses his own opinion on problems of the day. It is not quite clear that the writing of some hundreds of pages of descriptive historical treatment of the family bears any relation whatever to the opinions he presents on family problems today, although his opinions are for the most part moderate and doubtless could be sustained.

On the whole, with the foregoing qualifications which lean rather to discussion of the ideal textbook than to fair criticism of one of the first in the field, this book is a genuine contribution for which many of us have looked. Bridging as it does the gap between Westermarck, Howard, and other technical writers on the one hand, and younger minds confused by their infinite detail, it will be useful, if not the most useful, for undergraduate work in the study of the family for a long time to come.

B. WARREN BROWN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Bibliography of Municipal Government. By WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915. Pp. ix+472. \$2.50 net.

A classified list of selected materials on all phases of municipal life, for the general reader and special student. The references lay special emphasis upon American conditions; include only publications of the past fifteen years; give preference to publications easily accessible, and official data; aim to be comprehensive, not exhaustive. The references are not only to strict governmental matters. "The boundary lines between municipal government on the one hand, and sociology, social ethics, or allied subjects on the other, are not rigidly defined" (Preface, p. v). Many of the references are evaluated by critical notes "based upon personal familiarity with the material." An elaborate author-and-subject index is appended.

This volume is the most comprehensive and accurate bibliography, in English, in the field treated. Every person interested in the city will welcome it.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

American Municipal Progress. By CHARLES ZUEBLIN. New York: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. xiv+522.

This is a revised and enlarged edition of the author's work by the same title, issued in 1902. It is a comprehensive "record of typical instances of American municipal progress." Emphasis is upon the social activities of the city, not upon the form of government. It is the best popular work in English for the aid of instructors who use laboratory methods in studying the modern city. It does for American cities what Frederic K. Howe's books have done for German cities. When visiting American cities hereafter I shall be tempted to take this book as my Baedeker or guide to their social activities. The book has an appendix, an excellent index, and also a well-classified, comprehensive, and valuable bibliography, the latter 66 pages in length.

I should change the arrangement of the material in part. In several instances the figures and information are at variance with my own notes on the subject. These I cannot verify because Mr. Zueblin seldom gives his sources. Mistakes are almost inevitable in such a mass of information. This book has some, e.g. (p. 354), the civic center proposed by the Chicago plan is not at the corner of Halsted and Twelfth streets, but at

Halsted and Congress streets. One wonders why some subjects are not considered, e.g., the noise nuisance; also why so little attention is given to some important subjects, as housing.

However, the merits of the book by this well-known publicist so far outweigh the slight criticisms that we may say it is one of the indispensable books for college classes and for all persons interested in municipal sociology.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The House on Henry Street. By LILLIAN D. WALD. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1915. Pp. xii+317. \$2.00.

The growth of this New York settlement is here humanly and interestingly related. It is incidentally a source of first-hand observations of the effect of American institutions upon our foreign population in a great city. The daily experiences of a practical social service worker revealed here are "social origins" of some of our most important social institutions, e.g., recreation, trade unions, social centers, public nursing, and widows' pensions. It is an exhibit of a neighborhood center in its varied activities for a New York East Side population.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Satellite Cities, A Study of Industrial Suburbs. By GRAHAM ROMEYN TAYLOR. New York: Appleton & Co., 1915. Pp. xix +333. \$1.50 net.

This interesting and readable book shows the results of the decentralizing of our population; the reasons for the movement of factories to the suburbs. The emphasis of the work is on the *people*, who go to work in the factories, and how they fare. Industry succeeds in these suburbs, but not so much can be said for the people. The human point of view is not lost sight of in the different chapters. The social and political life of the satellite cities is briefly examined and surveyed, but the author never forgets his theme—How have the people been benefited? He rightly wants the same thought, foresight, and constructive genius used for the suburb as has been used for the business. The chapter on the "Social and Political Life of the Suburb" is particularly interesting. It shows how the suburbs have been the scene of the science of city-planning and good housing to the workers. Not all satellite cities are studied, but certain types are

selected—Pullman, Gary, Norwood, Granite City, Fairfield, etc. These are briefly compared with English industrial suburbs.

The book is a clear, human study of the domination of business and property rights over the social rights in these new "satellites" thrown off from the city. It should be read by all interested in city-planning, housing, and the growth of suburbs. Captains of industry should read this book.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Social Heredity and Social Evolution. The Other Side of Eugenics.

By HERBERT WILLIAM CONN. New York. Abingdon Press, 1914. Pp. vi+348.

This is an unusual book for a biologist to write (the author is professor of biology in Wesleyan University), for it argues that civilization rests primarily upon acquired rather than upon inherited characters. Briefly, the central arguments of the book are that man's inherited equipment, consisting of his organic structure and activity tendencies or dispositions (instincts) which are predetermined in this inherited structure (pp. 281-82), does not raise him above the animal plane; while human civilization is the result of an ages-long process of heaping up and socially transmitting wealth and technique—acquired characters. "Human civilization is not present in the human ovum, nor is it present in the nervous system of the newly born infant" (p. 286). With the advent of the human animal there comes a new goal into the world of life (p. 310). "Social advance rather than organic advance has become the goal of evolution" (p. 322). The method of securing this advance has also changed from natural selection, operating among animals, to social selection, which dominates among men (p. 342). In fact, man often has to rely upon his acquired social traits to enable him to overcome some of his strongest animal instincts, so greatly has the direction and content of his evolution changed (p. 331).

If this interesting work were confined to the elaboration and support of this argument most sociologists would probably find themselves in hearty accord, for they have arrived at these conclusions before the biologists. But the secondary arguments of the book are not so free from objection, for in developing these the author in large degree weakens or even contradicts his main contention. His first difficulty arises from his attempt to account for the new or "social heredity" factor in evolution. Apparently he does not regard man's more highly developed

nervous system with its greater plasticity, his hand development, his upright position, and his vocal equipment as sufficient in themselves to account for the new method of advance, though he takes account of all these factors (pp. 289 and 335). Man's social superiority is due to his conscience or moral sense, he says, and this he thinks is a spontaneous variation (pp. 118-19) which reduces itself in origin to the "altruistic instinct," "which leads to the willingness of the individual to sacrifice his own interests" to those of society (p. 339). Social life, guided by this instinctive moral sense (p. 292), is further aided by two other helpful instincts, "the instinct to obey authority" (p. 122) and the "social instinct" which causes people to take pleasure in contacts. Though he has defined instincts as merely the "outward expressions of the structure of the nervous system" (p. 282), he does not explain how this moral attitude of altruism, which involves one neural mechanism in one act and another in a different act, could be inherited as an instinct or unit character in accordance with his own definition of instinct. Thus, after all, he reduces the fundamental determining fact of "social evolution" back to a trait in organic inheritance which, even if genuine, must have been of very doubtful value in the Darwinian struggle for survival. "Society is a superstructure, built by social inheritance upon a foundation laid by organic inheritance" (p. 300). Reasoning in this way he finds it necessary to distinguish between moral sense, or the "impulse to do the right," and moral codes or the concrete content of moral conduct and choice, holding that the former is instinctive and prior while the latter is acquired from custom, experience, and education (pp. 293, 295-96) and embodies the main achievement of civilization (pp. 288 ff.). But he fails to make clear how the native "impulse to do the right"—necessarily a highly abstract and generalized attitude as we apprehend it in the large, or a very concrete valuation when we are conscious of it as the moral measure of a specific act—could either appear independently of moral experience or could come prior to the acts upon which it constitutes evaluations. This difficulty, which he gives no sign of recognizing, would seem to destroy his theory of an innate or inherited sense of right. Why he should accept an undemonstrated biological hypothesis of conscience (thus blocking his own attempt to escape from biological determinism) when the experience or habit explanation of conscience is so much simpler and has the weight of psychological and sociological observations behind it may be explained in part (but not wholly) by his failure to distinguish between instinct and acquired habit, a confusion which is apparent on many pages (especially pp. 217, 282, 285, and 330).

His theory of the function and origin of conscience also leads him to a rather antiquated and superficial emphasis upon the conflict between egoism and altruism (pp. 249, 265). He thinks that civilization is dependent upon individuals sacrificing their own interests to those of others, an act which he conceives of as never dictated by intelligence but by religion (p. 343), which at times he appears to identify with the ethical nature and at other times with the fear of future punishment. "Logic alone never leads one to follow conscience" (p. 277). To religion he gives a dominant place in the development of the future (p. 343). His confusion on these points might have been cleared up in part by reconciling two of his own statements. One of these might be called his prime law of civilization: "Ethics sacrifices both the individual to society, and the present to the future" (p. 262). The other is, "The evident drift of social evolution is to give to each individual a larger share in the good things of this world" (p. 341). Evidently a reconciliation of these two statements must be based upon an appreciation of the mutual advantages of intelligent co-operation rather than upon the old pleasure-pain quantity theory implied in "altruism versus egoism."

Space is lacking for more than the mention of some of the other secondary traits of the book which will serve to indicate its general qualities. The author constantly speaks of the family as the primal group, and traces much of social evolution back to it (pp. 84, 141-42). He develops a superficial contrast between "patriarchal" or oriental and "communal" or occidental types of social organization (p. 155), which would seem to rest upon instinctive race traits rather than upon differences of economic and cultural environment. The Aryan race, he thinks, embodies most perfectly the communal type (p. 196). He has some difficulty in reconciling our tendency toward increasing social organization and control with liberty, but finally comes out on the side of organization and control without giving a wholly consistent explanation. Above all, the fact that social evolution is due to the accumulation and social transmission of acquired characters, and is therefore infinitely more rapid than slow-moving organic evolution, causes him to be very optimistic. "The future is full of hope," he says (p. 344). But he does not mention the fact that our civilization is largely dependent for the accumulation of its techniques upon our power and structural resources and that the conservation movement has not yet been able to do much to check their waste. Indeed, he does not make any considerable use of the influence of the material environment in his account of social evolution; it appears to have escaped him. In spite of the subtitle of the book he

has almost as little to say of eugenics. While he does not find eugenic control of evolution valueless, he holds that "under the complex conditions of society the prospects of improving the race along these lines is not very great" (p. 326), because social evolution is based primarily upon acquired characters.

It should be repeated that the main criticisms of this book fall upon the secondary arguments, though these are by no means always faulty. The main contention appears to be sound and in agreement with the best sociological thinking of the day. It is regrettable that the value of this very readable book should be so greatly diminished by lack of psychological and anthropogeographical information and sometimes by a failure to have analyzed arguments completely. But if the book had no other value it still would mark a distinct advance in the history of one field of thought, for it is the advance guard of an inevitable tendency of the biologists to venture beyond the study of the invertebrates and to become acquainted with the facts and methods of social evolution. And because of this significance it has seemed worth while to give so much space to an analysis of its arguments.

L. L. BERNARD

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RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Arts in a Mechanical Society.—What is the province of the arts and the handicrafts in a society based on machinery is a question that involves estimating mechanical production *per se*. The whole issue is forced into the limelight by the temporary abatement of artistic, poetic, and intellectual creativeness through mechanism's deadly bacchanals on the continent. When we are again released to create, what shall be the province of the creative? Man used to put himself into his work: he once created as he produced. No more so. Socialism is one protest, an organized protest of labor, against the ugliness and injustice of the mechanical order. Machinery has become master, not slave. The expressive, the personal, the artistic—and the joy of creating—have been crushed out of life. "Familiarity with standardized ugliness" has displaced the intimate quality in things made with one's own hands. The question is larger than simply economic: it is one of mind and soul, of personality, of how man is shaping his life! There is a good and a bad in machinery; the time has come to discriminate between them; and this discrimination lies in the province of the arts.—C. R. Ashbee, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1915. M. T. P.

Social Sciences in the Secondary Schools.—Underlying all theories of the function of education are the two chief ends, cultural or liberal, and economic or vocational. The former is hoary with prestige. The latter is coming to its own as a result of the recent enormous progress in the world of industry. Training for political competency has been subsumed under the cultural aim. However, the complexity of the social, political, and economic issues upon which the citizen is asked to vote demand that this function of education should be a third distinct and independent function. In practice, however, civics, economics, etc., are usually elective. Returns from high-school questionnaires and data gathered from community voting on economic questions reveal a dearth of intelligence upon practical social issues. Competent high-school teachers equipped to teach social sciences are wanting. The teaching of civics as such needs thorough revision. Present texts are inadequate. Supplementary magazine reading needs to be instituted along with visits to social institutions. A basic course in social science should be required of all high-school students prior to civics and economics. Finally, the various courses which touch on social life should be correlated throughout the elementary- and high-school courses, to inculcate the social point of view and social intelligence.—Howard T. Lewis, *School Review*, September, 1915. M. T. P.

Legal Theories and Social Science.—It is asked frequently and in earnest whether American law keeps pace with the changing character of American life. The question is aggravated by the contention of some that law is in no way dependent on social and philosophical science—a view that rests upon a number of theories which need rigid inspection. Foremost among them is the theory of the separation of governmental powers. This theory forgets that the original conception of law came from these other sciences. In governmental practice, moreover, the legislators exert executive and administrative powers; the executive makes laws; and the judiciary decides issues of a legislative and an executive nature. A higher lawlessness is the accompaniment of a theoretical anarchy of a government. The second foundation pillar of the theory of laws' independence is the phonographic theory of the judicial function. In epitome: "It is not within the judge's function or within his power to enlarge or improve or change the law." Yet actually our common law is the accumulating product of judicial enactment; our statute law is interpreted, expanded, contracted by judges,

regardless of the intention of the legislatures; and our constitutional law has actually, for the most part, been created by our courts in the interests, not of the tardy will of an uninformed public opinion, but of justice. This practice should be recognized, and the judiciary should logically be provided power and means to investigate scientifically the justice of the social theories underlying their decisions. Thirdly, our constitutionalized theory of natural rights brings social science and judicial decisions into conflict and introduces confusion into our judiciary. Legal theory and practice may better be avowedly creative than merely so in practice, and then be free to take cognizance of scientific social science.—Morris R. Cohen, *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1915. M. T. P.

The Practical Value of the Higher Education of the Negro.—The great bulk of the Negro race must devote its chief energy to cruder forms of service for as long a time in the future as we are able to foresee. So industrial education for the masses cannot well be overemphasized. But it should be remembered that the Negro is a human being as well as a utensil of service. Each of the ten million Negroes in the United States needs to improve his personal qualities and his social efficiency. In this work of raising the Negro both industrial and higher education are needed. The former pushes up from the bottom, the latter pulls from the top. Neither alone is sufficient. According to the latest available data the number of Negroes engaged in the higher callings and pursuits number about one-half of 1 per cent and it is to these that the race must look for leadership. The Negro must have a leadership within his own race. It is only through higher training that these leaders can be developed. As racial segregation increases, the demand for internal leadership increases. These leaders need the same kind and degree of training as is necessary for the other races. The function of the Negro college is to prepare leaders for the race. These leaders are necessary and the training of them is of just as much practical advantage to the Negro as it is that he be fed and clothed and housed.—Kelly Miller, *Education*, December, 1915. E. B. R.

Germany's Social Insurance during the War.—The three branches of the German social insurance, though severely strained at the beginning of the war, are now well adapted to meet the extraordinary conditions of war times. (1) Sickness insurance: The sudden fall in membership, due to the disorganization of industry at the outbreak of the war, made certain modifications necessary; in the first place, limiting sickness benefits to a period of 26 weeks; and, secondly, raising the membership fees to 4½ per cent of the member's gross wages. The reorganization of industry to meet war conditions has greatly increased the membership and placed this branch on a firm financial basis. (2) Accident insurance: At a meeting of representatives of the different insurance companies, in August, 1914, it was decided that war-risks, arising from the employment of unskilled men to take the place of those called to the colors, or from the employment of crippled soldiers, would be assumed and payable in full. It was further decided that, as a means of counteracting this tendency to the increase of accidents, every effort should be put forth to secure the enforcement of safety regulations. (3) Invalidity insurance: The German invalidity, old-age, and widow's insurance is borne by 41 insurance companies. The war has greatly reduced the receipts and increased the disbursements of these companies, yet, in addition to meeting these obligations in full, they have loaned and given millions of marks to different kinds of welfare work.—C. V. Bramsnaes, "Tysklands Socialforsikring under Krigen," *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift*, October, 1915. H. A. S.

Alcoholism and the Means of Combating It.—A statistical study of the consumption of alcohol under different systems of control reveals the efficacy of those systems. In Holland the limitation of the number of cabarets has been hardly at all effective in combating alcoholism. Those which remain do a larger business. The effect of high duties is hard to observe in France, but it seems that heavy revenues have lessened the consumption of distilled liquors and have not affected the use of wines. As wine is less harmful than stronger drinks, its substitution is preferable to their continued use. The suppression of small distilleries means lessened consumption and greater government revenues, because of better opportunity for supervision. The government

monopolization of the retail trade is another step in advance toward retarding the consumption of alcohol. The famous and successful Göttembourg system interdicts the retailing of liquors in rural regions. In the cities it monopolizes the business in the hands of a company which derives from the sales no real profit. Competition is eliminated. The cabarets are wholesomely conducted and unadvertised. The system has resulted in a great reduction of the use of liquor in Scandinavia. Absolute prohibition is a still more radical step the success of which is on trial.—Dr. J. Bertillon, *Revue d'hygiène*, September, 1915. C. C. C.

Sexual War Questions.—The great importance of the sexual side in war has been shown repeatedly in past wars. It is evident today. According to Neisser, Blaschko, and others a relatively high percentage of married men of the army have contracted sexual diseases. Neisser explains that sexual abstinence is more difficult for these men than it is for the unmarried men. This also applies to the married women and war widows at home. Conclusive evidence of this is the increase of illegitimate births and the increase in sexual neurosis, not only among women whose husbands are at the front, but even among women who have nothing to do with war. The great mortality of the war will add a million or more of the best women to the number who can never marry. Therefore the easier war regulations for marriage should be kept up, and motherhood, in and out of wedlock, generously protected. Furthermore, the veterans of the war, crippled or unwounded, should be first considered for official positions. Finally female state officials and others should be allowed to marry, especially where the wife will be the main support of the family. Illegitimate children should be cared for like others and the sting of bastardy entirely removed. The war will cause the rise of new social and moral values in these and other respects.—Henriette Fürth, "Sexuelle Kriegsfragen," *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, July, 1915. C. C. J.

The Evolution of Sexual Preference.—The subject is of particular interest for the glimpse that it gives of animal psychology and for its important influence upon the evolution of mankind. The claim that animals show no preference for their mates cannot be granted, principally for the reason that it leaves unexplained the aesthetic sense in the lower animals. It is to be remembered that the survival of a species is dependent upon the number of offspring which live rather than upon the number born. Consequently the animal that makes the wisest choice of a mate will produce the offspring with the greatest survival value. Certain points on an animal readily attract the attention of the other sex. If there be a correlation between these and general good health, the individual attracted by them will produce stronger children than will others. Rosy cheeks are generally associated with bodily health; strong-smelling breath with bad digestion or decayed teeth. The man who found the former attractive would have a survival value over the one attracted by the second. This survival would perpetuate the aesthetic feeling for rosy cheeks and tend to exaggerate the rosininess of cheeks. The selection which increased the perfection of the feature would presently decrease its value as an index. But it would still be perpetuated to a point where it becomes positively harmful. Man's intellectual development allows him to select a mate according to a conception of beauty rather than merely upon the presence or absence of certain points. The points have no importance except in relation to the whole. A further and a higher synthesis in sexual selection of mankind places character with or above beauty as an attraction. Progress in this direction is slow.—R. A. Fisher, *Eugenics Review*, October, 1915. E. B. R.

The Influence of Racial Admixture in Egypt.—The intermingling of peoples and the influence of their contact one with the other is a main problem in the tracing of the history of civilization. Egypt is exceptionally favorable for tracing the effect of the admixture of races. The records there are relatively complete, extend over a long period of time, and start with a nearly pure-blood race. The unmixed original population covered the long, tubelike valley of the Nile with the Negroids at the one extreme and the Mediterranean races at the other. Before the contacts with either of the preceding peoples the Egyptians had for centuries had all the elements of a civilization, but these elements they had not developed. They existed rather as germs than

as developed institutions. The increase in cranial capacity that came from an intermixture with the alien blood from Europe brought also the wonderful development in the Egyptian arts and crafts. The abounding prosperity and advance, again, that marked the Eighteenth and Nineteenth dynasties came with the influx of the Western Asiatics into Egypt and the intermixture with them. At the opposite end of the valley contact with the Negroids and the infiltration of Negro blood was a drag and a hindrance. There the native culture of Egypt was degraded just in the proportion that the influence of the dark races of the south made itself felt. Decline in culture was coincident with and proportional to the amount of Negroid intermixture. The contrast is most instructive and striking. The contact and intermixture with the virile whites from the north brought advance and momentous achievement; the contact and intermixture of the sensuous black race in the south retarded development and presently resulted in an actual loss of culture. The two streams of immigration still go on, but there is now little intermixture with the virile northern peoples while there is a continual infiltration of Negro blood into the Egyptian. The effect is seen in the singular lack of originality and slavish devotion to convention which are the outstanding features of the modern Egyptian and are the result, in part, of fifty centuries of Negro intermixture that has finally more than counterbalanced the infusion of virile northern blood which explained Egypt's achievements in the zenith of her power and influence.—G. Elliot Smith, *Eugenics Review*, October, 1915. E. B. R.

Custom and Morality.—Jhering has emphasized custom as an essential element of our culture, as though it had, not only a historical, but also an essentially moralizing and ethically bettering element. This overvaluation is not German, but Chinese, French, and English, and has led rather to a contamination of morality. In countries like England custom has overgrown everything, and the observation of custom has become the standard of valuation. Custom may be regarded in two ways. First, custom may be designatory, as the friendly greeting of a person is a designation of certain existing relations and valuations; it replaces a verbal explanation. Only in so far does custom receive a heightened importance and meaning. Secondly, in contrast to this, custom may be regarded as prescriptive, as for instance in the matter of the fashion in clothes, or of going to church, or of returning a visit. But custom, in this sense, has a deeper meaning or background only when it contains the expression of a moral feeling. The confusion of custom and morality has, in connection with the pseudo-philosophy of utilitarianism, reduced English society to a low level. German philosophy has saved, and will save us, from that.—Josef Kohler, "Sitte und Sittlichkeit," *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, No. 8, 1914-15. C. C. J.

The Fighting Instinct: Its Place in Life.—Universal peace can never be realized until both militant and pacifist find the same outlet for human activity that make for peace and progress. The pursuits of peace often develop the hardy virtues that war takes and utilizes. It is often claimed by the militarist that war is a biological and a sociological necessity. But it is possible to find an adequate educational substitute for war. The fighting capacity, developed in the long struggle of man with nature and animal life, is in no danger of dying out. It tends to accumulate rather than to diminish in the world. It needs to be directed and trained rather than to be increased. The effect of war is to deplete, not to strengthen, the physical vigor of a nation. It gives an opportunity for a display of heroism but does not develop it in those who do not already possess it. If heroes are to be developed, it must be done during their impressionable years. In this games are the superior means. The virtue of endurance so well developed in war is yet better developed in those games that require not only obedience but voluntary obedience. Play, in short, preserves and purifies the martial capacities while it diminishes the belligerent spirit. It insures to us the benefits of past wars while it removes the moral necessity of future wars.—George E. Johnson, *The Survey*, December 4, 1915. E. B. R.

The Psychology of Christian and Jewish Children.—The Christian and Jewish students of three schools of Vienna, a trade academy for boys, a *Realschule*, and a girls' trade school, were studied as to comparative intellectual ability. The age of the different pupils was not shown. The following results were obtained. The Jewish

children were generally less industrious, but they were more efficient in German, French, English, chemistry, physics, mathematics, stenography, business and legal studies than were the Christian children. They had better vocabularies and expressed themselves with much greater ease. The Christian children excelled in drawing, calligraphy, deportment, and gymnastic work. They had better powers of observation but less ability to think abstractly than the Jewish children. The results of the study point to a greater intellectual ability on the part of the Jewish children. Religion and race will produce difference in performance and natural ability. However, the Christians of Vienna are a mixture of Germans and Slavs. Adolescence among the Jews and Latins comes a year or two earlier than among Germans. For a fair comparison, therefore, an allowance of a year or more must be made. Hence, the greater intellectual ability observed is only "superripeness."—Dr. Ottokar Nemeček, "Zur Psychologie christlicher und jüdischer Schüler," *Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung*, August-September, 1915. C. C. J.

A Critical Résumé of Mass and Social Psychology.—Psychology has remained a psychology of the individual. There have been only a few attempts at a complete psychology of the plurality. Yet a psychology of the individual demands also a systematic psychology of the group. Wundt uses the term psychology of peoples and is its foremost expounder. He begins with the exchange process between two individuals and builds up from there. Mass psychology, according to him, takes a distinct problem of a group and begins to analyze the group soul. Sighele in Italy and Le Bon in France have done similar work. Wundt refuses to deal with the mutual influences of two or more persons and takes up only the soul structure of a greater mass. Sighele says that even the crime-committing mob is under definite laws, first, that of collective resistance and, secondly, that of increased feeling in the mass. The brain works in inverse ratio to the number present. Reason is paralyzed and feeling increases intensively and extensively. Tarde and Le Bon agree in part. Le Bon is convinced of the mental inferiority of the mass. Simmel says the undifferentiated mass has a low mentality. Association and memory processes work rapidly, feeling is predominant, and the non-resisting individual is swept along by common inclinations and collective reactions. A simple, clear goal and a short route from motive to reaction are required. The more general the effect in the crowd, the stronger is the force of such feeling. This adaptive quality of the mass is necessary for effective collective action. The universality of the two ideas stated above may be seriously questioned. One need but think of classrooms, or of bodies of learned men. It is unnecessary to recognize a mass soul apart from the individual souls present. Repetition, contact, and adaptation are the principal processes in the mass. Simmel looks for forms of socialization and tries to find their psychological basis and to analyze them historically. With increasing numbers in society individuality is increasingly developed. According to him the business of social psychology is to analyze those mutual influences which have led to the organization of such institutions as the family. Finally we may say there is no rivalry between social and individual psychology. They may be of help to one another. The sociologist looks at the permanent relations, the group psychologist at those of a temporary nature.—W. Moede, "Die Massen- und Sozialpsychologie im kritischen Überblick," *Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie und experimentale Pädagogik*, September, 1915. C. C. J.

Sociological Morality and the Crisis in International Law.—The present great crisis in international law existed in spirit before it manifested itself in events. What, then, was the relation of the existing sociological theories to the apparent failure of international law? International law has always been sustained by a technique and a morality, not by force. Briefly, its moral principles are: (1) there exists a universal moral law; (2) the treatment of weak states shall be the same as that of strong ones; (3) states shall submit to the law as do individuals; (4) war shall be a last extremity in the adjustment of difficulties. In order to be effective these postulates must have the support of an intellectual and social élite. And despite radical efforts of peace workers this support had weakened. The Darwinistic doctrine of universal struggle tended to promote the belief in the normality of war. The evolutionary theory conceives of different species of morality for different peoples. This is contrary to the

idea of a universal moral law upon which international law depends. The doctrine of social solidarity had formed the intellectual basis of the vague gropings of the pacifists, including sociologists from Comte to Norman Angell. But their efforts did not prevent the war. In truth the evolutionary or sociological doctrines as far as they lead to theories of the relativity of morals are only caricatures of science. Were they valid, international law could not be re-established. Now sociology should be a science, not a doctrine of morality. Persons who still believe in the efficacy of law should inquire how it may be extended from local to international relations. Law has regulated the relations of individuals, families, classes, and provinces; it will come to regulate the relations of nations. Gradually co-operation will become more extended through the influence of law, for the former depends on the acceptance of the latter. The basis of such a reorganization must be in morals; the science of sociology may give the historical account of the change but cannot produce it. For the latter the elementary fact is the interaction of persons; for morality the elementary fact is the accord of wills.—G. Richard, *Revue philosophique*, November, 1915. C. C. C.

How Our Soldiers Will Return.—What will be the social and political attitudes of our returned soldiers? To answer this question one must have a wide and intimate acquaintance with the men in the field. We have obtained such an acquaintance with respect to the religious, pacifist, and political ideas of the soldiers. The war has brought a return of traditional religious sentiment and behavior. This revitalization of what was a languishing state of mind in France can be traced to sociological and psychological causes. Wrenched from their homes and familiar social relations, the men in the armies found among their common points of contact thoughts of their loved ones. Religion offers to them all soothing visions and consolations. Again, amid the fears and shocks of warfare occasional quiet such as that furnished by the religious service is a desideratum. The emotional excitements of the soldier also prepare him to receive the religious ceremony. But the change in behavior is due to stress in military life and is external. Our soldiers have not been at heart miraculously converted, as the resumption of normal peaceful life will demonstrate. Respecting the soldiers' attitudes toward peace, while their courage and determination have increased, they no longer regard war as a form of sport. It is a grim affair. And while many scout the notion of ever insuring a permanent peace, all are desirous of guarding as much as possible against the event of another war. Political discussion is beginning to return after having been practically dropped at the outset of the war. Despite certain statements to the contrary, the faith in democratic institutions remains unshaken. A rigorous discipline is taken as a matter of course during the war, to be rejected at its cessation. Soldiers feel that the common sacrifices of all classes during the war will be followed by general good feeling between the powerful and the weak. Perhaps, but whether the heroic conduct of the poor classes now will permit their voices to be heard later is uncertain. In conclusion, we may expect no fundamental changes in France as a result of the war.—Georges Bonnet, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, August-September, 1915. C. C. C.

Energy of the Nation and Energy of Women.—The wounds that the war inflicts upon the nation will have to be cured through the women. The men at the front are now conscious of their acute struggle for existence. The surgeon, however, is quite conscious of such life-and-death struggles even in times of peace. The entrance of every new person into the world marks one of the bloodiest of battles, inflicting wounds at times fatal or crippling for life. The non-professional underestimates, if he ever observes at all, the great expenditure of energy, the strain, the fatigue, the hardships and dangers connected with the process of reproduction. This underestimation is a danger to the nation, for modern conditions force woman to compete on equal terms with man, but this is more than nature had intended for her. Man's share in reproduction begins and ends with impregnation, a process consuming but little of energy. But it is otherwise with woman. Even when woman renounces motherhood for the sake of self-support, she still cannot without endangering herself renounce her constant need of extra energy for maintaining herself in the proper state for the function of motherhood when opportunity for it shall present itself. The professional man considers the misuse and expenditure of woman's energy as the source

of her dissatisfaction and ill health. Our present knowledge is sufficient to warrant the statement that if we want to save the German nation from degeneration we must begin with the proper care of woman's energy. When we realize that reproduction is dependent upon woman's capacity for further growth and development, we may say that the reproductive period of woman represents, in a biological sense, the age of youth. Woman, therefore, can no more compete with man without injury to herself and the future generation than a child can without injuring his full development. We are becoming conscious of the evil effects of child labor and seek remedial legislation for it, but we are not conscious yet of the evil effects of woman labor.—Professor Dr. med. Hugo Selheim, "Volkskraft und Frauenkraft," *Umschau*, April 3, 1915.

A. M. B.

Midwives and Their Influence on Early Infant Mortality.—In the following review of deaths under one month in Jacksonville, Florida, for the past six years, I have attempted to suggest a line for further investigation. The great majority of these deaths were those of colored infants. In 63.63 per cent of all the deaths occurring in the first months of life, the birth-attendant was a midwife, and 140 deaths occurred between the fifth and twentieth days. That dangerous infections of any nature might be expected in the practice of these women, one familiar with their type will not doubt. They belong, for the most part, to the most ignorant class of negroes, many of them infirm through age and all governed by folklore and superstitions quite easily traceable to the East Coast of Africa. A favorite umbilical dressing consists of grated nutmeg and raisins, while lard or fat bacon is preferred by others. An approved prophylactic for stomatitis is the wiping out of the infant's mouth with one of its own soiled napkins, and the occurrence of tetanus is attributed to the fact that the mother cried out with her labor-pain. Of almost general belief is the danger attendant upon bathing the baby or mother, or changing the bedding, or even sweeping the room within nine days after birth. While ridiculous to relate, the tragic bearing of these beliefs and practices on early infant mortality must not be lost sight of.—C. C. Terry, *American Journal of Public Health*, August, 1915.

Z. T. E.

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FIFTY YEARS OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES (1865-1915)

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper will plot some of the principal points of departure from which to map the main movement of sociological thinking in the United States during the period indicated in the title. It will incidentally write into the sketch certain details of a semi-autobiographical character. It will serve, further, as an introduction to a subsequent paper to be entitled "The Sociological Categories," and in connection with the latter paper it will attempt to throw light upon open problems of methodology in the entire field of social science.

Referring to the second of these items, no excuses will be offered for rather liberal transgression of the conventionalities of impersonal writing. The years which I have spent in studying the social scientists of the last four centuries have lodged in my mind one indelible impression, viz., that nearly every one of these writers might have done more for the instruction of subsequent generations if each had left on record certain testimony from his personal knowledge, which he probably regarded as trifling and which his contemporaries would probably have pronounced impertinent, than

they did by writing much of a more pretentious nature which they actually transmitted. If each writer in the field of social science had also been a Pepys, or if he had been shadowed by a Boswell, the reasons why thinking in social science had meandered in the precise courses which it has followed might be much more evident than they are. So it has seemed to me more and more that one of the traits of developing historical sense should be increasing consideration for the historians of the future. One hundred, two hundred, three hundred years from now there will be students trying to trace back the evolution of social science. No one who has sifted the monograph material of a past period can doubt that, so long as the volumes of this *Journal* are legible, here and there a historian will search them for clues to interpretation of the period that produced them. Men now living might divulge many things which will never be discovered from mere review of technical treatises, without which the historical significance of the treatises will always be partially misunderstood. Who can read the earlier volumes of the *Edinburgh Review* or the *Westminster Review*, for instance, without being aware that, as no biography of the writers appears between the lines, some of the most instructive signs in what they wrote must be undetected? Accordingly I shall regard it as a duty rather than a liberty to set down certain matters of fact within my knowledge, and also to express certain frank judgments which, whether they prove to be more or less correct, may have a certain index value in the future. I am not without hope that others who have had larger shares in shaping the fortunes of the social sciences during the past generation may be moved to similar contributions.

Certain generalizations may serve as preface to the more concrete details to be scheduled in this paper.

In the first place, all history of science, if written wisely, is less history of what given individuals have thought than of why they have thought it; particularly that part of the reason why they have thought it which is to be found in the manner of thinking that was prevalent at the same time; and, furthermore, in particular occasions at the same time for reconsideration of current thinking. Perhaps more important than any individual's thinking is the kind

and degree of success which it had in getting other people to think the same thoughts.

Again, all history of science consists less of the record of discovery of absolutely new facts or truths at its transition points than of placing modified degrees and combinations of emphasis upon ideas long more or less familiar; or in finding new ways of connecting old ideas with accepted conclusions about physical, mental, or moral relations.

As a general rule, the gains involved in passing from one period of thinking to another, in any division of theoretical or applied knowledge, may be summed up in a very few words, so far as the mere matter of the verbal expression is concerned. The work which bulks largest in distinguishing the new period is, in the first place, the work of abstracting from a mass of ideas, partly more or less permanent, partly already obsolescent, a single idea, or a small group of ideas, which thereafter become a sort of insurgent body, accusing the old thought-complex of incorrectness or insufficiency; then, in the second place, it is the work of restating all the phenomena which fall within the range of the newly projected or newly emphasized idea or ideas in formulas or idioms which correspond with the new valuations called for by the insurgent forces.

Perhaps the most familiar illustration of the sort of change referred to in the last paragraph is the revolution which has taken place within the last twenty-five years, in all thinking about human experience, through shifting the emphasis from the assumed individual agent to the *group* in which persons are now seen to be subordinate factors. Our reference in this paper is always implicitly to this category, and it will come under direct discussion both in this paper and in the one to follow.

Once more, changes in types of thinking are likely to have as one of their marks a restless rhythm between concrete and abstract interests within the field immediately covered; between narrowly specialized interests in details and highly generalized interests in the largest possible theoretical or practical organization and control of the elements involved.

As a case in point we may cite the swing of interest, between the middle of the eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth,

from the writing of so-called universal history, and so-called philosophy of history, to the collection of evidence going into minute details about selected episodes of history, and the most microscopic textual, philological, psychological, and sociological criticism of this evidence.

Now these generalizations, not to schedule others, have been illustrated by the career thus far of American sociology. Instead of specifying instances at the outset, I shall try to outline the story of the American sociological movement in such a way that these generalizations will be confirmed. In short, like every other distinct thought-phenomenon, the American sociological movement was a child of its time. It was not an isolated, alien, detached curiosity. It was a part of the orderly unfolding of native conditions.

The fact is of like kind with the development of sociology in Europe. In my judgment it will be common knowledge some day that historians, economists, and particularly political philosophers toward the middle of the nineteenth century focalized attention upon questions which turned out to be the problems now called sociological. In other words, the course of thought in older divisions of social science led inevitably to the sociological phase of human problems.²

The connection between the earliest onsets of American sociological interest and movements of a kindred nature in Europe has never been very clearly made out. There is an opportunity here for investigation which, if successful, would amount to a notable piece of historical work. Not attempting, therefore, to go farther back, I find little room for doubt that one of the roots which produced American sociology found its nourishment in the soil that was broken up by our Civil War. Just as American development in agriculture may be traced in part to influences set free by that war, so it was with the thinking that later took shape as sociology. The limits of this sketch forbid examination of evidence on this point. Enough that some of the men whose thought-world had

² Cf. Small on Von Mohl and Ahrens, *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII, 457-59. In some respects more tell-tale than either of the authors referred to in the above passage is Treitschke, *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, published in 1859.

been stirred to its depths by the war found themselves in 1865 star-gazing in social heavens that had never before looked so confused nor so mysterious. To express a familiar judgment more literally: At the close of the war the intelligent people of the country were more sophisticated than at its beginning. They realized in part that the country was not the primitive, simple affair which it had been when all its inhabitants were pioneers. They had been jostled a good deal in the fondest of American illusions that a constitution and laws enacted in pursuance thereof would automatically produce human welfare. They became acutely aware that life in the United States was not altogether a success. They perceived more or less distinctly that work was ahead to bring American conditions into tolerable likeness to American ideals. Some of these men reacted to the situation by trying to understand it as theorists and philosophers. Emerson was far and away the most notable of this type. Yet Emerson could least of all be claimed as one of the producers of sociology—he certainly could not be credited with intentional and direct work to that end. He was an interpreter either of the individualistic or of the transcendental phases of life. The association of Americans, as a concrete actuality composed by the interaction of all Americans upon one another, never presented itself to him as a much more substantial reality than the dagger that Hamlet could not clutch. There can be little doubt that John Fiske's approaches to sociological problems in *Cosmic Philosophy* would have been less objective if no Civil War had occurred. Though our knowledge of the precise connections between Lester F. Ward's army experiences and his subsequent thinking is deplorably meager, yet it is incredible that he could have arrived at his breadth of world-consciousness in an environment as provincial as that of the United States would have remained for a long time without the upheaval of the sixties.

II. FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The first men to make an overt movement toward mobilizing the newly aroused social consciousness into an effort which turned out to be in the general direction of sociology were of a quite

different type from those just named. They have put on record a brief account of themselves, as they were understood by Franklin B. Sanborn, the man who more than any other for many years succeeded in keeping the movement in motion. The movement itself took shape under the title, the American Social Science Association.¹

In brief, the period 1865-85 in the United States was a time of benevolent amateurishness with reference to questions which have since been distributed among the historical, political, economic, sociological, and philanthropic divisions of positive social science. There were a great many Americans of the type represented by most of the members of the Social Science Association, who had more or less of the spirit which William G. Sumner held up to ridicule in variations of his dictum: "The type and formula of most schemes of philanthropy or humanitarianism is this: A and B put their heads together to decide what C shall be made to do for D."² There were also a considerable number of Americans who were teaching, in professorships and editorial chairs, more or less undiluted versions of the classical economics.³ There were only a

¹ For an outline of Mr. Sanborn's career see Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, title "Sanborn, F. B."

For an account of the origin of the Association, see Tolman, *American Journal of Sociology*, VII, 797.

At the meeting of the American Sociological Society in New York in 1909, President Finley of the Social Science Association asked a place on the program for what seemed to some of the persons present the swan-song of that venerable organization. It was a sort of autobiography composed by Mr. Sanborn. It may be found in the *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, IV, 16, and in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 591-95.

² *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, 1883, p. 123; cf. p. 112 *et passim*.

³ For convenience of reference a few details collated from the *American Encyclopedia of Biography* are noted here in connection with the following men of the earlier part of this period who made an impression beyond their immediate groups:

Henry C. Carey, b. Philadelphia, 1793, d. there, 1889. Educated as bookseller, entered his father's store at age of eight, remained there, pursuing his elementary studies in literature and learning the business till he was admitted as a partner in 1814. At the death of his father in 1821 he became the head of the publishing business of Carey & Lea, which for a time was the leading publishing concern of the country. In 1835 he withdrew from business to devote himself to political economy. He was originally a zealous advocate of free trade, but became convinced that real free trade with foreign countries was impossible, in the existing state of American industry, and that a period of protection must precede it. In this view, free trade is the ideal toward which we ought to tend, and protection the indispensable means of reaching it. He

small number of men who were trying to teach history,¹ and until the later years of the period still fewer who had been affected very much by the critical methods which had been developing in Germany since the first decade of the century. In political science the work of Francis Lieber at Columbia University stands out before our present retrospect as far and away more notable than any other factor in his field. Yet we must regard his work as chiefly a scattering of seed upon soil scantily prepared. The yield of his sowing has

has been ranked in the United States as the founder of a new school of political economy opposed to the rent doctrine of Ricardo and the Malthusian theory of population. (The career of List in this country and in Germany should be considered if the propriety of this reputation is in question.) Of Carey's writings the chief is: *Essay on the Rate of Wages, With an Examination of the Causes of the Difference of the Condition of the Laboring Population throughout the World* (1835). This monograph was reproduced in greatly expanded form under the title *Principles of Political Economy*, 3 vols. (1837-40). The best known of his later writings is *Principles of Social Science*, 3 vols. (1858-59).

Francis Wayland, b. New York City, 1796. President of Brown, 1827-55. *Elements of Political Economy* (1837); *ibid.*, abridged (1840).

Amasa Walker, b. Woodstock, New Hampshire, 1799, d. 1875. Common school education. Entered business in 1814. Withdrew from business in 1840. Lectured on political economy at Oberlin, 1842-48. In politics in Massachusetts. Annual course of lectures in political economy, Amherst, 1859-69. "Reformer." *Nature and Use of Money and Mixed Currency* (1857); *Science of Wealth, a Manual of Political Economy*, 8 editions (1866).

Francis Lieber, b. Berlin, 1800, d. New York, 1872. In Prussian army of 1815. Imprisoned as liberal after the war. Prohibited from studying in Prussian universities and went to Jena; persecuted there and in Halle. Took part in Greek revolution. One year in Rome as tutor to Niebuhr's son. After more persecution went to England in 1825, and then in 1827 to New York. Professor of history and political economy, University of South Carolina, 1833-56. Same chair in Columbia University, 1856-60. From 1860 to his death, professor of political science in Columbia University Law School. *Manual of Political Ethics*, 2 vols. (1838); revised by Theodore D. Woolsey 1875; *Civil Liberty and Self Government*, 2 vols. (1852); new edition adopted as text book at Yale (1874).

Arthur L. Perry, b. Lyme, New Hampshire, 1830. Graduated from Williams, 1852. Professor of history and political economy, *ibid.*, since 1853. Wrote editorials for *Springfield Republican* and *New York Evening Post*. Earnest advocate of free trade. *Political Economy* (1865); *Introduction to Political Economy* (1877).

Francis A. Walker (son of Amasa W.), b. Boston 1840, d. 1897. Professor of political economy and history in Sheffield Scientific School, 1873-81. President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1881-97. President of American Economical Association, 1885-97. *The Wages Question* (1876); *Money, Trade and Industry* (1879); *Land and Its Rent* (1883); *Political Economy* (1883).

¹ See below, p. 777.

never been very precisely estimated. His two chief works have doubtless influenced, in some degree, all subsequent teachers of the subject in the United States, but that influence has evidently been largely unconscious in notable cases.¹

¹ A year ago I tried to test this with the following well-known professors of political science: President Judson (Chicago) replied to my question, to the effect that at the time of his graduation from college (Williams, 1870) Lieber was known to him simply as author of the military regulations adopted during the Civil War. He did not, until some time later, get him into focus as a teacher of political science.

Professor Burgess (Columbia) wrote: "Lieber's books on *Political Ethics* and *Self-Government* first excited in me the desire to develop the study of the political sciences in the United States. These books were recommended to me by Professor Theodore W. Dwight, warden of the Columbia Law School, New York, about the year 1870. The fact that Lieber was a German had no small influence in sending me to Germany at that time to study these sciences. As you probably know, I became Lieber's successor at Columbia in 1876, and kept not only his memory but his works alive and active among the Columbia students. From Columbia chiefly his influence has radiated, but also from Yale, as Dr. Theodore Woolsey, former president of Yale, was a great disciple of Lieber. Lieber's name is perpetuated at Columbia by the professorship of political philosophy."

Professor John J. Halsey (Lake Forest) answered: "I have two distinct impressions of Francis Lieber. The first is through the original thirteen-volume *Encyclopaedia Americana* which he edited, and out of which I got a large part of my early education—reading a large portion of it topically before I went to college. The other is his great influence internationally through his *Instructions for the Guidance of the Armies of the United States in the Field*, issued in 1863, which have so largely shaped the conduct of war ever since."

Professor William W. Folwell (Minnesota) testifies: "I can say without the least hesitation that Lieber's influence on my thinking and teaching was very great. It is not easy, after so many years of retirement, to speak definitely of the *kind* of influence. Of course it enlarged my horizon and moderated views which might have gone to extremes. His employment of the historical method seemed to me admirable, especially in the *Civil Liberty and Self-Government*. Of all Lieber's writings known to me, that which lingers strongest in my memory is his *General Orders*, No. 100, 1863, which was the basis of my teaching in one branch of international law. I believe you are doing an important service in reviving interest in Lieber."

Professor Jesse Macy (Iowa College) is less emphatic. He says: "As to Francis Lieber, I have a dim recollection of having years ago read some of his writings with a feeling of surprise that he was not more often quoted and more fully recognized. Since then he has almost entirely passed out of my mind. I have probably gone on using impressions derived from Lieber without giving credit or without a knowledge of their source. If I were called upon now to pass an examination in Lieber it would be a blank failure. Not one distinct idea can I recall. I have written this without doing anything to refresh my memory, as this is my understanding of the object of your question."

My own personal testimony is that my undergraduate course was in a small New England college into which at the time no political theory of any sort had made its way,

It may some day be possible to reconstruct the history of social science in general in the United States, and of sociology in particular, in a strict chronological order. I confess that I do not see a way clear to map out even the sociological part of the development in precise conformity with temporal succession. Fully to make out the relations of cause and effect, it would be necessary in the first place to evaluate the activities of the American Social Science Association between 1865 and 1885. For this purpose more impartial judges would be desirable than its early or surviving members on the one hand, or on the other hand members of the sociological group, who never felt drawn to that pioneer body. The publications of the society are of course the most authentic evidence as to the quality of its work.¹ It represented humanitarian sentiment more distinctly than a desire for critical methodology. It belongs rather among philanthropic and patriotic programs than in the course of strictly scientific development. It may be dismissed from our consideration then with this brief reference; and our attention must turn to a more direct antecedent of the sociological movement proper.

III. THE ORGANIZATION OF INSTRUCTION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES²

Until 1876, there was absolutely no instruction in social science in this country which could by any stretch of the imagination be called "advanced."³ With the exception of an occasional instructor except that which might occasionally emerge in unrecognized shape in the course of grammatical construction of the classics. In my Senior year (1875-76) the president, Dr. Henry E. Robins, nearly precipitated a revolution in the faculty by smuggling into his instruction in "Mental and Moral Philosophy" a short course based on Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, and another with Wayland's *Political Economy*, as the chief book of reference. In connection with one of these courses Dr. Robins put me on the track of Lieber's two major works. They were to me oases in the desert. They helped me to consciousness of my intellectual interests. They were distinct factors among the impulses that sent me to Germany three years later, and I have frequently recurred to them meanwhile as samples of the spirit in which social problems should be studied, rather than as direct sources of social doctrine.

¹ See note on Tolman, *supra*, p. 726.

² The paper already referred to by Mr. Frank L. Tolman (*American Journal of Sociology*, VII, 797), entitled "The Study of Sociology in Institutions of Learning in the United States," laid the foundations for a history of the movement.

³ See Giddings and Tenney, "Sociology," in *Cyclopedia of Education*, V (1913).

who was "inspirational" to a high degree, all the persons who were supposed to teach anything now regarded as within the range of the social sciences were going through the most elementary type of classroom program, guided by the crude textbooks then available. The opening of Johns Hopkins University in 1876 marked the beginning of a new academic era in this country, and this general transition affected the social sciences along with all other departments of knowledge.

Yet it cannot be said that the social sciences had a development at Johns Hopkins commensurate with that of the physical sciences. Nevertheless, with fewer men and inferior equipment, the Hopkins workers in the field of social science made an impression which is still felt throughout the United States and beyond. The whole range of subjects now distributed through what is known at the University of Chicago as "the social science group"¹ was within a single department at Baltimore. That department had the title "History and Politics." Its outlook has never been symbolized better in a brief formula than in the aphorism quoted from the historian Freeman and emblazoned on the wall of the principal lecture-room of the department, called "The Seminary Room," viz.: "History is past politics, and politics is present history."

No adequate account of the early years of this department is available. Its main dynamo was Herbert B. Adams, the head of the department.² Richard T. Ely did not begin his career there as instructor in economics until 1881. He remained until 1892, when he became head of the Department of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin.

In his collection of papers under the title *The Launching of a University* President Gilman has only this paragraph (p. 117) bearing directly on the department of history and politics:

In history and politics many able students were soon assembled, under the inspiring leadership of Herbert B. Adams, whose instructions were reinforced in economics by Dr. Richard T. Ely. The instructors and the students made

¹ This proposition does not refer to the more elastic sense in which for certain purposes that phrase is used to include philosophy, psychology, and education.

² See Professor Jameson's appreciation in paper cited below p. 776-78.

investigations especially in the domain of American institutional history, which were printed in successive numbers of a series entitled "Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Politics." These papers were widely circulated, and attracted so much attention that persons connected with other institutions offered their contributions. The long series published under this title constitutes one of the most important works of reference for those who would become acquainted with the development of American institutions. The allusions to its value by Professor Freeman and by John Fiske are not to be overlooked.

President Gilman might have added that the series was of evident service to Mr. James Bryce, when he was collecting the material for *The American Commonwealth*.

One whose memory reaches back into the seventies might easily yield to the temptation to linger at this point for personal reminiscences illustrating the sterility of academic activities in general at this period throughout the field of the social sciences. I will restrict myself to brief notice of certain waymarks about which more information is within easy reach, with the addition of two or three contributions from my own experience.¹

While there can be no doubt that the establishment of the Department of History and Politics at Johns Hopkins deserves to stand as the inauguration of critical as distinguished from elementary study of social science in the United States, yet it is equally evident that this development was itself an effect of causes which manifested themselves in various ways during the previous decade. Incidentally the query may be raised as to the extent to which Mr. Gilman himself, while teaching geography at Yale, was

¹ In recording the fact that he was one of the disappointed applicants for a fellowship in history and politics at Johns Hopkins in its opening year, the present writer wishes furthermore to confess that his college course had qualified him for no registration beyond courses I and II in history and economics in an undergraduate sequence.

Not all American college graduates at the time were necessarily as naïve with reference to those particular subjects, but only the larger institutions had begun to offer enough instruction to carry students beyond beggarly elements. I am moved to confess also that my abiding respect for Johns Hopkins is in large measure due to the further fact that the fellowship which I did not get in 1876 was awarded to Henry C. Adams.

Incidentally it may be remarked that Professor Adams' monograph entitled *Relation of the State to Industrial Action*, published in the "Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Politics" in 1880, has stood the test of the intervening years, and that it may still be cited as containing the fundamental principles of adaptation between individualistic and collectivistic ideals.

already breaking ground for the sort of study of the humanities which was about to begin.

Because of his connection with sociology in particular, it will not be out of place to schedule at this point, and as a sign of promise in the field of academic instruction in the social sciences, the career of William G. Sumner.¹ Without implying a judgment upon the question touched upon in the last two references in the previous note, Professor Sumner's priority in the sociological field may be referred to as incidental to the more general fact of awakening academic interest in social science.² Professor Sumner's course in sociology, announced in 1876, seems to have been withdrawn during the years 1880-85, and to have reappeared in 1885-86, or at the beginning of President Dwight's administration.³

¹ B. 1840, graduated from Yale, 1863, d. 1910. Studied at Göttingen and Oxford. Tutor at Yale, 1866-69. Ordained in Episcopal church and was assistant rector in New York City, 1869-72. From 1872 until his death "professor of political and social science" at Yale. *History of American Currency*, 1874; *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, 1883. See account of Sumner by Keller, *Popular Science Monthly*, XXXV 1889, reprinted in *The Challenge of Facts*, p. 3. Cf. Walker, "Note on Sumner," *American Journal of Sociology*, XX, 829.

² I am indebted to my colleague, Dr. C. H. Walker, for the information that light is thrown upon the status of sociology at Yale at this early period by an article entitled "Sociology and Theology at Yale College," *Popular Science Monthly*, XVII (June, 1880), 268-69.

³ Professor Sumner rather early acquired the rank of a Yale tradition. Several of his students have told me that in their day he was lecturing on what might be described as *the sort of opinions that ought to be held on things in general by a Yale man*. They added that no one was supposed to have "done" Yale as a gentleman should, without having taken at least one course with "Billy" Sumner.

Professor Sumner's place in American sociology has not yet been permanently assigned. At present he represents to the sociologists at large a curious double personality—the author of *Social Classes* at one extreme, and the author of *Folkways* at the other. His pupil, Dr. A. G. Keller, now his successor at Yale, is editing Professor Sumner's papers, and it is to be hoped that he will be able to interpret the author in such a way that students of the history of sociology a century hence will see him in a different perspective from that in which he appeared to his contemporaries—either close at hand or from a distance.

One of the frank utterances of which I was thinking in the opening paragraph of this paper (p. 721) is in point here. To this day I have not succeeded in thoroughly revising the opinion I formed of Professor Sumner while reading his *Social Classes* shortly after it appeared in 1883. It came to me consequently as a surprise and a shock that he was thought of as second president of the American Sociological Society.

As especially notable symptoms of this awakening, in the spirit to be sure of the "social science" as characterized above,¹ reference should be made first to the recommendation of President White of Cornell, in 1871, as to "a course of practical instruction calculated to fit young men to discuss intelligently such important social questions as the best methods of dealing practically with pauperism, intemperance, crime of various degrees and among persons of different ages, insanity, idiocy, and the like,"² It was not until 1884 that President White's suggestion resulted in the authorization at Cornell of a course on the subjects specified. It was given by Mr. Frank B. Sanborn.³

Further notable evidence that a new ferment was at work in the academic mind is contained in a suggestion by Professor Peirce of Harvard in 1878.⁴ Without suspecting at the time that I was qualifying myself to give first-hand evidence a generation later upon the question whether this and other seed-thoughts about the social sciences had borne fruit at Harvard, I went to Cambridge in the spring of 1888 to find out for myself what was going on in the way of graduate study of the social sciences. For seven years I had been occupying what Dr. Holmes called a "settee," from which I attempted to give instruction covering the whole range of the social sciences. I had been voted a leave of absence for one year, and was eager to get into the company of men who were trying to develop critical methods along the lines of my chief interests. I

At that time (1907) he was not within my field of vision as even nominally a sociologist. I had forgotten that he had by implication referred to himself as a sociologist in the book which still seems to me a moving picture of what a sociologist should not be. I have never been able to satisfy myself as to whether, or in what degree, Professor Sumner in later years changed his attitude toward problems of social improvement. I have been unable to rid myself of the impression that, on the side of social initiative, he remained the American echo of *laissez faire* as represented in England by Herbert Spencer. On the other hand, his book *Folkways* is on a scientific level even higher above the *Social Classes* than Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology* is above the plane of *Man vs. The State*.

¹ Tolman, note 1, p. 726.

² Tolman, *op. cit.*, p. 800.

³ For details, see Tolman, *ibid.*, p. 803.

⁴ See Tolman, *ibid.*, and Sanborn, "The Threefold Aspect of Social Science in America," *Journal of Social Science*, XIV, 26.

was introduced to Professor Peirce, as "Dean of the Faculty of the Graduate School." I stated my errand, and he seemed very much embarrassed. After some hesitation he began to expatiate upon the resources of the library. I told him I had some appreciation of a library, but that I wanted to get into the company of men who were more alive than books. Presently he confessed that, so far as he was aware, no work was carried on in my subjects at Harvard except in courses planned for undergraduates. He advised me, however, to confer with Professor MacVane of the history department. I did so, and he reluctantly confirmed Professor Peirce's statements.

It is an evidence of the state of academic publicity at the time, that I was much better acquainted with men and programs in the German universities than I was with other American institutions of higher learning. It was one of the most fortunate "accidents" of my life that at this time one of my colleagues was an enthusiastic alumnus of Johns Hopkins.¹ Although not directly acquainted with the social science field, he stimulated my interest in Johns Hopkins to such an extent, particularly by putting into my hands Dr. Ely's little book, *Problems of Cities*, that I went to Baltimore for the academic year 1888-89.

Although Dr. G. Stanley Hall had been lost to the Department of Philosophy, and Dr. Jameson had just resigned from the Department of History, I found a company of graduate students in the Department of History and Politics in number and character combined probably never surpassed in an American university. Their eagerness, breadth, and intelligence in the pursuit of knowledge, together with the leadership of the instructors in the same spirit, constituted an almost ideal academic environment. The men whom I remember gave credible promise of the usefulness which they later achieved. Amos G. Warner had just received his Doctor's degree, and was a sort of connecting link between the graduate students and the faculty. He had already begun the work which made his brief life memorable. Woodrow Wilson was also a recent graduate, and his visits to the seminary contributed to

¹ Dr. W. S. Bayley, now professor of geology, University of Illinois.

the stimulus with which it was charged. It is enough to mention without further comment names of members of that seminary whom I recall:

C. M. Andrews, professor of history, Yale University; J. William Black, professor of history, Colby College; F. W. Blackmar, professor of sociology and economics, University of Kansas; Jeffrey R. Brackett, director of School for Social Workers, Boston; John R. Commons, professor of political economy, University of Wisconsin; John H. Finley, state superintendent of education, New York; ex-president of Knox College, College of City of New York; Robert J. Finley, deceased; Douglas H. Gordon, vice-president of Baltimore Trust Company; Charles H. Haskins, professor of history, Wisconsin and Harvard universities; Toyokichi Iyenaga, lecturer and adviser of Japan Society, New York; Charles D. Lanier, business manager of *Review of Reviews*, New York; J. H. T. McPherson, professor of history, University of Georgia; Colyer Meriwether, teacher, Business High School, Washington, D.C.; W. B. Shaw, associate editor of *Review of Reviews*; Sidney Sherwood, became associate professor of economics, Johns Hopkins University (died 1901); Charles Lee Smith, professor of history, William Jewell College; president of Mercer University, Georgia; now in business, Raleigh, North Carolina; F. W. Spiers, professor of political economy, Drexel Institute and Swarthmore; editor of *Book Lovers Magazine* (died 1905); Bernard C. Steiner, librarian of Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore; Andrew Stephenson, professor of history, DePauw University, to 1913; William Howe Tolman, director of New York Museum of Safety and Sanitation; F. J. Turner, professor of history, Wisconsin and Harvard universities; J. M. Vincent, professor of history, Johns Hopkins University; S. B. Weeks, specialist in United States Bureau of Education; J. Leroy White, capitalist, Baltimore; W. K. Williams, teacher (died 1897); J. A. Woodburn, professor of history, Indiana University.

Before 1892, Columbia College, as it was then called, had scarcely been visible on my horizon. It was at Columbia, however, that the first comprehensive prospectus of social science was published, in accordance with a resolution passed by the trustees of Columbia College, June 7, 1880.¹ This action established the "School of Political Science," which presently occupied one of the most commanding positions in the United States in the whole field of the social sciences. On the personal side, Professor John W. Burgess was the chief impulse behind this enterprise, but I doubt if it would ever have become much more than a dream in his brain

¹ See Tolman, *op. cit.*, p. 805.

if the tremendous stimulus in Baltimore had not disturbed the sleeping giant in New York.¹

For reasons that will presently be stated more in detail, it is in accordance with historical perspective to reproduce Professor Burgess' program almost in full. The Columbia catalogue issued in May, 1892, as a prospectus for the year 1892-93, has the following statement (Part V, p. 3):

PURPOSES OF THE SCHOOL

The School of Political Science was opened on Monday, the fourth day of October, 1880.

The faculty aims to give a complete general view of all the subjects of public polity, both internal and external, from the threefold point of view of history, law and philosophy. The prime aim is therefore the development of all the branches of the political sciences. The secondary and practical objects are:

- a) To fit young men for all the political branches of the public service.
- b) To give an adequate economic and legal training to those who intend to make journalism their profession.

¹ John W. Burgess, b. Tennessee, 1844, A.B., Amherst, 1867. Admitted to bar, 1869. Professor of English literature and political economy, Knox College, 1869-71. Studied history of public law, and political science, Göttingen, Leipzig, Berlin, 1871-73. Professor of History and Political Science, Amherst, 1873-76. Since 1876 Professor of Political Science and constitutional law at Columbia. Chief books: *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, 2 vols.; *The Middle Period: The Civil War and the Constitution*, 2 vols.; *Reconstruction and the Constitution*.

Mr. Tolman (*op. cit.*, p. 804) quotes from Professor H. B. Adams' *Study of History in American Colleges and Universities*, as follows: "Professor Burgess was largely instrumental in the discovery of the European world of history and politics which was to the scholastic mind of young Amherst a real renaissance. It was the opening of a new hemisphere of thought and culture. Students began to appreciate that the world is truly round. An unusual number of graduates in 1874 (the first class taught by Professor Burgess) went to Europe for study and travel. Individual Amherst students had indeed gone to Germany before this time to study natural science, and some, quickened by the same personal influence which doubtless first moved Professor Burgess, went to study history and political science. The students of Professor Burgess went to Berlin in shoals. They went in such numbers that they began to be called 'The Burgess School.' They all went to hear Droysen lecture; and came home with trunks full of Droysen's *Preussische Politik* and of the writings of Leopold von Ranke. Not all of these young men have since become historians; but none of them are the worse for their travels. Some are extremely clever fellows, and have practiced law and politics with considerable success. A few developed qualities suited to academic life; and from the chosen few Professor Burgess has gathered recruits for the School of Political Science now to be described."

c) To supplement, by courses in comparative law and jurisprudence, the instruction in private municipal law offered by the Faculty of Law.

d) To educate teachers of political science.

To these ends courses of study are offered of sufficient duration to enable the student not only to attend the lectures and recitations with the professors, but also to consult the most approved treatises upon the political sciences, and to study the sources of the same.

Young men who wish to obtain positions in the United States civil service—especially in those positions in the Department of State for which special examinations are held—will find it advantageous to follow many of the courses under the Faculty of Political Science. Some of the subjects upon which applicants are examined are treated very fully in the curriculum of the school. Thus, extended courses of lectures are given on political geography and history, diplomatic history and international law, government and administration.

Full opportunity is given in the School of Arts for the study of the principal modern languages, and all the courses in that school are open to the students of the School of Political Science.

It is evident from a later paragraph that at the beginning the School of Political Science at Columbia was, as a matter of fact, principally an arrangement of courses for the Senior year in college. It is not clear whether, in 1880, the trustees had any definite purposes with reference to strictly graduate courses. I suspect that Professor Burgess looked farther ahead than the trustees did, and was an opportunist with reference to development. It appears from the catalogue that in 1892 the plan was for students to begin at the opening of their Senior year the curriculum indicated below, and to arrive at their doctorate three years later, i.e., after two years of graduate work.¹

A rather full abstract of the plan of instruction in the Columbia School of Political Science, as it was projected in 1892, is subjoined.

¹ In this program for the academic year 1892-93 the following were scheduled as members of the Faculty of the School of Political Science: Seth Low, president; John W. Burgess, professor of history, political science, and constitutional law, dean of the faculty; Richmond Mayo-Smith, professor of political economy and social science; Monroe Smith, professor of Roman law and comparative jurisprudence; Frank J. Goodnow, professor of administrative law, secretary of the faculty; Edwin R. A. Seligman, professor of political economy and finance; John Barrett Moore, professor of diplomacy and international law; Herbert L. Osgood, adjunct professor of history; William A. Dunning, adjunct professor of history and political philosophy.

Besides these there were scheduled five "lecturers," including one "assistant" in economics. It does not appear that these five were expected to play an important rôle as teachers.

It may seem at first glance like any other advertisement of intellectual goods for most of which most students today have little use. That ought not to be the effect upon any student of the history of sociology. The Columbia scheme of study in social science is certainly the best considered, most comprehensive, and most coherent attempt up to that time in the United States to organize team-work in the social sciences so as to cover all the ground which needs to be surveyed in that field. The attempt exhibits strong if not completely adequate apprehension of those underlying relations which it has fallen to the sociologists more actively to represent—viz., the phenomena of the *interconnections* of all human activities, and the consequent interdependence of all divisions of intellectual procedure aimed at understanding of these activities. The outline is the first respectable attempt of a group of academic men in the social sciences in the United States—or anywhere else so far as I know—to organize themselves as co-operative expositors of the principal phenomena of human life in such a way that their combined work would afford a rationally systematized view of modern civilization in its purposes, its technique, its results, and its open problems. This attempt was sure to pave the way for a *criticism* of the underlying conceptions on which this whole co-ordination was projected. That is, it stimulated the inevitable demand for general sociology, while it is questionable whether a single individual in the Columbia group in 1892 had a distinct perception that such a demand was involved, still less that he was helping to create it.¹

Meanwhile, I have for several years past recommended to my graduate students that they take to heart this Columbia survey as a fair indication of the field of knowledge with which every man who intends to work in the social science field ought to be acquainted in such fashion as a beginner is acquainted with anything. Such basic acquaintance with the whole field is the only proper preparation for specialization in any part of the field. With the addition of the sociological courses in the following years, this Columbia

¹ Possibly the association at that time between Professor Mayo-Smith and Professor Giddings had already been so significant that some modification of this statement would be necessary if the whole situation were to be explained.

conspectus marks an ideal by which it would be salutary for every specialist in the social sciences occasionally to test his mental vision. With certain abbreviations the prospectus is as follows:

I. HISTORY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

A. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

The student is supposed to be familiar with the outlines of European history, ancient and modern. Students who are not thus prepared are recommended to take the undergraduate courses in mediaeval and modern history. The courses of historical lectures are as follows:

1. *General political and constitutional history.*—This comprehends in detail: a view of the political civilization of imperial Rome; the history of the development of the government of the Christian church into the form of papal monarchy; the overthrow of the imperial system and the establishment of German kingdoms throughout Middle, Western, and Southern Europe; the character and constitution of these kingdoms; the conversion of the Germans to the Christian church, and the relations which the Christian church assumed toward the Germanic states; consolidation of the Germanic kingdoms into the European empire of Charlemagne; character and constitution of the Carolingian state; its disruption through the development of the feudal system and the independent hierarchic church, and division into the kingdoms of Germany, France, and Italy; character and history of the feudal system as a state form; re-establishment of the imperial authority by the reconnection of Germany with Italy; conflict of the Middle Ages between church and state; the political disorganization and papal despotism resulting from the same; the development of the absolute monarchy and the reformation; the limitation of absolute kingly power and the development of constitutionalism; and lastly the realization of the constitutional idea of the nineteenth century. Four hours a week, first session. Professor Osgood.

2. *Historical and political geography.*—The purpose of this course is to give a description of the physical geography of Europe, to point out the various sections into which it is naturally divided, to trace the territorial growth of modern European states, and to describe the geographical and ethnic conditions of the present states of the European continent. One hour a week. Professor Goodnow.

3. *The political and constitutional history of England.*—The object of this course is to trace the growth of the English constitution from the earliest to the present times, dwelling upon foreign relations during periods when they had an important influence. . . . About the beginning of the nineteenth century, and largely in consequence of the industrial revolution, the democratizing of the constitution began. The account given of the development of this tendency closes with the Reform Bill of 1832. The work of the first term will close at

1640. The history subsequent to that date will be treated during the second term. Two hours a week. Professor Osgood.

4. *The relations of England and Ireland.*—In a general way, the Irish question has been the question of imposing upon the last and most persistent remnant of the old Celtic race the Teutonic ideas and institutions that have been developed in England. Three phases of the process are clearly distinguishable in history—the political, the religious, and the economical. It is designed in the lectures to follow out in some detail the modifications in the relations of the two islands affected by the varying prominence of these different phases. . . . One hour a week, first session. Professor Dunning.

5. *Political and constitutional history of the United States.*—This course of lectures covers the history of the Colonies and of the Revolutionary War; the formation and dissolution of the confederate constitution; the formation of the Constitution of 1787; and its application down to the Civil War: the changes wrought in the Constitution by the Civil War, and the resulting transformation of the public law of the United States. Four hours a week, second session. Professor Burgess.

6. *Political history of the Colonies and of the American Revolution.*— . . . Four hours a week, one session. Professor Osgood.

7. *The United States during Civil War and Reconstruction.*—The object of this course is to describe the constitutional principles which came into play during the period from 1860 to 1877. . . . Two hours a week, second session. Professor Dunning.

8. *Political history of the state of New York.*—The purpose of this course is to give a knowledge of the constitutional development and political history of the state of New York, beginning with the foundation of the colony by the Dutch and extending to the present time. It gives a brief account of the condition of the colony of New York, and the constitution of its government; then of the constitution made in 1777, and of each of the constitutions of 1821 and 1846, the amendments of 1875, together with the conventions in which each of these constitutions was made; also the history of political parties in the state of New York, showing their particular relation to these constitutions, and showing finally the methods of procedure, or "practical politics" of other states, and of the great national political parties. . . . One hour a week. Mr. Whitridge.

9. *Charter and political history of New York City.*—This course treats of the relations of the city to the state, showing the growth of municipal independence. The early charters conferred but few rights on the city, the selection of the most important city officials being made at Albany. Tammany Hall has been the most important and powerful party organization. A brief history of the Tammany organization, its rulers, and its method of nominating public officers will be given. The "Tweed Ring" and the efforts to purify city politics since its downfall will be described, including the reform charter of 1873, the amendments of 1884, the report of the Tilden Committee of 1875, and

of the Roosevelt and Gibbs investigating committees. One hour a week, first session. Dr. Bernheim.

B. LEGAL HISTORY

1. *History of European law.*—

Book I. Primitive law.

Book II. Roman law.

Book III. Mediaeval law.

Book IV. Modern law.

Two hours a week. Professor Monroe Smith.

2. *History of diplomacy.*—Two hours a week, first session. Professor Moore.

3. *History of American diplomacy.*—Two hours a week, second session. Professor Moore.

4. *Diplomatic history of the United States during Lincoln's and Johnson's administrations.*—One hour a week, second session. Dr. Bancroft.

C. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Every people known to history has possessed some form, however vague and primitive, of political government. Every people which has attained a degree of enlightenment above the very lowest has been permeated by some ideas, more or less systematic, as to the origin, nature, and limitations of governmental authority. It is the purpose of this course to trace historically the development of these ideas, from the primitive notions of primitive people to the complex and elaborate philosophical theories that have characterized the ages of highest intellectual refinement.

Book I, after a short survey of the theocratical system of the Brahmins and the rationalistic doctrine of Confucius, treats mainly of the political philosophy of Greece and Rome, with especial attention to the profound speculations of Plato and Aristotle.

Book II discusses the political doctrines of early Christianity and the Christian church, with the controversy of Papacy and Empire, and the elaborate systems of St. Thomas Aquinas and his adversaries.

Book III treats of that age of renaissance and reformation in which Machiavelli and Bodin, Suarez and Bellarmini, Luther, Calvin worked out their various solutions of the great problem, how to reconcile the conflicting doctrines of theology, ethics, and politics.

Book IV covers the period of modern times, as full of great names in political philosophy as of great events in political history. Here are examined the doctrine of natural law, as developed by Grotius and Puffendorf, the doctrine of the divine right of kings, with its corollary of passive obedience, as in Filmer and Bossuet, the theory of the constitutionalists, Locke and Montesquieu, the idea of social contract, made most famous by Rousseau, and the various additions to and modifications of these doctrines down to the present day. Two hours a week first session, three hours second session. Professor Dunning.

II. PUBLIC LAW AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE

A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. *Comparative constitutional law of the principal European states and of the United States.*—Comprehending a comparison of the provisions of the constitutions of England, United States, France, and Germany, the interpretation of the same by the legislative enactments and judicial decisions of these states, and the generalization from them of the fundamental principles of public law, common to them all. Three hours a week, December to March. Professor Burgess.

2. *Comparative constitutional law of the several commonwealths of the American Union.*—In this course of lectures comparison is made in the same manner of the constitutions of the forty-four commonwealths of the Union. Dr. Bernheim.

3. *International law.*—This course treats of the general principles of international law, as it has been developed by positive agreement, in the form of treaties and conventions, and by common usage, as shown in legislation, in the decisions of international tribunals and of municipal courts, and in the conduct of nations. The rules thus discovered are discussed in the light of the principles of reason and justice as scientifically presented by writers on international law, and an effort is made to trace the systematic establishment of the rules which govern intercourse among nations at the present day. Two hours a week. Professor Moore.

4. *Conflict of criminal law, extradition and nationality.* . . . Two hours a week, second session. Professor Moore.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1. *Comparative administrative law of the United States and the principal European states.*—[Long description omitted.] Two hours a week. Professor Goodnow.

2. *The law of municipal corporations.*—[Description omitted.] Two hours a week, first session. Professor Goodnow.

3. *The law of taxation.*—[Description omitted.] Two hours a week, second session. Professor Goodnow.

C. ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE

1. *Institutes of Roman law.*—One hour a week. Professor Monroe Smith.

2. *Systematic jurisprudence.*—This course of lectures presents succinctly the leading principles of modern private law. One hour a week. Professor Monroe Smith.

3. *Conflict of private law.*— . . . Two hours a week, first session. Professor Monroe Smith.

III. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

A. POLITICAL ECONOMY

"It is presumed that students possess a knowledge of the general principles of political economy as laid down in the ordinary manuals by Walker or Mill, before entering the school. Students who are not thus prepared are recommended to take the undergraduate course on the elements of political economy."

The courses of lectures are as follows:

1. *Historical and practical political economy*.—This course is intended to give the student a knowledge of the economic development of the world, in order that he may understand present economic institutions and solve present economic problems. The principal topics are: introduction, concerning the study of political economy and its relation to political science; general sketch of the economic development of the world; the institutions of private property, bequest, and inheritance, and the principle of personal liberty as affecting the economic condition of the world; the problems of production, such as land tenure, population, capital, different forms of productive enterprise, statistics of production, particularly the natural resources of the United States; problems of exchange, such as free trade and protection, railroads, money, bimetalism, paper money, banking, commercial crises, etc.; problems of distribution such as wages, trades unions, co-operation, poor relief, factory laws, profit and interest, rent, progress and poverty; and finally a consideration of the function of the state in economic affairs. Three hours a week. Professor Mayo Smith.

2. *History and criticism of economic theories*.—This course comprises two parts. In the first the various systems are discussed, attention being directed to the connection between the theories and the organization of industrial society. In the second, the separate doctrines—e.g., of capital, rent, wages, etc.—are treated in their historical development. The first part is subdivided as follows:

- I. *Antiquity*: Orient, Greece, Rome.
- II. *Middle Ages*: Aquinas, Glossaton, writers on money, etc.
- III. *Mercantilists*: Stafford, Mun, Petty, North, Locke, Bodin, Vauban, Forbonnais, Serra, Galiani, Justin.
- IV. *Physiocrats*: Quesnay, Gournay, Turgot, etc.
- V. *Adam Smith and precursors*: Tucker, Hume, Cantillon, Stewart.
- VI. *English School*: Malthus, Ricardo, Senior, McCulloch, Chalmers, Jones, Mill, etc.
- VII. *The Continent*: Say, Sismondi, Hermann, List, Bastist, etc.
- VIII. *German School*: Roscher, Kines, Hildebrand.
- IX. *Recent development*: Rogers, Jevons, Cairnes, Bagehot, Leslie, Toynbee, Marshall, Wagner, Schmoller, Held, Brentano, Menger, Sax, Böhn-Bawerk, Leroy-Beaulieu, De Laveleye, Gide; Cossa, Nazzani, Loria, Ricca-Salerno, Pantaleoni; Carey, George, Walker, Clark, Patten, Adams, etc.

Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

3. *Railroad problems: economical, social, and legal.*—These lectures treat of railroads in the fourfold aspect of their relation to the investors, the employees, the public, and the state, respectively. A history of railways and railway policy in America and Europe forms the preliminary part of the course. All the problems of railway management, in so far as they are of economic importance, come up for discussion. Among the subjects treated are: financial methods, railway construction, speculation, profits, failures, accounts and reports, expenses, tariffs, principles of rates, classification and discrimination, competition and pooling accidents, employer's liability, etc. Especial attention is paid to the methods of regulation and legislation in the United States, as compared with European methods, and the course closes with a general discussion of state versus private management (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

B. SCIENCE OF FINANCE

1. *Science of finance.*—This course is historical as well as comparative and critical. It treats of the expenditure of the state, and the methods of meeting the same among different civilized nations. It describes the different kinds of state revenues, especially taxes, and discusses the principles of taxation. It is therefore in great part a course on the theories and methods of taxation in all civilized countries. It considers also public debt, methods of borrowing, money, redemption, refunding, repudiation, etc. Finally it describes the financial organization of the state, by which the revenue is collected and expended. Students are furnished with the current public documents of the United States Treasury, and the chief financial reports of the leading commonwealths, and are expected to understand all the facts in regard to public debt, currency, and revenue therein contained. Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

2. *Taxation and distribution of wealth.*—This course treats of the history of taxation in Europe and America; the effect of indirect taxation on the production and distribution of wealth; the income and the property tax; taxation of natural monopolies; taxes affecting morality and education; socialism; the single tax; progressive taxation; and the moral and political effect of direct taxation proportioned to the wealth of the taxpayers. One hour a week. Dr. Spann.

3. *Financial history of the United States.*—"This course endeavors to present a complete survey of American legislation on currency, finance, and taxation, as well as its connection with the state industry and commerce . . . (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

4. *Industrial and tariff history of the United States.*— . . . (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

C. STATISTICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

1. *Statistical science: Methods and results.*—This course is intended to furnish a basis for social science by supplementing the historical, legal, and economic knowledge already gained by such a knowledge of social phenomena

as can be gained only by statistical observation. Under the head of statistics of population are considered: race and ethnological distinctions, nationality, density, city and country, sex, age, occupation, religion, education, births, deaths, marriages, mortality, tables, emigration, etc. Under economic statistics: land, production of food, raw material, labor, wages, capital, means of transportation, shipping, prices, etc. Under the head of moral statistics are considered: statistics of suicide, vice, crime of all kinds, causes of crime, condition of criminals, repression of crime, penalties and effect of penalties, etc. Finally are considered the method of statistical observations, the value of the results obtained, the doctrine of free will, and the possibility of discovering social laws. Two hours a week. Professor Mayo-Smith.

2. *Communistic and socialistic theories.*—"The present organization of society is attacked by socialistic writers, who demand many changes, especially in the institution of private property and the system of free competition. It is the object of this course to describe what these attacks are, what changes are proposed, and how far these changes seem desirable or possible. At the same time an account is given of actual socialistic movements, such as the international, social democracy, etc. Advantage is taken of these discussions to make the course really one on social science, by describing modern social institutions, such as private property, in their historical origin and development, and their present justification" (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Mayo-Smith.

3. *Sociology.*—The courses of sociology, of which several are expected to be given, will be announced later.

IV. *Seminaria.*—"Outside of the regular instruction in the various subjects by lecture, it is the intention to furnish the students of the school an opportunity for special investigation of historical, legal, economic, and social questions under the direction of the professor. This is done by means of original papers prepared by the students. The papers are read before the professor and the students, and are then criticized and discussed. The number of meetings and the topics to be discussed are determined each year. Attendance at a seminarium is necessary on the part of candidates for all degrees."

ORDER OF STUDIES

It is recommended by the faculty that students who intend to devote their whole time to the courses of study offered by this faculty, take them in the following order:

First Year	Hours per Week
Constitutional History.....	6
Institutes of Roman Law.....	1
Political Economy.....	2
Science of Finance.....	3
History of Political Theories.....	22
Financial History of the United States.....	½
Historical and Political Geography.....	2

First Year— <i>Continued</i>		Hours per Week
Political History of New York.....	1	
Relations of England and Ireland.....	1	(1st session)
History of Diplomacy.....	1	
Second Year		
Comparative Constitutional Law.....	3	
History of European Law.....	2	
Comparative Administrative Law.....	2	
History of Political Economy.....	2	
Social Science: Communistic and Socialistic theories...	2	
Industrial and Tariff History of the United States.....	1	
Colonial History of the United States.....	2	
Third Year		
Comparative Jurisprudence.....	2	
International Public Law.....	2	
Conflict of Law, Public and Private.....	2	
Law of Taxation.....	1	
Law of Municipal Corporations.....	1	
Social Science: Statistics, Methods, and Results.....	2	
History of Political Economy.....	2	
History of the United States 1860-77.....	1	

The same catalogue gives the names of students in this School of Political Science for the year 1891-92. The number is 128. Deducting 6 who are registered in other parts of the university, and 46 who have no Bachelor's degree, the total of college graduates appear to have been 76.

In the catalogue for 1893-94 the number registered was 41. Of these, 9 were students either in the General Theological Seminary or in Union Theological Seminary. Thirty-four (34) more were members of the Senior class in the School of Arts but were taking certain courses under the political science faculty. One hundred and eighteen (118) law students were registered for political science courses, and finally thirty-three (33) who were not candidates for a degree, making a total of 226 doing their work wholly or in part under the political science faculty.

In this catalogue of 1893-94, Professor Giddings appears with the title "Lecturer on Sociology." The courses in sociology are not described as in the earlier catalogue. All that is said of them appears to be on pp. 35, 36, viz.: Under the general head "Economics and Social Science" we read:

COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY AND STATISTICS

XVI. *Physical geography and anthropology*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours, second term. Dr. Ripley.

XVII. *Practical statistics*.—Lectures, practical exercises, and private readings. Two hours, first term. Professor Mayo-Smith.

XVIII. *The science of statistics*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours. Professor Mayo-Smith.

XIX. *Sociology*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours, first term. Professor Giddings.

XX. *Socialism and communism*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours. Professor Mayo-Smith.

XXI. *Crime and penology*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours, second term. Professor Giddings.

XXX. *Seminarium in social science*.—Two hours bi-weekly. Professors Mayo-Smith and Giddings.¹

While the Harvard catalogue of 1891-92 seems to show a different state of things from that which I found when in 1888, I tried to discover something that would make it worth while for a graduate student in the social sciences to spend a year there, I have no reason to think that graduate work in these subjects existed at Harvard in 1891-92 to any great extent, except on paper. It is certainly true that there was no clear distinction, even on paper, between graduate and undergraduate work.²

The portion of the catalogue which sets forth the character of courses offered bears the title "Courses of Instruction Provided by the Faculty of Arts and Literature" (p. 56). The Graduate School is not scheduled and described until nearly 200 pages later (p. 239). In the latter section under the heading "Divisions and Departments of the Faculty of Arts and Science" (p. 258), Division V is entitled, "History and Political Science." Professor Dunbar, the economist, was chairman of the division. Turning back to the scheme of instruction (p. 80), we find under "Political Economy" two courses described as *primarily for undergraduates*; six courses, entitled "For Graduates and Undergraduates," and under the heading "Primarily for Graduate Courses of Research," there is this paragraph: "In 1890-91 Professors Dunbar and Taussig will guide competent students in investigations of topics to be selected after conference with them. Graduate students who take the courses 'for graduates and undergraduates' are encouraged to carry on special investigations in the subjects treated."

In other words, no plans for organized graduate study in economics had been developed at Harvard.

¹ Cf. Professor Giddings' note below, p. 761.

² Cf. above, pp. 733-34.

In history the case seems to have been somewhat different. Fourteen courses were offered for undergraduates. Under the head "Primarily for Graduates," fourteen courses were offered, including three seminars. There is no separate department of political science. One course, "for graduates and undergraduates," was offered in Roman law.

It is not a violent conclusion, therefore, on the basis of what is in and between the lines of this catalogue, together with the results of my personal investigation three years earlier,¹ that up to 1892 Johns Hopkins and Columbia were setting the pace in the social sciences, and all that need be added about the beginnings of sociological instruction may be submitted in the form of individual testimony.²

IV. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES

The most complete understanding of the American sociological movement which our present knowledge makes possible requires correlation of that movement with the whole modern development of social science in the largest sense. In a word, sociology of the type with which this monograph is concerned is an enigma and an offense, if it is judged upon the presumption that it is an isolated phenomenon, or even an ordinary case of fractious sectarianism.³ The movement, on the contrary, at once takes on significance, not only for itself but as a phenomenon of social science in general, when it appears as an inevitable phase of that expansion of DEMAND FOR OBJECTIVITY in social science which found voice in Adam Smith, and which became the beginning of a program in the methodology projected by Eichhorn, and Savigny, and Niebuhr, and Ranke.⁴

The present writer hopes to complete an outline description of the missing link in methodological evolution between the type of social science that culminated in the eighteenth century⁵ and the psychological social science which the sociologists have helped to

¹ *Supra*, pp. 733-34.

² See below, pp. 759-63.

³ Cf. p. 820.

⁴ Cf. my paper, "The Sociological Stage in the Evolution of the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, XV (1910), 681.

⁵ See Small, *The Cameralists*.

produce. The restrictions of this sketch compel us to take the immediately preceding stage of the evolution for granted, and to focus our attention upon the American phases of the movement since 1865.

The first notable evidence that a differentiating thought-movement was gathering momentum in this country in the realm of the social sciences was the appearance in 1883 of Lester F. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*.¹

The first point that impresses me as I try to place Ward historically, less by means of my own recollections than by examining the internal evidence of his writings, is that he felt himself to be a voice crying in the wilderness. The most direct sign of this may be found in a comparison of the preface to the first (1883) edition of *Dynamic Sociology* with the second (1897) preface. Both these prefaces are printed in the second edition. Everyone at all interested in the development of American sociological theory should compare these two statements. They are speaking witnesses to the advance in Ward's own relations to the subject. When he wrote *Dynamic Sociology*, he had only the most meager knowledge that anyone else had worked in the same field. His most intimate associations had been with physical scientists. The only previous thinkers named in the first preface as having had even a remote connection with sociology are (in a negative way) Hobbes, Locke, Voltaire, Mill, Spencer, and John Fiske; and (by implication) Comte in a positive way. Silence about other writers does not prove that he was unacquainted with them, but I have no reason to think that, in 1883, Ward had heard of any European movements toward sociology except the dubious attitude of the men named. He felt that he was putting completely new landmarks on the map, as indeed he was; but more than that, he supposed that, with the

¹ Ward's principal works are: *Dynamic Sociology*, 1883, second edition 1897 (the Preface alone differs from the contents of the first edition); *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 1893; *Pure Sociology*, 1903; *Applied Sociology*, 1904. Appreciation of Ward: *American Journal of Sociology*, XI, 61-78; Small, announcement of Ward's *Pure Sociology*, *ibid.*, VIII (1903), 710; "Notes on *Pure Sociology*," *ibid.*, IX (1904), 401, 567, 723. Light is thrown upon Ward's personality by a review of the first three volumes of his minor writings, entitled "Glimpses of the Cosmos," *ibid.*, XIX (1914), 659.

exceptions indicated, he was the first explorer who had started out to find the landmarks.

This detachment of Ward from the course of development of the social sciences in Europe, including, according to his own confession, psychology, not only made his own work provincial, but it helped to keep in countenance a provincialism which has not yet entirely disappeared from the thinking of American sociologists. I mean by this not that in recent years we have neglected current developments in European sociology, but that we have regarded sociology too much as a thing by itself. We have betrayed relatively little interest in finding out to what extent sociology is a phase of the methodological evolution in history, political philosophy, and economics during the first half of the nineteenth century. We have given immeasurably more attention to our later interrelations with psychology. We have not yet fully found ourselves in the succession of men who earlier confronted phases of the same problems which began to challenge us particularly after 1890. The development of American sociological theory might not have been more rapid; it certainly would have been more impressive among others than the sociologists, if Ward and his successors after a decade had been familiar with the German gropings in the direction of sociology at about the middle of the nineteenth century.¹

Another fact about Ward must receive more attention than has been paid to it, so far as I know, if he is to be correctly understood as

¹ Cf. note above, p. 724. On von Mohl and Ahrens, see *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII (1913), 457-59. At the present moment it is a matter of peculiar interest that the final word on the demand for or the possibility of a science of sociology was supposed to have been spoken in the negative in 1859, by Treitschke, so widely known in later years as historian and as preceptor of a large section of academic Germany in the spirit and theory of militarism. The monograph in which this conclusion was argued is entitled, *Gesellschaftswissenschaft* (1859). Although Treitschke was more elaborate than von Mohl in his argument that the idea of a science of sociology is fallacious and confusing, although he came to the conclusion, in opposition to Ahrens, that the foremost demand of social theory was the widening and deepening of political science, so that it would absorb and assimilate everything that had been suggested as material for a science of "society," the very discussion in which he expounded this opinion might have been used by Americans to save themselves much preliminary work of clarifying their ideas about that illusive concept "society." It took American sociologists more than twenty years from the publication of *Dynamic Sociology* to get themselves sufficiently oriented about this initial obscurity to be resolute in abandoning pursuit of the intangible, and in devoting themselves to objective study of men and women in their actual groupings.

a waymark. It may be stated roughly in this way: Ward was professionally a museum investigator. His daily work was to sift botanical evidence, to draw up reports on the evidence, to label and pigeonhole specimens, with a high degree of probability that both reports and specimens would rest forever after in undisturbed oblivion. At most they were indexed for the use of anyone who cared to call at the museum in search of them or to consult his monographs describing them. Responsibility for adapting knowledge of them to the mental needs of less scientific minds, or for putting it into such shape that it would be most convincing, must have been the weakest of the considerations to which he gave attention.

On the other hand, there has been scarcely another American thinker who has left a visible impress upon sociological theory who has not had a considerable amount of the responsibility of a teacher—not merely the sort of teaching which an author does, but teaching by word of mouth in the presence of the student.

As a consequence, Ward's writings have always impressed those who knew him best as, in the first place, specimens of work done by a man urged by his own interest in the work, and to satisfy his own ideals of good workmanship, but lacking certain mental plasticity which would have made his results more appealing if, while they were in the shaping, they had been subjected to contact with the reactions of unconvinced minds. Whether Ward wanted it to be so or not, his work was moreover always more insulated from that of men engaged on the same problems than was good for the author and his products.

Another aspect of the same fact was Ward's pontifical estimate of his own conclusions. Although in the later years of his life, especially as a summer lecturer at several universities, and then as professor at Brown, he had some of the experiences of a teacher, yet he grew more and more unable to abide anyone who showed signs of thinking that he might not have said the final word on the subject of sociology.¹

¹ As much ought to be said in connection with the fact that I myself, taking issue with Ward in connection with the *Journal of the American Sociological Association*, published the fact that there was so little criticism of one another's work by the *Journal*. In entire good faith I proceeded to criticize his work both in the *Journal* and in the *American Journal of Sociology*, III, 35, 36, 1907, to fear

One of the results of these facts was that his system of sociology had a very evident form and spirit as though, so to speak, it were addressed to absolute mind, not to the still finite human beings from whom every theorist must gather his disciples. Although Ward afterward wrote three major works¹ beside two minor ones and numerous monographs in exposition of his views, I have never discovered that, in any essential particular, they added to or subtracted from the system contained in *Dynamic Sociology*. Ward's sociology seems to have received form and substance, as the Germans say, *aus einem Gusse*. All that he did later was the enlarging of replicas of details. This is a unique and impressive intellectual achievement. It gives Ward a position of solitary distinction. At the same time, after the sociological movement began to gain momentum, everyone in it recognized him as its initiator in this country, and no one has approached him in grasp of the relations between cosmic evolution in general and the evolution of human associations.

The other prominent American sociologists, as just now observed, have all been academic teachers. More than that, they have evidently all been conscious of getting their sociology as they went along. They did not enter upon their work in possession of a complete system of interpreting the physical and moral universe, still less with a foreordained place and manner for the fitting of the human incident as a detail into the cosmic system. This was, on the one hand, a great disadvantage for Ward's sociological successors. As framers of systems of thinking they were evidently handicapped in comparison with him. They were far less sure of their physical universe. They were consequently far less sure how the human world geared into the physical world.

On the other hand, this contrast with Ward was also greatly to the advantage of his successors. Their ignorance in fields where

of responding in kind, Dr. Ward sent me a most bitter letter charging me with "the arrogance of the academic caste toward those not in their ranks." For two years we ceased to exchange letters. After the former friendship had been resumed, in a discussion during the meeting of the Sociological Society in New York in 1911, he blandly read Professor Hayes and myself out of the ranks of the sociologists because we had dissented from certain of his views about the problems of sociology.

¹ See note, p. 749.

he was wonderfully informed was in one sense comparative vacant-mindedness, but in another sense comparative open-mindedness. It left them with oppressive and even depressing consciousness that the relations which they wanted to understand were a labyrinth to which they had not found a very satisfactory guide. They were perforce inquirers. They had to work in a fashion which was a rough sort of induction. They had all broken away from orthodox moorings of one kind or another—historical, economic, political, philosophical, theological—and they had launched out on a quest of their own for an answer to the question: Of what sort is this human lot of ours? Not one of them has even yet arrived at an answer as complete in form as Ward's was in the beginning. For myself, I think we have arrived at something better. The human lot is not reducible to as simple formulas as Ward supposed. Discovery and acceptance of this fact are long steps beyond satisfaction with a version of the human lot which makes it simpler than it is.

We have discovered that human reactions have a baffling way of showing thoughtless independence of antecedent logic. We have discovered that we must pry into actual human facts to find out how they work; and that preconceptions which we carry into the facts, no matter how much presumption goes with them from knowledge of better analyzed relations, are quite likely to be discredited by the actual findings. We have learned that the human lot which we encounter in positive exploration makes up a bigger and more formless composite than our minds are able to reduce to complete symmetry without violence to reality. - In other words, we have taken seriously to heart the knowledge which was close to everyone docile enough to receive it, that the human lot is an unmeasured and, so far as our present powers go, measureless complex of uncompleted processes. We accordingly find our task to be, in the first place, the making out of workings within those ranges of the processes which we can bring within the grasp of our understanding. We have given up the notion that it is feasible to arrive at a survey of human experience so complete and precise that it may be reduced to a miniature, as we make reduced models of our physical world, or of our solar system.

Furthermore, the mental experience of the teacher-explorer, in the course of arriving at the present outlook of the sociologists, has involved inevitable mistakes, inconsistencies, changes of front, and reformulations. This has been not merely the consequence of collecting new observations. It has also been due to the fact that many of the advances in perception or expression have been in the course of attempts to meet students' minds at their precise point of outlook. This has necessarily involved frequent over-emphasis of considerations peculiarly pertinent to the difficulties met in the given student group.

What then was the gist of Ward's sociology? His own answer is given in the preface of the first edition (repeated, pp. xxvi f. of the second edition):

Sociology is reproached, even by those who admit its legitimacy, with being impracticable and fruitless. The prevailing methods of treating it, including those employed by its highest living advocates, to a great extent justify this charge. There are dead sciences as well as dead languages. The real object of science is to benefit man. A science which fails to do this, however agreeable its study, is lifeless. Sociology, which of all sciences should benefit man most, is in danger of falling into the class of polite amusements, or dead sciences. It is the object of this work to point out a method by which the breath of life may be breathed into its nostrils. . . .

If, in the detailed unfolding of this system, any comprehensive principles have been announced, to which attention has not heretofore been especially directed, the chief of these will, perhaps, be recognized in—

1. The law of Aggregation, as distinguished from that of Evolution proper.
2. The theory of the Social Forces, and the fundamental antithesis which they imply between Feeling and Function.
3. The contrast between these true Social Forces and the guiding influence of the Intellect, embodying the application of the Indirect Method of Conation, and the essential nature of Invention, of Art, and of Dynamic Action.
4. The superiority of Artificial, or Teleological, Processes over Natural, or Genetic, Processes, and finally—
5. The recognition and demonstration of the paramount necessity for the equal and universal Distribution of the extant knowledge of the world, which last is the crown of the system itself.

While there certainly have been adumbrations of many of these truths, it is believed that thus far no one of them has been systematically formulated or distinctly recognized.

Dynamic Sociology turns out to be, by way of introduction, a cosmic philosophy. It is afterward, in its more specific purpose,

a thesis in social psychology. As I shall repeat, after further quotations from Ward, his historical importance does not stand or fall with the validity of his psychology. It rests upon the significant timeliness of his antecedent profession of faith that psychic initiatives are actual differentiating factors in the distinctively human stages of evolution. This whole feature of Ward's theory centers about the concept "social forces." This concept played an important rôle in changing the current of American sociological thinking from the course which English theory has followed as a rule up to the present time. As the concept was introduced by Ward in 1883, it amounted to the first impressive challenge of the fatalistic implications of Herbert Spencer's rendering of the evolutionary theory.

Whether Spencer would have accepted the categorical statement or not, many and for a while the most aggressive of his disciples got the impression from his interpretation of evolution that the development of society is beyond voluntary control. It was supposed to be determined rather by those physical laws of the redistribution of forces found working in the lower scale of nature. It was inferred that human volition can neither hasten nor retard the pace of this social evolution. Englishmen are still dubiously asking the question whether evolution of society in directions selected by human agency is in any sort or degree thinkable. Ward was a biologist, with his special work in the division of paleontological botany. He was such a convinced disciple of Darwin that he was often mistaken for an unqualified materialist. His approach to sociological questions was from the frankly positive standpoint, and he was an avowed admirer of Comte. In his case there was no symptom of bias in favor of a moral or spiritual as distinguished from a mechanical interpretation of society. His bias rather against a psychical interpretation of society gave tremendous force to the book in which, for the first time, the evolutionary theory was used by *an evolutionist* as the basis for an exposition of social evolution by means of psychic forces. This exposition has never been accepted in detail by sociologists who were scrupulous about their psychology. Because of its central contention, however, it fairly ranks as the foundation of American sociology. It

has furnished a basis on which sociology has flourished for a generation in this country, while for most of the same period it languished in England.¹

One of Ward's most elementary statements is worth quoting. It is in his introductory chapter. In it he throws down his gauntlet to the dogmatists of societary fatalism as follows (I, 35):

[Our problem is] whether it is possible for society to improve itself. Society is simply a compound organism whose acts exhibit the resultant of all the individual forms which its members exert. These acts, whether individual or collective, obey fixed laws. Objectively viewed, society is a natural object, presenting a variety of complicated movements, produced by a particular class of natural forces. The question, therefore, simply is, Can man ever control these forces to his advantage, as he controls other, and some very complicated, natural forces? Is it true that man shall ultimately obtain the dominion of the whole world *except himself*? I regard society and the social forces as constituting just as much a legitimate field for the exercise of human ingenuity as do the various material substances and physical forces. The latter have been investigated and subjugated. The former are still pursuing their wild, unbridled course. The latter still exist, still exhibit their indestructible dynamic tendencies, still obey the Newtonian laws of motion, still operate along the lines of least resistance. But man, by teleological foresight, has succeeded in *harmonizing these lines of least resistance with those of greatest advantage to himself*. He has made the winds, the waters, fire, steam, and electricity do his bidding. All nature, both animate and inanimate, has been reduced to his service. One field alone remains unsubdued. One class of natural forces still remains the play of chance, and from it, instead of aid, he is constantly receiving the most serious checks. This field is that of *society itself*. These unreclaimed forces are the social forces; of whose nature man seems to possess no knowledge, whose very existence he persistently ignores, and which he consequently is powerless to control.

But we have said that the very *systems*, moral, religious, political, of which mention has been made, are but so many direct attempts to control society and improve its condition. True: and they failed to accomplish their object because they did not recognize the very laws and forces which they sought to control. The extraordinary influence which they have, in fact, exerted shows how great would have been the result had they really been directed in channels of human advantage. They recall the misdirected efforts and hopeless dreams of the crazy inventors of "perpetual motion," and, as attempted inventions, they have failed for the same reason; their complicated machines have not

¹ I am aware that the disciples of Sir Francis Galton would regard this statement as false.

worked because they were contrived in ignorance of the forces they were expected to control.

Again, the defenders of *laissez faire* will object that society has always done better when let alone; that all efforts to improve the moral or material condition of society by legislation and kindred means have not only been inoperative, but have in the majority of cases done positive *harm*, often to the very cause they were intended to subserve.

If it could be proved that they had always been absolutely inoperative, the case would perhaps be somewhat discouraging, but if they can be shown to have had an evil effect, this is all we can hope or desire. For if they can do harm, they can do something, and nothing is left but to make them do good. Legislation (I use the term in the most general sense) is nothing else but invention. It is an effort so to control the forces of a state as to secure the greatest benefits to its people. But these forces are *social* forces, and the people are the members of society. As matters are now and have thus far been, government, in so far as the improvement of society is concerned, has been to a great extent a failure. It has done good service in protecting the operation of the natural dynamic forces, and for this it should receive due credit. But it has also to be charged with a long account of opposition to science and oppression of aspiring humanity. But why has it failed as a promoter of the social welfare to which it has laid such special claims? Because legislators, as inventors, have proved mere bunglers; because they have been ignorant of the forces over which they have sought to exercise control. Success in invention must be limited by the acquaintance of the inventor with the forces that are to propel his machine.

As I intimated at the beginning of this reference to Ward, the importance of his main contribution to sociology does not consist in the accuracy of his psychology. It consisted rather in the force of his argument *from the biological side*, that there are social forces in addition to the merely impersonal cosmic forces—that human initiative, as distinct from purely physical causation, is a reality and not an illusion. In homely terms, Ward's assertion adopted into science of the most sophisticated type the untutored impression of the plain man that the human will is an actual power in the world, for weal or for woe, that it is not a mere way in which a fatalistic mechanical world displays misleading appearances of human initiative. In other words, Ward acted as the spokesman of physical science in supporting the immemorial conviction of plain people that men and women are morally responsible beings, simply because it is within their power to do good or to do evil. Ward made it a

scientific proposition that this popular belief is a conviction authorized by the facts of life. Men are psychic agents, capable of psychic causation, which not only within limits compels matter to do its bidding, but which, also within limits, organizes moral energies into constructive and creative action. Moreover, this psychic influence, according to Ward, is something more than a mere medium for doing what the action of physical forces would have done anyway.

Ward's assertion does not of course amount to a solution of all or any of the problems of psychology. It merely adds a new impulse to the study of psychology; because with the aid of that study, if at all, the mysteries of the action of the psychic forces, which are the social forces, must be resolved. Ward therefore furnished reinforcement, from the biological side, to previous interest in the study of the psychic factors in human life. He went farther than that, and made an elaborate analysis of these psychic factors, in answer to the question, What are the social forces? Thus he virtually proposed a system of individual and social psychology.¹

As to the value of Ward's psychological system in detail, it is not necessary at this point to express an opinion. A vigorous attack on Ward's theory of the social forces has been made by Professor E. C. Hayes, under the title, "The Social Forces Error."² The essence of Professor Hayes's contention against Ward, as I understand it, is not an impeachment of Ward's underlying idea, but it takes issue with certain of Ward's renderings of the concept "social forces." In brief, Hayes charges Ward with falling into interpretations of "social forces" which virtually nullify his other attempts to set them apart from mechanical forces. Whether Ward always kept the distinction clear or not need not be discussed here. His radical purpose was to explain that there is a realm of social forces which are psychical, not physical, and that in the use of these forces lies the sphere of the highest achievements of society.³

¹ For Ward's classification of the social forces, cf. *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 472.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, XVI, 613.

³ See Ward's paper "Mind as a Social Factor"; *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, III, 361.

V. DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL INSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES

The difficulty of choosing wisely between logical and chronological presentation of details becomes embarrassing in discussing this and the two following titles. It seems on the whole wisest to place certain occurrences under a title by themselves, in a sort of neutral zone, in the two sections following this, although they had intimate relations, both of cause and of effect, with the advances referred to under the present subtitle and the sections VIII and IX (pp. 728 and 827).

The article by Mr. Tolman already cited (above, p. 726) furnishes information about the growth of demand for instruction in "social science," particularly at Cornell and the University of Michigan, during the eighties. Reference has already been made to Professor Sumner's beginnings of sociological instruction at Yale in 1876 and to subsequent ventures in the same line (above, p. 732). A few personal notes will serve as partially satisfactory connecting links between the earlier and the later periods. Professor Weatherly, of the University of Indiana, writes:

You are right in assuming that there has been an unbroken succession of courses in sociology here since 1885. The record is as follows:

Arthur B. Woodford came here in 1885 as assistant and associate professor (so the title is given in the catalogue) in economics and sociology, but these subjects were given that year in the department of History and Political Science as a subdivision. In that year, 1885-86, along with courses in economics he gave this course:

XIII. *Sociology*.—The aim of this course is to bring before the student the latest results of this new department of scientific investigation in life as it is manifested in human societies. Senior year, second term (5); required of Seniors in the course of Philosophy; may be taken as Senior specialty in the course in Economic Science.

The next year, 1886-87 (still Woodford), the Department of Social Science and Economics was set off from History. In that department course V was thus described:

V. *Sociology*.—Spencer's *Study of Sociology*, Wilson's *Anthropology*, and Letourneau's *Sociology Based upon Ethnography*. First and second terms, three times a week.

Woodford continued this until he left in 1889. Then came Jenks, and the department was renamed Economics and Social Science. In 1889 the course was called "Anthropology and Sociology," but the following year it was called

"Introduction to Sociology," and there was also given a one-term five-hour course on "Social Problems." Jenks was followed by Ross, 1891-92; Ross by Commons, 1892-95; Commons by Fetter, 1895-99; and since 1899 the work has been in my charge. At various times through this period since 1891 new courses have been added, and in 1915 the title of the department was changed to Economics and Sociology. The Spencerian cast of the early years may be accounted for by the fact that Woodford was a Yale man.

The following is from Professor Blackmar:

In the early spring of 1889, the regents of the University of Kansas came to Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, searching for a man to take charge of a new department to be formed in the University of Kansas. They asked me to take charge of the department and name it. On being told what they wished the department to include, I thought it best to call it "History and Politics." Whereupon the regents were very much excited, telling me it would not do to give a department that name, because "the people of Kansas would not tolerate a Department of *Politics* in the University, as they had politics enough in the state already." But being held responsible for naming the new child, I told them I thought "History and Political Science" would be the name they desired. Again I met with rebuff when they told me the word "political" would not do in connection with the University. Finally, as a last resort, I chose the title of "History and Sociology." So far as my knowledge goes, this was the first time that the word "sociology" was used in connection with the name of a university department in the United States.¹

While you were taking your major in sociology at Hopkins, I took my major in history of institutions. During my three-year course at Hopkins, I took lectures under the late Amos G. Warner on "Charity and Charitable Institutions," and did some social work among the laboring men, factory hands, and negroes of Baltimore, and also gave a few extension lectures. I also gave some attention to Comte, Ward, De Greef, and other writers of sociology.

I entered the University of Kansas as professor of "history and sociology" in the autumn of 1889, and began to teach sociology, although it was largely overshadowed by history and political economy. In the University of Kansas, the American history and civics were set off in a separate department, and subsequently the European history and finally the economics were made into separate departments, which leaves the sociology as a distinct department which is developing satisfactorily.

To supplement Professor Blackmar's recollections I may add the following details:

After returning as President to Colby College, following the Sabbatical year spent at Johns Hopkins, I offered to the Seniors in the spring term of 1890,

¹ Professor Blackmar seems to be correct on this point. No evidence of priority in this respect over the University of Kansas is known to the writer of this paper.

as I then supposed, the first course in sociology ever given in the United States. As a basis for the instruction I managed to hustle together a printed syllabus of 149 pages. Dr. Ward refers to it in the preface to the second edition of *Dynamic Sociology*. I devoutly hope that the interleaved, crowdedly annotated and nearly worn-to-pieces copy in my own possession is the only specimen extant. I still believe that in writing it I was conscientiously following a spark of inner light, but it led me through a jungle of moral philosophy, theology, history, economics, and hortatory reflection, in which I set up here and there the notice, "Sociology wanted." I am not ashamed of the attempts I made, during the three years in which I continued at Colby, at the head of a bunch of loyal but no doubt bewildered Seniors, to blaze some paths through the labyrinth which the world of human experience then seemed to be. These efforts were respectable, but it is needless to confess that they were far back in the dead-work preliminary to science. In my *President's Report* for the year 1889-90, I find this paragraph (p. 16): ". . . I have introduced the class to modern sociological philosophy. To the best of my knowledge this is a line of study which has never been opened to undergraduates in American colleges. The field to be surveyed is but partially explored, and it is impossible to present as exact data as in the older sciences; but I am sure that the plan of study which I have outlined is a profitable one with which to complete the college curriculum."

Professor Giddings adds this important statement:

After much searching I have dug up copies of the Bryn Mawr College programs of 1889 and 1890 which enable me to answer your question. I had despaired of ever finding them.

I went to Bryn Mawr in the fall of 1888 to take up the work that Woodrow Wilson had suddenly left. His title there was associate professor of history and political science.

As set forth in the program of 1889, the subjects that I taught by lecture and seminar were: (1) Development of Political Institutions; (2) Political Economy, including Economic Theory and Economic History; (3) Methods and Principles of Administration; and (4) Methods and Principles of Charity and Correction.

These topics, with minor changes, I taught in 1890 and subsequent years; but also in the program of 1890, I find under the head of "Graduate Courses" the following:

"*Modern Theories of Sociology*.—The lectures on Sociology are intended to accomplish three things, namely: (1) to provoke thought on the question whether a philosophic science of society as an organic whole is possible; (2) to acquaint the student with what has been done already toward the construction of such a science; (3) to apply sociological conceptions and methods to a few chosen sociological problems. Fellows and graduate students expecting to do advanced work in this course must have, besides their equipment in History

and Political Economy, at least a general knowledge of the History of Philosophy and some acquaintance with Modern Biology and Empirical Psychology."

Among the preliminary readings suggested were Galton's *Natural Inheritance*, and Richmond Mayo-Smith's *Statistics and Economics*.

My interest in sociology, as I have on various occasions told, began while I was yet a youth, when accidentally a copy of the first number of the *Popular Science Monthly* fell into my hands a few days after its publication, and I read the first chapter of Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*. Before I entered college I had read a lot of Darwin, Tyndall, and Huxley, and nearly half of what Spencer had then printed. At college, and during ten subsequent years of newspaper work, I kept up my interest and my reading in sociology and was ready to improve the first chance that offered to teach it after I went to Bryn Mawr.

My work at Columbia began when Professor Mayo-Smith, who was going abroad for a year, asked me to give a course of lectures here during the academic year 1891-92, in substitution for his social science course which was largely statistical in content. I was asked to continue these lectures after his return and did so during the academic years 1892-93 and 1893-94, and in the latter year I was called to the University to the newly established chair of sociology. While my recollections on this point are somewhat vague, an impression lingers in my mind that the action of Chicago in establishing the Department of Social Science had an appreciable influence upon the action of Columbia.

You speak of a syllabus of sociology which you prepared at Colby College, and you vainly cherish the hope that your copy of it is the only one in existence. I beg to assure you that my copy of it is intact and that you could not buy it of me if you tried.

I am indebted to Mr. Edward Cummings, pastor of the South Congregational Church, Boston, for the following description of the first course in sociology offered at Harvard. It was in the academic year 1891-92.

3. *The Principles of Sociology*. Mon., Wed., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 1:30. Asst. Professor Edward Cummings.

Course 3 begins with a general survey of the structure and development of society; showing the changing elements of which a progressive society is composed, the forces which manifest themselves at different stages in the transition from primitive conditions to complex phases of civilized life, and the structural outlines upon which successive phases of social, political, and industrial organization proceed. Following this is an examination of the historical aspects which this evolution has actually assumed: primitive man, elementary forms of association, the various forms of family organization, and the contributions which family, clan, and tribe have made to the consti-

tution of more comprehensive ethical and political groups; the functions of the state, the circumstances which determine types of political association, the corresponding expansion of social consciousness, and the relative importance of military, economic, and ethical ideas at successive stages of civilization. Special attention is given to the attempts to formulate physical and psychological laws of social growth; to the relative importance of natural and artificial selection in social development; the law of social survival; the dangers which threaten civilization; and the bearing of such general consideration upon the practical problems of vice, crime, poverty, pauperism, and upon mooted methods of social reform.

The student is thus acquainted with the main schools of sociological thought, and opportunity is given for a critical comparison of earlier phases of sociological theory, with more recent contributions in Europe and the United States. Regular and systematic reading is essential. Topics are assigned for special investigation in connection with practical or theoretical aspects of the course.

Mr. Cummings adds these particulars:

I think the establishment of the Robert Treat Paine Fellowship in Social Science, in 1887, was the first step toward the new line of work at Harvard. It had the effect of giving me an opportunity to pursue abroad the studies I had already begun in Cambridge. Up to that time, no one had given me the slightest encouragement to believe there was any "academic future" for "sociological" work. Indeed the opinion that it had no academic future was freely expressed by my advisers.² The sudden demand for instruction in sociology in the early nineties was widespread; and academic opportunities became correspondingly numerous.

In the light of all that has been said thus far, together with details now to be added, there need be little hesitation about selecting the date 1892 as memorable, not merely for American university work in general, but for sociology in particular. This latter phase of the facts is not altogether the achievement of the sociologists themselves. After 1892 sociology came out into the open as an accredited university subject, but I very strongly doubt if this consummation would have been reached at that time—I am not sure that it would have occurred at all—if the University of Chicago had not been founded.

This is not a preface to self laudation by Chicago sociologists. It is only a statement of the facts which have led to the present position of sociology in the United States. The history of sociology contains many facts of which Chicago sociologists are proud, but they are not the only ones.

² Cf. Fiske or Jamieson's similar testimony *in re* history, below, p. 717.

I have first-hand knowledge and—as evidence of an inferior order, submitted for what it is worth—certain impressions which the facts made on me while they were occurring before my eyes. I repeat that, in my judgment, for reasons to be indicated at once, there would have been neither so rapid nor so extensive development of instruction in sociology as has occurred since 1892, if the University of Chicago had not been founded. On the other hand, I want to be equally unequivocal in my expression of belief that the influence of instruction in sociology at the University of Chicago was primarily not because of intrinsic merits, but because of the galvanic effects of the University of Chicago itself upon the whole academic situation in the United States. In some respects Leland Stanford Junior University, founded the same year, was a similar dynamic factor, but it was so remote geographically that it did not produce the same visible effects.

In a word, all the older universities were at first thrown upon the defensive by the founding of the University of Chicago. The mythical belief spread at once that this upstart institution had the intention, and the resources back of the intention, to do for the older institutions what the Standard Oil system had done for many of its rivals.¹ Much of the suspicion and fear stimulated by the name of Mr. Rockefeller in business was paralleled by the reaction of the older universities toward the new “Rockefeller University” in Chicago. It is doubtful if higher education in the United States has ever received as much stimulus from a single event as came to it from the founding of the University of Chicago. In certain aspects it may be compared with the military awakening of Great Britain after the German invasion of Belgium.² Jealousy and fear

¹ How extravagant this belief was will be shown in the forthcoming *History of the University of Chicago*, by Dr. T. W. Goodspeed.

² It is notable that of the Harvard faculty in 1891-92, out of 151 members in the Arts and Literature group, only 31, or 20.5 per cent, had the degree of Ph.D. Out of the corresponding 139 members of the faculty at the opening of the University of Chicago, 66 or 47.4 per cent had the same degree. To be sure, some of the strongest men in each institution did not have the degree, and in that respect the one offsets the other. Yet the larger proportion of Doctors of Philosophy in the new Chicago faculty was a fair index of the relative alertness, at the time, of the two institutions. Of course it was not long before the shock of the contrast reacted in such a way that Harvard renewed her youth, and regained her relative prestige.

drove each of the stronger institutions to their utmost exertions to maintain their positions. They kept close watch on every move of Dr. Harper. There were at first many attempts to discount and discredit his idealism. Ridicule of his actual or supposed plans became an inflated coinage of the American republic of letters. The collateral behind this coinage was a rather slow accumulation of perception that a modern university spirit had found means of expression, and that the older institutions must in self-defense take knowledge of it. The institutions with the most readily available resources rather promptly set themselves the task of equaling or exceeding Dr. Harper's achievements. It is superfluous to add that in many ways they were successful; sometimes in part, sometimes wholly.

Perhaps there was no single detail in which Dr. Harper's example turned out to be more constructive than in opening the way for the subject of sociology in curricula which otherwise might not for years have made room for that division of social science. At all events, there is no doubt in my mind that the rapid increase of academic attention to the subject of sociology in the United States after 1892 must be credited very much less to intrinsic merit of work done by the members of the new department at Chicago than to the general academic rivalry stimulated by Dr. Harper's aggressiveness.

To be sure, this particular effect of Dr. Harper's initiative has not even yet appeared at Harvard or Johns Hopkins or Princeton—to mention only the most conspicuous exceptions. To this day no one of these universities has given sociology its proportionate share of opportunity. It would be out of place to speculate about the reasons. On the other hand, I hope that those who have first-hand knowledge of the facts may be induced to testify as to whether or not the example of Dr. Harper in establishing a department of sociology at Chicago turned the scale in favor of a similar innovation at Columbia. It is hardly conceivable that sociological instruction in this country could have attained its actual rate and dimensions of expansion without the pioneering of these two universities.¹

¹Professor Giddings' testimony (above, p. 762) tends to confirm my hypothesis.

The Social Science Group, as we now call it, in the University of Chicago, started with seven instructors in political economy, scheduling nineteen courses; four instructors in political science, scheduling sixteen courses; six instructors in history, scheduling forty-eight courses; and six instructors in "social science and anthropology," scheduling thirty courses.¹

I must confess that a look at the schedule of the latter department now brings blushes to my seasoned cheeks. It is ocular proof of the boldness of the bluff we were putting up. We were dimly aware of problems not yet investigated, and in our zeal we rushed into the advertising of courses some of which now stand as an indictment on charge of ignorance. At present I can merely enter a candid plea of guilty, with prayers for the mercy of the court.

The extenuating circumstances are phases of the fact that the rest of the world of social science, or rather the American portion of it, was at the time as ignorant as we were, with a considerable amount of unconfessed conviction of sin, about methodology in general. The conventional type of ignorance was smug and intolerant. The sociological type was bumptious and possibly, not in purpose but in effect, insolent. Even in the conventional ranks, or perhaps it were more correct to say among the younger students of the social sciences who had not yet become hopelessly conventionalized, there was a lot of skulking suspicion that current ways of dealing with social realities had not gone far below the surface. Here was a program which looked strange enough to be impressive. The overt reactions were of course much more generally unfavorable than favorable. More jeering than admiration was in evidence among the followers of both popular and scientific tradition; but it was jeering not according to knowledge. It did not understand either the merits or the demerits of what it was

¹ This designation was never used by members of the staff. They promptly called the attention of the Board of Trustees to the fact that it was analogous with the conceivable title "mathematics and algebra." The Trustees at once authorized the change of designation to "Sociology and Anthropology." This has been the official title since 1893. In the *Register* for 1893-94 the name of George E. Vincent appears as assistant in sociology, and that of William I. Thomas as Fellow. Each of these began to offer courses in that academic year.

jeering at. It contained more fear of having its idols smashed than precise insight into the prematurity of the idol-smashers. While the rashness of these latter was also more creditable for its courage than for its clearness of vision, it may be compared, in the mode of its operation, to the influence of any other righteous disturbers of the peace. It was a demonstration against the futility of the existing order both of social conditions and of theories about the conditions. It made some people think that something must be the matter, both in society and in the science of society, else no one would be guilty of behavior so presumptuous. It fixed attention on an alleged hiatus in social thinking. The disturbance enlisted a small nucleus of sympathetic followers.

Meanwhile our Chicago sociological staff had jumped into a flood in which it was a case of sink or swim. We simply had to grow wiser than we were when we took the plunge. As I look back on these beginnings now, I realize that if I could have taken my own measure I never should have had the courage to assume the risk. I had only the dimmest suspicion of how far I now see that I was from having thought through the reality with which I had undertaken to deal in a virtually untried way.

There is, however, another side to the case. All my previous training in the social sciences, and my eleven years of college teaching, had forced me into a sort of Christopher Columbus attitude toward the unknown unexplored, and also toward the insufficiency of anybody's knowledge about the known explored. For a decade I had been growing more and more certain that our conventional interpretations of human experience had merely scratched the surface of the facts. So far as history was concerned, I was in a state of mind to welcome the aphorism which I did not hear of till several years later: "History is always interesting but never instructive." I felt that the work of the historians might be divided into two classes: first, that which ends with solemn conclusions which are not convincing; secondly, that which reaches no conclusions at all, but merely a litter of facts which, as such, are not worth getting. It seemed to me that the study of history ought to arrive at something that would make the living generation wiser, better, and more capable. While I could offer

few specifications to justify my feeling, I did not try to conceal my belief that the historians must change their attitude very radically before their work would do its utmost for human intelligence.

I had also been growing more and more dissatisfied with the ways in which the men were proceeding who had the impulses which I most respected about efforts to control the facts of society in the interest of social betterment. Not merely those cheerful dowagers of both sexes who thought they were solving social problems over safely isolated teacups, but even the vigorous pioneers who had organized the American Economic Association seemed to me, in very unlike ways to be sure, liable to the charge of attempting to prescribe before having a diagnosis.¹ It seemed to me that the members of the latter group were putting excessive stress upon projects for improving economic activities, and often for improvement of activities which were less economic than something else, while they were neglecting the crying fundamental need of probing into the deeper nature of human society, human resources, and human wants. More knowledge in these directions seemed to me to be the demand of the hour, rather than projection of reforms for the society which was only vaguely understood.

I remember this idea was active in my mind in connection with Professor Ely's stimulating little book *Problems of Cities*.² It was made up of articles that had appeared as a series in the *Baltimore Sun*. The argument was relatively novel on this side of the Atlantic, and not only in Baltimore but all over the country it was provocative of wholesome discussion. I was on the whole inclined to accept in the main Professor Ely's views about municipal control of public services, but at the same time it seemed to me that the case had been built so far too much upon mere opinion, and that a foundation should be constructed for it by penetrating into the essentials of urban life, and demonstrating the vital character of municipal activities as modes of human effort in general. I had an undeveloped feeling that more might be brought to light about the meaning of human society in the large, which would place the whole conception of public control of municipal services in a more demonstrative light.

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 779 sq.

² Referred to *supra*, p. 734.

That is, all of my acquaintance with generalized thinking about society, all of my own reflections upon the "true inwardness" of human relations, all of the programs for concrete improvement of human conditions, had been converging upon the central conclusion: The human race does not understand itself very well yet. Even the wisest are partially blind leaders of the blind. . Both for large theoretical purposes, and for the minutest concrete devices of betterment, the most pressing need is a scrapping of our old apparatus for explaining society, and a new procedure for finding out just how the wheels actually do go around in human affairs. I am expressing now, not my present thought about these things, but as nearly as I can reproduce it the state of mind with which I undertook my work at Chicago in 1892. I was far enough along at the time to have formed and to have professed the definite aim to have a hand in the work of inventing a new way of looking human facts straight in the face; of finding out, without deference to any previous conceptions about the matter, just what people are doing in the world, why they are doing it, why they partially succeed or fail, what means we have of deciding when and where it is desirable that men's present purposes should succeed or fail, what means we have of deciding what purposes would be more fit for success, what means we have of procuring the whole or any part of those successes which our best knowledge would sanction.

Of course this was an ambitious program. Whenever it was indicated, even in part, it was greeted with all sorts of ridicule. Unless I am greatly mistaken, however, every man who has added to the momentum of the sociological movement has been impelled by some such impulse. I am confessing for myself only, as far as details are concerned; but all the other sociologists, as far as I can gather, have been stirred by a similar sense of need and have pursued a similar purpose. I have neither regrets nor apologies for this youthful zeal. Still less have I any retractions of principle to make. In its spirit this sociological movement was genuinely scientific. It recognized limitations of knowledge in a certain area, and it set itself to investigate in that area. It was in its way as commendable as the scientific efforts of Galileo or Columbus. Moreover, it had to answer for itself to a learned public which was

scarcely more sympathetic than the publics which Galileo and Columbus had to confront. Its respectability consisted, not in its having arrived, but in its willingness to start on an untried search. More than this, it was necessary from the beginning for the sociologists to manufacture the more special tools for their research as their work progressed.

As it turned out, Dr. Harper responded to another true prophetic instinct. He insured from the beginning mutual reinforcement between men who were primarily interested in the theoretical phases on the one hand, and the applied phases on the other, of sociological knowledge. In so far as the University of Chicago has been a factor in promoting the sociological movement, the evidence in my possession leaves no doubt in my mind that, without Dr. Harper, whatever might have been done for sociology at Chicago would have been an exaggeration of one of these phases at the expense of the other, and consequently in the long run to the discredit of both. Dr. Harper brought together, as the nucleus of the Department of "Social Science," two men who were not only strangers to each other, but whose approach to the common problem was from opposite angles. The Department of Anthropology was attached to the Department of "Social Science," as a mere convenience of bookkeeping. It has always been essentially as independent as the Departments of History and Political Economy. Similar considerations of convenience originally linked the Department of Home Economics with "Social Science." In this case, too, there was independence, except on paper. Dr. Henderson and the present writer were therefore the sociological staff until it was recruited by Dr. Vincent and Dr. Thomas.

Although Dr. Henderson's center of attention was social betterment, and mine was the methodology of social investigation, we never from first to last had the slightest difference of opinion about the division and correlation of our own work and that of our students. Each of us recognized in the other's program the correlate of his own. I have never had a shade of interest in abstract sociology except as a necessary preliminary to the most intelligent conduct of each and every part, from least to greatest, of the whole range of human life. Dr. Henderson took the same view of the

relation between general sociology and concrete applications. While he devoted himself primarily to investigation of concrete conditions crying for immediate relief, he consistently regarded all plans for social betterment as tentative in the degree in which there is uncertainty about the underlying theories of larger social relations upon which the working plans have been based. So long as he lived, he was frequent in generous tribute to the basic importance of the more abstract phases of the work in the department.

How consistently and profitably the department has interpreted human experience in these blended phases of the general and the special is another matter. Moreover, as to both theory and practice, the relations in the country at large between general sociology and social technology still remain in an unsettled and unsatisfactory condition. Inability to do justice to the subject compels me to make this survey partial by omitting the whole history of the technological phases of the sociological movement. I restrict myself, first, to remarking that a comprehensive view of the sociological movement in the United States for the last fifty years would include such a survey as Professor Francis G. Peabody of Harvard, or Professor Graham Taylor, or Miss Jane Addams, or Dr. Devine might supply;¹ and, secondly, to insertion of the personal profession of faith that it will be a grievous mistake, and in its results unfortunate for both as well as for the public whose interests must ultimately evaluate the work of both, if the representatives of the generalizing and of the concrete phases of the sociological movement do not develop consciousness of interdependence, and ability to express that consciousness in mutually appreciative and sympathetic co-operation.²

There is room for an informing treatise on the state of demand for general sociology in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Truth to tell, so far as articulate opinion might be taken as the sole evidence, the ratio of requisition for a distinctive sociological technique, as compared with call for other techniques, would probably be represented by a coefficient of several decimal places.

¹ See Professor Lindsay's article on "Schools of Philanthropy," in Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, ed. of 1908.

² See the passage on divisions of labor in sociology below, p. 828.

In other words, few people spoke for sociology and many against it.¹ Those who spoke for it seemed to each other and to nearly everybody else to be "speaking with tongues." Very little could be made of their jargon.

As I have elsewhere implied,² a few people were listening to an inward voice calling them to the peril of condemnation as Quixotic, in the attempt to stir study of the human lot into greater objectivity. These men were more amply equipped with a sense of lack, a feeling of the futility of conventional knowledge of society, than with divining rods certain to point out sources of more satisfying knowledge. They had a respectable faith, however, that there are such sources, and they took their lives in their hands in search for them.

No one could fully realize it at the time, but a psychological necessity, such as has been illustrated whenever distinctive principles of thinking have disturbed the peace of previous programs, was forcing a reckoning between the social sciences and the new "biology," particularly with the evolutionary conception as projected into all thought by the biologists.³ In the first quarter of the nineteenth century the most characteristic variants of speculation about society had been conceptions of pure mathematics. In the second quarter the peculiar variants were those of physics. In the third and fourth quarters sociological interpretation of the most venturesome sort cast itself in the physiological mold. Of course each of the ruling tendencies in physical science struggled for mastery in social science.

It must be remembered too that in the early nineties there were scarcely any available "helps" for the men who tried to get a hearing for sociology in the universities. There was no standard literature of any sort which could be used according to the classroom methods of the older social sciences. Each instructor was thrown upon his own resources to an extent which made his task desperate,

¹ As symptoms of the situation, see report of remarks by Small, Patten, Giddings, Ward, and Ashley, at the meeting of the American Economic Association, *Proceedings*, X, 1895, p. 106 ff.; also note the apologetic tone of the Preface to Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, 1895. Cf. letter in Vol. I, No. 2, p. 210, of *American Journal of Sociology*.

² Cf. pp. 769, 823 *et passim* ³ Cf. Small, *Meaning of Social Science*, pp. 71-85.

as compared with that of the historians, economists, and political scientists. Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, and Schaeffle's four volumes on the structure and life of society (*Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*) were attempts to state objective facts of human experience in terms of physiological analogies. They were ridiculed by a hundred academic men to every one who was willing to consider them seriously. For several years my lectures were elaborations of Schaeffle, with one eye constantly on Spencer and Ward. This is a deliberate confession that during those years these writers about social phenomena got between me and the reality itself.¹ While the emptiness of this sort of work now almost makes my teeth chatter, I feel no conviction of sin for it. From my present outlook I cannot see how transition from the older ways of thinking about human affairs to our present process conceptions could have been effected more promptly and surely than by using those writers for what they were worth.

The present division of this paper may be treated as merely introductory to those parts of the study by Mr. Tolman which have not already been referred to,² and to the papers continuing the record by Professors Bernard and Clow.³

VI. EXTRA-ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION FOR PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

It is not the purpose of this section to record the experience or to evaluate the work of organizations outside of the sociological field. It is still farther from the present purpose to imply a right on the part of sociologists to censor their purposes or their programs. The sociologists have been more or less conscious of interests in common with those of these organizations. The sociologists have been more or less influenced by the work of these organizations. The present writer is unable precisely to estimate or to characterize that influence in very much detail. The obvious fact, to be set as

¹ Dr. Vincent will probably not object to the statement that our little book referred to above, p. 772, was his attempt to infuse some human interest into my interpretation of the scientific method.

² "The Teaching of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 11, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 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nearly as possible in its proper place in this survey, is that American sociology has been one expression among many of movement in the whole realm of social science and social practice. A functional history of either of these movements would have to make out how each influenced and was influenced by all the others, and how motion in the evolution of social science in the large sense resulted.

A document referred to above contains the claim that the American Social Science Association was the mother of all subsequent social science organizations in the United States.¹ Whether the claim was made, or was intended to be taken very seriously, is a question which this paper does not attempt to answer. It can hardly be doubted that the existence of the society named had something to do with the formation of the later societies. The important matter is that particular interests within the range of social science and social practice successively gained organized expression.²

Without attempting to prejudice the question as to the nearness or remoteness of the relation between these organizations and the general sociology with which we are principally dealing, some of the better known of these organizations are listed in the order of their formation, as evidence of miscellaneous busy social consciousness. It would be preposterous to suppose that general sociology was altogether independent of the same underlying influences which produced these organizations, or that it was altogether unaffected by the organizations themselves. For further information or sources of information about most of these bodies, cf. Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, ed. 1908.

1865 The American Social Science Association.

1866 The National Labor Union.

1867 Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange.

1867 Knights of St. Crispin.

1868 Knights of Labor.

1870 The National Prison Association (since 1907, the American Prison Association).

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 726.

² *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, IV, 16; *American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 591-95.

- 1870 The International Prison Congress (reorganized).
- 1872 The Catholic Total Abstinence Union.
- 1874 The National Woman's Christian Temperance Union.
- 1874 The Sovereigns of Industry.
- 1876 The American Secular Union and Free Thought Federation.
- 1879 The National Conference of Charities and Corrections.
- 1880 The Farmers' National Congress.
- 1881 The National Civil Service Reform League.
- 1881 National League for the Protection of the Family.
- 1884 National Education Association (expanded from National Teachers' Association, 1857).
- 1884 The American Historical Society.
- 1885 The American Economic Association.
- 1886 The American Federation of Labor.
- 1887 The American Protective Association.
- 1887 The Anti-Poverty Society.
- 1887 The Church Association for the Advancement of the Interests of Labor.
- 1888 The American Statistical Association. (Although this society was founded earlier than the period covered by our survey [1839], it is proper to schedule it here—i.e., at the time when it entered upon its major importance with publication of its *Quarterly*.)
- 1889 National Curfew Association.
- 1889 American Academy of Political and Social Science.
- 1889 The Society of Christian Socialists.
- 1880 The Farmers' Alliance.
- 1890 The Consumers' League (incorporated 1898).
- 1891 National Christian League for the Promotion of Purity.
- 1891 The American Christian Social Union.
- 1893 National Household Economic Association.
- 1893 The American Proportional Representation League.
- 1893 The American Railway Union.
- 1893 The Anti-Saloon League of America.
- 1894 National Municipal League.
- 1895 The American Purity Alliance (incorporated as continuation of the New York Committee for the Prevention of State Regulation of Vice).
- 1895 The Citizens' Industrial Association of America.
- 1896 National Direct Legislation League.
- 1897 The American Forestry Association.
- 1898 League for Social Service (after 1902 the American Institute for Social Service).
- 1898 The Anti-Imperialist League.
- 1899 The National Consumers' League (incorporated 1902).
- 1800 National Irrigation Association.
- 1000 Civil Service Retirement Association.
- 1000 The National Federation of Old-Farmers' Associations.
- 1000 The National Anti-Slavery League.
- 1000 The Immigration Restriction League.

- 1903 The American Political Science Association.
- 1904 The American Civic Association.
- 1906 The National Association for Labor Legislation.
- 1906 The Christian Socialist Fellowship.
- 1907 League of American Municipalities.
- 1909 The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
- 1912 The National Institute of Social Sciences.

*The American Historical Association.*¹—It would be impossible from the present point of view to substitute for Professor Jameson's sketch an equally illuminating account of the origin, character, and work of the American Historical Association. If the perspective of the present survey were to be made as accurate as possible, the whole of Professor Jameson's paper would be inserted here. Space limits forbid this, but brief quotations from the paper will serve to indicate the necessity of consulting it for further information:

The last twenty-five or thirty years have witnessed the growth of many such societies, so many that for each of the departments of study recognized in a modern American university there exists a society national in its scope and in the extent of its membership, which binds together the scattered devotees of the particular specialty, brings them into mutual acquaintance, friendship, and regard, effaces local jealousies and chauvinistic zeal for individual universities, and increases devotion to the scientific ends pursued in common. The phenomenon has an importance beyond what is apparently suspected by the average man. No millionaire endows these societies. When the American rich man wishes to do something for the endowment of research, he still does it through the conventional channels of the universities. Yet it may be doubted whether the universities, pressed by numbers increasing with unexampled rapidity, have with all their wealth done in recent years so much for the advancement of pure research as have the poor but single-minded associations of specialists. Indeed, it might be doubted a priori whether the American university, in its typical organization a body of specialists ruled over by a body of "prominent citizens," could ever be expected to promote the progress of the sciences so effectively as the scientific society, composed of specialists alone and working in unhampered devotion to intellectual ends.

Of such organizations, none has been more fruitful of good works than the American Historical Association, founded at Saratoga on September 9, 1884.

How much there was for superior organization to achieve, how much has in twenty-five years been accomplished by the American Historical Association,

¹ Cf. account of the founding and sketch of the first-quarter century of the Association, by Professor J. Franklin Jameson, *American Historical Review*, XV (October, 1909), 1-20.

and other agencies working in connection with it, can only be understood by giving a glance at the condition of American historical scholarship in 1884. It is now only a minor part of the members of the Association whose age permits remembrance of those conditions; and not all of these can without effort recall the situation in detail. The state and local historical societies were perhaps not half as numerous as now, their membership, their endowments, their libraries not half as great. State historical departments, or working archive establishments, of the modern type, were unknown. The *Magazine of American History* was the only general historical journal. In all the universities and colleges of the country there were apparently only fifteen professors and five assistant professors who gave all their time to history. "When a chair of history was established here," writes one of these teachers in 1883, "grave professors, educated under the old order of things, regarded it as an unwarranted expenditure of time and money. History should, they thought, be made auxiliary to some other department."

In most cases it was thus subordinated or annexed, the catalogues showing combinations with political science, political economy, English literature, philosophy, comparative philology, geology, natural history, German, and French, and the chair becoming, in Dr. Holmes's phrase, a settee. The writer of these papers, then a youthful aspirant for academic promotion, well remembers that several institutions, now abounding in historical teachers and courses, were then cautiously considering whether a professorship of history, or of history and something else, could or could not be established. He well remembers the rueful feelings with which he heard President Eliot, when discouraging to an academic audience at about that time on the unequal regard then paid to different studies in America, describe an interview with two promising young men who asked him if in his judgment it would be wise for them to fit themselves for professorships in history: "I was obliged to tell them that under existing circumstances it would be the height of imprudence." . . .

Plainly, the organization of historical studies in America was not far advanced. But organization, numbers, and quantities are not all. The graduate student of that time, it is agreed on all sides, was superior to the graduate student of today. . . . The professors were few but they included—to mention only the *stelligeri* in the catalogue—such teachers as Torrey and Gurney, Moses Coit Tyler and W. F. Allen, Herbert B. Adams and Charles Kendall Adams. Able young Americans, who had studied history in German universities when German historical instruction was in the height of its glory, were coming home full of enthusiasm, determined to make history flourish abundantly on American soil. . . . The truth is that, defective as our organization might be, we stood, without knowing it, at the beginning of a new and most fruitful era in the development of American historiography. To the student of historical writing there is nothing surprising in this. It was as natural that the great war for nationality should be followed within twenty years by a great outburst of historical activity as that the Reformation should

breed historians, or that the first epoch-making works of Niebuhr and Boeckh and Ranke in Germany, of Guizot and Mignet and the Thierry's in France, should appear within twenty years after the Napoleonic conflict. The time was ripe for the American Historical Association in 1884 as it was for the Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde in 1819. . . .

Many persons interested in history must have been impressed with the value of the American Social Science Association, founded in 1865, . . . and of similar bodies. . . .

The call for the meeting at which the American Historical Association was founded was signed by the president and secretary of the Social Science Association (John Eaton and Frank B. Sanborn), Charles Kendall Adams of Ann Arbor, Moses Coit Tyler of Ithaca, and Herbert B. Adams. But it has never been questioned that the main influence in the movement was that of Herbert Adams, professor in the Johns Hopkins University. . . .

The simple constitution then framed, and adopted the next day,¹ has with slight alterations served the Association to the present time. But its preparation brought up at once some of the gravest questions in the society's future, questions vividly debated in the committee. Should the effort be made to form something like an Academy of History, small in numbers, imposing in the weight of its individual members, and exerting through that weight a powerful influence on the development of the science; or should the society be a more popular body, into which any respectable and educated person interested in history might be admitted? One who stood upon the losing side of the question has since described it as being "whether we should try to be as big as possible or as good as possible." This has a specious sound, but "good" in such matters is good in relation to the existing conditions and the possibilities of achievement. Nothing has prevented any member from presenting to the Association as learned and profound a paper as he might have presented to a select forty having thirty-nine specialties different from his, and in any body the older heads have their full share of influence. On the other hand, how largely has the American public, scientific or other, shown itself disposed to defer to the authority, in any line, of forty immortals—immortals voiceless for lack of endowment and unable to obtain governmental support unless, with governmental selection? Diffusion of influence, diffused participation, is the democratic mode. The older element is quickened and helped by the presence of the younger; the wiser, even by the presence of those whom in American life they must perforce address. It would be hard to persuade anyone who has attended a meeting of the American Historical Association and carefully watched what goes on, in and out of the formal sessions, that a gathering from which nine-tenths of the present attendants were absent would do as much good for the common cause.²

¹ September 10, 1884.

² Important among the other contents of Professor Jameson's paper is the explanation of the relation of the Association to the United States government.

The American Economic Association.—Instead of offering an independent version of the facts, the present summary will be most objective if it quotes a few passages from the records.¹

Before the American Economic Society was born, Dr. Edmund J. James, assisted by Professor Simon N. Patten, proposed the formation of an organization to be called the "Society for the Study of National Economy." The draft of the constitution drawn up by Professors James and Patten doubtless represented the state of mind of a certain active few better than the less programmatic "Statement of Principles" eventually adopted.² Professor James said at the twenty-fifth anniversary: "The Verein für Socialpolitik had just gotten fairly to work, having been organized in October, 1872. Dr. Johannes Conrad, professor of political economy in the University of Halle, called the attention of his students to this organization and its work in one of his lectures, dwelling upon the causes which had led to the establishment of this organization in order to find a voice for new sentiments and new developments. It represented a protest against the extreme tendencies of the so-called orthodox school, and Manchesterthum as represented by the Volkswirtschaftlicher Kongress.

"I remember very distinctly Conrad's speaking to us Americans who were in his seminary one evening, urging us to organize a similar association in the United States upon our return, emphasizing the fact that times were changing. The old order was passing away, and if economic students were to have any influence whatever upon the course of practical politics, it would be necessary to take a new attitude toward the whole subject of social legislation; and if the United States were to have any particular influence in the great social legislation and the great readjustment of society on its legal side which seemed to be coming, an association of this sort would have very real value. I decided then that, as soon as I could, I would begin the agitation for such an association. . . . In February, 1883, I made a visit to several of our leading institutions. I remember very well on this occasion having held interesting and, to me, very profitable conferences with Henry Carter Adams of Michigan, Arthur Latham Perry of Williams, Dunbar and Laughlin of Harvard, John B. Clark of Smith, Sumner and Farnham of Yale, Francis A. Walker of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Smith and Seligman of Columbia, Richard T. Ely of Johns Hopkins, and Robert Ellis Thompson and Albert S. Bolles, Jr., of Philadelphia; and with all of them I raised the question whether the time had not come for the organization of an economic association of the sort suggested above.

¹ See "Report of the Organization of the American Economic Association," by the secretary, R. T. Ely, *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 1, 5-16; also *American Economic Association Quarterly*, 3d Series, XI, No. 1 (1910), 1-111. Being the report of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the society.

² The James-Patten draft is in the *Quarterly*, 3d Series, XI, 50-53. Cf. Professor James's reminiscences, *ibid.*, pp. 107-11.

"I found a general agreement that possibly such an association might do useful work, but in some cases also the view that the American Social Science Association practically performed the only available function of such an organization.

"Upon my return from Europe in the autumn of 1883 I entered the University of Pennsylvania, and here I took up again at various times the agitation in favor of a new organization which should have quite a different attitude toward our economic problems from that which was characteristic even of the Social Science Association, broad and liberal as that was.

"My own feeling then—and I may say it has not altered since—was very thoroughly in favor of an organization with a definite program and platform—that is to say, as definite a program as the Verein für Socialpolitik had, a declaration, if you please, that the time had come for a new attitude and a new outlook and the elaboration of a program, if possible, upon which those economists who were willing to join in such an association could agree.

"I am free to say that I found but little sympathy for this particular proposition, and when it was evident that I could not secure the co-operation of any large number of men upon the basis which I proposed, I was quite willing to do the next best thing, and join in with other men and do what I could toward making an organization of the economists upon another basis, believing that in the long run time and tide and circumstance would be on my side and in favor of my views."

Professor Ely's report as secretary at the first meeting in 1885 opened with the following statement: "The need of an association designed to promote independent economic inquiry and to disseminate economic knowledge was keenly felt long before any determined effort was made to establish the desired organization. Suggestions looking to the formation of a society of economists were heard from time to time, but no active steps in this direction appear to have been taken before the spring of 1885,¹ when it was agreed that the time was ripe for action, and it was determined to test the feeling in this matter of those who would be likely to prove helpful in associated work in economics. The class of men required for this purpose was, it was believed, a large and constantly growing one. Men were wanted who were investigators, men, consequently, who did not believe that the entire range of economic knowledge had been compassed. It follows from this that it was not proposed to form a society of advocates of any political opinion or set of political opinions, as, for example, free trade or protection. It was not meant to deny that a free-trade club or a protectionist club might have its legitimate sphere, but it was held that this sphere lay outside the realm of science. Likewise it was not aimed to form a society to champion any class interests, either of rich or of poor, either of employer or of employee. What was desired was a society which, free from

¹ At this time Professor Ely was evidently not fully informed about the incidents to which Professor James testifies.

all trammels, should seek truth from all sources, should be ready to give a respectful hearing to every new idea, and should shun no revelation of facts, but, on the contrary, should make the collection, classification, and interpretation of facts its chief task. The ideal of this new society, as it presented itself to the minds of its projectors, was to seek light, to bear light, to diffuse light—ever the highest aim of all true science.

"A statement of the objects of the proposed association and a platform were drawn up, which, while intended to be merely provisional, would be calculated to attract those who believed in economic research, who thought that there was a great work to be done in economics, and who for other reasons might be able to work together profitably. This platform, it must be distinctly asserted, was never meant as a hard-and-fast creed which should be imposed on all members, and least of all was it intended to restrict the freest investigation."

In order perfectly to understand the situation, it must be observed that, at the time, the men who promoted the movement for organization of progressive economists had the very definite belief that they must fight for their scientific and academic existence. They held that certain men, whom they were not unwilling to mention by name in private conversation, occupied a relation to the ideas and prospects of most of the men who were fresh from their studies in Germany, closely similar to the relation of the members of the *Volkswirtschaftlicher Kongress* to the innovators who formed the *Verein für Socialpolitik*. They felt that these men were virtually if not avowedly a trust to control the opportunities for economic recognition in this country, and that the alternatives were to be stifled by the current orthodoxy or to combine for the preservation of independence.

It would be difficult to find within equally brief space more revealing evidence of conflicting ideas, and of types of interest striving for mastery, than is presented by the contrast between the "objects and proposed platform," in the call to the meeting for organization and the "Statement of Principles" finally adopted.¹ The form agreed upon after lively debate was as follows:

CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I. NAME

This society shall be known as the American Economic Association.

¹ The former is printed in the *Publications of the American Economic Society*, I, 6; the latter in *ibid.*, p. 35. The former is republished in 3d Series, XI, 57, and the latter, in *ibid.*, p. 49.

ARTICLE II. OBJECTS

1. The encouragement of economic research.
2. The publication of economic monographs.
3. The encouragement of perfect freedom in all academic discussion.
4. The establishment of a Bureau of Information designed to aid members in their economic studies.

ARTICLE III. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

1. We regard the state as an agency whose positive assistance is one of the indispensable conditions of human progress.

2. We believe that political economy as a science is still in an early stage of its development. While we appreciate the work of former economists, we look not so much to speculation as to the historical and statistical study of actual conditions of economic life for the satisfactory accomplishment of that development.

3. We hold that the conflict of labor and capital has brought into prominence a vast number of social problems, whose solution requires the united efforts, each in his own sphere, of the church, of the state, and of science.

4. In the study of the industrial and commercial policy of governments we take no partisan attitude. We believe in a progressive development of economic conditions, which must be met by a corresponding development of legislative policy.¹

In his historical review, at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Association, Professor Ely said:

Rightly or wrongly to many, the Statement of Principles seemed like a proclamation of emancipation. At this time the enthusiasm with which we were greeted may appear a little difficult to comprehend. . . . Why this jubilation? Why this feeling of emancipation? It was felt by many that political economy was opposed to the recognition of any ethical element in our economic life, that it opposed all *social* reforms for social uplift as futile, that it exalted into a principle of economic righteousness the individual and unrestrained pursuit of self-interest, that it almost deified a monstrosity known as the economic man, that it looked upon *laissez faire* as a law of beneficent providence, and held that free trade must be received as an ethical dogma, being a practical application of the command, "Thou shalt not steal," for here inconsistently an ethical principle was admitted as all controlling.²

¹ This note was added: "This statement was proposed and accepted as a general indication of the views and the purposes of those who founded the American Economic Association, but it is not to be regarded as binding upon individual members."

² Everyone who wants to understand the economic factor in the development of the social sciences in the United States should read thoughtfully not only the whole of Professor Ely's historical paper, but the entire series of addresses contained in the anniversary report (*Publications*, 3d Series, pp. I-III).

The American Political Science Association.—In the *Political Science Quarterly* for March, 1904,¹ Professor W. W. Willoughby writes:

The interests of political science, political economy, and history are so closely related that an attempt wholly to separate them, or to pursue their study as absolutely independent subjects, would be as practically impossible as it would be undesirable. Of the relation between history and political science it has been said by the late Sir John Seeley that politics without history has no root, and that history without politics has no fruit. The connection between economics and politics, is, if anything, more intimate. . . . And yet, intimate as are these relationships, the field of political science is one that may be clearly distinguished from that of history, as well as from that of economics, and the topics which the field includes, in order to be treated adequately, need to be studied as distinct subjects of inquiry. . . .²

The foregoing description of political science is sufficient to indicate not only the propriety, but, in the interest of scientific progress, the necessity of recognizing the study of matters political as an independent discipline. Within recent years this recognition has been especially shown in the creation in our colleges and universities of departments and chairs of politics as distinct from those of history and economics. Not until December 30, 1903, however, did this recognition lead to the establishment of a political science association whose exclusive interests should be political in character. Upon that date there was established at New Orleans, Louisiana, at the time when the American Historical and American Economic Associations were holding their annual meetings in that city, an association whose title is the American Political Science Association, and whose object is, as its constitution declares, "the encouragement of the scientific study of politics, public law, administration, and diplomacy." . . . By those who have been most active in its establishment, it is declared that this new association is intended and expected to attract the support not only of those engaged in academic instruction, but of public administrators, lawyers of broader culture, and, in general, of all those interested in the scientific study of the great and increasingly important questions of practical and theoretical politics. . . . It is believed that, just as the establishment of the two older of these bodies marked the beginning of a new period in the scientific study in America of the subjects with which they are concerned, so the creation of the American Political Science Association will, in years to come, be looked back upon as at once indicating the definite recognition of the fact that political science is a department of knowledge distinct

¹ XIX, 107.

² The editors add this note: "The establishment of this *Quarterly*, in 1886, naturally raised the same questions which are here discussed, viz., the interdependence of all the social sciences, and the existence of a distinct science of politics. See Monroe Smith, 'The Domain of Political Science,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 7."

from that of the other so-called social sciences, and as marking the commencement of a new period in the scientific study and teaching of matters political in the United States.

The American Sociological Society.—It was not until 1905 that American sociologists became sufficiently aware of one another to constitute a self-conscious group. That such a development occurred was due, more than to any other individual, to Professor C. W. A. Veditz. The members of the group had all previously been members of one or more of the Historical, the Economic, or the Political Science Associations. The essential facts may be presented most conveniently by reprinting the editorial announcement in the *American Journal of Sociology* for March, 1907.¹

In December, 1905, a number of persons interested in promoting the study of sociology met at Baltimore, during the sessions of the Historical, Economic, and Political Science Associations, and organized the American Sociological Society. The first annual meeting of the society was held in connection with the meetings of the cognate societies at Providence, R.I., December 27-29, 1906. The proceedings of that meeting are contained in the following pages.²

The establishment of the American Sociological Society marks a notable stage in the positive investigation of human conditions. Not many representatives of the older forms of social science are ready to admit that there is a function for sociology. A sufficient nucleus of scholars has been differentiated from the traditional social sciences, however, to give sociology the prestige of a visible personal following. Together with the Institut International de Sociologie, and the Sociological Society of London, the American Sociological Society bears witness that a few men and women, in full possession of their senses, are convinced that something is lacking in methods of interpreting human experience, and that the most effective means of supplying the lack must be sought without rather than within the older sciences of society.

This organization demonstrates, in the first instance, merely that its members have the courage of their convictions. Since those convictions have now taken corporate form, they must henceforth command a somewhat heightened degree of attention. More will be said, and more definitely, and with more confident emphasis, from and about the sociological point of view. What is said from this point of view will necessarily attract more notice from

¹ XII, 579.

² The last sentence refers to the fact that this *Journal* at first printed the proceedings of the Society, and gave the use of the type for reprints to be bound as separate volumes. This practice continued until the membership became large enough to support separate publication of the *Proceedings*. This desirable consummation was reached with Vol. XX, i.e., for the session of 1915.

both theorists and practical men who have hitherto regarded sociology as negligible. The sociologists do not imagine that they are appointed to destroy the vocation of other investigators of society. They feel themselves called to represent factors in the problems of human association which have thus far received less than their share of attention. In organizing a society, they are not beginning, but continuing, the work of winning for those neglected factors the appreciation they deserve. The society makes no appeal for credit. It simply proposes to encourage sociological inquiry and to await competent judgment of results. It believes that it can add an essential factor in promoting both special research and correlation of special investigations among the phenomena of human association. It maintains that our last attainable insight into the meaning of life must be derived from organization of such special researches. It heralds the faith that all the social sciences are unscientific in the degree in which they attempt to hold themselves separate from each other, and to constitute closed systems of abstractions. It demands correlation of the social sciences, to the end that real knowledge of human life as it is may increase; that insight into the quality of life as it is capable of becoming may expand; and that effort to realize the possibilities of life may grow more concerted and more intelligent.

VII. JOURNALS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

A chapter in the history of social science in the United States should be devoted to the evidences of thought-currents to be found in the leading social science journals. The writer has not made the sort of survey which would qualify him to write such a chapter. Merely as a memorandum of a piece of research that should be undertaken the titles of those journals, assuming two or three liberties in the use of the term, are subjoined:

American Anthropologist, New Series. "Organ of the American Anthropological Association, the Anthropological Society of Washington, and the American Ethnological Society of New York." Vol. XVII, 1915.

American Economic Review. "Published Quarterly by the American Economic Association." Vol. V, 1915.

American Historical Review. Vol. I, 1895. "The *American Historical Review* originated in a conference of some twenty-six persons interested in history, held in New York in April, 1895. That conference resolved upon the founding of such a Journal. . . . A considerable fund being necessary to sustain the *Review*, the Board and other friends of the undertaking proceeded to raise money in the form of guarantees for three annual payments. . . . The first number of the *Review* was issued in October, 1895. . . . In November and December, 1897, the guarantees having expired without the *Review's* becoming self supporting, the Board began

negotiations with the American Historical Association, with a view to aid. The Association had up to that time had no connection with the *Review*. . . . At its Cleveland meeting of December, 1897, the Executive Council of the Association voted a subsidy to the treasury of the *Review*. . . . A year later, the Association, at its New Haven meeting, in December, 1898, proceeded to make a more permanent arrangement with the Board. . . . Acting under the terms of this arrangement, the Council immediately elected a member of the Board, in place of one whose term was then expiring, and has since annually made one such election, for a term of six years in each case, and has filled vacancies otherwise arising."—Statement of the Board of Editors, 1915.

American Journal of Sociology.¹ "By agreement with the American Sociological Society the officers chosen by that body become, during their term of office, the Advisory Council of this Journal." Vol. XXI, 1915-16.

¹ In this connection, an item should be recorded because of its possible interest to later historians of sociology. Among the appropriations in the first budget of the University of Chicago was a subsidy for a University extension magazine. Late in the spring of 1895, after he had stubbornly contested the conclusion for three years, Dr. Harper was forced to the decision that the attempt to create a constituency for such a journal must be abandoned. It was a matter which had never in any way come to my knowledge, and I was taken completely by surprise when, as I was about to leave his office after a consultation on routine business, Dr. Harper abruptly remarked, "We have got to give up the *University Extension World*. It would be a pity for that subsidy to be transferred to anything but publication. Are you willing to be responsible for a journal of sociology?" The audacity of ignorance to which I confessed above (pp. 766-67) had never gone to the extreme of imagining that our department commanded the necessary resources for maintaining such a venture. On the other hand, it was no time and place for men who would flinch at a challenge, and there was no room for doubt that Dr. Harper intended his suggestion as a "dare." After brief consultation with my colleagues, Henderson, Thomas, and Vincent, I reported to Dr. Harper that we believed there was a vocation for a journal of sociology, and that we were ready to undertake editorial charge of such a publication. When the announcement was made shortly after that the *University Extension World* was to become the *American Journal of Sociology*, the editors had not even promises of material enough to fill the first number. More than that, some of the men whom we tried to interest as contributors advised us to reconsider our purpose, as there could not possibly be in the near future enough sociological writing to fill such a journal. Nevertheless, we issued the first number in July, 1895, while it was still uncertain whether material for a second number the following September could be obtained. Without the prompt and hearty co-operation of Lester F. Ward, followed closely by Professor Ross, the enterprise would scarcely have survived its first year.

After so much of this note was in type I recovered from my files a letter dated April 25, 1895, which I am not humble enough to publish; but I will acknowledge its existence, and its location, for the benefit of some future historian of American social science. He may also be assured, with cordiality in direct ratio with his remoteness,

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. "The Academy was organized December 14, 1889, to provide a national forum for the discussion of political and social questions. . . . The Academy publishes annually six issues of its *Annals*, dealing with the six most prominent current social and political problems. . . . The Academy publications, now approaching one hundred and fifty in number, give the most comprehensive account anywhere obtainable of the political and social questions that have been before the American people during the past quarter century." Vol. LVII (Whole Number 151), 1915.

Annual Reports of the American Historical Association. 1889—.

Columbia University Studies in Political and Social Science. Vol. I, 1897. Vol. LXIV (Whole Number 155), 1915. Now entitled *Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*.

Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. "Under the direction of the Departments of History, Political Economy, and Political Science." Series XXXIV, 1915.

Journal of American Folk-Lore. Issued by the American Folk-Lore Society. "Designed for the collection and publication of the folk-lore and mythology of the American Continent." Vol. XXVIII, 1915.

Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol. VI, 1915. "Published bi-monthly for the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, by Northwestern University Press." "The object of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology shall be to further the scientific study of crime, criminal law and procedure, to formulate and promote measures for solving the problems connected therewith and co-ordinate the efforts of individuals and of organizations interested in the administration of certain and speedy justice."

Political Science Quarterly. "Edited for the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia

that I do not begrudge him the temporary relaxation which perusal of the letter will afford from labors not frequently mirth-provoking.

The letter was addressed to Dr. Harper. It was written at his request, for use with the Board of Trustees. It was a statement of the functions which, in my opinion, a journal of sociology might, could, would, and should perform, and therewith of the opportunity presented to the University of Chicago to serve the world. The records do not show whether Dr. Harper read the letter to the Trustees or not, but something persuaded them not merely to transfer the previous subsidy of the *University Extension World* to the proposed journal of sociology, but to increase the amount by the sum of \$800.00.

Although this *Journal* has realized only a fraction of the expectations expressed in the letter, I venture to hope that, in the final analysis, the *Journal* will be held to have justified its existence.

The letter has been filed in the minutes of the University of Chicago Trustees, in connection with the record of the vote which established this *Journal*.

University." "The *Quarterly* follows the most important movements of foreign politics, but devotes chief attention to questions of present interest in the United States." Vol. XXX, 1915.

Publications of the American Economic Association. Vol. I, 1886. 3d Series, Vol. XI, 1910. Merged into the *American Economic Review*, 1911.

Quarterly Journal of Economics. "Published by Harvard University." Vol. XXIX, 1915.

Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association. Vol. XIV (New Series No. 110), 1915.

The Survey: Social Service Weekly. "The *Survey* is a co-operative, non-commercial venture in journalism, for all those who have a genuine interest in the public welfare. Its supporters are the social and civic workers of the country, and public-spirited citizens who are helping to make their city and state a better place in which to live and work."

Yale Review. Founded in 1892 as "A Quarterly Journal of History and Political Science." New Series, Vol. V, 1915.

VIII. DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE UNITED STATES

For a dozen years or so after 1892 American sociology was chiefly an experimentation with method, and a many-sided debate about method. It must be admitted that for a long time we were as unreal in this debate as Ahrens and von Mohl and Treitschke had been in the fifties in their attempts to define "state" and "society." Yet this schematic debate was necessary. If we have a hole to bore in a plank, a common auger will do it. If we have to bore a hole in an armor plate, a tougher tool has to be invented. Tools had to be fashioned for making our technique of social analysis more penetrating. We used up much time and strength adapting mental means to this purpose. Of course most of our talk during this period, and in a lesser degree the same is still true, was more about these means than about the work for them to do. We were still duplicating the fatuities of our predecessors. Many a man who had never done a day's real historical investigation in his life was noisy in discussing "the province" of history or the methodology of history. Many a man who was merely a repeater of economic formulas waxed valiant in defending a presumed "domain" of political economy, or a method of political economy, or in trying to oust someone from the supposed preserve of political economy.

It is not to be denied that the sociologists for years did the same thing. Our talk was of methodology for finding out something, but we did not find out much of anything by use of the methodology. We were all the time more or less consciously tempering drills for our particular kind of boring, but we did comparatively little boring after we had produced the drills. Many people get so interested in the tools that they forget all about the work which the tools are expected to do. The common problem of the social sciences is to understand people, past, present, and if may be future; but we get so wrought up in championship of our favorite *method* of approaching people that we may omit to deal very intimately with people themselves. As we have seen, the last decade of the nineteenth century was a time of much empty-seeming wrangling in the United States about the "province" of history, the "scope" of political economy, the "field" of political science, the "problems" of sociology. It was a time of attack and counter-attack upon methods of procedure that were insisted upon in the various divisions of social science. This seeming emptiness was in reality vacuity only in the sense that it yielded no immediate results.

There is, however, another side to the case. All this abstract discussion was actually a testing out of machinery previous to setting it to work. The people who got least out of this discussion were people who had least of the spirit or power of discovery or of construction. They did not really get hold of the conception that there could be anything to discover either about the past or about the powers of people.

The upshot of all these apparently fruitless years of wrangling about methods is that those who have had the benefit of the process can now take for granted many important things which were not to be understood at all twenty-five years ago. We can now proceed in a commonplace way to investigate the human reality by means of thought-tools which have meanwhile become familiar as a direct or indirect result of these seemingly useless discussions.

It may be years since readers of these pages have seen a horse shy at an automobile. Twenty years ago, and less, there were few horses, either in town or in country, that could pass an automobile without hysterics. Nearly all horses of the present

generation have been nearly as familiar from birth with the sight of automobiles as of other horses, and they take the one as much as the other for granted. It is very much so with the ideas of objectivity which psychological and sociological methodology have at last lodged in the most reluctant minds.

These generalizations, however, have anticipated certain details which must be drawn into the picture. For the sake of adding illustrative particulars I turn back to the year 1892.

As evidence of the operation of factors which the subsequent years were to test, I would recall Ward's paper on "The Place of Sociology among Sciences,"¹ Vincent's on "The Province of Sociology,"² Thomas' on "Scope and Method of Folk Psychology,"³ and the book which I have found cited more frequently by European writers than any other American sociological work—Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*.⁴

It would not be in accordance with my present purpose to deal with the specific contents of either of these essays—considered as proposals of method each of them may be referred to in that way. Without discussing individual characteristics of these early sociological ventures, I refer to them as evidences of an attitude of mind which was typical of the American sociologists at the time, whether they had published much or little. That is, we were all more or less consciously and avowedly devoted to search for or to assertion of some single, central genetic principle, or force, or method of human society in all times and places. We were less inclined at that time to propose the problem: *How many* different kinds of influences operate in human affairs, in how many different ways, in what different combinations, depending upon what variations of circumstances? That is, we were inclined to beg a fundamental question, and this fallacy was a serious impeachment of our earlier procedure.

The question to which we were all more or less in danger of assuming an affirmative answer as our first point of departure was: Is it to be supposed that society is to be explained at last by relating it to a single ultimate cause of some sort or other?

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, I (1895), 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 473, especially pp. 485-88.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

⁴ 1896.

Doubtless there were more reasons for this tendency than those of us who illustrated it would be able to exhibit. I confine myself to one among them. In some cases, at any rate, the tendency was most obviously a survival of our associations with the philosophers of history. I confess that this now seems to me to have been the strongest determining influence in this direction in my own case. I do not now feel ashamed of the fact that for years I had diligently studied the best known philosophers of history. I was stimulated by the devout hope that somewhere among them I might find the Holy Grail of sufficient explanation. If anyone had asked me, even as early as 1890, what I thought about the philosophers of history as guides to the interpretation of society, I should have said—as indeed I did say to my students in history before I gave my first course in sociology—that the philosophers of history deserve our veneration as eager searchers for the light, but in effect they were blind guides. My reason at that time, however, was not distinctly that I doubted the possibility of an explanation of history as the working of a single causative principle. I simply realized that no such explanation had been discovered.

On the other hand, it is easy to see now that many mental associations formed before our declaration of independence of the conventional social sciences clung to us after the secession, and we were still a great deal influenced by lingering hopes of discovering some single master-key which would prove to unlock all the secrets of social evolution. If Professor Giddings was more sanguine than some others, his very confidence made him more stimulating than most others. Whether the rest of us believed that he was following a reliable or an unreliable clue, all of us were provoked to more zeal in the common cause by his enterprise. His proposal of the combination to unlock the mystery of society is made most briefly on p. 17 of the *Principles*:

But in the subjective interpretation it will be necessary, as we already know, to start from that new datum which has been sought for hitherto without success, but which can now no longer remain unperceived in the narrowing range of inquiry. Sociology must go right from this time forth, as Mr. Spencer says that humanity does in the long run, because it has tried all possible ways of going wrong. Since contact and alliance are phenomena obviously more special than association or society, and imitation and impression are phenomena

obviously more general, we must look for the psychic datum, motive, or principle of society in the one phenomenon that is intermediate. Accordingly, the sociological postulate can be no other than this, namely: The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *consciousness of kind*. By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself.

Without recalling the various phases of discussion which Professor Giddings' doctrine aroused, I would add that his reasoning at this point and in the context provokes curiosity as to the extent of his share in that trait of our sociological thinking at the time to which I am referring, namely: Just as we had not shaken off all the unfortunate effects of our associations with speculative methods, so we had not assimilated all the regulative principles of the positive and evolutionary conceptions. In this, to be sure, we were simply in the same predicament with those physical scientists who were certain that they had found in the evolutionary idea a final solution of the cosmic puzzle.

The simplest statement of a fallacious conception of evolution which lurked in the subconsciousness of many physical and social scientists alike at the time is that the word "evolution" was supposed to stand for a single principle, which single principle was understood to be the causal nexus between a given antecedent condition and a given consequent condition. I must guard my meaning by the qualification that probably no responsible thinker, either in physical or in social science, would have admitted twenty-five years ago that the version of evolution which I am about to indicate had any likeness except by way of caricature to his own thoughts on the subject. What I am trying to say is that, as I see it, there was a pretty general tendency at the time, and I think Herbert Spencer was involuntarily a pace-maker in it, to try out schemes of social interpretation which derived encouragement from tacit reference to the sort of evolutionary conception which I must further characterize.

Of course the truth is that the term "evolution," or the supposed enlargement of it in the phrase "natural selection," is merely a symbol for a concurrence of processes the details of which are in most cases to be explored. Either phrase is in one sense an affirmation, but in a more vital sense it is virtually an interrogation. It

stands at a point at which the assumption has been accepted as beyond dispute that any subsequent situation is actually a consequence, not merely in time but as an effect, of antecedent situations. But "evolution," or "natural selection," is a phrase which, in the present state of our knowledge, actually advertises our ignorance of the precise concurrences of causes which bridge over the gap between the antecedent conditions, whatever they may turn out to have been, and the subsequent situation, as it appears in the great majority of cases which have thus far attracted reflective attention.

As an alternative form of expression we may put the matter in this way: We have before us the organism, or for the present purpose the *social type* EFGHI. The loose quasi-scientific form of expression which we have in mind is to the effect that "evolution" has brought




Diagram 1




Diagram 2

EFGHI into existence as a more finished elaboration of another presupposed structure, say ABCD. The picture in our minds, either as cause or as effect of that formula, is something like this:¹ That is, the straight line xy connecting ABCD and EFGHI symbolizes our conception of what has taken place in the production of the latter; viz., a single secret of metamorphosis, the operation of a unique manner of causation, has wrought over an earlier type of thing into a later type of thing, and this same secret of metamorphosis, or unique manner of causation, always accounts for the change of an earlier type of anything into a later species of the same genus. If, therefore, we have the name of that secret of metamorphosis, or unique type of causation, we have therewith the master-key to all metamorphoses, whether physical or social.

¹ See Diagram 1.

But the fact turns out to be very different. Suppose again we have the derived type of society EFGHI.¹ To the best of our knowledge, that cross-section of social relationships, whether it can properly be regarded as a metamorphosis of a real or imaginary antecedent structure ABCD or not, is a resultant of the confluence of innumerable influences, *abcd . . . n*, within as well as without the group of people composing the society; but this is the crucial matter: In effect the term "evolution" or any substitute for it is mostly an interrogative symbol for the formula of the co-operation of all those factors, ascertained or not ascertained, which have actually had a part in producing EFGHI. Neither the word nor the fact "evolution," if we remotely apprehend the value of either, can figure in our calculations as a talisman to produce objective phenomena, nor as a code key automatically to interpret the phenomena.

An enlightening parallel may be drawn between the word and the process *evolution* and the word and the process *strategy*. If the word "strategy" were issued to a commanding general, it would not automatically win victories. No more would application of the omnibus word "strategy" to victories won in the past reveal the concrete content of the strategy of a single campaign, still less the contrasts between the strategy of two or more campaigns. The word "strategy" is simply a generic term for methods by which means are applied to the accomplishment of military ends. It does not of itself give knowledge of adequate means, and it comprehends combinations of operations which make one campaign more or less unlike another. Accordingly, the word "strategy" alone does not, even after the events, reveal the program by which the objects of the specific campaign were accomplished. It merely serves as an algebraic expression for the details which may be an enigma to a given person using the word, and which must be found out by examining the available evidence in each case.

So with the word "evolution." In and of itself it is only an advertisement of our conception that there is coherence and con-

¹ Diagram 2. It is unnecessary to cumber this discussion with details in which the precise method of the evolution of this social form must have been different from the details involved in the evolution of an organic form.

tinuity of cause and effect in the world of experience. Neither the word nor the reality to which it refers releases us from the task of finding out the factors and methods of the coherence and the continuity involved in a given case, nor from the necessity of reconciling ourselves to the fact that the actuality subsumed under the concept "evolution" is not a flash of magic, but a more complex process than any one imagined physical or social causation to be before the evolutionary generalization had been reached.

Returning to the central proposition of this section, for some years after 1892 the American sociologists were zealously publishing the proposition that society is something that has been evolved, and they were boldly assuming responsibility for showing how it was evolved; but what we actually did besides was hardly more than calling attention to statical relationships in human society which had attracted comparatively little notice. Incidentally we labored to convince ourselves and one another that ways might be found for more adequate exposition of society under the operative aspects of evolution. It seems to me that our situation was weak at the time in our unpreparedness to strike out in search of social causes, and in our virtual standing still in our tracks peering about for *the social cause*. In other words, the clue which we expected under the evolutionary title was in effect not so very different from the kind of clue sought by the philosophers of history.

The fact here pointed out must be considered later in another connection, viz., its relation to the earlier arrogations of the sociologists with reference to the rank of their division of labor in "the hierarchy of the sciences." For instance, Ward says in the paper cited above:¹

We come to the last and highest of the sciences, viz., sociology. . . . We see, then, the high place which sociology, properly defined, should hold among the sciences, and how clear and incisive are the boundaries which mark it off from all other branches of learning. It is the cap sheaf and crown of any true system of classification of the sciences, and it is also the last and highest landing on the great staircase of education.

Here again, that in the sociologists' ways of thinking which was most offensive to their colleagues was merely a consistent application of statical assumptions about science which in principle were

¹ P. 790.

accepted by everyone at the time. In no single way are we more vividly reminded of the change of outlook in social science during the latest two decades, than in the extent to which talk about "sciences" has given place to work upon problems.

The condition of sociological theory for a decade or more following 1892 may be indicated from another angle, by consideration of Mr. Tolman's findings. He says:¹

While the growth of sociology is obvious, it would be idle to deny that certain tendencies are at work which tend to challenge its right to an important position in the field of the sciences, or in educational institutions. The action of certain of our most important universities, as noticed in the first part of this paper, is evidence enough of this movement. The arguments of such critics may perhaps be stated somewhat as follows: Sociology must define itself either as a body of doctrine, as a point of view, or as a method of research. It has tried to define itself as a body of doctrine, and it has failed in the attempt. If it is merely a point of view, it cannot be separated from the matter in discussion and must subordinate itself to the various social sciences. It has yet made no serious attempt to develop itself as a method of research, and must develop itself on these lines, and show its fruitfulness before it can demand consideration at the bar of science. It is no part of the business of this paper to answer these charges theoretically. If an examination of the classified list of sociological courses shows them to be well founded, then there is nothing to say, unless, indeed, it be to advise the sociologist to develop sociology as a method of research as rapidly as possible. My purpose in calling attention to this tendency is merely to give a true representation of the present status of sociology in the academic world. No treatment of this subject would be complete which minimized this attitude.

As to the state of things which Mr. Tolman reported quite objectively, it must be said, first, that the sociologists presented a clear case of coping with a condition, whatever rôle was played before, at the time, or afterward by their own or other people's theories. This condition was that the squatter sovereignty exercised by earlier comers in the social science field was not in accordance with any scientific theorem which can be permanently maintained. There was a condition of things in the assignment of work to different people in the social field, or rather in connection with the claims staked out by different people, which could not be sanctioned by objective analysis of the work to be done. Under those circumstances, to get a hearing the sociologists had to meet the

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, VIII (1902), 86.

conditions which they encountered, in the only way that was open to them in the then existing state of mind about the relation of subject-matter to academic departments. They had to appear in the name of a "science" in order to get standing in court.

It must be observed, secondly, that it is not yet possible to express this situation in a way that will command the assent of many scholars outside the sociological ranks, or for that matter of all scholars within those ranks. The academic facts as I see them, however, constituted in 1892, and in a high degree still constitute, a temporary, provisional, unstable relation in social science. Support of this assertion is one of the essentials of the sociological case.

It must be noted, thirdly, that the whole academic division of labor in the field of human relations corresponds with an obsolescent conception of reality. In principle this conception is not merely obsolescent but obsolete. Everyone who ranks as a scholar today assumes, in one lobe of his brain, that the reality which it is the common task of social scientists to interpret is an incessant working of impulses as causes, transformed in and through their workings into effects, and reappearing in the changed form, or in repetition of the original form, or both, as modified causes, reproduced in modified effects, in series to which our knowledge can assign no limits.

The academic division of labor in the social sciences, however, corresponds rather to the conception of things fixed in an eternal state. If our experience brings us into contact with objects of knowledge corresponding with that conception, it is appropriate to mark out divisions of knowledge accordingly. It seems to me to be taken as true, that in the pedagogical no man's land between the grades in and for which earnest work in pedagogical psychology is attempted, and that paradise of independence of academic pedantries where pursuit of knowledge is followed whithersoever it may lead—that is, in the bulk of high-school, college, and graduate-school instruction—we are obliged for pedagogical purposes to deal with minds as though they could not form an idea of anything unless it is represented as statical, or at least, in motion at all, as moved only in the way in which dirt is carried in a

wheelbarrow, not as parts of an intricate interplay of reciprocities. For instance, in historical narrative we must not venture nearer to genetic or causal interpretation than to exhibit things or acts (treated as in effect things) in the mere temporal relation of succession. If we get a second or even a third dimension of causal connections, it is within a pitifully short radius. In political or economic interpretation we must deal with institutions, past or present, as though they were so many beads strung on a mere chronological thread without any effective prying into the psychology of the relationships of those beads as consequents of antecedent and contemporary causes, or as antecedents of subsequent effects. This pedagogical presumption has never been sufficiently studied to establish or to discredit its authority. Still less has a formula been reached for the stage of mental development at which transition should begin, and the rate of acceleration at which it should proceed, from superficial treatment of objects of knowledge as successions of assorted specimens to treatment of them as phases of eternally recombining correlations of forces.

One of the results of these facts is that our academic divisions of labor in the social sciences have remained in their outward form as they were shaped by the statical conception of their subject-matter. If the task of investigators is to describe things as fixed in an eternal state, our traditional division of academic labor is in a measure defensible, though it is obviously inadequate. The moment, however, that we begin to pry into the genetic relationships of the phenomena with which we are dealing, our traditional division of labor becomes indefensible. It grows more and more irrational and obstructive the more seriously we take our task of pressing back and out along every discoverable line of causal antecedent or conditioning circumstance.

For analogy: No physiologist can be merely a physiologist. In addition he must deal not only with anatomy. He must be prepared for recourse at any moment to chemistry and physics and all the biological specialties. In case he is not a mere pedagogical middleman, but seriously in search of knowledge, it is impossible at a given instant to predict whether the next necessary phase of his inquiry will be in one type of physical relationships or another.

It is precisely so in the field of human relationships. Suppose one calls oneself a historian, and suppose one's interest focalizes upon the concurrence of causes of which the German Kaiser's conception of his office is the latest phenomenon. He may write entertaining magazine articles on different phases of the doctrine of the divine right of kings; he may even read learned papers before the Historical Society on versions of the doctrine that have been current at different periods. In order to ascertain anything precise and reliable about the heredity of the Kaiser's version of the divine-right idea, its antecedents must be traced along lines of causes which run back through all the physical geography, and economics, and politics, and psychology, and philosophy, and theology of Europe. In order to locate every mesh in the web of causes, and not to credit imaginary causes, one must be able at a hundred crucial points to distinguish between primary and secondary and negligible degrees of the importance of factors with which the political historian, for example, might not have more than a layman's acquaintance. That is, to make an actual contribution to knowledge of the genetic history of the doctrine of the divine right of kings, in its Hohenzollern version, the particular technique most necessary at a given time might be that of physical geographer, economist, militarist, civilist, philologist, psychologist, or theologian.

The like is true of every type of investigation within the range of human experience. It must always be an investigation of causal connections which ramify back and forth through the entire scope of human interests and activities. Pursuit of knowledge then is something which cannot possibly be conducted within the definitions of procedure implied by the academic divisions of labor corresponding with the pedagogical traditions to which we have referred. Pursuit of knowledge within the sphere of human relations confronts the task of solving problems of causal connections within a circumference in which the differentiations of causal factors are innumerable. It makes no difference whether our problem in its most obvious features is biological, or economic, or political, or psychological, or aesthetic, or religious. It may presently lure the investigator into a plexus of causal relations in which the peculiar technique developed of, for, or by his original

interest may prove to be nearly or quite worthless. It may show him that, in order to solve the next question in his main problem, he must command the services of people whose center of interest is remote from his own.

To construct an illustrative case out of facts which came to my knowledge during the autumn of 1914: Suppose a jobber of watches in Chicago had said in July, 1914, "The nations of Europe may go to war all they please. It doesn't concern me. I don't sell European watches, and none of my customers are in Europe." Within the next few months that man would have discovered that a war in Europe may be almost as paralyzing to the trade in American watches in the United States as though it had actually killed off possible American purchasers. By suspending commerce in cotton, it may suspend the purchasing power of the particular territory containing that jobber's customers, and in that respect the virtual equivalent of war may be given.

Just as every competent economist knows that antecedents which are not primarily economic at all may be changed, as they work, into economic consequents, and vice versa, so in the whole realm of human relations we are dealing with transformations of forces more subtle than the changes of wheat into nutritive fluids, and nervous energy, and thought, and conduct; and these facts demonstrate the absurdity of the old static divisions of territory in the social sciences.

Returning to the main point of this explanation, it is to be remarked, fourthly, that the early sociologists came to consciousness at a time when this sort of perception had made very little impression upon men already working in the field of human relations. As a rule these elders seemed to be content, in theory, with the preserves to which custom, even if of very recent origin, had given them prescriptive titles.¹ There was little prospect that they would pay much attention to innovators professing their conviction that work in the social sciences ought to be reorganized in accordance with the dynamic conception. One sufficient reason for this moral certainty, we must confess, was that these same innovators had themselves at that time not sufficiently trans-

¹ For allusion to the fact that practice was very different, see *infra*, p. 840.

lated human relations into dynamic terms to make their renderings very intelligible or impressive. It was in the order of things that they must be convincing before they convinced. Whatever the logical character of the procedure, it was strategically necessary for these innovators, if they were to make a visible impression during their lifetime, to gain ground by playing the academic game under the existing rules. Their instincts rather than deliberate calculation prompted them to speak for a "science" in the old uncritical sense, and having announced themselves as the exponents of a "science," they were under bonds to "make good" by trying to assemble a body of material which would as plausibly represent a "science" in the old sense, as the material guarded within their respective stockades by the older claimants to social territory.

Suppose that in 1892 the sociologists had already sufficiently oriented themselves within human relations to be able to say to their predecessors in the social sciences: There are aspects of human relationships to which nobody has paid enough attention to insure for them the kind and degree of influence which they must have, if people in the future are to see human relationships more nearly as they are than we are able to now. Make room for us, whether we start from premises primarily anthropological or psychological, or historical, or economic, or political, to bring those aspects of human association into the full meaning in our interpretation which they actually have in the functional operations of society. In effect this occurred in certain instances, but it now seems improbable that the sociologists could have made as successful a struggle for existence as they have made if this appeal had been their sole recourse. The fact was that by no means all the men who were ready to enlist for the sociological campaign were sufficiently clear in their own minds about its essential relations to the tasks of the social sciences, as a whole, to be able to express their ambitions in this simple form. Both subjectively and objectively, therefore—that is, both as a matter of abstract reasoning and as a matter of feasible academic policy—it was impossible a quarter of a century ago to make a different sort of entry into the sociological field from that which actually was made, viz., by proclamation of a new "science," co-ordinate in right, if not in logical classification, with the older

so-called social "sciences,"² and it is still both subjectively and objectively difficult for sociology to make much headway academically except by following the other social science departments in accommodating itself to the persisting prestige of an academic superstition.

It may as well be confessed then, fifthly, that neither in 1892 nor in 1901 had sociology justified itself as a body of doctrine, as a point of view, or as a method of research. I shall try to show later that we have only recently become sufficiently certain of our orientation to be in a fairly tenable scientific position. At the time of which Mr. Tolman speaks, a few individuals were assured in their own minds that their message to the world in the name of sociology was a self-vindicating body of doctrine, point of view, method of research, or perhaps all combined. The deplorable fact was, nevertheless, that no one of these sanguine individuals was totally convincing to a single other individual who called himself a sociologist. The alleged "science" of sociology, as a discipline appealing for the recognition of responsible scholars, not merely of schoolboys or even of benevolent boards of trustees, was in reality more of a denial that all the other social sciences put together were conclusive, than it was a plausible substitute for, or even reinforcement of, the older so-called social "sciences." Sociology was more of a yearning than a substantial body of knowledge, a fixed point of view, or a rigorous method of research. It was rather a determination to follow a few promising clues, to see whither they would lead, than an assured body of scientific results or an adequate methodology for reaching results.

This then, sixthly, is our estimate of the situation which Mr. Tolman reported: The essential justification of the sociologists in an aggressiveness which quite naturally affected the older social scientists as presumption was their more or less clearly formulated

² Whether sufficient evidence is on record to prove it or not, I have certain persuasive reasons for believing that the academic beginnings of all social sciences in this country were in this respect substantially like those of sociology. There are certain hints to this effect in the paper of Professor Jameson cited above (p. 776). I was elected to the faculty of a New England college in 1880 on recommendation of the president, in spite of protests by all the professors, the latter on the express ground that "history and political economy are not suitable subjects to be taught in college."

discovery that none of the older alleged social "sciences" had a valid claim to that designation. They may not have been willing, at the time, to admit that sociology was more a running advertisement of the *need* of a science than a realized science. They were approaching willingness to make this confession, however, through their perception that the older types of attempts to explain human experience were able to pass as sciences only because they had silenced, if they had not satisfied, minds more docile than the minds of the sociologists. In other words, successfully conventionalized minds were convinced that history, politics, and economics—not to speak of other divisions of labor in the social field—were sciences in the strict sense. The primary contention of the sociologists was virtually a categorical denial of this presumption. In order to obtain standing-ground for support of this denial, it seemed necessary and proper to set up a claim for sociology which now, but for a reason quite different from that which repelled the older scholars, appears as extravagant and even paradoxical to some of the sociologists as it did then to everybody else, viz., that sociology *is* a science, and not only *a* science, but *the* science within the field of human phenomena. It was only by maintaining a claim at least to the former part of this assertion that the sociologists could acquire title to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," *as sociologists*.

The only sense in which the explicit or the implicit claim of the earlier sociologists just referred to could be valid would be a sense which would identify sociology with the logic, or the methodology, of social science as a whole. I shall argue later that the synthetic function for which the most far-seeing sociologists have always spoken is essential to the construction of an organon of knowledge which deserves the name "science"; but that there is more probability of the discharge of that function through some sort of co-operation or at least reciprocal understanding between the different specialists within the field of the social sciences than through evolution of a species of super-scholars to be charged with organizing the findings of sub-scholars, or through the supercrogation of a particular type of sub-scholars who detail themselves for the service.

As it will not be practicable to include in this paper an elaboration of the proposition, it is in order merely to state here, without argument, the methodological conclusion to which in the writer's judgment experience tends, viz.: The further we penetrate into knowledge of human experience as an evolving continuity of interpenetrating activities, the more evident it becomes that the utmost knowledge of this reality which is within human reach will be gained at last by the application of x types of research techniques, each adapted to investigation of a phase or phases of the involved processes. When we are a little more advanced in our mental adolescence we shall have, instead of supposedly independent "sciences," types of scholars who start with common conceptions of the nature of the human reality as a whole, and with a common modicum of knowledge about the relatively obvious facts of human conditions and activities. Each type of scholar will then be expert primarily in the use of one of these techniques, and intelligent secondly in co-operating with similar technicians in co-ordinating the findings of each and all into an increasingly objective rendering of human experience. That there will be a use for the sort of technique which the sociologists are developing, need not be doubted.

Returning to the facts of our sociological situation in 1892-1901, it turned out that the center of attention which chiefly challenged those sociologists whose primary interest was synthetic was the *interrelations between human activities*. Their response to this challenge was a reaction against the type of specialization upon human phenomena which had developed during the nineteenth century. We may illustrate that sort of specialization in this way: Suppose one type of interest in American experience had been fascinated by the sequences of events which made up the winning of the United States, considered as a wilderness conquered by a technique of agricultural, manufacturing, and transporting exploitation. Suppose another type of interest had centered upon the picturesque persons who had carried on the process—from the Plymouth and Jamestown colonists to the builders of the Panama Canal. Suppose another type of interest had been very feebly conscious of these external activities or of these dramatic person-

alities, but had centered about the development of political ideas and institutions in the colonies and states; suppose still another type of interest had been blind and deaf to all the former, but had been eager to find out everything possible about the phenomena of theological belief and of religious practice in the new country.

The sociological interest proper was neither of these; but speaking now concretely rather than in the most abstract way, the sociologist wanted to find out how it was, and why it was that these different sorts of activities—technical, personal, political, theological, religious, etc.—were not only contemporaneous but co-operative and reciprocally conditioning, both positively and negatively, both by way of reciprocal reinforcement and by way of reciprocal restraint. Surely this was a no less legitimate inquiry than those which prompted men to investigate from the other centers of attention. Surely the facts which might be ascertained from the other centers of attention would be left in a lamentably unsettled state, so far as intellectual comprehension is concerned, if the relationships in question from this latter center of attention were not also ascertained and correlated with whatever might be learned from each and all of the other possible centers of attention.

Acting upon this insight, the sociologists fell to tracing out *relationships* between different familiar types of human activity, relationships of cause and effect, relationships conditioning or qualifying, relationships stimulating or repressing, relationships increasing or diminishing the activities—always with more or less obvious and avowed effort to organize these relationships into some sort of a system supposed to represent human society as a whole.

This sort of study opened up a tropical jungle of uncontrolled facts; and the deeper we penetrated into this jungle, the more we were confirmed in the belief that we were right in protesting against the insufficiency of the traditional social "sciences." At the same time this experience soon began to develop in our subconsciousness misgivings which it took us a long time to be willing to confess, about the sufficiency of our own "science." We did not confess it then, and recollection of my own innocence at the time leads me to suspect that few of us were aware of it; but as might have been predicted from the nature of things and from the behavior

of minds, in spite of our brave purposes to the contrary, most of our work resulted, not in explanations, not even to a great extent in making out secondary causes and effects, but chiefly in exhibiting a miscellany of societary forms. We alleged processes more than we detected them.

It would incidentally furnish a beautiful test of the competence of the traditional social "sciences" for purposes of interpretation, to call upon them in turn for an explanation of how it came about that in the course of their championship of sociology the sociologists have become a much changed species of thinkers, with a procedure greatly altered from that which was prevalent among them in the decade following 1892. If the facts are ever recovered in detail and if the correlations between them are ever reconstructed, it will certainly not be the work of any single division of labor in our present academic organization. At present it would be impossible to go much beyond bare mention of certain indexes which show that movement was occurring, but which reveal comparatively little about the impulses behind the movement or about the precise methods of their workings. To put the whole experience in the form of the unanswered question: Who knows, and who knows how to find out, in what ways and in what ratios the evolution of sociological thinking has been impelled from within the sociological ranks, and how and how much by impulses from other divisions of social science, and by extra-academic factors, and what has been the formula of the interaction of these factors? If this question is ever answered, it will be as a result of such reciprocity as I have indicated as a scientific desideratum.¹

It cannot be doubted, that the joint meeting between the historians, the economists, and the sociologists at New Orleans in 1903 was one of the crises from which impulses to further sociological analysis emerged.² The prime factor in the episode was a paper by Professor Giddings, entitled, "A Theory of Social Causation." Professor Seligman, as president of the Economic Association, presided. The paper was discussed by Professors Burr, Emerton,

¹ Pp. 804, 819-20, 833.

² Cf. *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3d Series, V (1904), 383-443.

and West for the historians, and Cooley, Small, and Ward for the sociologists. It is to be regretted that Professor Emerton did not furnish a copy of his remarks for publication, for some of his statements voiced the extreme remove of opinion from that of the sociologists. The discussion proved to focalize upon two chief points: first, the merits of the pretensions of sociology to be "the over-science"; second, the merits of the conception that there can be an "explanation" of human experience at all.

Neither party represented in this debate was able precisely to formulate the opposition between historians and sociologists. The essential reason for this was that neither party was unequivocally conscious of its own attitude. In that vague state of mind neither party could precisely express the antithesis between its own attitude and that of the other party, because each was doubtless at least as beclouded about the other as it was about itself. From this distance, the main issue seems much more distinct, although it is still impossible to say how many members of either party would vote assent to the following formulation.

As I see it, the historians were assuming that the aspects of affairs which interested them as a guild of scholars had a value of their own, which made them independent of all revaluation by any or all other scholars. The sociologists, on the other hand, were trying to articulate the perception that things get their final meanings and values not from the appeal which they make to particular interests, whether material or intellectual, but from the part which they turn out to have as factors in the whole evolution of human values. No scholars, therefore, can permanently maintain the position that the aspects of things in which they are interested have an absolute value; that formulation of these aspects of things, apart from the aspects of things which complete the system of human experience, can constitute a "science"; that having satisfied their own interest in applying criteria to past facts, they have thereby made of those past facts *res judicata*, not to be examined further by any type of incredulity as to their status as last words about the processes in which they occurred.

Consequently, the two parties were actually doing this: The historians were in effect saying, "We are bent on finding out and

putting on exhibit as much as possible of aspects of affairs which interest *us*." The sociologists were virtually saying, "We are bent on finding out what aspects of affairs it is necessary to understand in order that the experience of past people may be as instructive as possible to present people."

It is hard for a sociologist to understand how anybody with sufficient intelligence to be interested at all in human experience in general can fail to see that these two purposes are complementary. Suppose, for instance, we should some time find out that no human event important enough to be noticed by historians had ever occurred without having been a resultant of at least x factors. Suppose we should discover that no historian had ever concerned himself about more than $x-y$ factors in dealing with a given movement. Is it not evident that no historian could have covered the facts in terms of $x-y$ factors, if it had been previously proved that all human occurrences are resultants of x factors?

No responsible sociologist or psychologist is likely to claim that we can fix in advance the exact number of influences involved even in a single occurrence, still less in all social occurrences. Every sociologist and psychologist is sure today, however, that if all the facts were ascertained about any selected social occurrence, it would probably be found that more elements had entered into it than any of the historians had discovered, or at all events more than had been finally evaluated; and that very possibly the elements upon which the historians had placed the most emphasis were not necessarily the elements which were most decisive in the given case. The sociologists and the psychologists consequently maintain that until a technique has been worked out by means of which all the factors which have entered into past events may be discovered, and the ratio of influence which the different factors exerted may be exactly computed, it is chimerical to talk of representing a past event just as it was—*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*. The sociologists say that telling the past event *as it interests the historian*, without proving that the event in that aspect is the precise link in the chain of causes and effects which occurred at the given time and place, may exhilarate the historian, and it may entertain his readers, but it is at best only the beginning of a dependable explanation of that

particular passage of human experience. The sociologists say that if the historians are to maintain themselves as scientific investigators, rather than as literary artists, they must at least consent to join in the invention and use of a technique which will exhibit the complexity of social causation to the last detail which psychological analysis can discover. Then the previous knowledge of how complex all social phenomena are, not the mere group choices of the historians themselves, will determine what the historians must do in order to represent past occurrences objectively.

Moreover, it is a special task to carry out the analysis of social forces and processes, so as to exhibit their greater complexity than conventional history recognizes. No discreet sociologist claims that he has any distinguishing gift which marks him out, rather than the historian, for this analysis of social forces and processes. All that the sociologists now claim is that this latter division of labor makes demands exacting enough to occupy one type of specialist; that consequently no man who gives his time chiefly to using on particular historical problems the historical apparatus as we have it is likely to have time that can be used profitably upon these more abstract problems of social forces and processes in general: that there must be co-operation between these types of specialists if the work of either is to attain to its maximum value.

Suppose we take for instance the history of the Civil War in the United States. In a general way we all know the course of antecedent events. In a strictly objective way we have yet to learn the precise conjunctions and collisions of influences which produced that war. The interpretations of it which had been written previous to 1903 and the estimates of it which had gone into our popular traditions, had treated it either as a politicians' war, or as a slaveholders' war, or as an abolitionists' war, or as some sort of a confusion of the three. These conceptions of such a social experience affect the psychologist or the sociologist, and the later school of historians also, very much as the biologist would be affected by assumptions that the human organism could be adequately described as *it actually is*, in terms of flesh, bones and blood.

When we come to think of it, even politicians and slaveholders and abolitionists are like other human beings in that they are

moved by mixed motives. Some of the ingredients in the mixture are conscious, some are unconscious. When we come to think further, we bring to view the fact that, say in 1854, the people of the United States who were neither politicians, nor slaveholders nor abolitionists probably outnumbered those three species several times over. It appears antecedently probable at least that these more numerous classes must have had several sorts of significance, both positive and negative, in making the war just when, where and how it occurred. When we have gone just so far in bringing to bear the mere rudiments of sociological analysis upon the situation, we have suggestions which make all the interpretations of the Civil War that had been written up to 1903 look extremely inconclusive.

But to return to the New Orleans episode. From this distance it seems evident to me that the session was a profitable exhibition of provincialisms and prematurities on both sides. The historical attacks hardly touched the contents of Professor Giddings' paper, they concentrated on previous questions as above indicated. I do not wonder that the historians were contemptuous toward what they regarded as the censoriousness of the sociologists. I do not wonder that they thought they detected in our expressed and implied conceptions of interpretations a yearning for a type of exploration which historians had thought about for generations, and had decided to be illusory. Possibly we were unwittingly looking at the time for a sort of explanation that would be parallel with a history of our earth in terms of chemical reactions, and which might purport to show an unbroken line of causes and effects in an alleged serial order of all the chemical reactions that occurred between the detachment of the nucleus of our earth from the total mass of star-dust and its present condition. All the speculative attempts to interpret past events as a whole have been requisitions for explanations upon this ground pattern. If we were in any way, shape, or manner perpetuating hopes of that sort, and if the historians referred to visions of that kind when they ridiculed us, they were to that extent nearer right than we were. As I shall try to show later, the sociologists are rapidly coming into sight of a different sort of synthesis in principle from that which may have been at issue between them and the historians a dozen years ago. The

most important difference at the time between the historians and the sociologists on this matter was that the historians were betrayed into an attitude of opposition to the very idea of finding an interpretation of human experience. On the other hand, the sociologists were confirmed in their impression that history, in so far as these utterances represented it, is a self-confessed futility, and in their resolution to keep on trying to perfect a technique which would serve to make human experience more intelligible. The sociologists present were most affected by those passages in the remarks of the historians which were in the line of the following allusion, and implied inferences from it, in the remarks of Professor Burr:

It is not the sciences alone which have a right to their names and to their fields. There are the literatures and the arts. Science is, after all, but an old Latin word for knowledge; and I gladly grant that knowledge is not the highest aim of history. It is no historical sentimentalist, no mere quibbling pedagogue, but a great constitutional historian of England, who holds the chief worth of history to lie, not in the knowledge it gives, not even in its training of the imagination, the sympathy, the insight, the judgment, but in the growth it brings to him who studies it for its own sake. It is travel, acquaintance, experience, life. History *is* society. Where else will the sociologist find that past with which he deals? Even of yesterday he knows only through the newspaper; and the newspaper is history.¹

As I review the debate, I am impressed that the most prophetic part of it was the contribution of Professor Cooley. His remarks so truly foreshadow the subsequent trend not only in sociological thinking, but in the social sciences at large, that they belong of right in this historical survey. Professor Cooley said:

In discussing this notable paper I wish to confine myself to only one of the fundamental questions upon which it touches, namely, that of the nature of history as regards cause and effect; and my aim will be to distinguish three ways of thinking about it; first, the *materialistic*, second, the *idealistic*, third, what I would call the *organic*. In the preference I shall avow for the last I hope that the distinguished author of the paper will, on the whole, agree with me, though I am not sure that he does not, here and there, show a certain leaning toward the first.

The materialistic view assumes that physical conditions are in some sense original and ultimate causes of the movements of history; that they are primary as compared, at least, with such complex products of the mind as institutions and social ideals, which are held to be secondary or derivative, though perhaps

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 435.

of equal immediate importance. The best known representative of this way of thinking is Herbert Spencer, whose whole philosophy assumes the primacy of material facts, and aims to show how mental and social facts grow out of them.

The primacy claimed for material elements must, I suppose, be a primacy either in time or in logic. As to time, I am unable to see from what I have learned of history and anthropology, that the physical aspect of life came before institutions and ideals, or was, generally speaking, of relatively greater importance in the past than at present. No doubt institutions and ideals have greatly developed, but no more, perhaps, than have economic activities. To me these seem to be co-ordinate phases of existence which have ever marched side by side. When I look back through the past I seem to see human nature, language, institutions, modes of conflict, modes of getting a living, philosophies, and aspirations, ever as one indivisible life, even as they are at present; although certainly the whole and every phase of it becomes cruder as we go back. We have learned from the works of Professor Giddings that we can no longer regard human nature as separable from language and other institutions; the individual no more created these things than they created him, all is one growth. Even poetry is, in a sense, as old as man himself; for language is truly said to be fossil poetry, and language and human nature, we now believe, arose together.

But have not the economic activities at least a primacy in logic, as being the necessary basis of everything else?

I cannot see that the getting of food, or whatever else the economic activities may be defined to be, is any more the logical basis of existence than the ideal activities. It is true that there could be no ideas and institutions without a food-supply; but no more could we get food if we did not have ideas and institutions. All work together, and each of the principal functions is essential to every other.

I am not sure that the feeling of the primacy of material conditions has any better foundation than their tangible and visible character which makes them stand out more clearly before the mind and gives an illusion of their independence. As they exist in society, or for us, they are really as plastic and changeable as thought itself. Social and psychological science is, in my opinion, far too complaisant to that prejudice of the physical scientist which identifies the ideal with the vague, and wishes to have as little to do with it as possible.

I do not object to the interpretation of history from the materialistic point of view, so long as it is recognized that this is partial, deserving no logical preference over the idealistic point of view, and always needing to be balanced by the latter. But, so far as I have noticed, writers who start from material data are inclined to hold not merely that this is *a* place to start, but that it is *the* place; and if so, I think they are justly charged with materialism.

I do not quite agree with the paper in the view that materialistic interpretations fail to satisfy us only because they have not explained the ideal. I

should not be content with seeing how the ideal proceeds from the material, but I should wish also to begin at the other end and see how the material, as it exists in society, proceeds from the ideal. The industrial society of the nineteenth century, for instance, is perhaps as much a result of the institutions and philosophies of the eighteenth as it is a cause of those which are to be in the twentieth. And, finally, I should wish to unite these partial views so far as possible into a total or organic view, a perception of the living fact.

I will not dwell upon the merely idealistic view of history, since it has little vogue at the present time. It has as much one-sidedness as the other. Looking upon thought as the causal force in all life, it treats things as no more than symbols.

I would not, however, conceal my opinion that it is quite as plausible and legitimate, quite as scientific, if you please, to treat the human mind itself as the primary factor in life, and history as its gradual unfoldment, as it is to begin with the material. Why should the stimulus or spur of progress be ascribed to things more than to the mind itself?

The organic view of history denies that any factor or factors are more ultimate than others. Indeed it denies that the so-called factors—such as the mind, the various institutions, the physical environment, and so on—have any real existence apart from a total life in which all share in the same way that the members of the body share in the life of the animal organism. It looks upon mind and matter, soil, climate, flora, fauna, thought, language, and institutions as aspects of a single rounded whole, one total growth. We may concentrate attention upon some one of these things, but this concentration should never go so far as to overlook the subordination of each to the whole, or to conceive one as precedent to others.

One who holds this view is not content to inquire whether the economic interpretation of history is the fundamental one. Back of that, he thinks, is the question whether there is, in fact, such a thing as a fundamental interpretation of history, in the sense that one aspect of society is in its nature more ultimate than others; whether life actually proceeds in a one-two-three manner, and not rather in a total manner, each special phase of it at any given time being derived not merely from some other special phase but from the total condition of mankind in the preceding epoch. He believes that life, go back as far as you will, is a progressive transformation of a whole, in which the ideal, institutional, and material phases are co-ordinate and inseparable.

History is not like a tangled skein which you may straighten out by getting hold of the right end and following it with sufficient persistence. It has no straightness, no merely lineal continuity, in its nature. It is a living thing, to be known by sharing its life, very much as you know a person.

In the organic world—that is to say, in reality—each function is a center from which causes radiate, and to which they converge; all is alike cause and effect, there is no logical primacy, no independent variable, no place where the

thread begins. As in the fable of the belly and the members, each is dependent upon all the others. You must see the whole, or you do not truly see anything.

Supposing that this organic conception is a just one, what practical bearing, let us ask in conclusion, has it upon the method of expounding or of comprehending history? It by no means discredits the study of history from particular points of view, such as the economic, the political, the military, the religious. The whole is so vast that to get any hold of it we need to approach it now from one point of view, now from another, fixing our attention upon each phase in turn, as all the world did, a few years ago, upon the influence of sea-power when Captain Mahan's work appeared. But no study of a special chain of causes can be more than an incident in that perception of a reciprocating whole which I take to be our true aim.

If we think in this way we shall approach the comprehension of a period of history very much as we approach a great work of organic art, like a Gothic cathedral. We view the cathedral from many points, and at our leisure, now the front and now the apse, now taking in the whole from a distance, now lingering near at hand over the details, living with it, if we can, for months; until gradually there arises a conception of it which is confined to no one aspect but is, so far as the limits of our mind permit, the image of the whole in all its unity and richness. And it is such a view as this at which we aim in the study of history. Every competent student may help us, whether his work is narrative or philosophical, large or minute, written from one point of view or several; but after all, what we would like to get is nothing less than a living familiarity with the past, so that in the measure of our faculty, we might actually possess it in something of the various unity of life itself.¹

The immediate impression of the discussion upon the sociologists present was probably reflected truly by the closing comment of Professor Giddings. At the same time his self-control deprived his remarks of the color with which agreement with him was expressed less guardedly in private. He said:

The only comment that I wish to make upon this discussion of my paper may be put in the form of a question. Do the historians wish to include the problems of social causation within the field of history, or to exclude them, as foreign to the historians' proper task? I care nothing for mere labels. If history properly comprehends an examination of the problems that I have set before you tonight—and I gather from the remarks of Professor Burr and Professor West that they think it does—I am quite as ready to hear these studies called history as to hear them called sociology. If, however, history has no business to meddle with such questions, and if the historian ought to

¹ For permission to make this and other quotations from its publications, I am indebted to the courtesy of the American Economic Association. It is also with Professor Cooley's consent that his remarks are republished here.

hold—as I understand Professor Emerton to hold—that the study of social causation is an impossible undertaking, that can end only in vague and worthless generalization, the historian cannot reasonably object if those who, like myself, hold a different opinion, take to themselves another name and attempt in their own way to build up a branch of science in which these problems are made the central themes of investigation.¹

There can be no doubt that a second notable factor in precipitating sociological opinion was the comparison of views on aims and methods in the social sciences, in connection with the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science, 1904. Although this event followed so immediately in time the apparent deadlock in the New Orleans meeting, just discussed, factors were in evidence at St. Louis which made it plain to close observers that methodological thinking in the social sciences had not come to a halt. It is impossible to demonstrate this fact in detail, but consultations during preparation for the Congress, during its sessions, and in subsequent review of its record have convinced me that it was an occasion for general taking account of stock, and of casting trial balances by leading thinkers in all divisions of social science. The program, so far as it can be exhibited in a schedule of the principal papers and their authors, was as follows:

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY PROBLEM OF METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES²

HISTORY

- Sloane, W. M. The Science of History in the Nineteenth Century. II, 23.
 Wilson, Woodrow. The Variety and Unity of History. II, 3.
 Robinson, J. H. Conception and Methods of History. II, 40.
 Lamprecht, K. G. Historical Development and Present Character of History.
 II, 111.
 Bury, J. B. The Place of Modern History in the Perspective of Knowledge.
 II, 142.

POLITICAL ECONOMY

- Conrad, J. Economic History in Relation to Kindred Sciences. III, 199.
 Patten, S. N. Present Problems in the Economic Interpretation of History.
 III, 215.

See also p. 444.

¹The references are to different volumes of the *Proceedings of the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science*.

- Fetter, F. A. *The Fundamental Conceptions and Methods of Economics.* VII, 7.
 Miller, A. C. *Economic Science in the Nineteenth Century.* VII, 21.
 Clark, J. B. *Economic Theory in a New Character and Relation.* VII, 47.
 Hollander, J. H. *The Scope and Method of Political Economy.* VII, 57.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

- Lowell, A. L. *Social Regulation.* VII, 263.
 Dunning, W. A. *Fundamental Conceptions of Nineteenth-Century Politics.* VII, 279.
 Andrews, E. B. *Tendencies of the World's Politics.* VII, 293.
 Willoughby, W. W. *Political Philosophy.* VII, 399.
 Wilson, G. G. *Problems of Political Theory.* VII, 326.
 Needham, C. W. *Fundamental Ideas of Jurisprudence.* VII, 459.
 Beale, J. H., Jr. *Jurisprudence: Its Development in the Past Century.* VII, 470.

SOCIOLOGY

- Giddings, F. H. *The Concepts and Methods of Sociology.* V, 787.
 Vincent, G. E. *Development of Sociology.* V, 800.
 Thomas, W. I. *The Province of Social Psychology.* V, 860.
 Ross, E. A. *Present Problems of Social Psychology.* V, 869.
 Hall, G. S. *The Unity of Mental Science.* V, 577.
 Höfding, Harold. *The Present State of Psychology and Its Relation to the Neighboring Sciences.* V, 627.

The actual thought-movement in the social sciences in the United States, during the first decade of the present century, will never be understood without a firm grasp upon the meaning of the different intellectual tendencies exhibited by this collection of arguments. They cannot be fairly evaluated unless the several divisions of thinking be considered in immediate reference to one another. The sociological papers in particular are speaking witnesses that the emphasis of the sociologists was not only shifting from social forms to social processes, but that attention was turning from mere generalization of types of social processes to the substantial objective in which, as I think, the strictly peculiar work of sociologists as contributors to general social science is to center, viz., the methods of analyzing the behavior of selected groups with reference to their formation by, and their activities in pursuance of, distinctive interests. This leads to more detailed reference to a third cardinal factor in the recent evolution of sociological thinking.

It is beyond question that since 1901 the American sociologists have advanced a long step, first, toward consensus about the location of precise problems in the direct line of their impulses, and, secondly, about ways in which those problems must be handled. For convenience we may speak of this phase of sociological development as the advance of social psychology. In order not to risk a defection into the archaic type of statical treatment, I will not attempt to define what I understand by social psychology. The fact which I want to signalize is that we have become increasingly attentive to the states of mind which characterize people in groups, and to the connections between these states of mind and all the activities which the respective groups perform. To express it in terms which seem most convenient to some of us, we are more and more seeing our distinctive vocation in trying to find out what interests are actually effective in the members of selected groups, and in what ways they shape the group fortunes. Approaches by somewhat different paths to this common rendezvous are to be found in such books as Ross, *Social Control*, a *Survey of the Foundations of Order* (which turns out to be a signal for survey of much more than mere order); Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and *Social Organization*; Sumner, *Folkways*;¹ Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*; and Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*. A variation of the common type is visible in all the work that Professor Giddings has been carrying on from the clue suggested in his later title, *The Social Marking System*.² I referred to this as follows during the debate previously discussed:

Before closing, I would express my admiration for the insight displayed in the third and fourth divisions of Professor Giddings' paper. I believe he has there reached some cardinal contributions to sociology. I cannot refrain from pointing out once more in this connection, however, that there is a vast void, which nothing but a new order of historical work can fill, between our present ignorance of actual social reactions and confirmation of such theories as Professor Giddings has proposed. We need to know, in the concrete, just how human interests have combined with each other in every variety of circumstance within human experience. There has never, to my knowledge,

¹ Cf. above p. 733, note.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 721; *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, IV, 42.

been a fairly successful attempt to schedule efficient human interests in general, till Ratzenhofer did it less than ten years ago in *Das Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, and *Die soziologische Erkenntniss*. With this work sociology attained its majority. Henceforth all study of human relations must be rated as provincial, which calculates problems of life with reference to a less comprehensive scheme of interests than his analysis exhibits.

The sociologists are settling down to as strict and positive analysis of the sort of thing that takes place in human reactions as the chemists have carried on in their sphere. Men in other divisions of labor within the social sciences cannot afford to leave the sociologist out of the account. Professor Giddings' position is impregnable, that we have something to say to each other, and that each of us needs the other's help for the completion of his knowledge.²

Other men must assemble their testimony before it can be known to what extent Ratzenhofer's work had been a factor in the development of American thinking, and to what extent the tendencies to which I am now referring developed independently of him. I merely take this occasion to record the facts in my own case.

In the Preface of *General Sociology* (1905) I said: "Our thesis is that the central line in the path of methodological progress, from Spencer to Ratzenhofer, is marked by gradual shifting of effort from analogical representation of social structures to real analysis of social processes."

I have no record to show when I discovered Ratzenhofer. The four volumes named above came into my hands at the same time, and they impressed me as so much of a find that I began at once to absorb them into my own thinking and writing. It was with mixed emotions that I found in them much more complete results than I had reached by following substantially Ratzenhofer's method in my lectures for several previous years. My plan for a book on general sociology was not only worked out, but I supposed the material was nearly ready for publication. Although I did not altogether agree with Ratzenhofer's preliminaries, his analytical process following the clue "interests" was nearly identical with the one I had been following for several years, and his conclusions seemed to me in general to reinforce my own tentative results. A consequence was that in one or two years my lecture notes, intended for incorporation in my book, had become so interlaced with

² *Publication of the American Economic Association*, 3d Series, V, 425.

Ratzenhofer's work that it was no longer possible for me to distinguish between the parts which I had arrived at independently, those which had been slightly expanded by drawing upon Ratzenhofer, and those which were entirely his own. It presently dawned upon me that I must choose between the alternatives of rendering myself liable to conviction as a wholesale plagiarist from Ratzenhofer, in those parts of my book which followed his method, or to abandon the hope of credit for originality and frankly assume the position of a commentator upon the man who had anticipated me both in method and in scope of its application. My only regret over choice of the latter course is that I was not as successful as I wish I might have been in showing the precise cleavage between Ratzenhofer's thought, my rendering of his thought, and those portions of the argument which are entirely my own.¹ And this regret is not on my own account. Doubtless here and there an American scholar in the future will want to know Ratzenhofer's precise thought. I now wish I might have saved them the trouble of comparing my version with all the passages which it may have epitomized, or of disentangling my elaborations from Ratzenhofer's leading propositions.

My impression is that a number of American sociologists found themselves sooner or later in virtually the same relation to Ratzenhofer which my own case typified. Our thinking had been gravitating into the method of interpreting group situations, whether passive or active, as phenomena of the interests of the members of the group. This aspect of sociological problems has of late years impressed most of us as more immediately promising for sociologists as such than investigation of the reactions between physical conditions and human groups on the one hand, or attempts on the other hand to accomplish at once, in terms of the motivations of persons, a convincing interpretation of that inclusive group which used to hold the center of our attention under the name "society." It seems to me that the sociologists are today beginning to locate research problems in a way which must appeal to other investigators

¹THE *AMERICAN SOCIETY*, 1907. General Sargent and, in particular the *age*, p. 240, attempted to acknowledge my debt to Ratzenhofer in full, and at the same time to accept complete responsibility for all variations of my treatment from his.

in social science as real; and that these scholars must eventually see the economy of associating the sociological technique with their own in arriving at generally desired knowledge.

By way of summarizing this section, we may epitomize as follows: Our present way of formulating primary methodological problems in sociology reflects a tremendous advance in objectivity within the last two decades. In 1895 we were in full cry after the answer to the question, What is sociology? Most of the people in the world at that time who had heard of the question were confidently volunteering variations of the answer: "It is a crazy trick of disordered imaginations." One of the reasons why the sociologists made no more headway than they did in convincing people that this sort of answer was not conclusive was that the sort of people whom they were trying to convince were already beginning to have some healthful suspicions about the sort of methodology which expresses itself in this form. The suspicions were not then articulate or general enough to make much trouble with the conventionally accepted sciences, but they had enough force to make themselves felt against a new applicant for acceptance as a science. In point of fact, the form of question, What is sociology? pointed to a radically questionable mental attitude. The question really amounts to this: What is the body of presumptions adopted as the working capital of a type of people calling themselves sociologists, who desire to be received into good and regular standing among scientists? That is, the question points inward into the consciousness of the people adopting the new designation, rather more than it points outward to a distinct portion or aspect of objective reality.

Nor was there much comfort to be derived from the circumstance that this subjective habit was a vice of all the actually accepted sciences. The very fact that they were accepted was proof that their vitiating subjectivity had escaped detection. This would not insure acceptance of a new aspirant to conventional rank. In fact, the question, What is history? has been discussed more or less since Herodotus, and it has scarcely for a moment been withdrawn from academic discussion since Niebuhr began to criticize the Roman legends. But the question, What is history? has always

- received for its answer an account of the opinions and preferences of a person or a select number of like-minded persons as to past occurrences which it is worth while to study, and as to the ways in which it was preferable to study them. The question has never been officially answered by reshaping itself in this form: How can we find out what past occurrences are most worth studying, and in what ways they must be studied if they are to yield up the most of their meaning?¹ Thus the question, What is history? has always been virtually a question as to what is a *convention* among certain persons claiming authority in certain premises. It has not been an unequivocal and unrestricted inquiry as to the things which must ratify or demolish conventions.

In principle, the same was true of all the so-called sciences, whether physical or human. There was this difference. In the degree in which the objects of attention are simple and uniform, and do not admit of expression varied by human opinion, the conventionality carried along in the definitions and procedures of scholars tends to disappear. The formulations tend earlier and more constantly to approach the objective reality. Accordingly, if the astronomer, the physicist, the chemist, the physiologist asks and tries to answer the question: What is astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology? the answer must tend rather rapidly to discredit any a priori opinions which astronomer, physicist, chemist, physiologist may hold about what the facts and relations are or ought to be. In these cases it will make comparatively little difference how the people immediately concerned answer the question: What is this, that, or the other "science"? The reality to which they give their attention soon proves more compelling than any conventional opinion about those objects of attention and the proper attitude of mind toward them.

In proportion, however, as the objects of attention are complex and, so far as human knowledge has gone, irregular, the room for play of opinion about ways of inquiring into them increases. Schools of thought about them may acquire plausibility and conventional authority. It is comparatively easy for each of these

¹ Lamprecht's attempt to reshape historiographic methodology in this sense made him a suspicious character among his German colleagues.

schools, with its own constituency, to defend its own conventional answer to the question as to the sphere and scope of its alleged "science," and to discredit with this same constituency any trespassers upon the preserve so claimed.

Thus it has come about that scholars for a large part of the latest two thousand years have carried on intermittent discussions that have been meanwhile almost utterly sterile about the scope and definition of the sciences. In so far as scientific method, i.e., procedure necessary to find out objective things as they are, has been concerned with inorganic and organic phenomena only, objectivity has come rapidly into the place of conventionality ever since freedom of scientific inquiry has been enjoyed. In the field of human phenomena, however, the range of illusion is greater, and the persistence of conventionality has been more tenacious. Very few people even now perceive that it is a crudity to ask either of the questions: What is history? What is political economy? What is political science? What is sociology? Very few scholars in any of the divisions of labor so indicated realize that encouraging or tolerating the asking of the question in that form is a hindrance to the progress of knowledge. It is no wonder then that the sociologists had to pay the penalty of their interloping crudity when they tried to get room in the sun upon territory already occupied by vested crudity. From the standpoint of the sort of conventionality which prevailed twenty-five years ago, and which has never extensively withdrawn its claims, all the ground for scientific occupancy had been parceled out, and a new comer was not only as unwelcome but as impossible as an unbidden thirteenth guest at a table large enough for only twelve.

Not attempting now to inquire into the extent to which the older conventionalities still control the ideas of other scholars in the social science field about division of labor in their subjects, the crudity of the sociologists about their own interests has certainly passed into clearer intelligence. Whether we might have made a stronger impression if we had seen the situation twenty-five to a hundred years ago as it presents itself to us now, it would be futile to inquire. The facts are these: Without having thought it through clearly, certain men here and there, from the forties

- of the eighteenth century down to the present, have had inklings that the work of investigating human experience was not organized so as to yield the fullest results. The men who have promoted sociology in the United States have been distinctly of this type. While in form they were trying to give a convincing answer to the question: What is sociology? in substance they were trying to answer the question: What variations must we introduce into our ways of studying human experience in order to learn the most from it? This is a point of order which always has precedence in the parliament of science. Whatever the division of science, a hearing must always be given to him who can show probable cause for distrusting the finality of the current methods of that science.

Whatever might have been our fortune if we had earlier presented our case in terms of the question just formulated, the whole range of the social sciences is now coming under the influence of men whose attitude is more or less affected by the spirit of that question. The leading American sociologists have all implicitly asked that question, and stimulated others to ask it. The whole body of American sociological theory is virtually an attempt to contribute to the answer to that question. The sociologists have never thought of themselves under the aspect of explorers trying to find an undiscovered country where they might establish an isolated kingdom. Their ambition might rather be compared to that of men who are trying to discover ways of intensifying cultivation in territories already occupied. More literally expressed there is no range of human relations not immediately or remotely involved in the observations which we call history as written, for example, by Herodotus. Probably no historian today would be content, however, with an account of any passage of human experience which represented no more minutely analyzed inquiry as to all the factors concerned than the reflections of Herodotus represent. In general, every modern historian holds that there are factors in every passage of human experience which call for investigation with the technique of geographer, and anthropologist, and philologist, and psychologist, and legist, and economist. Every one of these latter specialists recognizes that there is work for the historian in collaboration with men of his own type, in giving

the completest possible reality to the details which it is a co-operative task to reconstruct. Now the sociologists believe that all the previous divisions of labor in reconstructing human experience have failed to provide adequately for certain vital factors in the process. Of course they must assume the burden of proof until their belief has become a part of common knowledge. Assuming that they do establish their claim, they will simply have added one more to the recognized methods of viewing human experience, each of which is necessary to the reinforcement of all the rest.

Another important preliminary to the study of American sociological theory must be noticed. As we have said, in substance, each of the men who have helped to develop sociological technique was obeying an impulse which might have been expressed in the question: What variations must we introduce into our ways of studying human experience in order to learn the most from it? Not one of these men had an answer to this question with which he was satisfied. Each was feeling his way toward an answer. Each made use of certain clues by means of which he was trying to work out an answer. Each of these men must be interpreted by the latest phases of his thinking, not by the tentative thinking which he may have abandoned.

If there is an exception to this rule, it is in the case of Lester F. Ward. He is certainly the only American sociologist whose thinking was crystallized in permanent form and substance in his earliest version.¹ Whether this was absolutely true in Ward's case or not, it was certainly more nearly true than in the case of his successors. They were all conscious of experimenting with means of interpretation. However confident they may have been in their forms of expression, they were obliged to change their minds about certain matters, and the very fact that they did change their minds shows that their confidence was largely hypothetical, and their dropping of untenable hypotheses adds to the credit of their entire method.

Probably there is no more mortifying case in point than one of my own youthful indiscretions. There was a time when it seemed to me wise to project the three divisions "descriptive, statical,

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 752.

and dynamic sociology," and to define the scope of each in a certain way.¹ I cannot now think myself into a state of mind in which I could imagine that this classification corresponds with reality. It helped me for a time, however, but I have tried since to work out some of the penance due for having been so naïve. I should certainly plead both the statute of limitations and subsequent good behavior as bars to action against me for this early misdemeanor. This is by no means the only fault of the kind which might be brought home to me. I fancy my colleagues have some similar skeletons in their own closets. The timely thing now is not to recall our earlier mistakes in superfluous proof that we are fallible, but to criticize our present thinking.

I fancy I am not far from the conclusions of my sociological colleagues when, for my own purposes, I use this description: *Sociology is that variety of study of the common subject-matter of social science which trains attention primarily upon the forms and processes of groups*. I fancy that, along with clarified conception of our task in accordance with something like this description, we find ourselves in a much different state of mind from that of two decades ago about our relation to other types of social scientists, and we have arrived at certain steadying preliminary results which give us confidence for pursuit of our work.

We now know, for instance, that men and women are irrepressible want-generators. We know that men and women universally reach out after satisfaction of their wants. We know that in pursuit of their native impulses to satisfy their wants they inevitably both combine and collide with one another in the crossings of interests which their several wants create. We know that everything visible in human life is a permutation of these elementary facts.² We know that the task of understanding the precise causes and effects within a given group is the task of getting at the precise qualitative character, and the proportional quantitative influence of the simple terms in the foregoing propositions,

¹ See Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 70.

² Of course it is a prime problem of social psychology to discover in particular, and in general, in what ways the metaphor "permutation" fails to indicate the kind of factors, and the mode of their relations actually operating in social groups.

as they are presented in the particular instance. We know that human approval or disapproval of any actual or possible choice of human aims, in the satisfaction of individual or collective wants, has no other positive standard than the knowledge which we have derived, or may derive, about the comparative tendencies of one type or combination of aims and another, with reference to the sort of people probably to be the resultant of either. We know that the problem of social intelligence is that of comprehending the workings of these want-factors, in the particular combinations in which they present themselves in the group or groups with which we are concerned. We know that the problem of social efficiency is, first, the problem of evaluating the competing wants in the given group, and, secondly, the problem of concentrating group volition upon that selection of wants which will justify itself in a relatively high degree of group achievement.

By putting the results of our sociological methodology into this compact shape, we by no means assert that exhaustive and adequate knowledge of our human lot has become easy. We simply assert that a formal expression of the contents of a given group experience may be more feasible by this means, and that it may carry less admixture of fictitious elements than in the case of previous attempts at expression. Instead of dealing with somewhat mystical renderings of life, the form in which we now render group phenomena brings us face to face with the elemental problems of people; in terms of, first, physical antecedents, temporal and spatial, which constitute the minimum conditions of human realization; secondly, the human body, the organic setting of our psychical peculiarities; thirdly, human groupings or the more or less plastic structures of persons in reaction with persons; fourthly, the phenomena of that psychical initiative which branches out into all the variations of driving activity that give group characteristics and group programs; and, fifthly, the types of results, in the shape of individual and group achievements, subjective and objective, which promotion of alternative types of activity tends to produce.² There is nothing fictitious about all

² Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Part I, has exhibited these relations at some length.

- this. In principle it is objective throughout. It presents the problems of social self-knowledge in the most matter-of-fact form in which they have been construed up to date. It indicates the task which everyone confronts who tries to understand any selection out of human reality. To know anything at all about human reality, we must know it, to the extent that we know it, as a veracious factor in the complex of factors thus formulated.

It must be admitted that to the initiated the foregoing passage is a code message. If one has the key, if one can read into these propositions all that they mean to the trained sociologist, it amounts, to venture a different figure, to a tabloid form of the essentials in our whole sociological literature up to date. Dropping both figures for another, there will be nothing worth while in these propositions unless they function as seed truths rather than as food truths. That is, very little knowledge of any kind can be assimilated out of hand in the form of results taken over from another. Knowledge that becomes vital has to be gained by personal experience along the main lines of operations which arrive at the results.

It would be unfortunate not to include in this summary a reference to the effect of recent sociological thinking upon our present attitude toward genetic interpretation of experience in general, and upon our impressions as to the adequacy of the traditions of the historians to indicate methods of arriving at satisfactory interpretations. This subject is referred to in the next section.¹

IX. AN APPRECIATION OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

At once I must disclaim the purpose to undertake all that this subtitle appears to promise. I shall not venture beyond an attempt to indicate certain additional important elements which should be included in the multiple standard of value by which the sociological movement up to the present time should be measured. For this purpose it will be necessary to repeat in slightly modified form much that this monograph has already contained.

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 837-38.

In the first place, we must remember that this movement has never been the operation of a single factor. From the date which we have chosen as our starting-point, it has been the operation of two principal factors, each highly composite; first, an impulse to improve ways of improving the world; secondly, an impulse to improve ways of interpreting the world.¹

In the second place, we must remember that the people who have called themselves, or have been called by others, sociologists have by no means been of a single type, and they have not carried on a single type of work. On the contrary, we may distinguish at least eight types of program which would have to be understood in their peculiarities and in their relations to one another, if a valid appreciation of the sociological movement as a whole were to be reached.

The different kinds of work to which the name sociology has been indiscriminately applied include the following:

1. Promotion of innumerable efforts for immediate betterment of concrete conditions; from first aid to the injured, and pure milk for babies, to reconstruction of marriage or attempts to abolish war.

2. Training persons for service in the different kinds of ameliorative agencies.

3. Developing technologies as distinguished from techniques of social improvement; for instance, restorative v. retributive theories in penology; or vocational v. cultural conceptions in education.

4. Investigation and teaching of abstracted phases of social conditions, with inconstant relations to ulterior use of the results. The variations here referred to range from physical anthropology to social geometry (Simmel).

5. Investigation and teaching of comprehensive syntheses of human relationships. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* may be taken as an illustration of this type of work.

6. Investigation and teaching of group psychology. This is a specialty as distinct from either 4 or 5 as physiology is from geometry on the one hand and from cosmic philosophy on the other. It has already differentiated into several types of research program.

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 726 and 769; also Small, "Points of Agreement among Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, XII, 633; "The Meaning of Sociology," *ibid.*, XIV, 1; "The Sociological Stage in the Evolution of the Social Sciences," *ibid.*, XVII, 804.

7. Investigation and teaching of the methodology of the social sciences, as a means of criticizing the objectivity of each and every technique of interpreting the human reality.
8. Investigation and teaching of pure and applied ethics.

In the third place, we must remember that each of these varieties of effort, whether, as carried on by given persons, closely or remotely connected with one or more of the other varieties, is nearly or remotely connected by descent or by affinity or both with the whole antecedent body of social science. Before finishing an audit, therefore, of the investments and returns in those divisions of labor which have been known as sociological, it would at least be safe to consider the ways and degrees in which the findings, for better or for worse, commit the finders to similar findings in the case of the other divisions of social science. No one is competent to evaluate any portions of the sociological movement who is unintelligent about the differentiation of the movement from the forms of reflection upon human conditions which had been in the course of evolution previous to the middle of the nineteenth century. No one is competent to evaluate any portion of the sociological movement unless he is aware that the personnel of each of its divisions is made up of men and women whose competence to make necessary appeal to the general sciences and technologies and techniques by which their special activities must be reinforced, compares favorably with that of corresponding specialists in other divisions of physical or social science and their derivative arts.

In the fourth place, we must remember that the distribution of the divisions of sociological labor has not been uniform. There are cases of workers who have made an impression in only one of these eight fields. There are perhaps a few workers who have had a certain influence in each of them. It is not certain that those who have done work in the larger number of these fields have had identical logical or psychological centers for the different portions of their theory and practice.

In the fifth place, we must observe that it is an absurdity to apply the name sociology to each and all of these divisions of labor, and at the same time to insist that the term is an instrument of scientific precision. Certain demands of convenience might justify

an inclusive name for gardening, and cooking, and nursing, and teaching. To analyze the roots and branches of each, four somewhat different techniques would be necessary. To the present writer the choice of terms of, in, and for the social sciences is a matter of relatively trifling concern, provided there can be progress toward a consensus about the meaning of terms and consistency in the use of them. Up to the present time, the attempts to standardize the term "sociology" have all been prompted to some extent by the desire of each person who employed the term to make it a comfortable roof for shelter of his particular combination of activities. Especially if he was a teacher, he has strained after a definition of sociology which would seem to indicate a foreordained association between all the elements in the conglomerate which he purveyed to his students. The consequence has been that, so far as classification was concerned, academic sociology has often exhibited reminders of that pre-scientific spirit which inscribed in the faculty list of a certain American college the legend: "A.B.C., Professor of History, Ancient and Natural."

If we consider for a moment the eight types of activity just specified, and if we remember that each of them is sometimes called sociology, it will be obvious that the designation "sociology" is a mischievously ambiguous middle term. Each of the eight activities scheduled has a legitimacy of its own. Any one of them might possibly make out a better claim than any other to the name sociology. No contention about that possibility is involved here. The one essential matter is that the present ambiguity of the term "sociology" compromises each type of work to which it is applied. Self-interest not less than scientific responsibility demands that as soon as possible the sociologists shall free their own minds and the minds of others from the confusions which this ambiguity perpetuates. They are unlikely to accomplish this very successfully until they fix upon a terminology as distinguishing as that which indicates the division of labor in biological science.

In the sixth place, and expanding especially the third proposition in this series (*supra*, p. 829), the sociological movement, especially of the fourth to the eighth types inclusive, cannot be accurately evaluated if it is considered solely as a phenomenon apart

- from the other divisions of social science. If we may assume license for an extravagant and not altogether dignifying figure, the sociological movement in one aspect is a laboratory "culture," the prime purpose of which is to visualize a process taking place less artificially in living organisms. More literally, the sociological movement has been spoken of above as a revolt against unsatisfactory academic conventionalities.¹ Now it would be as contrary to the facts to assume that the movement for improvement in the methods of social science was confined to the sociologists, as it would be to assume that the movement for reform in the Catholic church was confined to the Protestants. Luther and Calvin merely represented more peremptory and daring demands for reforms which in some kind and degree were in demand among the most docile supporters of the Papacy, and which in some kind and degree were realized by the Council of Trent. It would also be premature to assume that the existing division between traditionalists and revolters in social science is to be permanent. It is certainly permissible to look for a more reasonable outcome. Meanwhile, it would clarify the present situation wonderfully if we could have a complete survey of the extent to which the methodology of the older divisions of social science has actually tended toward removal of the defects which provoked the sociological revolt.

In the seventh place, for reasons similar to those which set limits to the scope of our inquiry in a previous section,² we must refrain from expressing judgments about those phases of the sociological movement which center in the types scheduled as 1, 2, and 3 above.³ It is evident that those divisions of labor have precisely the same relation in principle to fundamental social science that every other technique or technology has to the general science or sciences which are logically antecedent. Our further discussion will confine itself accordingly to the sociological movement as represented by workers in the lines 4-8 inclusive.

Speaking then for those five divisions of labor in particular, suppose we try to take an inventory of ourselves. Or suppose we first indulge in a forecast. I will venture to put myself on record with the guess that in a hundred years there will be writers on the

¹ *Supra*, p. 769.

² *Supra*, p. 771.

³ *Supra*, p. 828.

history of the social sciences who will point out that between the years 1865 and 1915 a decomposition and a recomposition of social science were occurring, and that in effect, though not in detail, the change resembled the reorganization which had its preparatory period in Germany between 1765 and 1815.

It is needless to particularize the comparison. The outstanding resemblance between the earlier period and that which we may refer to as though the year 1915 were its terminus, is that in both periods there were resolute attempts to run scientific dividing lines and containing lines between social sciences. In the earlier case many of these lines were transient, and my prediction is that the same story will presently be told about many of the lines of definition which have been drawn by social scientists during the later period.

For one, I feel safely intrenched in the position that, whatever the coming changes, social science will prove to be a growing reality, while only the provincial foolishnesses of social scientists will be put to shame. Few social scientists are ready to adjust themselves to the fact that social science, like any other science, is not an entity, not a thing. Few are ready to admit that it cannot be divided at will into office space, like a skyscraper, to serve the convenience of tenants. If we understand by science *comprehension of phenomena*, social science is an unrelenting emergence of problems, and response of effort to solve the problems, and accumulation of positive and negative results of the efforts, in cycles as far as we know without end. Men do in part make these problems in the backs of their heads. Sooner or later the problems which are chiefly subjective are crowded out by those which are more objective. The moving world engages observing minds with the incessant challenge, Watch me, and explain me if you can! Less and less is any division of science what detached preference would have it. More and more it is what objective occurrences compel it to be. Science is more than the camera of life, but it is like the camera in depending upon external objects for the veracity of its results.

All of these reflections furnish an introduction to the larger generalization that before much more time has elapsed, all the men who are actually explorers in social science are likely almost

with one accord to realize, first, that they have not been so very different from the sociologists in claiming for their own technique more than it can conceivably perform; secondly, that, just like the sociologists, they have assumed that they were arriving at their conclusions by means of a technique wholly their own, while in fact they were borrowing for their own structures building material from every available source; thirdly, that the really scientific part of their work is the invention of tools and methods of research into particular phases or evidences of phenomena, which phenomena must also be investigated by other tools and by other methods; fourthly, that the invention of these tools and methods, and practice with them upon abstracted subjects are after all merely preliminary to actual scientific processes in the full sense. Social science, as distinguished from the dilettantism of satisfying curiosity about mentally segregated aspects or episodes of human experience, must consist in comprehending units of human experience, whatever they turn out to be, to the extent that the modes of their coherence each within itself are so completely made out that no inquiry about those correlations is left unanswered; although inquiries will sooner or later arise about the coherence of the given unit with a larger human complex. Thereupon, through inevitable reference to the larger human complex, another unit of experience will be given, and the realness of science will be tested again by its adequacy to make out the correlations within the larger unit, and so on to the utmost content of human experience. This understanding of actual units of human experience presupposes, therefore, the co-operative use of all the techniques which have been elaborated or which may be elaborated by all the divisions of social science.

I base this prediction, first, upon what has actually been taking place wherever investigation of human experience has occurred; and, secondly, upon the probability that the future will not reverse the rule of the past that the intellectual perceptions of the few presently become the property of the many.

There have been innumerable variations of this process, but we may say in the rough that, since 1850, prestige has tended to depart from all phases of attempts to establish the authority of

omnibus interpretations of reality, and prestige has tended to gather around every attempt to isolate a relatively controllable problem, and to bring to bear upon it all the aids to solution which are credited with competence to throw light upon the problem. Thus the once imposing "philosophy of history" has today no scientific standing; while at the opposite extreme the case method of studying child psychology is treated by scientific men in general with a degree of respect beyond the proportion of its merits as measured by unquestionable results.

In sociology, this reaction from omnibus interpretations to study of rather definitely bounded units of experience is a distinctive mark of our present stage of thinking. In and of itself this change is a scientific achievement. It is a result of much futile bombardment of the citadel of all reality, and of consequent recourse to intensive operations upon details of the structure and processes of reality. We are becoming aware of the relative superficiality of our knowledge of the most immediate and ordinary units of experience. What, for instance, are the springs of motive, the processes of the fusion of motives, and the resources for control of motives in the different boys' groups in our own community? What is the precise series of antecedents and consequents that have resulted in the break-up of a given family—not to speak of a formula of causes of family disintegration in general? What is the precise composition of interests which furnishes a constituency for a given local elective official? By virtue of what combination of factors did the people of the United States arrive at the state of mind which they expressed in a given presidential election?

Waiving now the question whether a scientific answer to such questions is thinkable, this much is certain: the people who have focused their attention upon such questions can no longer be hoodwinked by the scientific pretensions of any more wholesale and summary methods of asking and answering questions about human experience. If we are at our wits' end to understand the boys in the nearest schoolyard, it is barely possible that no one has any better understood the crusade of the children. If we are not quite sure about the rights and wrongs involved in the troubles of the Smith family in our own set, it would not be so strange if we

- turned out to be incompletely informed about the details and the social significance of the domestic relations of Henry VIII. If we find ourselves guessing about the undercurrents of politics in our own ward, the suspicion naturally steals in upon us that we may have believed fairy tales about the Wars of the Roses, or the revolts of the Italian cities, or the European war of 1914. If the United States of America in our own day and generation, with the whole publicity apparatus of our modern civilization, baffles the comprehension of the wisest of us, what are the chances that we have the key to the combination which makes any other previous or contemporary culture area intelligible? In a word, this at least is a contribution which present fashions in sociological research are making to the objectivity of social science in general, viz., we are demonstrating the complexity of those group relationships which it should be easiest for us to investigate, and we are correspondingly challenging the credibility of accounts of more remote experiences to which no such analysis has been applied as we find necessary for the credibility of interpretations of experiences near at hand. Otherwise expressed, the sociologists are at least performing the negative service of encouraging a wholesome suspicion that much remains before anything which is conventionally accepted as social science will be able to stand the test as more than one of the tributary techniques of science, or as a gathering of materials for science. In this respect sociology is not essentially different from those older divisions of labor which have been conventionally accepted.

More than this, it is no longer possible for moderately sophisticated people to be deluded by the superstition that such knowledge as we have of any past or present unit of experience has been given to us by a single academically defined science, or that if we have only such knowledge as is literally the find of a single academically defined science, it has relatively more evidential value than the brick which the Greek in the story carried about as a sample of the house he wanted to sell.

As a matter of fact, the mortal assumption that the different so-called social sciences have developed each in an air-tight compartment of its own must be one of the standing jokes among the

immortal gods. Ever since there have been any pretensions of social science, each exponent of any part of it has appropriated everything within his reach in other social sciences, if he had wit enough to see that this scrap information or cunning tool or wise method could be utilized in his particular pursuits. Every commentator upon any phase of human experience whatever has greedily grabbed up every stray item of information from investigators of other phenomena, provided some way could be seen to weave that information into the projected plan of explanation. Resistance of this program has been a sign of invincible ignorance or of insuperable prejudice.

For example, one of the humors of the evolution of thought in the latest century has been the self-righteous indignation of the so-called Manchester economists over the outrageous violation of their sanctuary by the historical school. The latter miscreants actually proposed to call in historical precedents to test the correctness of the classical generalizations. After a body of doctrine had comfortably established itself, it was sacrilege of course to confront it with mere historical facts which weakened the conclusiveness of the previous historical generalizations!

When this violation of the temple began, and when indignation became hot against the disturbers, none of the priests of this economic holy of holies seems to have remembered that the whole structure purported to have been founded upon the historical basis. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* had been accepted as the revelation of a new orthodoxy in part because it gave itself the manner of an induction from all previous economic experience. What the range of Smith's historical knowledge really was, is immaterial. His book is ostensibly a digest of all the teachings on economic relations which previous experience had bequeathed to his time. It turned out that while enough history to serve as the basis of an acceptable economic cult was welcome to the British economists, enough more history to raise doubts about that cult was taboo.

Today the tables are turned, and there is intermittent eruption all along the historical heights, because explosives lodged by economic perceptions are bursting the crust of historical traditions. The affairs of nations are not as simple as the convenience

- of historians chose to make them; and historians who read the omens are facing the alternatives of involuntary bankruptcy or reorganization of the business. At the same time others besides the wisest historians have abandoned the type of hope that used to be cherished about the sort of knowledge which may be gained about the past.

Nor have we told the whole story yet. Learning about human experience today is not only not an affair of logically delimited academic "sciences," or departments. So far as contemporary phases of the process are in question, it is not primarily an affair of "science" at all, in the constructive sense of that term, any more than the manual labor of serving a machine gun is generalship. Suppose we subject the best books that have come from the press in all the major social sciences in any recent year to a minute analysis of the sources from which the authors drew, and of the ratio between the authors' own contributions and the aggregate contents. We should presently be aware that the differences between either of these books and a volume published fifty years earlier on a similar subject represent, in the first place, a largely increased mass, and a more highly criticized control of intermediately accumulated material, with knowledge of which the later author approaches his work. This part of his equipment is not necessarily a departmental monopoly at all. Having once been given to the world, it actually becomes a part of the outfit of every fully trained scholar in social science. In the second place, the later author has enriched his book through use of certain techniques which are equally at the service of scholars in every other division of social science—that is, library administration in general, and particularly the work of cataloguers, indexers, and bibliographers. No thoroughly modern book in social science is as provincial as it would be if it actually observed the boundary lines drawn for it by the academic department which it is supposed to represent. It is actually a variant of a common scientific tradition.

In brief, then, the sociologists have less in common than we had a decade or two ago with those wide-reaching thinkers who used to follow, closely or afar off, the lure of an ideal of causal interpretation which may be symbolized by a chain stretching from

the beginning of man's life on the earth to the present moment. We believe today that explanation of the human episode is conceivable not in the sense that it will ever be possible to connect each subsequent event as a link in an endless chain of antecedents, or as a link in an endless web made up of interlinked parallel chains; but in the sense that we see in the whole bulk of human phenomena a more or less differentiated mass of functional occurrences, the principles of which functional occurrences we partially understand.

To reduce this hypothesis to the simplest expression, we believe:

First, that from a certain level on, human life is always and everywhere primarily an affair of groupings of some sort between people.

Secondly, that wherever we encounter an observable phenomenon of human life, we have given in that phenomenon always the same essential factors, namely: (1) the relations between people and their habitat; (2) the essentially similar physiological and psychological outfit of the persons, by virtue of which they move toward a certain control of the physical conditions; (3) the social problems in the strict sense, i.e., the play of personal forces in various group formations; (4) the prime factors of social motivation proper in the wants of the persons themselves.

Thirdly, the elements of human experience, or, as we have just called them, the prime factors of social motivation, are the both spontaneous and deliberate outreachings of these prime factors to satisfy their cravings, physiological, psychological, or social.

Fourthly, the content of these cravings varies from time to time in quality, and quantity, and proportion; but if we have made out the generic types of physical and psychical wants ("interests"), we have in them the clues to all the specific cases of moving impulse in all human situations.

Fifthly, the consequence is that we have come to visualize human experience in the large as a very inadequately charted world. We see that in this whole very much more than can be symbolized in terms of only two dimensions, but confining ourselves for the present purpose to that inadequate type of expression, we may vary our figure by describing what we make out in a general survey

of human experience as a disorderly procession of persons formed into groups of different sizes, stabilities, and degrees of dependence upon, or independence of, one another. These groups are at different removes from one another both in time and in space. As we see them in the form of an only partially organized procession, we cannot escape the impression that different elements in this procession, whether we observe them longitudinally or laterally, have some sort of reciprocal relations. Positive evidence of this reciprocity may be within our control only in an utterly inadequate degree. For convenience we may call these groupings which we make out in the procession of human events, "units of experience"; that is, reactions of persons who affect the mind of the onlooker as having some sort of coherence, but who, so far as the onlooker can see at first glance, have only invisible or at least negligible connections with the other persons in the procession. In extent these "units of experience" may reveal themselves to the observer in every gradation of magnitude, from the crisis in the latest disrupted family that the United Charities visitor has discovered, or the latest bell boys' strike, to units of experience that are national, like an American presidential campaign, or international, like the present European war.

The present sociological contention is that we can explain human experience genetically only in the degree in which we can make out both the physiology and the psychology of all the units of experience out of which human experience as a whole is composed. A very short clinical experience, in attempting to discover the precise physiology and psychology of a familiar contemporary group, will induce wholesome skepticism as to the permanence of the prestige which our present social sciences enjoy as authoritative interpreters of human life as a whole.

This summary of considerations which must be weighed in forming an appreciation of the sociological movement at its present stage would be incomplete, and perhaps it would be justly condemned as injudicial, if it did not make frank confession of certain crudities which the sociologists have not entirely outgrown.

First, then, in common with all other academic men, and particularly with all the other social scientists, we have suffered from

imperfect differentiations between the pedagogical and the investigating sections of our work. Not only in the colleges but even in the universities, the decisive question has usually been, not what aspects of reality most urgently demanded investigation, but with what sort of material one could most certainly establish oneself as a teacher. The consequence has been much sacrifice of scientific integrity to pedagogical expediency. Not a division of social science in the United States has escaped the corruptions of academic politics. Not a division of social science in the United States has fully defended itself against the lure of profits from textbooks. Whether in the less obvious struggle for standing-ground in a faculty, or in the more obvious deferring of the question, What most needs to be investigated? to the question, What sort of mental pabulum will the market digest? the union in the same persons of the two functions of teaching and research has encountered hindrances to the effectiveness of both. A large part of the reasons why such miscellaneous activities as we have scheduled still bear the common name, "sociology," may be found in this connection.¹ I am bound to contend, however, that the situation is not essentially different in any other division of social science. Nowhere does the actual teaching conform to the pseudo-scientific formulations of the scope of the department. Francis A. Walker's textbooks of political economy, widely used a couple of decades ago, may be cited as symbolical of a general condition. Walker began his smaller book by alleging that "political economy has to do with no other subject, whatever, than wealth." Yet he does not finish the page on which this statement appears without referring to "mankind," to "individuals," and to "communities"; and only special pleading could make it appear that a single page in the book confines itself strictly to the subject of wealth. This is because wealth is really a function both of material and of people; and it was one of the marks of the juvenility of science to suppose that such a block system of demarkation lines as that to which Walker paid verbal tribute could actually be observed in practice.

If sociology could stand strictly on its own merits as an intellectual pursuit, it would rank either as a luxury for a few or as

¹ *Supra*, p. 828.

- a penance for a different few. It would be a millstone hung about the neck of the many. In competition for registrations with teachers of subjects which may legitimately be made more immediately attractive, the sociologist would have to be a superman if he did not unconsciously try to commend his subject by presentation of it in ways which could not pass a very rigid methodological censorship. But what historian is content to offer college classes merely drill in historiographic technique? What economist rests his case with students solely on discipline in analyzing purely economic cause and effect? When such a man as Thomas Davidson accuses the universities of frivolity, his position is respectable, whatever our opinion of the merits of the charge. It is at least true that, until a revolution has occurred in the methodology of academic social science in general, it will remain a case of the pot calling the kettle black when men in the other divisions of labor blame the sociologists for breaking scientific discipline.

To many teachers of sociology, and to many more teachers of other subjects, what I have said may seem to make for the conclusion that the material of instruction which has been brought into academic schedules by the sociologists has no value and ought to be excluded. Precisely the opposite conclusion seems to me to follow from the facts. Without discussing the case at length, I merely remark, first, that in writing this sketch I have had in mind a very sharp distinction between the *value* of things called sociology and questions about methodological classification and arrangement of those things. We must not allow conclusions which we may reach on the latter subject in any way to prejudice the former, any more than we should allow our opinions about the place of mathematics in scientific classification to influence our judgment about the availability of mathematics for purposes of general or special education. Secondly, whatever we or others may think about divisions of labor in social science, no one who is teaching in any part of the fields which the sociologists have cultivated need have any fear that the sane pragmatism which has made room for these subjects in our curricula will ever reverse this action. The intelligence of men must steadily become confirmed in the belief that there never can be more vital education than that

which is gained by dwelling upon the constructive interests of men, their ways of manifesting themselves, their abortive experiments, their achievements, their contemporary problems, and their prospects of further realization. If we should extinguish the name sociology altogether, and if we should reconstruct our entire system of the social sciences, these phases of life which the sociologists have brought to academic attention would certainly hold their own under some title or other, by virtue of their intrinsic importance.

Secondly, we are still shifty in our attempts to specify the precise functions which we feel ourselves called to discharge. We have not come to a complete understanding with ourselves about our relations to that lightning change artist "society," alias "association," alias "activities." These are all omnibus designations. They are conceptions. That is, they are already essays in interpretation. A procedure which starts to investigate an intellectual expression for reality instead of stark reality itself, simply tolerates a curtain between itself and objectivity.

Until the social psychologists, in groping after a vocation for sociology, tore that veil away, the sociologists were only semi-conscious of a phase of reality not yet investigated in a thorough fashion. That phase of reality consisted most obviously of persons always appearing in certain species of groupings with other persons, and behaving themselves toward one another in certain ways within one type of grouping different from their manner of behavior in other types of grouping. Accordingly the problems sooner or later arise, whatever may turn out to be their ratio of importance: What are the relations between these groupings and the types of behavior within the groupings? To what extent are these relationships constant, and to what extent variable? To what extent do they depend upon factors not immediately given by the forms of groupings on the one hand, and by the behavior on the other? These uninvestigated relationships had been imperfectly investigated as they had appeared in various partial disguises. They had never been stripped naked, and examined apart from their multitudes of trappings and attachments.

These relationships are then, in general, *persons wanting satisfactions and trying to get satisfactions in unavoidable contact with other*

persons trying to get similar or dissimilar satisfactions. In a word, human experience is an affair of human groupings, with the one plausible clue to the phenomena of these groupings, viz., the *wants* impelling the units. So far as we know, this is the stark reality, conventionalized in the term "society" or its alternates. Now the distinct task presents itself of beginning to observe this reality in all the variations in which it can be found, from the casual group of two alien tribesmen, to the permanent group of two marital partners, and then through the permutations of groupings numerically and functionally as far as it is possible to observe and report. This reduction of social reality to terms of *socii* (Baldwin, Giddings) and their behaviors, I will now for convenience call the sociological clue.

Nothing but perception that studying human affairs by means of this clue is a method which has attracted very little attention, that it looks promising, and that it is more appealing than any visible alternative pursuit, can compel a given person to devote himself occasionally or permanently to the use of this clue. No law, human or divine, has such efficient sanction that one who is not attracted by the prospects of the sociological clue need give it a trial against his will. If, however, one does enter into a course of research ostensibly guided by the sociological clue, one is immediately under obligation to use it for what it is worth, as literally as possible, until it seems to have exhausted its usefulness for him, or he has exhausted his usefulness with it. Especially is a teacher who undertakes to show students how to use the sociological clue bound to do his utmost to show its various leadings.

Since we have arrived at the understanding of groups as functional, rather than logical, and especially since we have grasped the fact that, in the world as we find it, performance of function is inextricably mixed with derangement of function, we are not as much inclined as we once were to suppose that we can ever work out a completely schematic rendering of the phenomena of human groupings. In compensation for this disillusion, we find that a world of uncriticized group phenomena falling within the formal categories "structure" and "function" invites investigation. It is also a spur to this investigation to realize, as sociologists

now realize, first, that nothing which has already been observed in any division of social studies or of homely experience in the way of behavior of human groups need be negligible for this particular kind of induction; and, secondly, that everything which can now be generalized from existing evidence about the behavior of human groups will probably lend aid to other divisions of social science, by calling attention to correlations of their own kind of material, which they had partly or wholly neglected, and which might indicate still more fruitful pursuit of their own division of labor.

To take the most threadbare illustration: Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of books have been written in a score of different languages on the constitutional law, or the constitutional history of selected countries, the underlying conception of which treatises was that political constitutions are affairs of legal construction alone; that they are held together solely by the bonds of certain presuppositions about political principles and personal rights and duties, and that they are to be judged solely by the criterion of their consistency with these principles, or by their relations to some other constitutional and legal system adopted as a standard. Perhaps an equal number of books have been written about economic relations, with the presupposition that these relations are affairs of men concerned wholly about gainful occupations, and affected by no influences outside of those occupations. Suppose the perception dawned suddenly upon an author of each of these types of books that the sort of relations he had been theorizing about are in reality devices of groups of men who for generations and centuries have been dividing their time between struggling for economic gains at one moment and for more satisfactory legal adjustments at the next. Suppose that these men did not go beyond this discovery to the perception that these groups of men with economic interests and political interests were at the same time groups structuralized and motivated by topographical interests—"Ye crags and peaks, I'm with you once again"—and racial interests, and creedal interests, and composite physical, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral interests of innumerable sorts. On the basis of the primary discovery alone that economic groups are at the same time also political groups, and vice versa, these two authors

- ought at once to perceive that their ways of explaining the institutions with which they had been dealing must be reconsidered from the beginning. If they penetrated deep enough into the facts to see that these groups were interplays of more than the two interests, and perhaps of as many as I have suggested, these authors would cease to have confidence in their attempt to understand real life as an affair of a single factor.

This is merely a trite illustration of the concrete aspect of experience on a large scale when it is looked at through the medium of initial insight into the workings of human wants. At the more homely extreme, a case in real life is typical—and typical not merely of many everyday situations, but typical also of much supposedly critical treatment of concrete facts. I was brought up among people of a deeply earnest evangelical type, to whom I do not believe the idea ever occurred that actors were human beings like themselves, with the slight variation that they got their living by trying to entertain people, instead of trying to sell them groceries, or lumber, or dry goods, or sheep skins, or medicines. They were “stage people,” and that was the end of it. “Stage people” were of course not *people*, in a sense which made them in any way profitable objects of attention for church members. It had never occurred to those good Christians to associate “stage people” with the homely concerns of ordinary commonplace folks. No inkling had ever entered their minds that stage people go through life, like other people, worried about getting money or credit to stave off the boarding-house keeper, and the shoemaker, and the dressmaker, and the tailor; that they have fathers, and mothers, and brothers, and sisters, and children, and friends, and enemies, like other people; that they have headaches and heartaches, and ambitions and disappointments, and aspirations and discouragements, like most of the millions who have lived and died on the earth; that they are even, like the rest of mankind, in certain recesses of themselves, religious inquirers, and perhaps religious believers, or at all events that like other people they have a certain reserve of wistfulness about the mysteries which the creeds profess to explain. These good friends of mine would have been speechless with astonishment if anybody had suggested that church people

ought to find some point of contact with stage people. The fallacy of the whole situation was in the ecclesiastical myth then obsessive, that actors are actors instead of people. The moment we dissipate this myth, the moment we discern plain people in all sorts and conditions of men, the moment we realize that wherever there are people there are in principle the same conflicts of cross-purposes within them, urging them with or against people of their kind to get ahead in efforts to satisfy these purposes—the moment we entertain this rudimentary idea of what the human lot is, from that moment we have a point of departure for exploring the given case of the human lot which is next to us, whether it is a special individual or a group of scores, or hundreds, or thousands, or millions. The clue expresses itself interrogatively in the diagnostic questions: What is the precise kind, degree, and combination of the wants actuating this person or group? What is the order of valuation, by the person or the members of the group, among the wants in this combination, that is, which would be canceled first, second, third, etc., under the stress of circumstances by the persons moved by the wants in the hope that at least the residual want might win at last? What adjustments with other persons, or what enmities against other persons, or possibly what independencies of other persons, have the people in question inherited or adopted in conscious or unconscious effort to satisfy their wants? What failures of normal attachments to others exhibit pathological features of their situation? What resources are within reach of these persons for setting up a normal circuit between themselves and others in furtherance of their wholesome desires?

In drawing out an illustration to this length I have not forgotten what it was to illustrate. To come back to the point, the sociological clue to human experience, namely the study of persons as they act in structural and functional group relations, under pressure of wants that spring up in the consciousness of each, partly because of and partly in spite of their contacts with others—this clue, to be of any scientific value, must be systematically applied. Or perhaps it would be better to say, if one is to become scientific and efficient in the use of this clue, one must get acquainted with the typical forms of the manifestations of these factors—the

gamut and combinations of subjective wants on the one hand, and the phenomena of combinations and actions of persons impelled by these wants, and gravitating into groups in the effort to realize the wants on the other.

We have among the sociologists many promising beginnings of plans for exhibiting the typical human relationships in some of their most important workings. We have not arrived at such agreement about these plans that there is a very impressive degree of uniformity of method among us. This is partly because we do not evenly apply our underlying plan to control of our actual program either as teachers or as investigators. One not familiar with the development of sociological thinking might read many different specimens of our literature without getting a definite notion of the clue conception which all are trying to follow. The uninitiated might easily miss the key that all are trying to translate human relationships, throughout their length and breadth, into terms of *people employing group connections to realize their respective types of wants*. We can scarcely wonder that such readers are in doubt whether the sociologists have come to a settled understanding with one another about what they believe to be the literal terms of human experience.

This last remark might be varied by putting it in this form: The sociologists often fall behind the present standards of objectivity by repeating the immemorial artificiality of hypostatizing certain aspects of human experience, and then using those mental constructions as data, instead of pursuing research into more closely observed characteristics of persons in the relationships so conventionalized. That is, if we do not pry back of the omnibus terms "society," "association," "activities," we are stopping short with composite mental snapshots of reality which are as different from the whole of reality as a snapshot of a horse at a given point in the circuit is from the whole race he is running. In other words, we are still putting so much emphasis on the process side of life as such, in its merely formal aspects, that we make little impression with our attention to the *content* or substantive aspects. The essence of human life is not the ways in which it conducts itself, but the inchoate and developing personalities that conduct

themselves in those ways. Life is a transaction in which infant human animals become adults not merely in body but in character. Not merely do infants of successive generations repeat the advance from infancy, through adolescence, and maturity, and then down the decline of senility, but certain individuals in every large group in every generation excel other individuals in certain physical, mental, and moral attributes of personality. We speak of this casually in various terms of personal character. Still more, through the generations further unfoldings of personal variations occur. The amateur becomes the professional; the jack-at-all-trades becomes the specialist; the sensuous type passes into the more controlled type; the credulous become critical; the provincial become cosmopolitan, etc. These human maturing, or people pursuing their own realization and the realization of their larger selves in readjusting their group reciprocities—these are the substantial things of life, or human values, as the sociological phrase goes. It is one of our chief tasks at present to push this realistic conception of human experience to the front as consistently as possible; and at the same time we are in a stage at which we are peculiarly tempted to drop back into practices which tend to throw the spotlight so brightly on *conceptions of processes*, that our attention is sidetracked from the literal persons who in their forth-putting of themselves in their individual and group character are the reality. If we talk so much about "association" that we call off our search for better knowledge of *persons as they associate*; if we promote the concept "activities" to so high a rank in our esteem that it arrests our inquiries into why people act and how they act, we have made, not a scientific advance, but a retreat. There is a valid and an invalid use of general categories, as the paper to which this is preliminary will attempt to show. The sociologists are not to be blamed for using general categories as parts of their apparatus of research and report. Nothing to the contrary is implied in the foregoing. The emphasis, however, is on the consideration that the categories must be controlled as means of comprehending those aspects of reality which they are supposed to generalize. They may never be allowed to substitute themselves for those realities. The philosopher musing over the category

space so dreamily that he loses his actual bearings among landmarks is a symbol of what is not a scientific use of categories. They are viciously used if they take the place of reality. They are validly used if they aid us in orienting ourselves within reality. We have often erred on the side of magnifying "society," "association," "activities," and minimizing *socii*, people associating, and people acting.

In brief, a sociological method tends backward toward sterile dialectics in the degree in which it encourages the impression that progress can be made in objective knowledge by reflecting upon conceptual representations of experience. A sociological method makes for complete objectivity in the degree in which its employment of categories promotes first-hand acquaintance with that reality which the categories provisionally symbolize.

Thirdly, we have not yet wholly emerged from the state of mind in which extravagant claims are made by sociologists for sociology. Before we fully find ourselves in the ranks of social science, we shall have to make very clear, first to ourselves and then to others, that we have a clue to a particular quest, and we shall meanwhile have called in our juvenile pretensions to be the masters of everything while we are giving proof that we can discover something.

We used to compare the relation of general sociology to the whole range of human activities with the relation of general biology to all the phenomena of organic life. Most of the sociologists at one time made assertions to that effect without a suspicion that they were comical. In fact, neither term of the comparison was conceived in accordance with reality. Biologists today do not recognize a science of general biology, except in the sense of co-operation of many divisions of labor in a field designated generally as biology. No more is there such a possibility as general sociology which is not a division of labor upon a reality common to all the social sciences. The only possible contradiction of this assertion must be in terms of a methodology of social science as a whole. The early presumption of the sociologists was victoriously that the most vital functions of social science in general are the special preserve of sociology. The assertion which I have substituted for myself, and

which I shall develop in a later paper, is that this generalizing claim for sociology is an accrediting to our specialty of that which is the ambition of our broadest humanity, regardless of specialties. We delude ourselves, however, if we suppose that our specialty is furnishing us the wherewithal to satisfy, as far as we do satisfy it, this aspiration of our whole personality. The fact is, as we have seen above,¹ that we draw upon all that we can borrow from all other men, plus all that we can derive from our specialty, to give us our conspectus and interpretation of life as a whole. Other men do precisely the same thing. It remains to be seen (let us hope it will some day be seen) what proportions of credit for the final perspective of life will fall to the different scientific divisions of labor.

When, therefore, we have descended from our exceeding high mountain, where the hereditary sociological devil has tempted us with an option on the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, we have found a certain humdrum of homely work falling to the sociologists' lot. Making due deductions for our haltings and wanderings, we have not shirked this work. Much has been accomplished. Perhaps it will turn out, however, that the tangible results of the sociologists' work up to date consist quite as largely in the changed attitude which men in the other divisions of social science have grudgingly adopted, as in any body of conclusions to which the sociologists can maintain exclusive title.

Fourthly, we are still crude in our ideas about the relation between sociological discovery in the strict sense and ethical evaluation of the things discovered. Some of us are still identifying sociology and ethics. If we mean by ethics a comprehensive system of valuations covering all the dimensions of conceivable human activity with judgments of the principles, policies, and precepts of control which should prevail throughout those diameters, it is unthinkable that there can ever be a specialized academic department which could have such a system in its keeping. A little later I shall discuss this proposition in a somewhat more concrete form. I anticipate briefly here what I shall express more in detail. An ethic, considered as a standard and a moral technique

¹ *Supra*, p. 835-36.

for the whole program of all living persons, can be credible only in the degree in which all the different planes and areas of experience have contributed their portions to the valuations and the programs of which the ethic consists. It is safe to assume that the human race will not have reached its mental and moral limits until all persons, whatever their division of labor, do their share of work with ever-present consciousness that, to the extent of its scope, what they are doing is a tentative theorem of the most worthy way in which that part of life might be conducted; and that the work to that extent is an indispensable factor in the inductive derivation of an inclusive human ethic. This assumption might be put into the concrete in numberless ways. For example, it is a human function to do a family's washing, or scrubbing, or cooking as it ought to be done. It is a human function to run a grocery store or to use medical knowledge for the relief of sickness so that the utmost service will be rendered. It is a human function to administer the machinery of financial credit, or to shape the moral sense of a community into the form of legislation which will represent that moral sense in the most salutary way. What I am trying to say is that we humans will be relatively juvenile in our moral development until each of us has vision enough and sense of responsibility enough to be moved by an imperative within himself to do the particular job which falls to him *as a human function*, as a part of the task every fraction of which must be performed for the best it is worth, or the whole work of humanity will be so much retarded. It is not probable that there can be a single science of all these ethical tasks which are presented by all the functions of life; and in particular it is not probable that sociology can be such a science; nor that it can remain very long under the impression that it can be such a science, without putting in jeopardy the distinctive function which it seems called to perform. The attitude of most of the American sociologists with reference to this matter seems to me to have been as provincial as the attitude of each separate vocational group in the United States that believes in military preparedness would be, if it claimed that its vocation is the one that is primarily responsible for, and pre-eminently competent about, military preparedness. As a matter of fact, the butchers' or

bakers' or candlestick-makers' union might conceivably do more successful agitating for military preparedness at a given time than any or all other groups; but this would not prove that butchers or bakers or candlestick-makers are qualified as such to write the specifications for adequate military preparedness, or to organize preparedness in accordance with the specifications. These are functions which may be utterly beyond the competence of persons who are most eager to have the functions performed, or of any other single type of persons. They must be performed by a wide co-operation. We sociologists have mistaken our perception of the importance of group control with reference to intelligent and just ends, for a vocation to write the specifications of purposes and programs which would realize those ends. We have mistaken our share of that human aspiration which is normal after mental and moral infancy have been outgrown, for call to the distinctive social function of guiding that aspiration.

Some of us have been carried away by the more or less cultivated instincts of the preacher. We have set before ourselves such incandescent pictures of the importance of the far-off divine event, which our longings project, that we have been seduced into moralizing when our job demanded analyzing. True, there are possible and desirable moral interpretations of every conceivable human incident; but a teacher of sociology makes a mistake if on the one hand he claims to act in a scientific way, and if on the other hand he treats his public as a congregation to be preached to, rather than as a company of laboratory investigators preparing to find out for themselves how to know what is worth preaching. Some of our misapplications of energy during the past quarter-century have been due to allowing the homiletical habit to take the bits in its teeth and start upon a preaching circuit, when the work to be done was really a digging down after something fit to preach. The best that all humanity has learned about the values of life is what ought to be preached; but whoever of us goes to preaching it as his leading occupation is pretty sure to diminish his usefulness for any division of scientific research which may be not strictly and safely incidental to a preacher's experience.

In my student days the divinity schools were giving their classes the impression that the only divinely sanctioned method of deriving spiritual truth was through finical dissection of biblical texts; or perhaps still more highly favored of God was extortion of some elusive shade of meaning from alternative readings in the oldest versions or manuscripts. I have heard men schooled in these methods utter fervent exhortations not to risk our own and other people's souls by missing the shade of idea hanging in the balance between an imperfect and an aorist. This was really one of the amusing and at the same time pathetic variations of egotism. It centered in the assumption that the things to which one gives the most studious attention must be the most revealing things in the world. Given the homiletical impulse and habit, and one man gets sermons out of the stars, another out of the growing crops, another out of children's prattle, another out of the phenomena of society. But sermonizing does not make astronomy, nor botany, nor child psychology, nor sociology; no more does it furnish a worthy program for the pursuit of either science.

There is a type of sociology which starts where it hopes to end. That is, it virtually does what the conventional preacher does when he announces his text. Literally, it is then "all over but the shouting." The text is supposed to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, except that it is supposed also to be in itself proof of the truth and guaranty of the truth. If there is a scientific technique corresponding to the name sociology, and if there is a substance of knowledge ascertainable by use of the technique, the immediate business of the investigator in sociology is to apply that technique so that it will reveal knowledge; or if he be a teacher, his business is to initiate students into the use of that technique, so that they in turn may make it useful in gaining knowledge. If there is a preaching value in this knowledge, it will be time to develop that side of it after its credentials have been established. If as teachers we "feature" the preaching value of sociology; at least, if we allow this aspect of the case to appear while we are laying the foundations of our teaching, we virtually offer an emotional bribe for attention to a dubious subject.

It would be an anticlimax after that to let our treatment drop down to the level of plain objective analysis. One is bound thenceforth to maintain the evaluative manner in a degree which forbids the necessary dull prying into objective relations, regardless of their presupposed ethical values. That is, whatever analysis one does after such a beginning must remain incidental to one's preaching, instead of being ruthless exploration, regardless of any moralizings which the results may justify.

I hope I have not seemed to imply that I find no ethical values in sociology. On the contrary, I have always believed that social science is at its highest power only when it has arrived at ethical expression. I should have no use for sociology if I did not believe that it is an essential factor in that veracious social science which must furnish the content of positive ethical theory. It is necessary to understand primary arithmetic in order to be able to understand what it means to be honest with our neighbor. One cannot be reliable in converting honest intentions into honest acts if one has not the necessary arithmetical knowledge for calculations of the quantities concerned in everyday transactions. It does not follow that the best way to learn arithmetic is to listen to sermons on the the virtue of honesty. So with sociology and ethics. The one deals with certain objective structural and functional relationships. The other assigns values to the relationships. In the nature of the case it is a mental impossibility to pay very much attention to observation and analysis of these relationships without beginning to evaluate them; and I see no reason why a teacher, whether of physiology, or psychology, or history, or economics, or sociology, or anything else for that matter, should try to arrest this tendency, provided that it is not allowed to interfere with the requirements of valid scientific method. There can be no escape from such interference, however, if the evaluating process is pushed into the foreground and made to determine the whole plan of procedure.

Fifthly, we sociologists have taken ourselves too seriously as distinctively or pre-eminently interested in the welfare of mankind. There is a sense in which this claim is valid,¹ but the sociologists have also cherished a version of this claim which is egregiously in-

¹ Vid *supra*, p. 847-48.

valid. It is a fact that the sociologists have helped to rescue thought of human beings from almost total submersion in impersonal social science. The sociologists have followed a true instinct in making people paramount to any and all of the institutions of people, or generalizations about people. The sociological perception has steadily grown clearer that knowledge of occurrences within human experience, or of results consequent upon those occurrences, which can be expressed otherwise than in terms of developing personality, is relatively empty. Herbert Spencer has seldom been accused of being a sentimentalist, but his precept, "judge between alternatives of conduct by the type of society they tend to produce," made more directly than he imagined toward adoption of values pertaining to persons as the standard of all sociological judgments. The sociologists insist that all knowledge about externalities is trivial in comparison with knowledge of the sort of people we are, the sort of people we are becoming, the means within our reach of evaluating the types of persons that we are tending to become or that we might conceivably become, and our resources for controlling choice of means toward the desirable alternative.

On the other hand, the phase of these facts which is not equally familiar to the sociologists is that all this may be true, and that it may still be as exclusively cognitive as a mental activity may be; that is, it may have no necessary accompaniment of especially sympathetic characteristics. The theologians afford an instructive analogy. They have always been devoted to intellectual formulation of the "plan of salvation," the means whereby human beings might attain the supreme end of their existence. Those, however, who have been best qualified to compare theologians as a class, throughout the Christian era, with other types of religious people, have not bequeathed to us the impression that the former deserve to rank as uniquely ardent lovers of mankind. In like manner, our sociological technique no more certainly makes us the moral superiors of other social scientists than evolutionary biologists are necessarily

socially superior to men who are not evolutionary biologists. It is not for me to confess my doubt whether there has ever been an investigator, teacher, or writer in the whole field of the social

sciences who has not been stimulated in some degree by some type of interest in human well-being as a goal to be reached by conscious effort. Of course that interest at its lowest terms may have been mere intellectual curiosity. It has ranged from that moral minimum to the most self-abnegating devotion to human betterment; and the prevailing type of interest has not been determined regularly by the particular division of social science to which the individual was credited. In its ordinary types the underlying human interest has been perhaps more analytical or generalizing than emotional or motor. Yet it would be hard to find a thinker about human affairs from Herodotus down who has not been moved in some measure by care for improving the human lot, or for bettering the ways in which human beings adapt themselves to their lot. Often, to be sure, and for many reasons, this fraction of motive may have been obscured by various other motives. Many men have gone about the work of reflecting upon human conditions in precisely the state of mind to which Gibbon has testified in his account of the way in which he came to begin preparation for writing the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.² At first he early developed literary ambitions: "How often did I sigh for my proper station in life and letters!" Then he went about the search for a *subject* suitable to his talents. He seems to have done this with no greater reference to a possible philanthropic bearing of his ambition than a man about town might have in selecting a costume for a charity ball. In either case, however, a certain human element is involved. As Gibbon describes himself, he was a youth looking for a *historical subject*; not, so far as he expressed himself, looking for an opportunity to benefit the world by any light he might throw upon the course of events in some crucial time and place. Yet it is hardly credible that no remote reference to this ulterior consequence influenced his ambition. Even if he never analyzed the situation in this way, he knew at least vaguely that the prestige of history and of the writer of history is due to a certain traditional estimate that the writing of history is useful to the readers of history, and that the writing of history rates as something to be socially commended. It is incredible that his ambition could have developed

² Smith, *Milman's Gibbon*, I, pp. 72 f.

without some such social stimulus, no matter what other motives may have co-operated.

Taking Gibbon as a specimen of one extreme type, we may select the most fervid advocate of altruism who has ever cultivated any division of social science as symbolic of the other extreme type. On the one hand, men pursue social science mostly as a polite art, the intellectual interest being most in evidence, and a rather egoistic impulse being the chief incentive. On the other hand, men pursue social science from consuming zeal for humanity. They want to make other people better and happier. They regard any and every phase of social science as merely incidental to stronger and surer grip upon the means of shaping human destinies to human advantage.

If we could sift the recorded thinking in the social sciences during the modern period, say since the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*; and if, on the basis of the evidence so collected, we should divide the writers into two groups, first, those who show signs of pursuing social science because of some kind and degree of interest in the welfare of human beings; secondly, those who show no such signs; the former would not only many times outnumber the latter, but a candid critic would have to admit a strong probability that many of the writers whom lack of evidence had consigned to the latter group had simply abstracted their writings more completely than other authors had from visible connection with the whole body of their interests; and that, if the truth were known, the majority even in this second group might prove to have been liberally affected by concern for general human welfare.

Isolation of the intellectual problem in hand from all antecedents and collaterals and consequents has been the first rule of method during the period of scientific specialization. The severity of the application of this rule has been the first standard of scientific criticism. To betray an emotional attitude with reference to human facts has been as compromising as an exchange of mysticism for literalness would be in astronomy or physiology. To let opinion as to what is desirable affect judgment as to what is actual in such phenomena as the birth-rate, death-rate, marriage-rate, divorce-rate, wage-rate, crime-rate, cost of living, social unrest, tendencies

in property stratification, etc., would be as fatal to scientific prestige as to allow our color preferences to warp our conclusions from the data of optics, or our fancy in crystals to interfere with chemical analysis of their composition.

The facts may be generalized from a slightly different point of view in this way: Every division of social science is among other things a reflection of curiosity on the part of some human beings about the life of all human beings. Particular intellectual interests from time to time bring about differentiation of fields of inquiry out of the whole range of human phenomena. As this sort of specialization occurs, there also occurs, both as cause and effect, corresponding specialization in the peculiar interests of investigators. No one would be a historian, let us say, unless he were in some way concerned about the destinies of mankind. Suppose a historian gravitates, however, into pursuit of the history of sculpture, or painting, or literature, or a type of religious thinking. This change of focus and of emphasis by no means necessarily involves secession from general interest in the destinies of mankind. It simply means a difference of balance between interest in human destiny in general and interest in that incident in human destiny to which attention has been transferred. So if one begins with some type of interest in political phenomena, say the philosophy of law; this center of attention may have seemed to a given philosopher the focus around which all interpretation of human destinies must gather. Presently he may have found himself entangled in some relatively technical problem of political relations—without having a particular case in mind, let us instance hypothetically the different implications of sovereignty. Thereupon he becomes so devoted to this aspect of political phenomena that the traces of his former interest in human destinies become indistinct. To ordinary observation he seems to have withdrawn from interest in human affairs and to have accepted a retainer for an abstraction. In reality he may be moved by an ardent impulse to promote human well-being by putting in his work upon a subject which seems to him more vital than it seems to most men.

To speak more concretely, the major social sciences of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, history, politics, and

economics, were clearly ethical sciences in essentially the same sense in which the sociologists have later claimed that distinction for their division of labor. That is, the subjective dimension of these sciences reached back to appreciations of the value of human welfare, various in quantity and kind as the implicit valuations may have been. In their own minds the men who pursued each of these sciences were agents of mankind for particular intellectual functions; each of these functions being regarded however as in the service of human betterment. In the course of time, as the quests which they had undertaken became more and more exacting, as the processes which they had to perform in the course of their work became more and more technical, there was an inevitable change of the ratio between the broadly human and the narrowly special aspects of their programs. The tendency was for the more efficient specialists to shrink, so to speak, from world-citizens into departmental functionaries; and for the divisions of science which they represented to undergo a similar modification. The sense of immediacy between these departments of knowledge and the interests of human beings as such was weakened; while a feeling that the work had in itself an absolute value became more dominating.

Another variation of the same facts may throw light on the situation. As persons, all the people who have worked in the social sciences have been interested in the common destinies of mankind, and especially in the problems of human beings. As specialists, these same persons have reacted variously toward those general interests. These reactions may be divided into three principal groups, first, desire to reduce human phenomena in general to terms of those aspects of human phenomena upon which the given persons have specialized; secondly, desire to find the co-ordinating principle of all human phenomena within those aspects of phenomena upon which the given persons have specialized; thirdly, effort to discover some type of super-specialization above the current social sciences by means of which an objective rendering of all human events and values might be achieved. As a matter of fact, neither of these reactions is confined to a single division of social science. They are rather the reactions of different intellectual types within each division of social science. As a rough

generalization, these reactions will be prominent in the order scheduled in the degree in which specialists are repositories of a conventionally accepted and arranged body of conclusions. The classical economists are the most familiar case. When they supposed that they had reported and accounted for economic phenomena in general, they were dogmatic in their interpretation of all phenomena as economic, or as foreordained by economic antecedents. The Marxians present the same type with changed details. The philosophers of history are in principle essentially of the same sort, with variations of incidentals in their exhibit of the ground pattern. Reactions of the second type are frequent among specialists within the several social sciences, or men who have begun to depart from those conclusions. The leading cases are those German economic groups known in turn as the historical, the Austrian, and the ethical schools (e.g., Knies, Menger, Schmoller). The sociologists have been the most evident cases of the third type of reaction. As a rule they entered their present division of labor through the door of one of the older social sciences. Presently they found themselves cast for the rôle of Ishmael in the world of social science. They were wanderers from the ancestral tent, with no prescriptive rights. They were not decisively bound to one aspect of human phenomena more than to another. They were free to feel that human life is bigger than either of the aspects of human life which had furnished the older divisions of social science their means of subsistence; and while they were taking possession of a peculiar division of inquiry they instinctively insisted on views of life not dominated by either of the fractional views of life which had made themselves conventional.

Long ago, however, the tendency to repeat the reactions of the older social sciences has shown itself among the sociologists. It is not difficult to imagine our technique so developed that in our manipulation of it we shall have no more convincing *prima-facie* claim to the credit of being distinctively interested in human welfare than the specialists who devote their lives to collating documents, or analyzing the phenomena of demand and supply, or expounding comparative constitutional law. As sociology settles down to consistently characteristic researches, as it vindicates a

method of inquiry, and establishes itself as statecraft did by the side of history, and later economic theory did by the side of history and statecraft, the exception may begin to become the rule that, like his predecessors, the sociologist may be typically a bureaucratic routinist, not in his vocational consciousness and in his most obvious behavior a surveyor of the world *for* the world.

The moral of all this is that sociology is already far enough advanced so that it is in order for the sociologists to revise their early estimates of themselves. The sober truth is that we could originally pass with ourselves and sometimes with others as more humanitarian than the historians, the political scientists, and the economists; not because we actually were so, or at least not because in pursuit of any strictly controlled scientific procedure we were so, but because we were looking for a definite job and were meanwhile less standardized than they were. That is, we were capitalizing our share of rather general interest in humanity for the credit of our prospective specialization. Now that we are beginning to find ourselves with precise research tasks, the difference between us and other social scientists is to be expressed most exactly, not in terms of contrast in our favor between our supposed humanitarianism and theirs, but rather in terms of the comparative nearness or remoteness of the relations between the aspects of life which we are respectively studying and probable availability for the control of conduct. That is, a given pure mathematician may be more concerned about personally contributing to the welfare of mankind than a given social philosopher. On the contrary, it is to be presumed that social philosophy would afford more insight into ways and means of promoting the welfare of mankind than pure mathematics. A visiting nurse who worked for the pay only would be less of a philanthropist than the philosopher of history who aimed first and foremost to steady the world's brains by his labors. The comparative moral quality of the mercenary nurse and the unselfish philosopher must not be mistaken for the comparative functional rank of nursing and philosophizing.

In the days when sociologists were struggling for academic recognition, they were powerfully sustained by their own appraisal of themselves as more purely devoted than others to the essentially

human interests. Whether they retain the academic recognition they have won will depend on whether they turn out to be at least as scientific as the most responsible of their colleagues.

The lines of cleavage between humanitarians do not in reality correspond with the lines of division between academic departments. Among the most loyal workers for human well-being that I have known, and not confining myself to my immediate colleagues, I think at once of a list made up of philosophers, psychologists, geologists, economists, political scientists, professors of law, historians, mathematicians, biologists, etc. The humanitarianism is in the person, not in his academic division of labor. I have known sociologists who, as far as I could fathom them, were neither more nor less devoted to general human well-being than equally conscientious shoemakers. They were craftsmen and nothing more. They were classifying and analyzing human phenomena. They did it with no different quality of devotion to human destiny in general than might be exhibited by any honest carpenter, or mason, or blacksmith. Whether sociology affords a more advantageous base than history, or political science, or economics for humanitarian operations is another matter; and opinions about it are not likely soon to become unanimous. In any event, the character of the base does not settle the quality of the operations.

The primary fact is that the sociologists have found a function which reinforces scientific investigation of human experience. They are rapidly adjusting themselves to that function, viz., the discovery and psychological interpretation of group phenomena. It is possible for them to increase knowledge by discharging this function as non-socially as one might verify specimens in a museum of conchology. The secondary, and to be sure morally more significant, fact is that choice of group phenomena for investigation may be made so that the results of analysis will reveal points of maximum demand for contemporary social co-operation.

In other words, there may be study of sociology, as of mathematics, or physics, or metaphysics, or history, or politics, which is in form unimpeachably scientific, but in substance hopelessly sterile. The sociologists have found work for themselves which is not likely to be finished so long as the world furnishes spur and

scope for the variation of human interests. The spirit in which they perform this work will or will not entitle them to membership in the order of Ben Adhem.

Fortunately even for its reflex influence upon pure science, and still more happily for non-academic interests, it is the rule rather than the exception that men in each of the social sciences have been led to their vocation in part by urgings to do something for the general good, and that they tend to use their vocation more or less directly as a means of promoting the general welfare in ways not required by the letter of their academic obligations. The scientist in each of these cases is not the full measure of the man. Whether or not the sociologists will exhibit this tendency in the future to the same extent as in the past, either absolutely or comparatively, cannot be foreseen. My present emphasis is by way of warning against the illusion that there is anything in the sociologists' division of science which necessarily differentiates them as a more social species than others of the academic genus.

A generation ago we heard oftener than we do today that the criterion of science is its power to predict. In my college days I rather sulkily accepted this standard as the highest conceivable criterion of intellectual achievement. My feelings refused to acquiesce. It had not occurred to me that we are content to predict only when we do not dare to think of control. If we are dealing with astronomical phenomena, due humility may well rest with foretelling the movements of the heavenly bodies, without so much as entertaining the fancy of possible human modifications of their movements. On the contrary, we do not today stop content with analytical chemistry. We proceed to synthetic chemistry. We are not satisfied with predicting what chemical elements would do under hypothetical circumstances. We decide which of these things it is desirable for them to do, and we qualify ourselves to make them do it.

From the dawn of thought about human fortunes, or at least from the earliest recorded traces of that thought, we may detect signs of an inarticulate impulse not to accept life wholly as a fate, but to convert it into an art. There have been times in which that

which called itself science rebuked this impulse, and commanded men to acknowledge that the limits of their powers are reached in knowing things as they are. Today men are bolder than ever before in professing the belief that we cannot know things as they are unless we know large reaches of them as subject to human control. Social science is study of the correlation between the foreordained and the controllable in human affairs, together with the signs by which men may learn to what end it is rational to exercise their powers of control, and the means by which they may exert those powers. Whatever other functions are essential to progress in social science, no one who commands a wide outlook over human experience can doubt that there will be increasing rather than diminishing use for that type of study of the common problem which fixes attention primarily upon the forms and processes of human groups: the facts, the connections between the facts, and the implications of the facts for the problems of control.